Morris C.J. adopted the view that the foregoing facts disclosed no fiduciary relationship between Page and Mrs. Fysh but that if there was one, the conditions under which a fiduciary may purchase from his beneficiary were satisfied. This appears to mean that the relation had terminated with the disclaimer; that the transaction had not been impeached within a reasonable time, that there was no fraud or concealment, that there was independent advice and that the consideration was adequate. When the learned judge said that the conditions mentioned in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. 33, p. 284, were satisfied this, it would seem, must have been his Honour's meaning. In the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Clark v. Clark [1] , which was reversed in the Privy Council [2] , Holroyd J., speaking for himself, Stawell C.J. and Higinbotham J. said: "In our opinion, until a person appointed executor unmistakably divests himself of that character, or by his solemn act puts it out of his power ever to clothe himself with it, he is as much incapacitated from purchasing from his co-executor as if he had obtained probate. The possibility of those evils which a Court of Equity apprehends from the conflict between his interest and his duty attaches to his acting in a doubtful as well as in a dual character" [3] . If this proposition were law the first step in support of the right which Mrs. Fysh claims would be effectively taken. But Sir Arthur Hobhouse in delivering the judgment of the Board expressed a very different view. "And their Lordships cannot agree", he said, "that a sale is to be avoided, merely because when entered upon the purchaser may, at his option, become the trustee of the property purchased, though in point of fact he never does become such. A man so placed might possibly use his power in such a way as to raise a case for setting aside the transaction, and whether David so acted is one of the questions to be decided. But that is a different thing altogether from the absolute disability attaching to one who would at the same moment be a vendor in trust for others and a purchaser on his own behalf" [4] David Clark, whom this passage mentions, was the surviving partner of the testator in that case and one of the two executors appointed by his will. The transaction was quite different from that in the present case and in the facts their Lordships perceived no ground for impeaching it. The appellant therefore finds no difficulty in distinguishing the actual decision. But the case certainly means that a person who is appointed an executor or trustee if he neither proves nor acts and subsequently renounces or disclaims is in the interval under no absolute incapacity from becoming a purchaser from an executor or trustee who does accept the office. It is in fact treated in the argument presented for Mrs. Fysh as one element, to which other considerations are added. One such consideration is, so it is contended, that immediately on the death of Fysh his realty devolved pursuant to s. 4 of the Administration and Probate Act 1935 upon the executors mentioned in his will, although the result of the disclaimer by Page might be that thereafter it must be considered to have vested as at death in Terry alone as executor. On this footing he was a trustee of the legal estate on 10th October 1941. It is unnecessary to pursue this argument. For plainly enough such a technical vesting could not matter in a question of the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship with Mrs. Fysh and as the disclaimer operated from Fysh's death the legal estate must now be regarded as having vested ab initio in Terry. A peculiarity in the case is that while on 9th October 1941 Mrs. Fysh authorised a sale of the farm for £4,600 the authority would not on its terms cover a sale to Page because it was an authority to Page and Terry as executors to sell. A further peculiarity is that while on 10th October 1941 Terry entered into a contract of sale to Page he made it impossible for himself to carry it out by vesting the property in Mrs. Fysh. She was not contractually bound to carry out the contract but her conveyance did effectuate it in fact. It is her conveyance therefore which matters. For it was the instrument and the only instrument which really involved a disposition of the property binding her whether contractually or in point of interest. The fact is not unimportant perhaps, because it means that it was on 29th May 1942 that Mrs. Fysh took the only step which involved any alienation of her interest. At that date she knew of course that Page was the purchaser. By that time Page had entered into possession. She had discussed his purchase of Brightside months ago not only with Websters but also with the solicitor, who acted for the estate as well as for other parties in the transaction. She had discussed it with him as early as 16th October 1941. Possibly she was under the impression that she was bound by the sale and that it only remained for her to complete it by conveyance when she would receive the net balance of the purchase money after the payment of mortgage and other debts. But she manifested, so far as the evidence shows, no reluctance to complete and she certainly raised no objection. It would seem therefore that the question of setting aside the transaction should be decided on the facts as they existed at the time of the conveyance. But however that may be, Mrs. Fysh must rest her claim to rescind the transaction on the general jurisdiction of the court to set aside an alienation of property brought about by unconscientious and unfair dealing. She cannot sustain her claim on the ground that Page occupied a fiduciary position necessarily disqualifying him from purchasing the trust property or that he stood in a specific relation to her of confidence or of influence. She can of course use his appointment by the will and the delay in disclaiming the offices of executor and trustee as one of the general circumstances of the case. In other words, these facts may take their place with other circumstances which she may rely upon in combination to show that there was unconscientious dealing or that a relation in fact of confidence or of influence existed between Page and herself. But her difficulty is that the evidence does not affirmatively show any of these things and it may indeed be doubted whether circumstances appear in evidence which would even cast the burden upon Page of explaining or justifying the transaction. But the point of most importance is the character of her equitable title if any to relief. What has been said makes it clear that she could not impeach the transaction except in virtue of an equity to set it aside to which she became entitled because of some unfair or unconscientious dealing. This means that the sale stood effective in law and equity unless and until she elected to avoid it and to seek rescission. But for a dozen years she stood by without attempting to do any such thing. In the meantime by 1952 the monetary expression of the value of the land had more than doubled. By the time of the issue of the writ the figure had grown still further. Since 1941 when Page made the purchase land sales control has come and gone. We have experienced a progressive loss in the purchasing power of money which is reflected in the expression of values. Rescission with restitutio in integrum would mean that Mrs. Fysh would receive back the farm possessing a value which if expressed in money is doubled or trebled, and Page would receive back the same amount of money he paid, viz. £4,600, without any adjustment on amount of the decreased purchasing power of the money. It is natural to suspect that the change in the monetary value of the land has seemed to Mrs. Fysh the most persuasive argument that in 1941 she must have been overreached. "It is only a rule of equity, that a trustee shall not purchase. In all cases in which length of time has not been allowed to operate against the title to relief, it has been shown that there has been a continuance of the circumstances under which the transaction first took place, as of the distress of the parties, or of the improper influence used, or of some other circumstance": per Sir William Grant M.R., Gregory v. Gregory [1] . In Roberts v. Tunstall [2] , a tenant for life who was also a trustee of the remainder with a power of appointment among a class, purchased the interest in remainder at an undervalue and obtained releases of the estate in remainder from the power of appointment. Fifteen years later a suit was brought to set aside the transaction but it failed on the ground of delay. Wigram V.C. said: "Where a transaction of this kind has been brought about by misrepresentation, concealment, or undue influence, or where the vendor is dependent on the bounty of the purchaser, the Court considers that the right of the vendor to rescind the sale exists, without the imputation of laches, until such time as it is shown that he was released from the position in which he was placed by those circumstances. The poverty of a vendor, added to the other circumstances, is also a material ingredient in such a case. But where none of these special grounds of complaint exist - where there is no misrepresentation, concealment or undue influence, and no dependency of the seller on the purchaser - where the right to rescind the transaction is an equity arising out of the transaction itself, as in the case of the sale of a reversionary interest, is it to be said that waiver will not apply, or that no time will be a bar, merely because the seller was poor?" [3] . When the Court is asked to rip up a transaction years after it has been completed the lapse of time itself is one of the elements bearing upon the equities that exist entitling the plaintiff to relief. If a plaintiff establishes prima-facie grounds for relief the question whether he is defeated by delay must itself be governed by the kind of considerations upon which the principles of equity proceed. If the delay means that to grant relief would place the party whose title might otherwise be voidable on equitable grounds in an unreasonable situation, or if, because of change of circumstances, it would give the party claiming relief an unjust advantage or would impose an unfair prejudice on the opposite party, these are matters which may suffice to answer the prima-facie grounds for relief. See Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd [4] and the observation in Lord Blackburn's speech in Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. [1] .