70 On the other hand, it is of course clear that, under the current s 91, a plaintiff need not be a member of the deceased's family. That is plain, not only from the language of s 91(1), but also by reference to subparagraph (e) of s 91(4), which directs the court to have regard to "any family or other relationship" between the deceased person and the applicant. Nevertheless, the defined nature of the duty, as perceived through the eyes of a wise and just testator, must necessarily limit the ability of persons, who are not related to the deceased, to successfully make application for provision under s 91(1). Ordinarily, a wise and just testator would readily recognise an obligation to make proper provision for the support and maintenance for his or her spouse and children. As I have stated, that obligation, of a parent or spouse, is well recognised according to contemporary accepted community standards. On the other hand, in my view, those standards would only support the existence of such a moral duty by a testator, to a person, who is not a member of his family, in quite rare and exceptional circumstances. Ordinarily, I would not expect that a wise and just testator, adhering to contemporary standards, would perceive it his or her moral duty to make provision for the maintenance and support of a close friend or neighbour, even where such a person had rendered invaluable and selfless service or aid to the testator. It might be commendable, or even desirable, for a fair-minded testator to include such a person in his or her bounty. However, in my view, it would only be a rare and quite exceptional case which would justify a conclusion that the testator had a moral duty to provide for his or her maintenance and support.