For these reasons I agree in the opinion which Crisp J. maintained in In re Norris [5] . I would reiterate, however, as a comment on the headnote to that case, that courts exercising jurisdiction under Testator's Family Maintenance Acts have constantly to remind themselves that the power confided to them is not to order such provision generally for applicants as it thinks their testators ought to have made. It is confined to provision for their maintenance and support, or maintenance, education or advancement in life, as the case may be. What is proper is to be tested by reference to the provision which in all the circumstances of the case satisfies, but does not exceed, the requirements of moral justice in regard to those particular purposes. This leads me at once to the first of three submissions which were put on behalf of the appellants in addition to their broad contention that the principles of Bosch's Case [1] have no application under the Tasmanian Act. The submission was that under that Act there is no power to order the payment to an applicant of a lump sum, because a lump sum is outside the concept of maintenance and support as contrasted with such wider concepts as advancement, preferment and benefit: cf. Lowther v. Bentinck [2] ; In re Peel; Tattersall v. Peel [3] ; In re Heyworth's Contingent Reversionary Interest [4] ; In re Patterson [5] . In some Acts, such as the Western Australian Act which was under consideration in Sampson v. Sampson and Perpetual Executors Trustees & Agency Co. (W.A.) Ltd. [6] , specific provision has been inserted for the awarding of lump sums, but there is no specific provision on the point in the Tasmanian Act. Such provisions may be traced historically to the fact that some of the judges who took part in deciding the case of Plimmer v. Plimmer [7] considered that under a power limited to providing for maintenance and support the court could not in any circumstances give a lump sum. Edwards J., with whom Denniston J. agreed "though not without hesitation" [8] , gave as his reason that to give capital of a testator's estate would be to provide the applicant not only with maintenance and support but also with a fund or an estate which he or she might leave to others on his or her death [9] . Cooper J. seems to have agreed [10] ; and Chapman J. also agreed, saying that a lump sum did not fulfil "the generally accepted meaning of the expressions maintenance and support" [11] . Stout C.J. dissented, expressing the opinion that to limit the discretion of the court to a weekly, monthly or yearly allowance would be, in many cases, "to render this beneficial statute futile or inoperative" [12] . Some of the difference of opinion on the point may be a result of using the expression "lump sum" to refer without discrimination to all kinds of non-recurring payments. The payment of a sum to trustees to be held upon trusts for an applicant's maintenance and support out of income, or out of income and capital, and provide for any ultimate surplus to be restored to the testator's estate, would doubtless be generally recognised as within power. On the other hand, an award of a gross sum to be paid once for all, if it were by way of capitalisation or commutation of periodical amounts which otherwise would be ordered, might be difficult to justify under the Acts. But the question is apt to arise more often with respect to non-recurring payments of other kinds, which may be open to the objection that the purpose they serve is, not to provide for the recipient's maintenance or support, but to add to his disposable assets, and so to enable the Act to be turned to the indirect benefit of other persons. But it is not true that a single out-and-out payment can never have the character of a provision for maintenance and support. A payment to discharge some pressing debt, or to meet the cost of a surgical operation, or to purchase furniture for a home, or to provide a fund to meet eventualities of everyday life which are considered likely to occur, may well be of this kind in some cases. It is less often, I think, that such a purpose as the discharge of a mortgage on the applicant's home will fall within maintenance and support, but it is not incapable of doing so. In the present case, for example, the mortgage debt is small, and its discharge may fairly be treated as an affair of current maintenance. This is not the occasion to consider matters involving substantial capital investment, such as the purchase for an applicant of a business or an income-producing property or a home. The provision of assets such as these is more likely to be within the power of the court under statutes which speak of advancement in life than under Acts like the Tasmanian and New Zealand which refer only to maintenance and support; but I am not prepared to say that such a provision is never within the power conferred by the latter Acts. The fact that a payment may produce an incidental effect going beyond maintenance and support cannot put it beyond power, I think, if its substantial character is that of a provision for maintenance and support. On the broad question I have been discussing it remains only to say that the fact that some statutes have been amended to give explicit authority to award lump sums affords no reason for concluding that the view taken in the majority judgments in Plimmer v. Plimmer [1] was right. In my opinion what was said in those judgments went too far, and under the Tasmanian Act it cannot be maintained as an absolute proposition that a lump sum, in the sense of a non-recurring amount, cannot be ordered.