THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM.
39 His Honour delivered a careful and detailed judgment. The summary here set out necessarily omits much of the detail contained in the judgment.
40 There is a detailed discussion of the evidence that was given by Mr Daniels, Mr Cottam and Sir Ronald Brierley. Much of that evidence was not controversial. However, there was an important factual question which the learned Primary Judge was required to resolve, namely, whether at some time after the implementation of the Spassked structure it was intended that dividends would be declared in favour of Spassked. We will return to that evidence later.
41 The learned Primary Judge then discussed a number of cases. He concluded that the question whether interest incurred by a taxpayer was incurred in gaining or producing assessable income was ordinary to be determined by looking at the objective circumstances. What was involved was a question of characterisation. Reference was made to the judgment of the High Court in Ronpibon Tin NL & Tongkah Compund NL v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 47 where the Court said at 57:
'… to come within the initial part of the sub-section ['losses or outgoings ... incurred in gaining or producing ... assessable income'] it is both sufficient and necessary that the occasion of the loss or outgoing should be found in whatever is productive of the assessable income or, if none be produced, would be expected to produce assessable income.'
42 The reference in that passage to 'expectation', linked as it was to the occasion of the outgoing signified, his Honour said, that 'the voluntary incurring of a loss or outgoing must be seen to be explicable by the taxpayer's favourably looking forward to' the gaining or producing of assessable income as a result, or must be seen to be 'for', or 'for the purpose of', or 'directed to' the gaining or producing of such income.' The word 'expectation' was not, his Honour said, to be understood in the mere neutral factual sense.
43 However, the Commissioner had submitted that it was necessary in the present case to look at the subjective purposes of the taxpayer, through its officers and once this was done it could be seen, or so it was submitted, that the Spassked structure, and the loans which were entered into by Spassked as a result of its implementation, were designed to eliminate the dividend traps and to obtain deductions for losses to be transferred to the many companies in the IEL group. So, it was said, the interest was not incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income but for other purposes such as reducing income tax.
44 His Honour, while preferring to consider the question by reference to objective factors said that this did not mean that subjective expectation or purpose was irrelevant to the identification of the purpose which characterised the incurrence of the loss or outgoing. His Honour found 'that there was no agreed plan, mechanism or time frame, according to which Spassked would cease to be a dividend trap, cease to be a repository of losses, and begin to receive dividends from GIH'. Further his Honour found that the receipt by Spassked of dividends from GIH formed no part of the motivation, subjective purpose or impetus behind the Spassked restructuring. His Honour did not find the testimony of either Mr Daniels or Mr Cottam persuasive. His Honour said that he was not satisfied that Mr Daniels himself expected that Spassked would cease to accrue interest to IEF and commence to receive dividends. His Honour said that it was his view that Mr Daniels had not given more than a fleeting consideration to the likely duration of the Spassked structure as his hope was that it would continue to be used so long as it was useful and no change of circumstances required it to be abandoned.
45 His Honour said that Mr Cottam's evidence was 'generally unsatisfactory' on this issue.
46 In reaching the conclusion that the interest received was not incurred in gaining assessable income his Honour took into account a number of matters which his Honour referred to as 'Particular Circumstances'. One in particular was the subject of criticism by counsel for the appellants as being wrong in law. We shall return to that matter later. Because the significance of this subparagraph assumed importance during argument it is useful to set out here all the matters mentioned by his Honour so that the significance of the subparagraph to his Honour's conclusion can be appreciated:
'Particular circumstances
The circumstances described in the numbered paragraphs below have varying degrees of relevance to the factual questions:
o whether the interest expense was incurred by Spassked, that is, whether Spassked's course of borrowing at interest from IEF was engaged in by Spassked, in gaining or producing assessable income in the form of dividends from GIH; and
o whether the interest expense was necessarily incurred, that is, whether Spassked's course of borrowing at interest from IEF was necessarily engaged in, in Spassked's carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income in the form of dividends from GIH.
1. The terms of the borrowings were not reduced to writing and were not recorded in the minutes of meetings of the boards of directors of borrower or lender. Such contemporaneous records as exist are, generally speaking, only records of movements of money.
2. The directors of Spassked, being also the directors of IEF, GIH and most of the Subcos (though not of IEL):
o were in a position, and, I am satisfied, intended, to act in what they perceived to be the interests of the Group as a whole, rather than the specific interests of one or more of the companies of which they were directors; and
o in their capacity as directors of Spassked, borrowed knowing what was to be the destination and use of the money borrowed as well, at least in a general sense, as the destination and use of any income which the deployment of that money would generate, that is, of any dividends the Subcos would receive from the underlying investments.
3. As noted earlier, since there was no agreed term of any of the ten loans from IEF to Spassked, by implication, they were repayable in full upon demand by IEF, whether with or without the prior giving of reasonable notice. But, again, repayment would not be required unless for some reason this was seen to be in the interests of the Group as a whole.
4. So long as Spassked was incurring an interest liability to IEF or had undistributed losses, it would not receive dividends from GIH.
5. As Daniels acknowledged, in view of (4) above, and the fact that Spassked's 'A' shares in GIH were its only investments, so long as that situation continued, Spassked would not have the necessary income with which to pay the interest accruing on its borrowings from IEF, which therefore would have to be capitalised. Spassked could therefore be expected to make a loss each year of the order of the amount of the capitalised interest for that year. Except to the extent the losses were transferred by Spassked to other members of the Group, they would accumulate in Spassked.
6. The streaming up of dividends to IEL could not occur through Spassked while Spassked remained a dividend trap, but it could occur directly through GIH, by reason of IEL's holding of 'B' shares in GIH. In fact, in the period 1988 to 1994, $33,378,828 (in franked dividends, representing the total amount of franked dividends received by GIH during that period from the Subcos) was streamed up to IEL in this way.
7. GIH used the funds received from Spassked (and the $150,000,000 subscribed by IEL for 'B' shares in GIH) in subscribing for shares in the Subcos which were:
(a) shelf companies; and
(b) already capitalised companies within the Group,
in most cases, the latter.
8. Money paid by GIH to a Subco would be applied by the Subco, first, in discharging any interest bearing debts it owed to companies in the Group, in particular, to IEF. This had the effect, as Daniels acknowledged it was intended to do, of enabling the Subco:
o to stream up to GIH, free of any dividend trap problem, any dividends the Subco received from its underlying investments; and
o to enjoy the full s 46 rebate in respect of dividends it received.
9. (a)Shelf companies referred to in 7(a) above would deposit with IEF at interest the funds they received from GIH, until those funds were required, if they were required at all, to enable the shelf company to make a specific investment.
(b)The already capitalised companies within the Group referred to in 7(b) above would deposit with IEF, at interest, any surplus funds received from GIH remaining after their intercompany debt was paid off as described in (8) above.
10. Daniels agreed that it was an element of the Spassked Structure that 'at least in [the] early years' Spassked would be incurring losses because it would be incurring interest to IEF and would not be receiving income with which to pay that interest, and that Spassked would transfer the resulting losses to other members of the Group.
11. Daniels said that 'the major'reasons for adopting the Spassked Structure in preference to other structures that were considered were that:
o it enabled franked dividends to be streamed up to IEL without being subsumed in a dividend trap;
o it enabled unfranked dividends to be streamed up to GIH without being subsumed in a dividend trap; and
o it enabled maximisation of the amounts of losses available to be transferred to members of the Group.
12. Daniels said that there were three other reasons which were not 'critical', and which would not themselves have led to the Spassked Restructuring, but which were considered 'as part of the structure'. They were that:
o pre-capitalised shelf companies would be readily available as and when required, through which acquisitions or other investments could be made;
o the Group would be rid of 'pockets of non-wholly owned companies' and any associated problem for 'grouping for section 80 purposes';
o the possibility would be opened up that 'the company owning an asset [might] be sold in lieu of the asset which may yield a higher cost base for tax purposes'.
Daniels agreed that as events transpired, generally, advantage was not taken of the first and third of these matters, that is, most of the shelf companies capitalised by GIH in January 1988 were not in fact used to acquire external assets, and in all cases underlying assets were sold rather than the companies owing them.
13. Importantly, neither Daniels nor Cottam suggested that the derivation of dividend income from GIH formed any part of the motivation behind the Spassked Restructuring: rather, Spassked's case is that it was expected as a matter of neutral fact that at some time in the future dividends would begin to flow to it from GIH. As I have indicated earlier, in my opinion this is not sufficient to bring a loss or outgoing within subs 51(1).
14. Progressively down to 1998, Spassked transferred out to members of the Group all of its tax losses amounting to some $3.2 billion to be applied against their otherwise taxable incomes, that is to say, income against the tax on which no rebate under s 46 of the Act was to be applied. Daniels agreed that 'the reason for making the losses …, for transferring the losses [pursuant to s 80G of the Act], was to reduce the amount of tax that the other members of the group would otherwise have had to pay.'
15. It was to be expected and was in fact expected, by Spassked's directors, that the Subcos would receive substantial dividend income from the underlying investments. Over the 1988-1994 financial years, the Subcos received approximately $83.4 million of franked dividends and approximately $1.454 billion of unfranked dividends. Because the Subcos had been rendered clear of debts and associated interest liabilities, those dividends were not subsumed in dividend traps at the Subco level. What happened to those funds? As previously noted, GIH paid to IEL franked dividends totalling $33,378,828 (the amount of franked dividends GIH itself had received from the Subcos), and to Spassked the two unfranked dividends totalling $43,962,139 previously mentioned. This left GIH holding a balance of $182,749,388 of unfranked dividends it had received from the Subcos available for streaming up to Spassked, but not in fact streamed up to it. But perhaps more significantly, the Subcos were left holding some $50 million of franked dividends and some $1.227 billion of unfranked dividends which, so far as GIH's articles of association were concerned, could have been streamed up to GIH and thence to Spassked and (in the case of franked dividends only) to IEL. There would be no streaming up of dividends to Spassked so long as it was a dividend trap and still had transferable losses. In relation to the latter, the Commissioner submits as follows:
"The importance to the IEL group of maximising the tax losses is illustrated by the impact of the losses on the total taxation position of the members of the group. In the year of income ended 30 June 1991 the total taxable income of the IEL group was $1,309,955,903.00 (before the transfer of losses), $162,665,425.00 of which represented rebateable dividends … After allowing for the rebateable dividends, the resulting total taxable income was $1,147,685,524.00. This figure was reduced to $5,460,747.00 by the transfer of tax losses in the sum of $1,142,224,777.00. Spassked's contribution to these losses was $642,273,167.00. In the year of income ended 30 June 1992, the total taxable income of the IEL group (before the transfer of losses) was $4,045,564,415.00, $2,860,074,321.00 of which represented rebateable dividends. After allowing for the rebateable dividends, the resulting total taxable income was $1,181,494,467.00. This figure was reduced to $699,872.00 by the transfer of tax losses of $1,180,794,595. Spassked's contribution to the transfer of losses was $800,415,065.00. In the year of income ended 30 June 1993, the total taxable income of the IEL group (before the transfer of losses) was $676,949,195. After allowing for the rateable dividends, the resulting total taxable income was $430,708,195. This figure was reduced to nil by the transfer of tax losses. Spassked's contribution to the transfer of losses was $200,917,810 ..."
Daniels, said of Spassked's ceasing to be a dividend trap and a repository of losses, "the two go together. It cease[s] to be a dividend trap. It ceases to be a borrower. It ceases to have interest deductions."
16. It was the Administration Team and the tax division within the Group (in particular, Daniels and Latham), not the Investment Team, which perceived a restructuring of the Group to be desirable and initiated exploration of the question.
17. Similarly, while Price approved of the Spassked Structure, it was the Administration Team (notably Latham and Cottam), not the Investment Team, which determined the timing and amounts of the transactions by which the Spassked Structure was implemented.
18. Nonetheless, there was a 'very strong desire' on the part of the Investment Team that IEL be in a position to receive franked dividends and pass them on to its shareholders. But any incurring of interest in any company down the line from IEL would impede the flow of such dividends up to it.
19. Daniels said that to the extent that a liability to pay interest down the line constituted an impediment to the free flow of dividends up to IEL, 'there was a necessity to try and improve that situation'.
20. I am not persuaded that simplification of the complex debt and equity lines within the Group explains the Spassked Restructuring. Overall, those lines appear to have remained as complex afterwards as they were before. The Spassked Structure may have had simpler debt and equity lines than alternative forms of restructuring that were being considered, but that is a different matter. In any event, a motive of simplification of debt and equity lines does not assist Spassked in relation to the issues under subs 51(1).
21. I am satisfied that the dominant motivation for the Spassked Structure was to be found in the following interrelated considerations:
o the removal of many dividend traps in the Group in favour of one large dividend trap (Spassked) which could be sidestepped, so that dividends, whether franked or unfranked, could be streamed up to GIH and franked dividends paid to IEL;
o ensuring the availability of s 46 tax rebates; and
o the concentration of all transferable tax losses in a single company in the Group (Spassked).
But this alone does not signify that the interest expense lay outside the terms of subs 51(1): consistently with the subjective motivation described, the borrowings might also have been explained by an expectation (in the positive sense explained at [164]-[166]) or purpose of gaining or producing assessable income.
22. The dispute with the ATO did not arise before early 1991 and did not affect the decision of GIH whether to pay a dividend to Spassked in the years ended 30 June 1988, 1989 and 1990. Moreover, Daniels conceded that it would not have affected that decision in respect of the year ended 30 June 1991 to the same extent as it did later years. Quite apart from the tax dispute with the ATO, GIH would have continued not to pay dividends to Spassked because Spassked remained a dividend trap, and did so, as Daniels agreed, at least until he left IEL on 30 June 1994.
23. Spassked was the only shareholder in GIH entitled to unfranked dividends. It follows that, unless GIH's articles of association were altered:
o if there was an expectation or purpose that Spassked would cease to be a dividend trap and a repository of losses and that GIH would then pay unfranked dividends, there was an expectation or purpose that payment of them would be made to Spassked; and
o if the facts suggest that GIH intended to pay unfranked dividends, they suggest that it intended to pay them to Spassked.
But I am not satisfied that any such expectation, purpose or intention existed. It must not be overlooked that it was open to GIH, if it wished to upstream unfranked dividends it had received from the Subcos, to pay the relevant tax and pay franked dividends to IEL. That is, in effect, it was possible, by paying the relevant tax to 'convert' incoming unfranked dividends into outgoing franked dividends.'
47 His Honour's accordingly at [236] did not accept: