Consideration
65 The case was pleaded and conducted by Prosperity before the primary judge upon the basis that Mr Croom made the various representations attributed to him as agent of all of the respondent parties (including Quikfund and AER) acting "… within the scope of his actual or apparent authority". That allegation was denied by all respondents. It was the relationship of principal and agent that was said to be the foundation of the alleged liability of Quikfund and AER for the misrepresentations made by Mr Croom to the executives of Prosperity with whom he dealt.
66 The learned authors of Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (19th ed, 2010 at par 1-001) define agency as follows:
Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the other should act on his behalf so as to affect his relations with third parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests assent so to act or so acts pursuant to the manifestation …
67 The onus lies upon the party alleging agency to prove:
(a) The existence and terms of the agency; and
(b) The fact that, in dealing with that party, the agent acted within his or her actual or ostensible authority (Dal Pont: The Law of Agency, 2nd ed, 2008, at par 1.10).
68 In the present case, there was no evidence that either Quikfund or AER had expressly authorised QCC or Mr Croom to act as its agent in relation to the lease finance transactions into which Prosperity entered or had expressly authorised Mr Croom to make any of the statements which he made to the representatives of Prosperity.
69 If Prosperity was to succeed, it had to establish implied actual authority on the part of QCC and Mr Croom or that Mr Croom acted with the ostensible authority of Quikfund and AER.
70 There is a difference between implied actual authority and apparent or ostensible authority. That difference was explained by Diplock LJ in Freeman & Lockyer (a firm) v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 at 502-503 in the following way:
It is necessary at the outset to distinguish between an "actual" authority of an agent on the one hand, and an "apparent" or "ostensible" authority on the other. Actual authority and apparent authority are quite independent of one another. Generally they co-exist and coincide, but either may exist without the other and their respective scopes may be different. As I shall endeavour to show, it is upon the apparent authority of the agent that the contractor normally relies in the ordinary course of business when entering into contracts.
An "actual" authority is a legal relationship between principal and agent created by a consensual agreement to which they alone are parties. Its scope is to be ascertained by applying ordinary principles of construction of contracts, including any proper implications from the express words used, the usages of the trade, or the course of business between the parties. To this agreement the contractor is a stranger; he may be totally ignorant of the existence of any authority on the part of the agent. Nevertheless, if the agent does enter into a contract pursuant to the "actual" authority, it does create contractual rights and liabilities between the principal and the contractor. It may be that this rule relating to "undisclosed principals," which is peculiar to English law, can be rationalised as avoiding circuity of action, for the principal could in equity compel the agent to lend his name in an action to enforce the contract against the contractor, and would at common law be liable to indemnify the agent in respect of the performance of the obligations assumed by the agent under the contract.
An "apparent" or "ostensible" authority, on the other hand, is a legal relationship between the principal and the contractor created by a representation, made by the principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted upon by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the "apparent" authority, so as to render the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed upon him by such contract. To the relationship so created the agent is a stranger. He need not be (although he generally is) aware of the existence of the representation but he must not purport to make the agreement as principal himself. The representation, when acted upon by the contractor by entering into a contract with the agent, operates as an estoppel, preventing the principal from asserting that he is not bound by the contract. It is irrelevant whether the agent had actual authority to enter into the contract.
In ordinary business dealings the contractor at the time of entering into the contract can in the nature of things hardly ever rely on the "actual" authority of the agent. His information as to the authority must be derived either from the principal or from the agent or from both, for they alone know what the agent's actual authority is. All that the contractor can know is what they tell him, which may or may not be true. In the ultimate analysis he relies either upon the representation of the principal, that is, apparent authority, or upon the representation of the agent, that is, warranty of authority.
71 A common feature of both species of authority is conduct on the part of the alleged principal which, in all the circumstances, evidences the clothing of the alleged agent with the requisite authority to bind his or her principal.
72 As far as ostensible authority is concerned, the only conduct on the part of Quikfund or AER that is capable of constituting the necessary representation as to Mr Croom's authority upon which Prosperity could have relevantly relied comprised the actions of those corporations in making it possible for Mr Croom to have possession of their standard equipment lease and associated documentation. Whether, by that conduct, either Quikfund or AER made such a representation and whether Prosperity relied upon that representation are both questions of fact which fall to be decided after considering all of the relevant circumstances.
73 For reasons which we shall shortly explain, we think that the evidence tendered at trial in the present case did not justify a conclusion that Mr Croom and QCC acted with the authority (actual or ostensible) of either Quikfund or AER in the dealings which Mr Croom and QCC had with Prosperity.
74 In Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 AC 552, the House of Lords considered the various legal relationships associated with hire purchase transactions. Lindgren J analysed the speeches in that case in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) (2000) 107 FCR 270 at 392-394 [544]-[553] as follows:
The distinction between an agent and a mere introducer of business
544 Citibank submits that the present case relevantly replicates the non-agency circumstances of Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 AC 552 (Branwhite). Branwhite is one of many cases concerned with the legal relationships associated with hire-purchase transactions.
545 Branwhite owned a Talbot motor car and wished to buy a Rapier motor car from a dealer, Raven Motor Co. Raven's manager arranged with Branwhite that the price of the Rapier would be £430 and that £130 would be allowed on the trade-in of the Talbot, the balance of £300 being payable by 60 monthly instalments of £5. The manager produced certain forms of Worcester Works Finance Ltd ("Worcester Works") which Branwhite signed without reading. One was a proposal form and the other was a hire purchase agreement. The hire purchase agreement contained no figures and the manager said he would fill them in. Branwhite left his Talbot with Raven and took away the Rapier.
546 There was subsisting a "master agreement" between Raven and Worcester. This provided that Raven would submit hire purchase agreements to Worcester. After Worcester accepted them, it would pay Raven the price of the goods less the initial payment or trade-in credited to the hirer. The master agreement allowed Raven to retain that initial payment or trade-in as part payment of the purchase price payable to it by Worcester as buyer.
547 Raven's manager sent to Worcester the signed forms but had inserted £649 rather than £430 as the cash price. With charges, the hire purchase price amounted to £805 and the monthly instalments were shown as £18 14s 11d. The deposit was correctly shown as £130.
548 Worcester proceeded with the transaction, buying the Rapier from Raven for £649 and paying Raven £519 (£649 - £130). Worcester sent a copy of the signed hire purchase agreement to Branwhite who, seeing the discrepancy, relied on Raven's manager to have it corrected. Branwhite paid no instalments. Contrary to his promise, Raven's manager did nothing and Worcester repossessed the Rapier. Worcester sued Branwhite to recover arrears of instalments but failed on the ground that Worcester and Branwhite had never been ad idem and that there was no valid agreement between them. Branwhite then sued Worcester for return of the deposit.
549 The House of Lords held that Worcester had received £130 from Branwhite for a consideration that had wholly failed and must therefore repay it. But a majority of their Lordships were of the opinion that Raven was not Worcester's agent to receive and hold the initial deposit.
550 I need not address the ground on which Branwhite succeeded. What is of present interest is the ground on which Branwhite failed, namely, that Raven had acted as agent for Worcester in receiving and holding the deposit. Branwhite failed on that ground by a three to two majority. Lords Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Guest and Upjohn were of the view that Raven was not Worcester's agent to receive and hold the deposit, whereas Lords Reid and Wilberforce thought that it was.
551 Lord Upjohn (with whom Lord Guest agreed) considered that the acts of holding a stock of Worcester's forms of hire purchase agreement, filling them in with particulars including particulars of Worcester's charges, having a prospective hirer sign the documents, and forwarding the forms to Worcester, showed that Raven was assisting the proposing hirer but did not establish that it had actual or apparent authority from the financier. Lord Upjohn identified the various stages of the typical hire purchase transaction and emphasised the role of the dealer as a party-principal and the financier's lack of interest in the transaction between the dealer and its customer. His Lordship's speech contained the following passage which is of some relevance to the circumstances of the present case (at 577-578):
"It is argued that in having possession of the finance company's forms and the ability to settle and fill in all these essential figures he showed that he was acting in the transaction generally as the agent of the finance company. But I do not myself think that this is a realistic approach. A motor dealer must have, if he is to be successful, one or more finance companies willing to enter into the ordinary bona fide hire-purchase agreements with purchasers, many of whom cannot pay the cash price. They must, therefore, supply him with forms and tell him as a matter of common sense the terms upon which they are prepared to do business, and this must include information upon the terms of their hiring charges, their minimum initial instalment and the maximum period of hire; probably this will be controlled by the relevant statutory regulations but if their terms differ no doubt they will inform him of their commercial practice. But I cannot see that this makes him an agent of the finance company. In any event, all he is doing is to fill in a document which he submits on behalf, as I think clear, of the would-be hirer which contains a proposal for hire-purchase finance.
…
I cannot see how, in fact, it is possible to spell out of this transaction that in these circumstances the dealer is in any way a general agent for the finance company. He is a principal acting on his own behalf in selling his own car, in taking at a price another car in part exchange, and in submitting the hire-purchase forms to the finance company he is submitting them as proposals on behalf of the would-be hire-purchaser. That is good business on his part. No doubt, when the transaction has gone through and the hire-purchase agreement has been completed the dealer has the express authority of the finance company to hand over the car which they have purchased to the hirer; but on the facts of this case that seems to me the extent of his agency on behalf of the finance company. The facts of this case negative any general agency of the dealer on behalf of the finance company."
552 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, like Lord Upjohn, thought that while the evidence in a particular case might demonstrate that the dealer was the agent of the finance company ad hoc for one purpose or another, the evidence did not establish that Worcester held out Raven as its agent to receive and hold the deposit. In particular, his Lordship thought that Raven's possession of Worcester's forms and the terms of the master agreement between Worcester and Raven did not establish agency.
553 Lord Wilberforce (with whom Lord Reid agreed), dissenting, also identified the sequential steps involved in a hire-purchase transaction. While accepting that in each case "something, much or little, must depend on the individual facts" (at 586), his Lordship thought that the normal conclusion should be that a dealer is the agent of the finance company unless there are facts displacing that conclusion. In arriving at this "presumption of agency", his Lordship relied heavily on "the established mercantile background of hire-purchase transactions" or "mercantile reality". He stated (at 586-587):
"In my opinion, such questions as arise of the vicarious responsibility of finance companies, for acts or defaults of dealers, cannot be resolved without reference to the general mercantile structure within which they arise; or if one prefers the expression, to mercantile reality. This has become well known and widely understood by the public, as well as by the commercial interests involved. It involves a system by which consumers expect to be able to acquire goods on hire-purchase terms: by which they expect these terms to be made available to them either at the premises where the goods are exhibited and sold, or by the representatives of the dealer who offers them for sale elsewhere, for example, at the customer's home. So far from thinking first of a purchase from the dealer, and then, separately, of obtaining finance from an outside source, the identity or even existence of the finance company or bank which is going to provide the money is a matter to them of indifference: they look to the dealer, or his representative, as the person who fixes the payment terms and makes all the necessary arrangements. And in this, their expectation conforms with reality. It is in fact the dealer who seeks and obtains the business; he who makes the decisions, subject to what is little more than the possibility of veto by the finance company: for practical purposes both dealer and customer regard the transaction as complete when the forms are signed, subject only to a right of veto, and delivery of the article takes place then.
If this is so, a general responsibility of the finance company for the acts, receipts and omissions of the dealer in relation to the proposed transaction of hire-purchase ought to flow from this structure of relationship and expectation, built up from accepted custom and methods of dealing: a general responsibility which requires to be displaced by evidence of particular circumstances rather than to be positively established in each individual case.
It may be that some wider conception of vicarious responsibility other than that of agency, as normally understood, may have to be recognised in order to accommodate some of the more elaborate cases which now arise when there are two persons who become mutually involved or associated in one side of a transaction. Whether this could be so, and on what facts, was, I think, the real issue in Garnac Grain Co. Inc. v. H.M.F. Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1968] A.C. 1130; [1967] 3 WLR 143n; [1967] 2 All ER 353, HL(E) But I think that 'agency' still has room in it for the relationship that exists in such cases as this."
In the present case, no "established mercantile background" or "mercantile reality" touching a class of contracts can be called in aid by NM: the form of transaction in the present case was sui generis.
75 As Lindgren J observed in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) (at 394-396 [554]-[562]), the reasoning in Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd was adopted and applied by the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Lynch [1993] 2 VR 469; by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Luff (unreported, 27 November 1990); and by Cole J in Octapon Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (unreported, 3 February 1989).
76 In NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10), Lindgren J held that the fact that the advisers in that case had possession of Citibank forms, the fact that they assisted the customers to complete those forms and the fact that they forwarded the completed forms to Citibank, whether taken individually or in combination, did not lead to the conclusion that the advisers were agents of Citibank but was consistent with them being mere introducers of business to Citibank.
77 We agree with the observations made by Lindgren J in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10) which we have extracted at [74] and referred to at [75] and [76] above and with his analysis of Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd. We shall apply those observations to the case at hand.
78 At 493-495 [1023]-[1032] in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10), Lindgren J considered whether there was any actual authority that had been given to the advisers outside the relevant formal contractual arrangements. His Honour observed that a mere introducer of business could become an agent without ever entering into a formal agency agreement. He went on to note that a finding of actual authority depended on the existence of consensus. His Honour said that the Court ought not to find such a consensus if to do so would be inconsistent with the express arrangements between the parties.
79 It is clear from the above brief conspectus of some of the relevant authorities that assertions made by the alleged agent that he or she is acting for the alleged principal can never by themselves prove the existence of the alleged agency. More is required. There must be some conduct on the part of the alleged principal from which the relationship of agency can be inferred and which breathes life into the assertions of the alleged agent.
80 In the present case, at [31] of his Reasons, the learned primary judge found that Mr Croom signed each of the documents which he signed on 25 October 2007 as a representative of QCC, AER or, as the case may be, Axis. With great respect to his Honour, that finding was erroneous. Mr Croom did not sign any of those documents as a representative of AER. Indeed, there is no evidence that Mr Croom ever signed any document on behalf of either Quikfund or AER. Furthermore, most of his signatures on the various documents which he did sign were as a witness to the signature of Mr King. Mr Croom did, of course, sign various versions of the Letter of Understanding on behalf of QCC. He also described QCC/Technix as the "Sales Agent" of Axis in the Axis Unlimited Plan document dated 11 October 2007 and signed several documents in October 2007 and in March 2008 on behalf of Axis which recorded the arrangements between Axis and Worldnet and Axis and Prosperity. But his actions in signing these latter documents are not probative of any agency between QCC and him, on the one hand, and Quikfund and AER, on the other hand.
81 Three of the four AER equipment leases were signed on behalf of AER by a person whose identity was not revealed in the evidence. It is clear that the signature on each of those documents is not that of Mr Croom. The signatory is described as an "authorised officer" of AER. The evidence also showed that the same position obtained in respect of the Quikfund equipment lease. The signature of the Quikfund representative on the Quikfund equipment lease is the same signature as appears on the relevant AER equipment leases.
82 The other matters relied upon by the primary judge as supporting his finding that, in making the representations which he made to the officers of Prosperity, Mr Croom was acting as the agent of Quikfund and AER, are referred to at [54]-[57] above. They were:
(a) Mr Croom was the Regional Manager of both QCC and Technix and described himself as such;
(b) QCC and Technix shared business premises;
(c) Quikfund and AER always dealt through brokers and never dealt with the ultimate consumers directly;
(d) Mr Croom had possession of both Quikfund's and AER's lease documentation in blank as well as other Quikfund and AER documentation;
(e) Mr Croom was able to and did, in fact, cause to be forwarded to Mr King on 1 February 2008 a copy of the various documents which Mr King had signed on behalf of Prosperity on 25 October 2007; and
(f) Mr Croom repeatedly asserted to the officers of Prosperity with whom he dealt that he and QCC represented a linked group of companies in relation to the Axis telecoms contract and the relevant equipment leases.
83 To the above list of factors relied upon by the primary judge may be added the further fact that, at least for some period after the date of the incorporation of AER and Axis (viz 19 June 2007), AER and Axis were sister corporations with at least one common director (George Tawaf). Mr Tawaf had also once been a shareholder of QCC although the precise details of his shareholding were not made clear in the evidence.
84 It is obvious that the primary judge's finding at [31] of his Reasons to the effect that Mr Croom signed relevant documents on behalf of AER was critical to his ultimate conclusion that Mr Croom had acted as the agent of Quikfund and AER in his dealings with Prosperity. If that finding is removed as a factor in favour of a finding of agency, the remaining factors relied upon by his Honour, even if supplemented by the additional matters to which we have referred at [83] above, do not warrant the conclusion which his Honour reached in respect of agency.
85 Factors (a) and (b) concern QCC and Technix only. They do not have any relevance to the question of agency as between Quikfund and AER, on the one hand, and QCC and Mr Croom, on the other hand.
86 Factors (c), (d) and (e) are in the same category as very similar factors considered in Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd and the Australian cases which have followed Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd (NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 10); Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Lynch; Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Luff; and Octapon Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd). The transactions in question in the present case are typical lease finance transactions. In addition, there are features of the present case which make it even less likely that Mr Croom and QCC acted as the agents of Quikfund and AER in their dealings with Prosperity. First, there is no evidence as to how and why Mr Croom came to have Quikfund and AER documentation. Second, there was no binding arrangement between Quikfund and AER, as owner, and Prosperity, as hirer, until Quikfund and AER accepted the deal by executing the contractual documentation. All that Mr Croom did was complete the relevant forms, procure the hirer's signature on them and then submit those forms to Quikfund and to AER for their consideration. Third, there was no communication between Quikfund or AER and QCC and Mr Croom that could conceivably support a finding of agency.
87 It must also be remembered that Mr Croom was not employed by or an officer of either Quikfund or AER and that there was nothing to suggest that QCC (or Technix) had ever been authorised by Quikfund or AER to do anything on its behalf. The evidence of common shareholdings and directorships was not directed with any precision to the relevant period (from about September 2007 to late March 2008) and therefore did not establish the precise shareholdings in that period. That evidence did not usefully add to the evidence relevant to agency.
88 Finally, as far as factor (f) is concerned, the assertions made by Mr Croom as to the corporations which he represented were vague and imprecise and, in any event, on their own, incapable of establishing agency. We should add, at this point, that the existence and terms of the Customer Satisfaction Certificates provided by Mr Feo of QCC to Prosperity do not advance Prosperity's case on agency. The terms of those certificates are inconsistent with that case. In any event, they are QCC documents and do not assist at all to prove the requisite agency.
89 For all of the above reasons, the primary judge erred when he found that, in his dealings with Prosperity, Mr Croom had acted as the agent of Quikfund and AER. His Honour's finding of agency was the foundation for his Honour's ultimate conclusion to the effect that Quikfund and AER must be held liable for the misrepresentations made by Mr Croom to Prosperity. That conclusion was also erroneous.