What is meant by "absence of re-negotiation" in cl 5?
30 The principles of construction of enterprise agreements are well established.
31 First, the task of interpreting the agreement turns on the language it uses "understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose": Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [2] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J).
32 Second, while one starts with the ordinary meaning of the words, the words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities: City of Wanneroo v Holmes (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378 (French J). Rather, as the Full Court put it in Workpac Pty Ltd v Skene (2018) 264 FCR 536 (Tracey, Bromberg and Rangiah JJ) at [197]:
[I]ndustrial agreements are made for various industries in the light of the customs and working conditions of each, and they are frequently couched in terms intelligible to the parties but without the careful attention to form and draftsmanship that one expects to find in an Act of Parliament (Holmes at 378-379, citing George A Bond & Company Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498 at 503 (Street J)). To similar effect, it has been said that the framers of such documents were likely of a "practical bent of mind" and may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in a way likely to be understood in the relevant industry rather than with legal niceties and jargon, so that a purposive approach to interpretation is appropriate and a narrow or pedantic approach is misplaced: see Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 (Madgwick J); Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association v Woolworths SA Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 67 at [16] (Marshall, Tracey and Flick JJ); Amcor at [96] (Kirby J).
33 By ground 1 of the notice of appeal, Qube alleged that the primary judge misconstrued cl 5 of the Railways Agreement because, on its proper construction, it did not provide for remuneration increases if Qube continued to negotiate for a replacement agreement. Qube argued that the ordinary meaning of the noun "re-negotiation" is to engage in negotiation "again or further" and the words "in the absence of re-negotiation" simply refer to the absence of that process. Thus, Qube reasoned, construed in accordance with its ordinary meaning, the words "[i]n the absence of re-negotiation" in cl 5 of the Railways Agreement mean in the absence of the parties to that agreement taking part in the process of negotiation. As long as negotiations had begun, Qube maintained, there was a "re-negotiation" and the primary judge erred in finding otherwise.
34 Qube submitted that its construction was supported not only by the text but also by considerations of context and purpose.
35 As to context, Qube pointed to the inclusion on the signatures page of the future negotiations clause. It argued that this clause was "instructive" in several respects. First, by using the terms "new agreement" and "other agreements" the parties were aware of the "critical distinction" between "negotiations" and the product of negotiations (a new or other agreement). Second, the words used in this clause are different from the words used in cl 5, a point which appears to be no different in substance from the first. Third, this clause "informs the obligation in cl 5". Qube submitted:
The parties intended to commence negotiations two months before the nominal expiry of the IRA Agreement. Clause 5 of the IRA Agreement seen in context was a mechanism to provide an incentive to do so or penalise Qube Rail for not doing so. If there was no re-negotiation, certain pay increases would follow. The parties could not have contemplated that the negotiation process would commence and conclude (with an approved replacement agreement) in a two month period. It is incongruous to confer upon the parties the objective intention that they had in mind that a comprehensive and concluded replacement agreement would be reached within this period of two months or that the result of not being able to reach a concluded agreement within such a period would mean an automatic payment of a 3% wage increase on 1 April 2014 and each year thereafter until such an agreement could be reached. Such an interpretation would not be in line with the industrial realities of the enterprise agreement making process. That agreement making process (which occurs in the context of the FW Act) involves a number of procedural requirements including the issue of notice of employee representational rights, appointments of bargaining representatives (including ones other than the Union), negotiations with those bargaining representatives, the conclusion of the drafting of a new agreement, explanation of its terms, and all of the steps involved in putting it to a vote, providing for an access period and an approval process before the Commission: see, generally, ss 173, 178, 180, 181 and 228 of the FW Act.
36 Qube also submitted that the purpose of cl 5 was not only to identify the nominal expiry date, which is a legislative requirement, but also "to incentivise negotiation for a replacement agreement, and in turn disincentivise delay in entering negotiations". Qube argued that the Union's construction, which the primary judge accepted, would lead to the unintended consequence that, regardless of the prevailing economic conditions or the state of the business, employees could simply refuse to enter negotiations or not agree to Qube's offers and be guaranteed wage increases of 3% per annum in perpetuity. Qube noted that the primary judge said (at [29]) that cl 5 proceeded on an assumption that the parties will negotiate in good faith and that negotiation will be on-going. Consequently, his Honour explained, the entitlement to the increases in remuneration would only continue as long as negotiations proceeded in good faith. Qube submitted, that this "assumption" was not reflected in the words of cl 5 and there was nothing in the clause to support the inference his Honour drew. It argued that his Honour's reliance on the so-called assumption and "implied limitations" "underscored" the correctness of Qube's construction.
37 We are not persuaded by Qube's arguments.
38 First, stripped of context the meaning of the phrase "in the absence of re-negotiation" is ambiguous. As the primary judge recognised, "negotiate" can mean "to bring about by discussion and settlement of terms", which was the meaning urged by the Union, and it can also mean "to treat with another or others … in the preliminaries to a business deal", which was the meaning urged by Qube. His Honour referred to the definitions in the Macquarie Dictionary (3rd ed., 2002). "Negotiation" is defined as the "mutual discussion and arrangement of the terms of a transaction or agreement". "Renegotiate is defined as "to negotiate (something) again or further". Renegotiation can refer to the process of renegotiation or the achievement of a renegotiated agreement. What it means in the present case is entirely dependent on context. When the relevant contextual matters are brought into consideration, we are persuaded that the Union's construction is the correct one.
39 As the Union submitted, cl 5 reflects first, a settlement as to the term of operation; second, an understanding that the Railways Agreement might nonetheless continue to operate beyond the nominal term; and third, an agreement as to what would happen in that event, namely that the employees would receive the annual increases in remuneration guaranteed during that term. The purpose of the third matter is to deal with the question of pay in the interregnum between the nominal expiry date and the negotiation of a replacement agreement by ensuring that the agreed wage increases were maintained if there was delay in making a replacement agreement.
40 We reject the notion that the purpose of the provision was to provide an incentive to the parties to enter into negotiations. Nor do we accept that the prospect of delay in reaching agreement means that it was unlikely that the interpretation urged upon, and accepted by, the primary judge was intended.
41 As the Union pointed out, by their commitment in the future negotiations clause, the parties had agreed to start negotiations on a new agreement before the end of the nominal term of the Railways Agreement - at least two months before. The agreement made in the future negotiations clause meant that either party could compel the other to start negotiations on pain of a penalty (for contravening the Agreement). Further, the parties had agreed to "move forward in 'good faith'" and, once negotiations began, they were entitled to rely on the good faith bargaining obligations imposed by Div 8 of Pt 2-4 of the FW Act.
42 In these circumstances, it is unlikely that the purpose of cl 5 was to provide an incentive to negotiate. There was no need for such an incentive.
43 Clause 5 was in substantially similar terms to cl 3 of the predecessor enterprise agreement, the Independent Rail Australia Union Collective Agreement 2008 (2008 Collective Agreement) and was obviously based on it. Clause 3 of the 2008 Collective Agreement read:
This Agreement shall operate from the date of lodgement and shall have a nominal expiry date of 1st April 2011. In the absence of renegotiation, the last increase of pay detailed in Clause 26.4 will be the agreed increase of pay for each anniversary of such date thereafter.
44 Clause 26.4 provided:
This company agrees that it will increase the rates of pay each year on the anniversary of the lodgement date in line with the Consumer Price Index (All Groups) that is posted in the previous September Quarter by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
45 This appears to be the origin of the 3% annual wage increase for which the Railways Agreement provided. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the CPI rose 3.3% through the year to the March quarter 2011.
46 Both parties would have been alive to the possibility of delay in negotiations for a new agreement. The evident purpose of providing for increases in wages after the nominal expiry date was to ensure that employees were not prejudiced by delay in negotiations. In circumstances where the CPI is rising, it would be unsurprising that the employees would have been concerned to protect the real value of their wages while the negotiations were under way. There is no reason to believe that the IRA, or a reasonable employer in its position, would not have agreed to do so.
47 Ground 1 of the notice of appeal should be dismissed.