The Facts
19 The transactions which took place in 2012 are described in my injunction reasons and I will not repeat what I said in those reasons.
20 The circumstances which gave rise to the interim injunction and application for an interlocutory injunction were described in my injunction reasons as follows (at [38]-[39]):
Bidco has not delivered to the Agent the audited consolidated financial statements for the Holdco group for the financial year ended 30 June 2016 as required by clause 16.1 of the PLNSA. That led to a letter from the ICG to Holdco and Bidco dated 20 February 2017, but not delivered until 21 February 2017. The next step, assuming the interlocutory injunction is not granted, will be a formal demand under clause 18.2(b), and if that is not met, the ICG could (among other things) declare all or part of the Loan payable on demand under clause 18.9. There is also power under the General Security Interest to appoint a receiver.
A meeting of the board of directors of each of the four applicants was held on 22 February 2017. Dr Heine and Mr Shelswell resigned from the board of each of Holdco and Bidco before a resolution authorising the appointment of lawyers on behalf of the companies was passed. In the case of SCF Holdings and SCF Group, the resolution authorising the appointment of lawyers was passed on the casting vote of Mr Sykes.
21 I granted an interim injunction on 22 February 2017 in the following terms:
3. Upon the applicants giving the undertaking set out in Annexure A to these orders, the respondents and each of them be restrained, whether by their servants, agents, or otherwise, until further order from taking any steps under, or purporting to invoke or exercise any rights set out in any of the written agreements, deeds or other instruments between any one or more of the respondents and any one or more of the applicants, including, without limitation:
3.1 the Share Sale/Purchase Agreement dated 25 May 2012 between Archer Capital Growth Funds Pty Limited as Custodian for Archer Capital GF1A Pty Limited as Trustee for the Archer Capital GF Trust 1A, Archer Capital Growth Funds Pty Limited as Custodian for Archer Capital GF1B Pty Limited as Trustee for the Archer Capital GF Trust 1B, LMPACT Pty Limited as Trustees for the LMPAC Family Trust, Richard Sykes as Trustee for the Richard Sykes Family Trust, Richard Sykes, LMPACA Pty Limited ACN 125 011 636 as Trustee for the LMPAC1 Super Fund; Kym Malcolm Dunn, Masnun McNamara, Paul Desmond Teisseire and Joyce Kay Woody as Trustees for the Teisseire/Woody Superannuation Fund; Matthew William Hancock and Alicia Michelle Hancock, Nicholas Schwartz and Nicole Elizabeth Handley, Nicholas Woodward as Trustee for the Woodward Family Trust, Jonathan Paul Coad, Matthew Davis Harris and Rose Harris, Popeye Bidco Pty Limited ACN 158 359 285, Popeye Holdco Pty Limited ACN 158 356 471;
3.2 the Subscription and Shareholders Deed dated 25 May 2012 between Richard Sykes, Nicholas Woodward, Kym Malcolm Dunn, Jonathan Paul Coad, Matthew William Hancock, Nicholas Schwartz, Matthew Davis Harris and Brett Carthew, Richard Sykes as Trustee for the Richard Sykes Family Trust, Nicholas Woodward as Trustee for the Woodward Family Trust, Alicia Michelle Hancock, Nicole Elizabeth Handley, Rose Harris and LMPACT Pty Limited as Trustee for the LMPAC Family Trust, Intermediate Capital Group Plc, Popeye HoldCo Pty Limited ACN 158 356 471, Intermediate Capital Group plc; and
3.3 the Preferred Loan Notes Subscription Agreement dated 25 May 2012 between Popeye Bidco Pty Limited ACN 158 359 285, Popeye Holdco Pty Limited ACN 158 356 471, Intermediate Capital Australia Pacific Limited, Intermediate Capital Group plc, and AET Structured Finance Services Pty Limited ACN 106 424 088.
22 I heard submissions on whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted on 7 March 2017. The interlocutory injunction which was sought was in similar terms to the interim injunction, save that reference to action under the Subscription and Shareholders Deed dated 25 May 2012 was removed. On 10 April 2017, I refused the application for an interlocutory injunction. The costs now sought relate to those applications.
23 It is necessary for me to provide some further details of the relevant events.
24 On 21 February 2017, the respondents provided a letter to the Popeye Companies, dated 20 February 2017, advising them that they were in breach of a clause in the Preferred Loan Note Subscription Agreement concerning the provision of audited consolidated financial statements for the Group and that they had until 5.00 pm on 22 February 2017 to remedy the breach and that failing the remediation of the breach, the respondents intended to instruct the agent to serve a formal demand. Upon receiving the letter, Mr Sykes on behalf of "SCF" sought legal advice. One firm approached by Mr Sykes declined to act because it did not have the resources to deal with the matter. Mr Sykes approached Cosoff Cudmore Knox late in the evening of 21 February 2017.
25 The next day, there were board meetings of each of the four applicant companies. During the meetings, Dr Heine and Mr Shelswell resigned as directors of Popeye Holdco and Popeye Bidco. In the case of each applicant, a resolution was passed that the company appoint independent lawyers to advise and act in relation to its rights and obligations. In the case of Popeye Holdco and Popeye Bidco, the resolution was passed by its two directors (Messrs Sykes and Woodward) and, in the case of SCF Holdings and the SCF Group, by Mr Sykes exercising his casting vote over the opposition of Dr Heine and Mr Shelswell.
26 Cosoff Cudmore Knox immediately sought an undertaking from the respondents not to proceed on their notice. A very short time after, the applicant companies sought relief from the Court which relief I granted on an interim basis. On the same day, the solicitors acting for the respondents wrote to the solicitors acting for the applicant companies advising him that they considered that Messrs Sykes and Woodward were acting in their own interests and not in the interests of the companies. The matter came back before the Court on 27 February 2017 at which time the respondents made submissions concerning the inadequacy of the undertaking as to damages. On that day, the issue of whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted was listed for hearing on 7 March 2017. On 3 March 2017, the solicitors for the respondents wrote to the solicitors for the applicant companies advising them that they considered the undertaking as to damages to be worthless. On 7 March 2017, I heard the application for an interlocutory injunction and reserved my decision. On 22 March 2017, the respondents put the non-parties on notice by letter that they intended to seek non-party costs. On 10 April 2017, I refused the application for an interlocutory injunction. The applicant companies did not seek leave to appeal and nor have the non-parties sought to progress this proceeding under some residual power as directors or by the exercise of derivative rights. On 13 April 2017, the non-parties and other shareholders commenced the shareholders' action. The documents put before the Court on this application indicate that the legal fees of the applicant companies were paid by the SCF applicants, rather than the Popeye applicants.
27 The respondents pointed to my identification in the injunction reasons of difficulties in the case of the applicant companies, particularly the state of mind attribution point (at [49]-[53]) and submitted that some of these difficulties would not be faced by the shareholders.
28 One of the elements the respondents seek to establish is that the applicant companies were insolvent or men of straw. I made the following findings in the injunction reasons (at [36], [57] and [71]):
The business of the Holdco group did not grow as anticipated and rather than five years of growth before another sale process and the realisation of the investment in equity envisaged for June 2017, those with an interest in the Holdco group were, towards the end of 2016, considering the refinancing and restructuring of the Holdco group with a view to what was called delivery of a new plan to June 2019. The proposal for refinancing and restructuring involved converting the Preferred Loan Notes to equity and, as the paper which sets out the proposal states, setting all current equity to zero. The senior debt (i.e., the NAB debt) is said to be approximately $40 million and the estimated value of the enterprise is said to be $132 million. The parties with an interest in the Holdco group have not been able to reach an agreement as to the refinancing and restructuring of the group.
Absent an injunction, the ICG could serve a notice under clause 18.2(b) of the PLNSA. Failure to comply with the notice would be an Event of Default which could lead to a declaration that the Loan is payable on demand and the appointment of a receiver. The steps which the respondents could take would be subject to the undertaking, but leaving aside the penalty issue, Holdco and Bidco would be required to repay approximately $173 million. They could not do that. They could not do that even if all of their assets are sold. On present indications, there would be a shortfall in repayment to the ICG of approximately $81 million (Enterprise value $132 million - Senior debt of $40 million - Respondents' debt of $173 million).
The applicants do not contend that from 25 May 2017 the respondents will not be able to initiate an Exit Event and that the respondents will not be entitled to the repayment of an amount of approximately $173 million. If the respondents' case is correct, then absent the respondents granting an extension of time, the applicants will be liable to repay the respondents approximately $173 million on 30 June 2017. On the evidence before me, there is no prospect the applicants will be able to do that without a major injection of cash. On the evidence before me absent a major injection of cash, the applicants will recover something in the order of $92 million.
29 Nothing was put on the present application to suggest that these conclusions need to be qualified in any way. It is clear that any costs incurred by the applicant companies would diminish the secured amount ultimately recovered by the respondents. The non-parties suggested in argument that there was no proof that the applicant companies were insolvent in the sense of being unable to pay their debts as and when they fell due. I do not think that this is the correct way to analyse the matter. The key point is that the applicant companies were in a parlous financial condition and could not survive without a major injection of cash. I think that is sufficient to engage the first of the three elements I have previously identified.
30 It is convenient to note the current financial position of the applicant companies, other than Popeye Holdco. The facts agreed between the respondents and the non-parties are as follows:
The ICG Parties, Mr Sykes and Mr Woodward agree the following matters
1. In early 2018, the receivers for Holdco accepted an offer from Intermediate Capital Asia Pacific 2008 GP Limited for the acquisition of 100% of the shares in Bidco in accordance with [3] below, in return for a release of Holdco and a reduction of the debt owed by Bidco under the PLNs.
2. The assets of Bidco, SCF Holdings and SCF Group now exceed the amount owing on the PLNs and each of those companies:
a. is solvent; and
b. is able to meet a costs order.
3. Popeye Bidco is, in consequence of the transaction referred to at [1] above, now wholly owned by Specialised Container Holdings Pty Limited (Newco). Newco is itself wholly owned by a Jersey Limited Partnership known as Specialised Container Holdings L.P (JLP)., which is registered in Jersey. Intermediate Capital Asia Pacific 2008 GP Limited is the general partner of JLP.
4. Holdco is now in liquidation and has no assets.
5. The limited partners of the JLP are Intermediate Capital Group PLC, Hartland Investment Pte. Ltd, and Intermediate Capital Asia Pacific 2008 GP Limited as general partner for Intermediate Capital Asia Pacific Fund 2008 L.P., each of whom is an ICG Party.
31 I turn now to the evidence of Mr Driscoll. He, like the non-parties and others, was a management shareholder. By December 2016, it was apparent to all concerned with the group that it could not survive without a major restructure. The management shareholders were trying to negotiate a favourable deal with the respondents and Mr Sykes was involved in negotiations with the respondents' representatives. Mr Sykes was also trying to rally the management shareholders to support the negotiations and then, as events transpired, to take legal proceedings.
32 Mr Driscoll gave evidence of discussions he had with Mr Sykes. At some point, it is clear that Mr Sykes considered that having two actions against the respondents could result in a favourable settlement for management shareholders because of the costs to the respondents of defending two actions. I do not think that this conclusion could be contentious. Nor could it be contentious that, from January 2017, if not before, legal proceedings by the management shareholders were a possibility. The critical issue is whether an action by the applicant companies was part of a formulated strategy prior to 22 February 2017 or was no more than a reaction to the notice served by the respondents. If the former, that would be a powerful reason in favour of an order for non-party costs. If the latter, that might affect the long-term costs of these proceeding if they are continued, or perhaps aspects of the shareholder proceedings, but not the present application.
33 There was correspondence between Mr Sykes on the one hand, and Dr Heine or Mr Shelswell on the other, in late 2016, with a view to deciding upon a restructure, including a Management Incentive Package, which would be acceptable to the management shareholders and the respondents. Proposals were put by the respondents, but they were not acceptable to Mr Sykes who, on 13 December 2016, wrote that the respondents' offer did not "address the small shareholders along with a fairly poor result for myself". It seems that Mr Sykes sought legal advice as to the position of the management shareholders before 16 December 2016 and had not yet received it when he wrote to Mr Shelswell on that date.
34 At or about the same time, Mr Sykes was communicating with a group of management shareholders about his discussions with the respondents. On 19 December 2016, Mr Driscoll received a notice of a shareholders' meeting to be held on 21 December 2016. He attended the meeting and he gave unchallenged evidence that either Mr Sykes or Mr Woodward said the following:
We received an offer from ICG. It does not sufficiently deal with my shareholding, and it completely overlooks Brett and Kym [referring to Brett Carthew and Kym Dunn, former employees of SCF].
ICG is acting outside of the terms of its contract.
It is trying to revalue our shareholding and reset everything at $0.
We [that is, Richard Sykes and Nicholas Woodward] are trying to strike a new deal with ICG, to try and recover some of our funds [I took that as a reference to the Management Shareholders' investments in Holdco].
Management would seek to make you [that is, Management Shareholders] whole.
You will get an update from us later on.
35 By the time Mr Sykes wrote to Dr Heine on 19 January 2017, he had received some initial advice that there may be a number of causes of action associated with the transactions in 2012 and, in particular, that aspect of the transaction which involved the issuing of the Preferred Loan Notes. The tenor of the letter is that the causes of action were vested in the "non-ICG shareholders". Evidence of Mr Sykes confirms that in that he refers to rights "in our capacities as shareholders, against ICG and entities in the ICG Group".
36 Returning to Mr Driscoll's evidence, as I have said, there was a meeting of management shareholders on 21 December 2017. There was a second meeting on 14 March 2017. Although I did not deliver judgment on the application for an interlocutory injunction until 10 April 2017, all the costs which are the subject of the present application were effectively incurred up to and including the hearing on 7 March 2017, save and except for the costs of handing down judgment on 10 April 2017.
37 Mr Driscoll gave evidence of numerous telephone conversations and other conversations with Mr Sykes between 21 December 2016 and 14 March 2017 wherein Mr Sykes was urging Mr Driscoll to join a proposed class action by management shareholders against the respondents. Mr Driscoll thought that during the last week of February and the first week of March 2017, he was receiving at least three telephone calls a day from Mr Sykes. During those telephone conversations, Mr Sykes said words to the following effect:
ICG's offer is not sufficient.
We will seek to apply financial pressure on ICG to force a settlement.
We will commence law suits against them.
We are launching two Court proceedings. The first is on behalf of the business. The second will be a class action on behalf of all the Management Shareholders.
The first proceeding is to get an injunction to stop ICG from taking over the business and resetting our shareholding at $0. The second action is to get a better outcome for the Management Shareholders and it will flow straight after the first.
The entire management team needs to band together to force a negotiated outcome.
You have nothing to worry about. I am very confident that we will win.
This [the second action] will never go to Court. ICG will fold before that. It's 100% given that ICG will fold.
If we all band together, ICG will have to blink. They will have no option but to settle. They will not want this in the press, and they cannot afford to have a business without a management team.
Your job is safe if you stick with the management team.
38 I have considered Mr Driscoll's evidence very carefully. As I have said, the critical question is whether the two-case strategy was in place at the time the applicant companies brought this proceeding on 22 February 2017. I have taken into account as a significant factor that neither Mr Sykes nor Mr Woodward gave evidence refuting Mr Driscoll's evidence. Nevertheless, having regard to the cross-examination of Mr Driscoll, I am not satisfied that the two-case strategy was in place before the institution of this proceeding. Of importance in reaching this conclusion is the fact that the proceeding seems to have followed as a matter of urgency from the service of the notice by the respondents. Proceedings in those circumstance would not be unexpected. In saying that, I am not making any assumption about the merits. One of the perhaps unusual features of this application is that it is made before a final determination of the merits of the substantive issues in either this proceeding or the shareholders' proceeding.