Queensland Trading & Holding Company Limited v Commissioner

Cash held up to April 2003 $273m Less: applied on 8 April 2004 $219m Balance 54

IV. Total assessments for SPA loss transferee coys (excl. Woolworths) Spassked Adjustment Primary Tax Additional Tax Total Tax Payable

$ $ $ $

1991 642,192,274 250,455,025.86 296,443,693.67 546,898,719.53

1992 513,486,146 200,259,596.97 212,653,873.49 412,913,470.46

1993 194,694,355 75,934,893.44 133,328,737.43 209.263.630.87

1994 232,328,568 76,668,427.44 139,630,280.90 216,298,708.34

1995 90,238,415 29,779,163.33 49,362,676.28 79,141,839.61

1996 123,133,973 44,328,230.28 68,341,506.40 112,669,736.68

1997 106,858,150 38,468,934.00 53,712,481.48 92,181,415.48

TOTAL 1,902,931,881 715,894,271.32 953,473,249.65 1,669,367,520.97'

14 The payment of $188,053,042 made by or on behalf of Spassked on 8 April 2004 occurred in the context of an agreement in writing reached on 7 April 2004, which was structured in the form of a letter of the Australia Government Senior Tax Counsel (Mr Chochula) addressed to the Chairman of Industrial Equity Limited (Mr Ryan), bearing their respective signatures and containing the following arrangements: 'Deferral of Action to Recover - Primary Tax 4. Pursuant to s 255-5 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 and in consideration of the payments set out in clause 1, the Commissioner agrees to defer any action to recover the disputed primary tax from the Relevant Taxpayers in relation to the transfer of losses from Spassked until all litigation in relation to the application for special leave filed by IEL and Stanley Park Ltd are finalised, namely the last of: (a) 14 days after the hearing of the special leave application before the High Court in respect of the IEL and Stanley Park Ltd 1992 Spassked matters; (b) if the High Court grants special leave, 14 days after the handing down of its decision in any appeal where such decision is adverse to the appellants; (c) if the High Court orders that the matter be remitted to the Federal Court for hearing on whether Part IVA applies to the transactions in question to disallow the interest deductions claimed by Spassked, 14 days after those proceedings (and any appeal) are finalised. Deferral of Action to Recover - Other Disputed Tax 5. Pursuant to s 255-5 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 and in consideration of the payments set out in clause 1, the Commissioner agrees to defer any action to recover the disputed tax from the Relevant Taxpayers in relation to the interest, penalty tax and general interest charges for the assessments and amended assessments set out in the Schedules, until the earliest date of the following occurrences: (a) withdrawal of any disputes in relation to the interest, penalty tax and general interest charges; (b) a deed of settlement is entered into between the parties in relation to the interest, penalty tax and general interest charges; (c) the Federal Court or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal delivers judgement in relation to the interest, penalty tax and general interest charges. 6. The Commissioner agrees that the obligation on him to "defer any action to recover" will preclude him from issuing notices pursuant to s 260-5 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, or taking any other action or exercising any other power he may have to recover, collect, garnishee, access or encumber monies in relation to the tax liabilities of the Relevant Taxpayers until all litigation in relation to the application for special leave filed by IEL and Stanley Park Ltd are finalised. Taxpayers Right to Seek Remission of Interest 7. The Commissioner acknowledges that the Relevant Taxpayers reserve the right to seek further remission of interest, penalty tax and general interest charges relating to the assessments and amended assessments set out in the Schedules and that nothing in this agreement precludes them from seeking such remission.' 15 Under the heading 'Upstreamed Funds', IEL further agreed by this document of 7 April 2004 to provide to the Commissioner of Taxation monthly details in relation to the accounts reflecting those funds and the capitalising of interest. Paragraphs 9 to 11 of the document thereafter read as follows: '9. IEL acknowledges that the Commissioner is interested in the continued preservation of the Upstreamed Funds and the capitalising of interest into the accounts, so that the Relevant Taxpayers can pay any liability to tax. IEL agrees to notify the Commissioner in writing of any movement, withdrawal or dealing in relation to the Upstreamed Funds and the capitalising of interest into the accounts within three business days of such movement, withdrawal or dealing, other than funds used to meet the ongoing administrative, accounting and legal expenses of the RAGL group economic entity (which includes RAGL, FJL, Tooth, Dextran and their subsidiaries), including the costs and expenses incurred in funding the taxpayers in that group in relation to all the taxation disputes. 10. IEL acknowledges that members of the RAGL group economic entity have ceased to pay any further interest to their financiers. IEL further acknowledges that members of the RAGL Group economic entity will not conduct any business other than to seek resolution of the IEL Group's taxation disputes and to maintain the RAGL group economic entity's investments and bank deposits. 11. IEL further acknowledges that it shall continue to be aware of the need to preserve funds, including the Upstreamed Funds and the capitalising of interest into the accounts, so that the Relevant Taxpayers can meet, to the extent possible, remaining balances of the disputed tax, if any, and agrees to act in a way that is consistent with this need.' Those further arrangements demonstrate obligations of the IEL Group to act in good faith, pending the finalisation of the income tax disputes, and to confine the IEL Group's access to the income derived from the so-called Upstreamed Funds for its ongoing administrative accounting and legal expenses, including what would be required for the funding of 'all the taxation disputes'. Those disputes would appear to relate to the three fiscal years respectively ending 30 June 1991, 1993 and 1996. 16 Interlocutory proceedings, chiefly in the nature of directions hearings, have taken place before the Court on the following occasions, namely 27 May 2004, 8 June 2004, 23 June 2004 and 16 July 2004. Each have involved, directly or indirectly, the implications of the agreement of 7 April 2004.

ADJR applications 17 Applications were also filed in this Court, earlier on 16 April 2004, apparently by IEL subsidiaries presently involved in the context of the Spassked litigation. Those applications seek declaratory relief pursuant to s 13(4A) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ('ADJR Act'), to the effect that the IEL subsidiaries are entitled to reasons, pursuant to s 13 of the ADJR Act, for the decision made by the Commissioner under s 227(3) of the Tax Act not to further or fully remit additional tax imposed on each IEL Group applicant, in accordance with Part VII of the Tax Act, in relation to the year of income ended 30 June 1991. To date the Commissioner has apparently declined to provide any such reasons. 18 In written submissions provided to the Court by the Commissioner on 3 June 2004, the following propositions were advanced: (i) each of the ADJR Act applications were unnecessary, since if and when it might become appropriate to advance the appeals in relation to additional tax, interlocutory processes in those appeals, to the extent then perceptibly necessary, would overtake the utility of any separate requests for reasons; and (ii) each of the applications was in any event incompetent, since the decisions were not within any class in respect of which an entitlement to request reasons arises; I was referred in that regard to item (ga) of s 13 and Schedule 1 to the ADJR Act. Those ADJR Act issues do not fall directly for consideration in these reasons, but it is appropriate, in this complex context, to include reference thereto at this first stage of describing the context of what is likely to be ongoing interlocutory disputation, at least to facilitate the task of case management. I should also record that the Commissioner has objected to the competency of the ADJR applications, pursuant to s 13(4A) of the ADJR Act. 19 The Commissioner further informed the Court as follows: (i) one of the IEL Group members has appealed to the AAT against its assessment to additional tax in respect of the 1992 fiscal year, and has sought to progress that appeal before the High Court will have disposed of the special leave application (ante)to be heard on 10 December 2004, being a course which the Commissioner has opposed; and (ii) the AAT has reserved its decision as to whether it should adjourn that appeal, apparently on the basis that if the adjournment is granted, the appeal would be heard in any event on an expedited basis, once it became clear that it is appropriate to do so, in the light of a final determination in the High Court upon the appeal from the Full Federal Court's judgment in Spassked. 20 It is appropriate, for future reference on issues involving case management of what is inevitably shaping to be further substantial litigation, to record in summary what has occurred on the four occasions the present matters have been before the Court.

The directions hearing of 27 May 2004 21 At the initial directions hearing on 27 May 2004, a number of matters were canvassed in a preliminary way. Counsel for the applicants referred to the following matters: (i) in relation to the many individual proceedings the subject of applications of corporate members of the IEL Group which had been filed in the Court, the issue arising related to the interest charge attributable in each case to a corporate member of the IEL Group, commencing from 1987, and in particular, for present controversial purposes, commencing from 1990; (ii) the total amount of income tax and penalties the subject of the existing assessments involve 'nearly a billion dollars'; it was predicted that 'there may well be an avalanche of cases coming to the court'; (iii) none of the penalty tax issues had 'yet been ventilated', whether before Lindgren J at the time of the Spassked hearing at first instance, or on the Spassked appeal; in that regard, complaint was made on behalf of the applicants that no details had ever been furnished as to how the imposed penalties had been calculated by the Commissioner; moreover it was pointed out that the 'penalty regime' in force prior to the 1992 tax year was materially different to that prevailing in respect of the 1992 tax year and subsequently; and (iv) the circumstance that the penalty tax issues related to matters of principle, in particular as to remission in whole or in part. 22 Consequently it was said on behalf of the applicants that the concern of the IEL Group, in relation to all foreshadowed issues yet to be resolved, apart of course from the High Court proceedings relating to the 1992 fiscal year, was to '… get the matter moving to a point no matter what the outcome of the special leave application', and to do so partly by reason of the accrual of interest on the outstanding income tax and additional tax at the rate of 12% per annum. It was further said on behalf of the applicants that the relief which would be sought from the Commissioner would be the 'reasons for imposing penalties as part of [the assessment] process'. 23 Senior counsel for the Commissioner produced calculations purporting to demonstrate that the total amount of the loans made between 30 December 1987 and 28 June 1990 from IEL Group members to Spassked were in the order of $3.7 billion, all of which loans were interest bearing. He indicated that whilst the Commissioner did not presently intend to adduce affidavit evidence, the Commissioner was 'considering an application for security to seek arrangements [to the effect] that costs would not be taken out of that otherwise available fund'.

The directions hearing of 8 June 2004 24 Prior to the continuation of the proceedings on 8 June 2004, the applicants tendered evidence by affidavit to indicate (inter alia) how the sum of $118,053,402, already paid to the Commissioner since the Spassked litigation was finalised, was calculated by the IEL Group, having regard to the Commissioner's break-up of primary and additional tax assessment which I have already detailed, and also how that sum was apportioned between ninety-nine (99) IEL Group members, inclusive of the present two applicants. The Commissioner tendered evidence by affidavit to the effect that the disputed tax assessment in each case related entirely to '… tax losses said to have been transferred to each of the members of the IEL Group to Spassked Pty Limited'. 25 At the same time, senior counsel for the Commissioner referred to one effect of the agreement of 7 April 2004 in the following terms: '… that sum [is] available for payment of tax is earning interest… [which] will be available to contribute to the ultimate liability of the group and it has also been agreed that out of the interest that is being earned the group may make expenditures on ongoing administration including legal costs.' The sum referred to is of course the amount of $188,053,042. He stated the Commissioner's position, in relation to the implementation of that agreement, as follows: '… It's agreed that so far as it is necessary to run legal proceedings they may pay for them out of the interest that's being earned on the sum of money, but the Commissioner nevertheless takes the position that he doesn't want to see any more legal proceedings go on than are necessary.' 26 The Commissioner's updated fiscal calculations as at 8 June 2004 were said to be 'in round figures' as follows: Primary tax $719 million Additional tax $958.4 million General interest charge $539 million After taking into account the payment of $188,053,402 already made on behalf of Spassked, senior counsel for the Commissioner referred to an estimated liability of $2,064,000 million, together with yet a further sum of $135 million '… from today to the date when the High Court would make its decision'. That sum of $2,064,000 million would appear to comprise the amount of $1,902,931,881 I have earlier identified, together with accrued interest. It was submitted that in the light of the 'available assets of $756 million, it is entirely academic unless the taxpayer is successful on a number of very substantial issues which would remove either, for example, the entirety of additional tax or the entirety of the primary tax for some tax years or make some very big difference to what's been assessed according to these figures'. Reference to the amount of $756 million has earlier been mentioned. Senior counsel for the Commissioner further pointed out that additional or penalty tax issues were not agitated before the primary judge, though he said that '… an enormous amount of evidence… was presented before Lindgren J about the Part IVA case…'. Moreover he asserted that the presentation by the IEL Group at first instance involved 'no differentiation of one year from the other', the loans involved having been 'booked in the years 1987 to 1990', and that 'the purpose of the structure was laid down then'. It was also stated on behalf of the Commissioner that '… at least since the Full Court decision, a further $15 million interest has been earned on these three principal deposits'. 27 To enable the parties to further consider their respective positions, the interlocutory proceedings were stood over until 23 June 2004 for further hearing and consideration.

The directions hearing of 23 June 2004 28 The Commissioner sought at the directions hearing of the proceedings on 23 June 2004 the following orders: '1. Order pursuant to Order 1 Rule 8, Order 10, Rules 1 and 2(1)(e) that further proceedings on each of applications Nos. N539-543/2004, N621-651/2004, N681-686/2004 and N765-795/2004 be stayed until further order of the court and that each of the said applications be stood out of the list. 2. Grant liberty to any of the parties to the said applications to apply to the Court to have any or all of them re-listed for the purpose of lifting the stay and making directions for their further conduct or disposal upon seven days notice of: 2.1 the High Court's determination of the special leave applications in matters Nos. S613, S614 and S615 of 2003 or 2.2 if special leave in any of the said applications be granted by the High Court, the High Court's determination of the appeal or appeals.' In summary, the Commissioner thereby sought the stay indefinitely of those 72 applications for review of income tax assessments lodged by members of the IEL Group, and presently in evidence before me. 29 In support of the Commissioner's application for those orders, the following submissions were advanced on behalf of the Commissioner on this occasion: (i) four judges of this Court had already determined adversely to Spassked the issues arising on the pending High Court special leave application; (ii) the essence of their reasoning was that 'this structure under which this interest was incurred was such that it never was envisaged that Spassked would earn any income at all and therefore the interest was simply not deductible ever and never was going to be…'; (iii) the presiding judges '… looked at the 1992 year but to do that they had to look at a structure which had been set up under which interest was incurred in the 1992 year, it had been set up between 1987 and 1990, and Spassked never earned any income in the subsequent years of 1993 and 1994. There were two years in which it earned nominal amounts of income and I think I am right in saying that it did not earn [income] in 1993 and 1994 but if it did earn any [income] it was nominal relative to the borrowings…'; (iv) '… having regard to the whole basis on which the disallowance was made, the Commissioner's case is that it necessarily governs the 1991, 1993 and 1994 years'; (v) if special leave to appeal is refused by the High Court, the Commissioner would forthwith make a strike-out application; and (vi) if special leave to appeal is granted by the High Court, and the Full Federal Court's decision is subsequently reversed, the proceedings will then have to be remitted to Lindgren J to determine the Part IVA issues raised by the Commission; consequently '… this will all have been a complete waste of time'. 30 Moreover the Commissioner further indicated that if any of the IEL Group transferee companies were to seek to implement in their favour the purported transfers of the tax losses asserted by Spassked in the context of the pending special leave application, the Commissioner would invoke at the appropriate time the doctrine of Anshun estoppel, as exemplified for instance in Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd [2001] 53 NSWLR 198 at 202 et seq (per Handley JA with whom Mason P and Heydon JA agreed). 31 One difficulty presently arising with the Commissioner's submissions thus far summarised lie with the terms of the agreement in writing of 7 April 2004, reflected in what has been extracted from the agreement earlier in these reasons, concerning the extent of the purported entitlement of the so-called 'Spassked loss transferees' to meet ongoing administrative, accounting and legal expenses within the terms and conditions of agreement in writing of 7 April 2004. The Commissioner submitted however that the agreement between the parties of 7 April 2004 was 'completely silent on this question that the court is faced [with] now…'. 32 Ultimately senior counsel for the Commissioner accepted in principle, as an alternative course of action for implementation, that the applicants proceed with the interlocutory step of filing and serving, within the framework of the presently constituted proceedings, statements of facts, issues and contentions, upon the basis of access to the funds the subject of that agreement of 7 April 2004 for the purpose of paying the reasonable legal costs and expenses of the present applicants of the causes of action contemplated by the subject proceedings. 33 In response to what the Commissioner submitted should be at least one major outcome of the present interlocutory disputes, senior counsel for the applicants referred me to Order 52B Rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules, which is reproduced below for ease of reference: 'Within 28 days after a sealed copy of an application is served on the Commissioner, the Commissioner must, unless the appeal relates to a private ruling: (a) file: (i) [repealed] (ii) a copy of the notice of the appealable objection decision concerned; and (iii) a copy of the taxation objection concerned; and (iv) any return or other document in the Commissioner's possession or under the Commissioner's control to which the taxation objection relates that is relevant to the hearing of the matter; and (v) a statement outlining succinctly the Commissioner's contentions and the facts and issues in the appeal as the Commissioner perceives them; and (b) service on the applicant: (i) [repealed] (ii) a list of the documents filed under subparagraphs (a)(ii) to (iv) (inclusive); and (iii) a copy of the statement referred to in subparagraph (a)(v).' 34 It was consequently submitted on behalf of the applicants that I should make the following orders: (i) that the Commissioner file and serve the documents stipulated (other than its statement of facts, issues and contentions) under Order 52B Rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules within a specified time; (ii) that the Commissioner file and serve statements of facts, issues and contentions on or before one month thereafter; (iii) that the applicants file and serve statements of facts, issues and contentions on or before one month thereafter; (iv) that the applications be listed for further directions hearings within three days thereof; and (v) that the parties have liberty to apply on three days' notice to the other. 35 It was further submitted on behalf of the applicants that each of them had 'an undeniable right to contest these matters', pursuant to the agreement in writing between the parties on 7 April 2004 (supra), and reference was made in particular to the concluding words of par 9 thereof '… including the costs and expenses incurred in funding the taxpayers in that group in relation to all taxation disputes'. No notice of motion was required of the applicants to set matters in train for those purposes, so it was further submitted, nor for the purpose of the applicants obtaining access to the funds the subject of that critical agreement.

The notice of motion of 16 July 2004 36 By notice of motion filed on 9 July 2004 in the present proceedings numbered N539, N540 and N543 of 2004, the Commissioner sought interlocutory relief to the effect set out in [28] above, or in the alternative the following orders: '3(a) Order that all applications listed in paragraph (1) be adjourned for further directions on 17 December 2004; 3(b) Order in relation to all applications listed in paragraph (1) that the requirements of Order 52B Rules 5(a) and (b) be suspended until 28 days after the directions hearing on December 2004.' In effect, the Commissioner thereby sought a 'standstill' situation until the outcome of the High Court proceedings. 37 However the major subject debated on 16 July 2004 was the emphatic emphasis of senior counsel for the applicants that the requirements of Order 52B Rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules were, in effect, intractable in operation in the context of taxation reviews initiated by a taxpayer against the Commissioner, and further that in the present context, no contention had been advanced on behalf of the Commissioner, adversely to the applicants, as to issue estoppel or abuse of process, such as to exclude the applicants from invoking the operation of Order 52B Rule 5. Consequently it was submitted that the Commissioner was bound to comply with that Rule in the context of the issues presently ventilated by the applicants, particularly since compliance was sought otherwise than for the fiscal year in issue in the Spasskedlitigation, namely that ended 30 June 1992. 38 The response of senior counsel for the Commissioner was that the Commissioner should not be compelled to defend its present position, adopted as it was said to have consistently been upon the basis of the Full Court's reasons for judgment in Spassked, asserting in that regard that '… all this is governed by what's been decided in the Full Court which is the Commissioner's position; its all decided by that….'. I was referred to the table appearing in the Australian Tax Cases report of the Full Court's decision in Spassked, which demonstrated that in respect of each of the financial years 1988 to 1994 both inclusive, there were only two fiscal years during which income (being of course dividend income alone) was derived by Spassked, namely the sums of $29,308,093 and $14,654,046 in relation to the fiscal years 1990 and 1992 respectively, as compared with the substantially greater interest expense incurred by Spassked in relation to the seven consecutive fiscal years 1988 to 1994. That material alone was said to be reflected in the findings of Lindgren J summarised on pages 4240 and 4241 of [2003] ATC 4184. 39 Senior counsel for the Commissioner thus submitted that there was overwhelming significance inherent in the applicants' failure to disclose, in the context of their conduct of the present interlocutory proceedings, the reasons or basis for changing the position adopted on behalf of the applicants in the Full Court, or before the primary judge, in the Spassked proceedings. On that footing, the Commissioner submitted that the applicants had not disclosed any reasonable basis or justification for their present interlocutory application. Moreover the Commissioner pointed out that the evidence which was induced by the Commissioner on the Part IVA issues, fully pleaded and argued as it was in the Spassked litigation, was readily to be discerned from the Australian Tax Cases' reports thereof in first instance and on appeal (which I have earlier identified), and this Court need therefore look no further in the course of resolving the present interlocutory application. It was reiterated that the Commissioner did not oppose, but did not consent, to the applicants assembling their affidavit and documentary evidence, implicitly pursuant to funding out of the so-called Upstreamed Funds, but that the Commissioner did not wish to incur any expenditure by way of response or other interlocutory step, at least until the outcome of the special leave application. 40 Although the Commissioner did not therefore seek to resile from the earlier indication on his part not to oppose the applicants accessing the Upstreamed Funds, or at least income derived therefrom, for the purpose of preparation of evidence for the prosecution of their respective applications for review of their respective taxation positions imposed related to any of the fiscal years 1988 to 1994, the Commissioner sought to be relieved from obligation to comply with the provisions of Order 52B Rule 5 upon the basis outlined above.

The concluding submissions of the parties 41 The applicants accepted from the outset that it would be inappropriate to agitate issues (other than as to penalty) concerning the transfers of losses by Spassked to other IEL Group subsidiaries in relation to the fiscal year ended 30 June 1992, prior to Spassked's special leave application being determined by the High Court on 10 December 2004, and if that leave be granted by the High Court, prior to the subsequent hearing of the consequential Spassked appeal to the High Court. Nevertheless the applicants' case was that because the matters agitated before me are related to years of income of Spassked additional to that ended 30 June 1992, there was no reason for the applicants to be in effect compelled to delay the preparation of representative cases in relation to the 1991, 1993 and 1996 fiscal years up to the point where the same would be ready to be heard, or substantially so, once the outcome of Spassked's special leave to appeal application to the High Court was known in about four months time. As earlier explained, the experience of the applicants' solicitors in relation to the Spassked litigation was said to demonstrate that it would take considerable time to bring the further proceedings Spassked presently proposes for those three further years to a state of readiness for hearing by the Federal Court. 42 The Commissioner maintained its response that it would be futile and wasteful to progress the litigation of those issues, at least prior to the outcome of the hearing of Spassked's special leave application, since if special leave to appeal was to be granted by the High Court, and if the subsequent appeal of Spassked was to be successful, it would not be necessary for the presently contemplated applications for review to differentiate the basis for claims to deductibility for those three other fiscal years from that fiscal year ended 30 June 1992, being a differentiation it presently required the applicants to make. 43 It was emphasised on behalf of the applicants however, apart from its position maintained as to the three differing years of income further identified, that there were in any event significant issues arising for determination concerning the Commissioner's quantification of additional tax, each of which should be resolved without awaiting the outcome of the High Court proceedings. Moreover since the Commissioner was said to have declined to provide the IEL Group with documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth), and to provide reasons pursuant to the ADJR Act, it was further submitted by the applicants that '[i]n the absence of any information as to the matters taken into account by the [Commissioner] in deciding to impose and/or remit additional tax, the applicants do not know the extent to which the Commissioner may have made factual errors, or failed to take into account relevant matters, including a vast amount of information provided to the Commissioner by the IEL Group over many years of enquiry'. 44 The applicants emphasised that the present proceedings have their genesis in events which occurred as far back as 1986 and 1987, and which were implemented more than 10 years ago, and therefore to the extent that information 'going back' so many years may be relevant, the same would become more difficult to obtain, given the continuing effluxion of time. That was said to create problems 'particularly acute for the IEL Group', because it no longer had any employees, and its ability to locate relevant documents was becoming increasingly diminished. Moreover to the extent it might be necessary for the applicants to adduce evidence from former employees and directors, a number of those persons were said to now reside overseas or even to have died.

My conclusions upon the various issues raised in the course of the interlocutory proceedings to date 45 It may reasonably be inferred that in charting the course set out in the agreement in writing reached on 7 April 2004, which was entered into after the conclusion of the Full Court's decision in Spassked given on 8 December 2003, the parties mutually settled upon a constructive compromise which took into account, on the one hand, the possibility of the Full Court's unanimous decision being reversed by the High Court following upon any grant of special leave, and on the other hand, the possibility of challenge to the substantial additional tax or so-called penalties set out in the table earlier extracted in these reasons. 46 The predominant interlocutory issue which has thus far arisen concerns the applicants' insistence that the Commissioner effect forthwith compliance on the Commissioner's part with the procedural requirements of Order 52B Rule 5. As I have earlier indicated, the applicants have not articulated as yet the basis upon which they would seek to distinguish the operation of the Spassked decisions at first instance and on appeal from the circumstances relevantly prevailing in relation to the financial year ended 30 June 1991, 1993 and 1996. Until they do so, there is no good reason why the Commissioner should not be entitled to rely upon the outcome and reasons for judgment in Spassked. 47 That conclusion disposes of what appears to have eventuated, in the course of the interlocutory proceedings to date, as the principal matter in contention. However there are a number of other issues which have arisen, in the course of the interlocutory proceedings which I have referred to, which should also be addressed. 48 In my opinion, the applicants should be permitted to implement in an appropriate way, and to a reasonable extent, the mechanism envisaged by the terms of the agreement in writing of 7 April 2004, by curial challenge to the substantial quantifications of additional tax in the nature of penalties, as distinct from additional tax reflective of accrual of interest on whatever may crystallise as the Commissioner's assessments of primary tax made in conformity with the requirements of the Tax Act. There is no good reason why the applicants should not be permitted at this present stage to require the Commissioner to account for the basis of his assessment of penalty tax and the justification therefor. Presumably the basis for calculation of additional tax upon the applicants would apply universally 'across the board', as it were. 49 The further course which I think the applicants should be presently authorised to take, at least in advance of the outcome to the pending special leave application, is whatever may be appropriate to enforce their entitlement, pursuant to the agreement of 7 April 2004, to access the so-called Upstreamed Funds in order to meet ongoing administrative, accounting and legal expenses of the applicants. Any such enforcement would need to be made by way of application to the Court in the usual way in accordance with the Federal Court Rules. The entitlement of the applicants to do so is contractually based, by reference to the terms of the agreement of 7 April 2004. There is no reason in principle that I can identify why the applicants cannot seek the enforcement of that arrangement, in advance of the outcome of the High Court special leave application. Moreover a ruling of the Court in favour of the present applicants should govern in principle the circumstances appertaining to the other members of the IEL Group relevantly involved, without the need for a multiplicity of applications, and the consequential incurring of court filing fees 'across the board' as it were. Doubtless the applicants will consider what relief needs to be precisely framed in that regard, within the present scope of course of the Federal Court Rules. Given the status of the Commissioner as a model litigant, my present anticipation would be that declaratory relief would suffice, without the need for consequential orders. 50 The next view I would express, in the light of the various issues canvassed in the course of the interlocutory proceedings to date, is whether Order 52B rule 5 provides an appropriate vehicle in any event in the present circumstances for originating the challenge(s) which the applicants seek to mount to the assessments of additional tax or sometimes so-called penalties. The inference I would draw from the carefully crafted terms of the agreement of the 7 April 2004 is that the processes thereby contractually stipulated were intended to govern, or at least principally govern, the resolution of the issues thereby addressed, such as penalty tax issues, and that I should not charter for the parties any inconsistent course of administrative review, pending the final conclusion of proceedings in the High Court, at whatever stage that may occur. To the extent that there presently exists an applicable objection decision or decisions, I would be inclined to, pursuant to Order 1 Rule 8 of the Federal Court Rules, dispense with compliance on the Commissioner's part in any event, unless I can be persuaded to the contrary, with the procedural requirements of Order 52B Rules 5(a) and (b) of the Federal Court Rules. Instead the applicants must bear the procedural onus of formulating and initiating such claims for relief as may be lawfully open to them to seek in the particular circumstances presently prevailing. The parties have seen fit to formulate a carefully crafted contractual basis for the regulation of their differences, pending the outcome at least of the High Court special leave application, and expression should be given to any enforcement of the terms of that contractual basis by appropriate process at the instance of the party seeking enforcement. I see no reason why the applicants do not have at their disposal a present entitlement to the enforcement of those arrangements, in accordance with its terms, in order to challenge the present quantification of the interest, penalty tax and general interest charges (to cite the areas of challenge stipulated by the agreement of 7 April 2004). That does not mean of course that the applicants, or any other affected members of the IEL Group, are entitled to access the fund in question other than by an appropriate process of administrative review which is geared to such expenditure as can be reasonably justified upon the true construction of the agreement in writing of 7 April 2004. 51 I do not think therefore that the Commissioner's proposed course of virtually an entire 'standstill' regime, pending the outcome of the special leave application, so far as the Commissioner's conduct is concerned, is consistent with the terms of the agreement of 7 April 2004 and their implications. Obligations are open to be implied in relation to those provisions of the agreement of 7 April 2004 concerning 'funding… in relation to all the taxation disputes'. On the other hand, the applicants are not entitled to engage in uncontrolled, unnecessary and unjustified expenditures. Since the parties appear presently to stand far apart in relation to their respective rights and obligations arising out of the agreement of 7 April 2004, it would seem that the Court will become involved, albeit reluctantly, in considering the grant of ongoing interlocutory and declaratory relief to either party. 52 There remains for immediate consideration what course should be implemented in relation to the presently outstanding applications of the IEL Group for declaratory relief. I am concerned as to the utility of the ADJR applications, geared as they presently purport to be to a statutory basis alone, and thus without reference additionally or alternatively to the provisions of the agreement in writing of 7 April 2004. I propose to list the proceedings the subject of those applications, as well as the current proceedings, for mention within seven days or so. I invite both parties to mutually consult in the meantime in order to produce an agreed framework for formal directions, with a view to the early resolution of an expedient process by which would be forthwith put in operation, in order to enable the parties relevantly and appropriately to carry into effect the terms of the agreement in writing of 7 April 2004, to an extent geared to disputes presently on hand, and in particular to facilitate the applicants obtaining a review of the appropriateness of quantification of the penalty regime imposed by the Commissioner. Draft forms of declaratory relief proposed by each party, consistently with these reasons, should be provided to my Chambers on or before 4.00 pm on 17 August 2004. Either party should have liberty to apply on two days prior notice. 53 Nothing indicated in these reasons should be taken as indicating one way or another any foreshadowed response to the presently filed ADJR applications. It will be necessary or appropriate for the parties to provide an analysis of existing authorities involving judicial review of penalties imposed by the Commissioner in the context of the present and previous statutory provisions, and of any material differences between the same. Consideration will need to be made to the standing of the present applicants, by reference to the relief to be sought. If it is necessary or appropriate to add all IEL Group members to the proceedings, I will give further consideration to a reasonable quantification of filing fees. 54 I will reserve the costs of the present proceedings for later consideration. I certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Conti.

Counsel for the Applicant: CC Branson QC and PM Fraser

Solicitor for the Applicant: Blake Dawson Waldron

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing: 27 May, 8 and 23 June and 16 July 2004