I infer as a fact that the disputed reports were and were intended to be the source of information that Powercor used and intended to use for its normal business purposes including: obtaining legal advice; providing information to the Royal Commission; providing information to the regulator under the Electricity Safety Act 1998; providing information to the Coroner, if need be; providing information to its insurer; providing information for its internal Powercor Asset Failure Reporting & Investigation procedure; and in reviewing its maintenance program and the continued use of the type of equipment that failed at Coleraine. As I have indicated, no evidence was led by Powercor to the contrary.
THE FAILURE TO CALL THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
The failure of the CEO to give evidence was not explained. I assume that the CEO at the time was Mr Shane Breheny who also prepared a witness statement for the Royal Commission. There was no suggestion that he was not available to give evidence by affidavit of otherwise. He instructed Ms Rands to carry out the investigation which was likely to involve her obtaining information from experts. I can only infer what his purposes were in obtaining the report. His failure to give evidence in circumstances where it is central to the establishment of the privilege does give rise to the inference that his evidence would not have assisted Powercor's claim to privilege. As has been discussed, the plaintiffs seek to draw the inferences from the evidence that Powercor needed the information for multiple purposes and that legal advice from Ms Rands was not the dominant purpose. As the CEO failed to give evidence to rebut those inferences, the court is entitled to more readily draw those inferences.[5]
I find that there were multiple purposes for which the information in the reports were to be used. I accept an important one was to give legal advice to Powercor and to use it in the anticipated legal proceedings in giving privileged advice about the Royal Commission. Nevertheless, Powercor bears the onus of establishing that the privileged purpose was the dominant purpose.[6]
I find that Powercor has not done that. Powercor led no evidence on its internal procedures that would have required or made use of the information in the reports. The court can only imply that the requirement for the
information would have been legally necessary and important to the operations of Powercor's business.
Powercor failed to produce evidence of the CEO or explain the requirements Powercor had for the information other than for legal advice. It failed to explain its legal obligations of reporting under the Electricity Safety Act 1998, WorkCover, the Coroners Act 1985 or the duty of its officers under the Corporations Act 2001 or otherwise at common law to have the information in the reports to carry out their duties whether legal or otherwise. Powercor failed to explain the variety of uses to which the information would be put and why it was needed.
Having regard merely to the duties placed on officers under the Corporations Act 2001 and in particular their duty to exercise their powers with care and diligence,[7] the officers of Powercor were probably bound to find out what happened and the role Powercor's assets played in the Coleraine fire so that they could take proper steps to carry out their reporting obligations, make claims on their insurers, attend to maintenance issues, and attend to a myriad of other matters in the interests of Powercor. As I have said, Powercor has led no evidence on these matters to establish the privilege claim.
Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the dominant purpose Powercor had in obtaining the disputed reports was for privileged purposes. I find that the reports are not protected by legal professional privilege.