25 The difference exposed by these decisions is whether fraud "does not necessarily involve any moral turpitude" (the view expressed by Lord Denning M.R. in Applegate) or whether moral turpitude must be shown[27]. What is clear, I think, is that the courts have tended against too narrow a construction of the words "fraud" or "fraudulent" in limitation provisions[28]. In this case, however, there is in my view conduct that may properly be described as moral turpitude on the part of the defendants. I will not repeat what I have said above in relation to my conclusion that the defendants had not satisfied me that they could rely upon the protection of clause 13. A dealing with the trust property in a way that prefers the commercial interests of the trustees (or of the directors of the trustees) to the broader interests of all the beneficiaries of the trust is, in my view, conduct amounting to moral turpitude. A breach of the self dealing rule is not merely a technical gateway to establishing a cause of action, rather it is a shorthand way of describing facts which indicate that people who assumed, and had, fiduciary obligations have preferred their interests to those of others in circumstances where they have assumed duties over a fund designed, even if only in part, to provide for the future welfare of dependant employees and their dependants. A transaction such as was entered into would lack moral turpitude, that is, it would be protected from criticism, where it could be shown by the defendants that they did their utmost to ensure that the interests of the beneficiaries had been adequately preserved, protected and looked after. This they have not done. Furthermore, their conduct subsequent to the transaction is, in my view, less than acceptable from a trustee, or from persons in the position able to influence a trustee. Some of that conduct, whether by intention or simply by its effect, had the consequence of preventing a full and prompt disclosure of the nature of the breach and the consequences which might flow from it. There was not a full statement to the beneficiaries about the details of the transaction at the time that it was entered into or for some time thereafter. The evidence given on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiffs had opportunities to make enquiries is not in my view sufficient in the context of a superannuation fund established for the benefit of employees. Such disclosures as were made were in my view inadequate for a full appreciation of the transaction as would enable a dissatisfied, or concerned, beneficiary to take steps to pursue any claim. I accept as accurate the complaints made by the plaintiffs that they had not been adequately informed of the underlying matters. Indeed, the reaction of Mr. Fried to suggestions which he may have regarded, and may even have been, offensive was not a reaction that was conducive of disclosure and was not appropriate for people occupying fiduciary positions. A trustee may properly be called to account for his or her activities and should not seek to have "quashed unceremoniously" suggestions that may call for an account even though the suggestions may be perceived, or may be, offensive. In cross-examination Mr. Fried said, understandably, that he would seek to quash suggestions that he had acted dishonestly. Understandable though it may be, a trustee has duties to discharge which must transcend personal feeling and, more to the point, any reluctance to accept full scrutiny may have the consequence of concealment. Lack of full disclosure was evident also in the conduct of the proceedings with unhelpful responses to notices to admit and less than responsive answers to some critical interrogatories. Such factors combine to bring the conduct of the defendants within the provisions of s.21(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958.