41 Finally, in relation to the provisions of and construction of the Heads of Agreement, reference should be made to the Plaintiff's argument - oft repeated, expressly or implicitly at the hearing in these proceedings - that to the extent that the parties have, by their conduct, demonstrated any understanding or belief that they were obliged to comply with any of the provisions of the Heads of Agreement, a presently enforceable lease agreement was thereby established. As I said in the course of the hearing, this does not follow. In my view, an argument in this vein can, at its highest, on the basis of the contents of the Heads of Agreement and the nature of the proposed transaction or arrangement between the parties as demonstrated by the documents and other evidence, only be put to the extent that fulfilment of the matters set out in all or part of the "Special Conditions" was required before any agreement for lease or lease would be entered into. Thus, in my view, to the extent that it might be said that a party was bound or obliged, it was only so bound or obliged in a commercial sense that if these matters were not attended to or resolved satisfactorily between the parties there would be no prospect of an agreement for lease or a lease being entered into. Moreover, as the preceding reasons indicate, I am of the view that the Heads of Agreement were simply not immediately binding on the parties. Consequently, I reject the submissions by the Plaintiff to the effect that the correct characterisation is an agreement which is binding but subject to fulfilment of one or more preconditions before it would, in effect, yield a binding agreement for lease.