Judgment
Applications for a judge alone trial and for Crown to call tendency evidence
HIS HONOUR: Michael Amante has been arraigned in this court today on two counts. Count 1 alleges against him that he on 4 January 2015 at Mascot supplied a prohibited drug, namely, 81.3 grams of methylamphetamine. Count 2 alleges that the same date at the same place he supplied a prohibited drug, namely, 380 grams of cannabis. He has pleaded not guilty to those charges.
The first matter I was requested to do today when the matter was assigned to me, although I was not put on notice that this was to happen, was to determine whether the Crown should be permitted to lead evidence of an alleged tendency on the part of the accused to commit one of the two offences with which he is charged arising out of events at another time. I will summarise from the Crown case statement the character of the Crown case and what I understand to be the particular material relied upon by the Crown as evidence of the claimed tendency in the Tendency Notice that was served upon the accused at some date after 10 October 2016.
At 6 am on Sunday 4 January, police attached to a Highway Patrol Unit stopped a BMW sedan that was driven by a person called Chantelle Karanikolas and in which the accused Michael Amante was a passenger. Various checks were undertaken and the driver was submitted to a breath test which achieved a negative result. The reason the car was stopped, although this would be totally irrelevant at any trial in relation to the drug supply matters, was that it was believed the vehicle in which the accused and the driver were travelling had been reported as stolen around about midnight on 24 December 2014. A search of the motor vehicle was conducted and inside the motor vehicle was found firstly an ASIC brand shoe bag in the rear passenger's side footwell, beside it was a white plastic shopping bag which in turn contained a vacuum sealed bag of green vegetable matter later analysed to be 380 grams of cannabis. That is, the cannabis particularised as relevant to count 2. Also found was a brown toiletries bag containing a glass pipe and a syringe and in a 'slide out' area, as it is described, of a rear armrest was found a set of digital scales and a small black purse. Inside the purse were a number of empty small plastic bags and four plastic bags containing a crystal substance later analysed to be 81.3 grams of methylamphetamine, the subject of count 1 in the indictment.
R v AMANTE [2016] NSWDC 432 | Case summary | Zoe
The accused and the driver were conveyed to Mascot Police Station and interviewed by the police. I have read the transcript of the electronic interview conducted with the accused and essentially in relation to the accused's relationship of the vehicle he told police that he borrowed the vehicle from another person that had various names. Karanikolas denied knowledge of the items in the car and denied knowledge of the car being stolen. As I understand it, although my understanding is not complete, the car was being driven by Karanikolas at the request of the accused, the car having earlier been provided to the accused but he being disqualified from driving was unable to drive it. He had another driver at an earlier time before the events given rise to his arrest in relation to the current matter.
Pertinent to the Tendency Notice which I will come to in a moment there was a police operation in relation to premises at Bourke Street Surry Hills where the accused lived. On 27 May 2015, police stopped a female person leaving the location. She was searched on suspicion of being in possession of prohibited drugs and police found 0.4 grams of methylamphetamine. The female was arrested and cautioned. She gave an interview to police stating that she had purchased the drug for $150 from a person she knew as "Michael" at the address described as 17/670 Bourke Street whether that is a typographical error in one or other of those two addresses I do not know.
On 11 June 2015, in circumstances I hasten to say where the accused at that point had not been charged in relation to the prohibited drugs found inside the car, a tape lift was undertaken of the zippers of the two bags in which were contained the respective drugs to which I have referred. The tape lift on the zippers revealed a DNA profile match to the DNA profile of the accused, he having either submitted to a forensic procedure on his arrest on 4 January or at some other time. The accused was arrested by police on 25 June 2015 in relation to the current matters.
The Tendency Notice that was served on the accused's legal representatives dated 10 October 2016 identifies the person whose tendency is the subject of the evidence sought to be adduced as the accused and the relevant tendency sought to be proved "is his tendency to act in a particular way, namely to engage in the supply of prohibited drugs." The basis for the claimed tendency relates to material contained within an interview conducted by the police with Ms Boyd and a statement of Senior Constable Nick Pike dated 10 September 2015. So far as the tendency sought to be adduced bears upon the facts in issue in the prosecution, the following facts in issue are identified as being "the relevant facts in issue" to which the tendency is said to be relevant and admissible as tendency evidence. Firstly, whether the accused on 4 January 2015 had 380 grams of cannabis in his exclusive possession. Secondly, whether the accused on 7 January 2015 had 81.3 grams of methamphetamine(sic) in his exclusive possession, thirdly, whether the accused on 7 January 2015 had 380 grams of cannabis in his possession for the purposes of supply and fourthly, whether the accused on 4 January 2015 had 81.3 grams of methamphetamine(sic) in his possession for the purposes of supply.
As the matter has been discussed before me, if I might just pause at this point, it is quite clear in its terms that the evidence of the arrest of Ms Boyd could have no relevant probative value to proof of guilt of the accused in relation to the allegation of supply cannabis. It would seem and it was conceded by the Crown that the matter in respect of which the tendency evidence is said to have "significant probative value" concerns the issue of the accused alleged supply of the methylamphetamine or "methamphetamine" as it is described in the Notice. The case against the accused in relation to the supply of the methylamphetamine, that is count 1 in the indictment, is that the accused had the relevant prohibited drug in his possession "for the purposes of supply."
There is in the Crown case, from what I understand from the bar table and my reading of the Crown case summary, a number of issues seen to be relevant to the proof of guilt of the accused beyond the issue of tendency.
Firstly, the accused's presence in the car in which the relevant drugs were found, particularly the methylamphetamine, at this point of the discussion. The location of the items in the rear passenger side foot well behind the seat where the accused was sitting. The accused's DNA profile being found on the zipper of the purse that contained the methylamphetamine, and other circumstances, I take it, relied upon in relation to possession for the purposes of supply, which include the packaging of the prohibited drug methylamphetamine and the presence of empty plastic containers for distribution, the presence of electronic scales in the vehicle, amongst other matters.
In relation to the issue of the probative value of the "tendency" evidence as it relates to the legal tests to be applied the Crown has pointed to the matters that I have already briefly summarised, particularly the presence of the DNA profile of the accused in a location approximate to the container in which were found respective prohibited drugs dealing with the methylamphetamine on the zipper of the "purse" in which the drugs were found, where the Crown has pointed to the need of the Crown to establish that the accused, if found to be in possession of the prohibited drugs, did so for the purposes of supply. Of, course, I point out that the legislation makes clear that for the purposes of a criminal trial a person in possession of more than five grams of this particular prohibited drug, methylamphetamine, is by reason of the deeming provisions and the relevant trafficable quantity for methylamphetamine (three grams), deemed to be in possession of the prohibited drug for the purposes of supply and thus amenable to prosecution on indictment. Unless, of course, he can discharge the onus upon him to establish the "defence" that if he had the prohibited drugs in his possession he had them for purposes other than supply. One would have thought one would have a great deal of difficulty persuading a jury on balance that one had over 80 grams of methylamphetamine in one's possession solely for one's personal use, which is the usual issue that arises in relation to consideration of the defence.
The accused's counsel has provided detailed written submissions and the essence of her written submissions is that the alleged tendency is general in its character. The proof of the possession of drugs supplied by a person "Michael", even if it be established to be the accused (I will come to why that would be accepted as such in a moment) is not of significant probative value. In any event, if the matter did have significant probative value, the unfair prejudice to the accused would outweigh such probative value as it had, warranting exercise of the power under s 101 Evidence Act 1995 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) to exclude the evidence.
As it has developed in the brief discussion that all the parties have had with me about the matter there is another issue in relation to the issue of unfair prejudice or prejudicial effect and that is the fact that as the tendency evidence is only relevant to one count in the indictment, the risk of unfair prejudice in consideration of the two counts together in the trial where the claimed tendency and the proven of conduct of the accused giving rise to the tendency can only have relevance to one count.
The matter I said I would come to is the fact that I am informed by the learned counsel for the accused, and I am grateful for the concession, that the issue of the supply to Ms Boyd occurring on 27 May 2015 is not a matter that is to be in contention as such. There is a s 166 certificate which has upon it a number of allegations against the accused and I am informed that if the accused is to be sentenced in this Court he would be pleading guilty to the relevant offence relating to Ms Boyd in respect to the supply to her of methylamphetamine on 27 May 2015.
I pause for a moment to point out, of course, with the recent decision of the High Court in IMM and, of course, the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Shamouil [2006] NSWCCA 112 and XY [2013] NSWCCA 121, it is not for this Court in determining the admissibility evidence to assess the reliability of the evidence in determining whether the evidence relevantly has the probative value required to be established in order for evidence of tendency to be admitted. That is not an issue in any consideration of the evidence and the legal issues that relate to them.
Section 97 of the Evidence Act provides
"Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person or a tendency that a person has or had is not admissible..."
I emphasise the words "not admissible"
"...to prove that a person has or had a tendency, whether because of the person's character otherwise to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind unless"...
putting aside issue of reasonable notice, which has not been argued before me
"...the Court thinks the evidence will either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the parties seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value".
In relation to the issue of "notice" I appreciate the learned Crown Prosecutor today has no control over this. He has only come into the case lately. But to my mind, and this is of no weight whatsoever in my decision, it is just unacceptable that a matter that was listed for trial, as I understand it, in March this year, in a pretty simply straightforward case requires the service of a Tendency Notice on 10 October, some 14 days before the listed to start trial, bearing in mind the issues that go to the question of tendency were well known to the prosecution well before the committal for trial. It is quite clear, one would have thought, bearing in mind what the Crown has told me about the enquiries made by the police in May and subsequently in June last year, that issues that now are said to relate to claimed "tendency" were fully apprised by the police, at least, before the accused was charged, or certainly before he was committed for trial.
Anyway, be that is it may, with regard to s 97 there are a number of matters to be noted, some of which were raised by the learned Crown Prosecutor.
First of all the Dictionary definition of 'probative value'. The Evidence Act provides;
"Probative value of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue".
In relation to that definition and what it means, it has been long held, going back to early decisions of Hunt J in relation to the Evidence Act, after its enactment on 1 September 1995, that the significance of probative value of the tendency evidence must depend upon the nature of the fact in issue to which it is relevant and the significance or importance which the evidence may have in establishing that fact.
In AW v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 1, Latham J noted at [47]
"The evidence must have "significant probative value" that is it must be evidence that is meaningful in the context of the issues of trial. The provision is concerned with the qualitative aspects of the evidence not quantitative ones. It must be more than merely relevant, but may be less than substantially so. The question for the trial judge is whether the evidence was important in establishing the facts in issue".
I note what has been said about the proper approach to the application of s 97 in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308, particularly in the judgment of Simpson J, and also the observations of Basten J in R v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504.
In R v Ford [2009] NSWCCA 306 Campbell JA at [52] stated
"For a judge to decide that evidence has significant probative value is a decision about the reasoning processes that are open to the jury".
In DSJ v DPP (2012) 215 A Crim R 349 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal understood Simpson J's reference in Fletcher to assessing
"The likelihood that the jury would assign the evidence significant probative value", to be "in truth focussed on the evaluation to be performed by the trial judge, although her language on one view might be thought to suggest otherwise". That view expressed in DSJ would seem to be at odds with what has been held subsequently by the High Court most recently in IMM.
In relation to the assessment of the probative value of a tendency "inference" there are a number of matters that may be taken into account. The learned author Odgers SC in his leading text "Odgers Uniform Evidence Law", points out some of those factors will include the number of occasions that a particular conduct is relied upon. Here there is one such occasion. The time gap between the relevant acts. The act giving rise to the inference of tendency and the act, the subject of the trial here, are over five months apart. The degree of specificity or generality of the conduct or alleged tendency. Here the tendency is generally expressed. In fact it is expressed in terms of the very act that the Crown would seek to establish is the crime committed by the accused. The degree of similarity between the conduct on the various occasions, including the conduct sought to be proved here, the only common element is the presence of methylamphetamine. One case involves the possession of a very substantial quantity deemed to be in the possession of the accused for the purposes of supply, the other conduct, the tendency evidence relied upon by the Crown, is concerned with a very, very small quantity. The result, as I would understand it, of supply or sale of the drug to the accused to the person Boyd.
As to the degree of similarity of the circumstances in which the conduct took place, as was pointed out by learned counsel for the accused, there is no common or even generally alike "modus operandi". I accept, of course, in passing, dealing with some submissions that were made, modus operandi does not solely determine the issue of admissibility of tendency evidence. It is one of a number of matters that may or may not be taken into account to be seen in the proper context. Whether the tendency evidence is disputed. In this case the evidence giving rise to the claim of tendency is not disputed. The issue to which the evidence is relevant. Here, the Crown says, the tendency is relevant to establishing possession for the purposes of supply. But the facts of the matter are that the quantity of the drug in itself is prima facie evidence of possession for the purposes of supply, in which case by reference to the quantity, the pursuit of a statutory defence would be, one would have thought, a forlorn exercise.
There are other matters referred to by the learned author. I have made some comment upon the various matters that are referred to by the learned author. Each of those matters appropriately footnoted with a large number of cases identifying those decisions which have pointed to one or other, or some, or most, or a few of the particular features that might be thought to be relevant to considering whether the evidence has significant probative value.
Such is the generality of the tendency claimed by the Crown, even allowing for the fact that the acts or conduct of the accused giving rise to the alleged tendency is not disputed, I am of the view that the evidence does not have significant probative value and thus should not be admitted. Bearing in mind, of course, that s 97 is expressed in exclusionary terms. Evidence relating to the character, reputation or conduct of a person is not admissible to prove the person has a tendency et cetera, unless, of course, the evidence has significant probative value.
But if I was wrong in that assessment of the matter, having regard to the matters I have briefly summarised, s 101 provides that tendency evidence about an accused that is adduced by the prosecution cannot be used against the accused unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused.
I pause for a moment to point out that I accept as a general proposition, and have accepted in circumstances where I have on a number occasions admitted tendency evidence, that juries will act upon the directions and instructions given to them by the trial judge. So I accept the general proposition that prima facie the fact that evidence is available for a tendency purpose, generally speaking, would not of itself create the situation where the test in s 101 for exclusion had been met. Ordinarily if one found that evidence had significant probative value it would require something particular about the case, not just the fact that tendency evidence is available to be used in aid of the Crown case, in order to invoke the exclusion under s 101.
Here the difficulty is that it is not a simple case of the evidence of tendency being able to be applied by the jury to proof of guilt in relation to a count under consideration by the jury without regard to any other consideration. Here, as I have pointed out, there is another count that is connected to, but not necessarily intimately included within, the circumstances giving rise to the bringing of count 1 in the indictment to which the tendency evidence would be relevant. There is a count in relation to the possession for the purposes of supply of cannabis, the cannabis being found in a container or object other than the object that contained the methylamphetamine. I bear in mind, of course, the two items are relatively close together in the motor vehicle. I bear in mind, as I have pointed out, that there is DNA evidence that would link the profile of the accused with the DNA profile that has been identified from a tape lift upon, as I understand it, the zipper of the particular pouch or container in which the cannabis was found.
The Crown submitted, as he must I suppose if he wants to press the tendency evidence, that "your Honour can deal with that" with appropriate direction to assist the fair determination of the case. I am a great believer, from many years of trial experience, in the capacity of the judge to properly direct a jury and to have juries put out of their mind any relevant material or prejudicial material that otherwise is admissible for another purpose. But in this particular I do not believe the vice of "unfair prejudice" can be corrected or removed from the jury's consideration by appropriate direction. It is to be borne in mind, of course, that s 101(2) requires that tendency evidence cannot be used against an accused "unless the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused. The prejudicial effect it may have on the accused is in the fair consideration of what I understand to be somewhat different, but also somewhat related considerations concerning the alleged supply of cannabis.
Thus, in the circumstances, bearing in mind my view earlier about whether the evidence has significant probative value, even ascribing a passing through the gateway provided by s 97, the Crown cannot, in my view, get over hurdle that is provided in s 101(2). Therefore, I will not admit into evidence the evidence of the claimed tendency particularised in the Crown's tendency notice.
This brings me to the second issue that was litigated before me today. It was the issue of an application by a Notice of Motion for a trial by judge alone. The defence had filed a motion on 20 October, the motion could not be dealt with of course before today, and there is no particular issue I wish to raise about that. Although it seems to me again that it is a matter that could have been raised earlier than the date of the motion. In fairness to the accused, of course, the accused was not on notice of the intention of the Crown to rely upon tendency evidence until 10 October 2016 at the earliest. In relation to that aspect of the matter which requires a grant of leave because the application for such a trial has been made within the period prescribed in the legislation, the two bases upon which the application proceeds are that, firstly, the reliance upon the Crown of tendency evidence may be a matter that would be best dealt with by a trial judge rather than a jury acting on instruction from the judge, the second matter relied upon by the defence concerns evidence relating to the provenance of the vehicle to which I earlier referred, the BMW, and matters relating to its reported theft on Christmas Eve the year before.
Dealing with the first aspect of the matter, prima facie the reliance upon tendency evidence by the Crown, if permitted to do so, is not necessarily a basis for directing that there be trial by judge - as it is described in the legislation - or trial by judge alone. We get back to the point I made earlier. Judges assume, the High Court of Australia on a number of occasions has expressly said so, that juries will act upon the directions that trial judges given them. Many, many trials are conducted in this jurisdiction where tendency evidence is relied upon the Crown, permitted to be so by the Court, a proper instruction is given, and accused persons are acquitted or not as the case may be on the merits of the particular case.
As to the second issue, it is quite clear to me - and I have not heard any opposition to this from the Crown - that the question of whether the motor vehicle was stolen or not is completely irrelevant to the question of whether the accused is guilty or not guilty of the charges with which I am concerned. There is an issue about how the accused came to be the occupant of the car, and I accept that there is an aspect of the Crown case relevant to the issues in the trial that effectively the accused was the person who had control of the car, and the person that was driving the car was driving the car at the request of the accused, but in circumstances where the car had been given to the accused, as I would understand the account given by the accused in the interview.
As to whether the car had been stolen or not however, that is neither here nor there. It is of no relevance at all, and need not be introduced to deal with the accused's possession of the car. Thus, the fact that the car was "reported stolen" is an irrelevant issue, and there should be no reference to the fact that it was a stolen car. The jury does not need to know that there was a basis for the police to stop the car. In any event there is evidence that they gave the driver a random breath test. As I understand the law in New South Wales police can stop me, or the Crown Prosecutor, or Ms Bagot, any day of the week and submit either one of us to a random breath test without having reasonable belief in order to do that. The administering of a random breath test could be led in evidence. The other matters concerning the suspicions that were had by the police about the car, as I say, are entirely irrelevant. The electronic interview could be edited accordingly, leaving just those questions that were asked of the accused about the items that were found in the rear of the car giving rise to the two charges in the indictment, as well as such questions and answers that deal with the circumstances in which the accused happened to be in the car insofar as they may shed light upon the fact, as I understand it, that the accused was in fact - temporary though it may be - the custodian of the car. With the person behind the driving wheel driving the accused, at his request, or by arrangement of some other person.
Thus, the two major matters relied upon by the defence for there to be granted leave as required under the Criminal Procedure Act fall away. In those circumstances, if there be a remaining application for a grant of leave in the circumstance where the Crown opposes the grant of leave, I believe I have no other option, bearing in mind the remaining matters for litigation can be properly directed to a jury without prejudice to the accused that the matter should proceed, as prima facie one would have thought all trials should proceed unless there is reason for a trial by judge. Alternatively, if the parties agree that it should be a trial by judge, it should proceed as a trial by judge and jury. Thus I am not prepared to grant the application for a trial by judge or judge alone in this particular instance.
There is one aspect of the tendency issue I must refer to for completeness. The Crown referred me in his oral submissions to one judgment, that is the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of Elomar & Ors v R [2014] NSWCCA 30. This judgment runs to 189 pages and the Crown did not have a copy of it. I can understand the frugality of the Crown in not producing a copy and if I had known how long the judgment I would not have had an entire copy of it printed out.
This was a judgment relating to the trial that was conducted in front of Whealy J at Parramatta that, with legal argument and proceedings before the jury, ran in excess of 18 months. To consider the range of topics that were considered by the Court one needs only go to the index which identifies over some seven pages the various matters that were litigated before the Court, including as well an overview of the Crown case and a procedural chronology. It was a most complex and difficult case.
The summary of the Crown case runs from [60] through to [127]. The Crown referred to me to [253]. Paragraph 253 is concerned with grounds 1 and 2 in the appeal of Mr Hasan and ground 1 of Elomar concerning the use of evidence concerning "the Melbourne evidence" as evidence of relevant tendency. At [253] which was cited by the Crown, the Court simply stated what is well understood as being the law and which is encapsulated in slightly different terms in the remarks I have earlier made,
"Tendency evidence is evidence tendered to establish that a person has or had a tendency to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind. It is evidence that is tendered in order to provide the foundation for an inference that, because the person has or had that tendency, it is more likely that he or she behaved in a particular way, or had a particular state of mind at a time or in circumstances relevant to the issues in dispute (citing Gardiner v R [2006] NSWCCA 190 in which are observations, or a judgment, of Simpson J who in fact sat in the appeal of Elomar)".
In relation to the matters that I considered one of the matters I have taken into account in concluding that the relevant tendency did not have significant probative value is, contrary to the circumstances of the cases of Mr Hasan and Mr Elomar, the evidence said to have "tendency" relevance was evidence of conduct of the accused after the events the subject of the indictment; whereas in the matter of Elomar of course, without going into detail, the "Melbourne incident" was an incident that preceded the events giving rise to the charges brought in the trial conducted by his Honour at Parramatta.
The issues relating to tendency evidence were again discussed later in the judgment in respect of grounds for appeal lodged by the appellant Cheikho. The particular of the relevant ground of appeal in relation to the admissibility of tendency to prove not acts of the accused but the state of mind are set out at [358] - [360]. The Crown particularly cited [360] or part of the paragraph. The part that he cited in his helpful submissions, again stating what I think is self-evident from the scheme of the legislation,
"Tendency evidence is a means of proving by a process of deduction that a person acted in a particular way or had a particular state of mind on a relevant occasion when there is no or adequate direct evidence of that conduct or that state of mind on that occasion".
Here, I hasten to say, the issue of the relevant tendency claimed by the Crown, as was it was particularised in the Crown's tendency notice, was "a tendency to act in a particular way, namely to engage in the supply of prohibited drugs". What is significant in the context of "process of reasoning" that is identified in detail at [360] of Elomar & Ors v R is the fact that the Crown case, in proof of guilt in respect of the matter on the indictment, is one of possession for the purposes of supply. In that regard, as I pointed out in the course of my judgment, the Crown case is one that relies upon the deeming provisions to establish possession for the purposes of supply which if not met by the defence once the trafficable is established beyond reasonable doubt and of necessity must be established providing that possession is established. The critical issue in the of course is the issue of the accused's "possession" of the drugs and in that regard the fact that the accused, five months after the event, actually sold the same type of drug to another person, albeit in a very, very small quantity, to my view of the matter could not have significant probative value in the context of the claim of possession for the purposes of supply.
I make those additional comments to just emphasise the fact that I had regard to the decision of Elomar and the particular passages to which I referred. It can be seen by having an understanding of the Crown case in that matter that the particular matters claimed to establish a relevant tendency either to act in a particular way in one instance, or to have a particular state of mind in another instance, had far greater salience or significance, having regard to the facts in issue and having regard to the particular conduct or state of mind that had previously existed, such as to give rise to the inference of relevant tendency to act in a particular way as was claimed by the Crown in that particular case.
HIS HONOUR: I'll stand the matter over before the Court at 3.1 tomorrow at 9.30. I will report to the list judge and/or the registry what I've done today. The matter may come back to me but it would seem as if at the very least at this stage that a possibility, probably a real possibility, that the case can't finish this week in which case it may go to another judge. It may turn out there are going to be three or four judges around tomorrow, if they're not doing anything today, who will be able to take the case I'd imagine subject to other trials not proceeding or otherwise not being able to be heard this week.
Mr Amante, your matter is adjourned till tomorrow. I'll direct a s 77 order for you to be back here tomorrow morning by 9.30 so that your trial can commence if it can commence some time tomorrow. You're excused. You are remanded in custody and bail refused and I direct that a s 77 order issue for you to be here at 10am tomorrow.
ADJOURNED TO TUESDAY 25 OCTOBER 2016 AT 9.30AM
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Decision last updated: 14 June 2017