D THE CONSOLIDATION AGREEMENT
14 Additionally, the proposed consolidation agreement has not been finalised.
15 It is unclear to me why this is so. Although I am told that arrangements for consolidation have been agreed in principle, those arrangements are not reflected in a finalised document: Wertheim Affidavit (at [23]-[26]). Indeed, counsel indicated that the proposed consolidation agreement remains a "dynamic document", which was provided to the Court: T14.35-45.
16 Two comments should be made about the proposed consolidation agreement in its current form. The following appears in the recitals:
D On 21 December 2022:
a) the parties reached agreement in principle to consolidate the R&B Proceeding and the Furniss Proceeding on the basis inter alia that they would seek:
i. an order (Litigation Fee Order) requiring each group member who receives a payment in the resolution of the consolidated proceeding (whether by way of settlement or an award of damages) to pay to Shine and Banton a proportion of that sum, in an amount to be determined by the Court; or
ii. if the matter is transferred to the Supreme Court of Victoria, a 'Group Costs Order' pursuant to s 33ZDA of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) (Group Costs Order); …
17 First, as can be seen, the proposed consolidation agreement foreshadows the applicants seeking, at the conclusion of the proceeding, a solicitors' common fund order.
18 It has been suggested recently that there is no power to make any type of common fund order under Pt IVA of the FCA Act: see Davaria Pty Limited v 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd (No 13) [2023] FCA 84 (at [190] per O'Callaghan J). Although it is unnecessary to decide such a point for the purposes of these reasons, I doubt that this is the case. I also doubt that the making of such an order is necessarily restricted to funders. Even leaving aside the question of statutory power in the context of "Settlement CFOs", as I indicated in Klemweb, this Court, as a Court of equity, will apply fundamental equitable principles in the execution of its jurisdiction, including the maxim that equity is equality. One of the outer workings of this maxim is seen in relation to the proper order for costs in representative proceedings brought in Chancery in respect of the reimbursement for the costs of litigation. I went on to observe (at 612-3 [139]-[141]):
[139] Focussing on the context of Pt IVA proceedings, it is not apparent to me why a properly formulated common fund order that relates, in its operation to a common fund and involves a contingency payment to a solicitor could not, in some cases, be appropriate to ensure justice in some Pt IVA proceedings. …
[140] In circumstances where there is real doubt about the ability to intervene with contractual promises given to funders absent any complaint by the contractual counterparty … the practical benefit of common fund orders has been to maintain control over disproportionate deductions from modest settlements, prevent windfalls, and ensure the Court's protective and supervisory role in relation to group members is given effect. …
[141] Subject to being properly framed… I do not consider it unlikely that a common fund order incorporating a contingency payment could be made. When one has regard to the equitable roots and restitutionary basis of common fund orders, it is not apparent why a common fund order incorporating a contingency component is antithetical to doing justice in a Pt IVA proceeding in an appropriate case.
19 Secondly, and relatedly, it is proposed that if the Court does not make a solicitors' common fund order, the parties will seek what is known as a "Group Costs Order" in the Supreme Court of Victoria: see Allen v G8 Education Ltd [2022] VSC 32; Fox v Westpac Banking Corporation; Crawford v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2021] VSC 573.
20 It should be obvious to all concerned that such a step will mean that the substantive progress of these proceedings will be frustrated. This reinforces a concern that one often has about Pt IVA proceedings, namely that solicitors and funders are focussed so intently on their own position that they forget that it is their duty to advance the claims of the applicant and group members towards a swift resolution of the substantive matter. As I said in Klemweb (at 601-2 [85]):
Legal representatives acting for an applicant have professional, contractual and fiduciary duties. Those duties involve advising and assisting the applicant to discharge the obligation to represent the claims of the group members they represent in accordance with Pt IVA and Pt VB of the Act. The Court is entitled to expect that the applicant and the lawyers will not act contrary to the interests of group members as a whole in advancing and dealing with the common aspects of their s 33C claims. It is to be expected that differently represented applicants may responsibly and in good faith come to disparate views about pleadings, claim periods, forensic decisions and case theories in complex litigation. Leaving aside manifest deficiencies in a way a case is pleaded or conducted, often it will be difficult to tell whether a particular decision was sound until the end of the litigation. Having said that, provided there is no reason to think otherwise, the Court should assume that a relevant legal team will reflect regularly upon the conduct of the case and give thought to amendments including refining or including further causes of action and, if appropriate, bringing s 33K applications to augment or restrict the class.
21 Although I have no firm view about the matter and will hear any application if it is made on the merits, in the light of the overarching purpose, it is presently difficult to reconcile further delay of the proceeding by countenancing the transfer of the matter to the Supreme Court of Victoria only to procure more favourable financial arrangements for the solicitors and funders in the proceeding.
22 It is unnecessary to form any final view about these issues today. For present purposes, the solicitors for the applicants intend to send a letter to the New South Wales Legal Services Commissioner regarding, among other things, the prospect of seeking the solicitors' common fund order, including whether the Commissioner wishes to be heard in relation to the making of any such order. I consider this to be a sensible course.