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[2006] VSC 363
Supreme Court of Victoria
2006-10-05
OSBORN J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Compensation for compulsory acquisition of part of land - Before and after value - Pointe Gourde principle - Hypothetical zoning - Hypothetical availability of services - Highest and best use - Comparable sales - Enhancement - Severance - Expert evidence - Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986, ss.40, 41, 43.
Introduction
1 On 1 February 2000 the claimant purchased a parcel of land of approximately 74 hectares in area situated on the southern side of Cooper Street, Epping at No. 335-413 ("the subject land").
2 The subject land was comprised in two lots, more particularly described as Lots 4 and 5 on Plan of Subdivision 8359, Parish of Wollert, and described in Certificate of Title volume 6821 folio 152. Both lots run alongside each other with frontages to Cooper Street.
3 The land was traversed by a Gas easement affecting 3.337 ha.
4 The broader area comprising the subject land was known as the Cooper Street development area or precinct. It had been so designated by the City of Whittlesea ("the Council") as a matter of planning policy. Although the subject land was zoned for rural purposes there was an expectation that it would be rezoned to facilitate employment generating uses i.e. industrial or business uses.
5 In February 1998 a parcel of land at 300 Cooper Street on the northern side of Cooper Street and opposite the subject land ("the Scanlan land") had been substantially placed in an industrial zone by way of a site specific planning scheme amendment.
6 There was, however, some continuing uncertainty as to the future configuration of development in the area for two reasons. Firstly, there was uncertainty as to the alignment of the proposed Craigieburn Bypass, a freeway extension to the Hume Highway proposed to connect to the Western Ring Road. Secondly, there was uncertainty as to the capacity to provide sewerage infrastructure to development within the area.
7 The bypass was intended to run generally north south. In December 1999 a First Advisory Committee had recommended an option known as Option 5 some distance west of the subject land.
8 There was, however, continuing controversy over this alignment and through 2000 the bypass was understood to have the potential to take this alignment or alternatively to take a series of other alignments including one running within the western boundary of the subject land.
9 In mid 2000 a working party formulated a series of further possible freeway alignments and in August 2000 a Second Advisory Committee was appointed to consider the options. In December 2000 the Second Advisory Committee recommended Option Y which ran over the western portion of the subject land.
10 On 21 January 2001 the Premier of Victoria formally announced the bypass alignment as following a route which traversed the western portion of the subject land in a north south strip.
11 On 1 July 2001 approximately 43 hectares of the Scanlan land was sold into a joint venture ("Northpoint") for $9,734,139.
12 In September 2001 amendment C23 to the Whittlesea Planning Scheme was approved facilitating the acquisition of land for the proposed bypass by the imposition of a public acquisition overlay.
13 In October 2001 part of the Scanlan land was compulsorily acquired to facilitate a widening of Cooper Street in the vicinity of the subject land.
14 In December 2001 Yarra Valley Water (the local sewerage authority) made an offer to Northpoint for the provision of sewerage to its proposed development.
15 On 11 February 2002 ("the relevant date") Roads Corporation ("the authority") served a notice of acquisition with respect to that portion of the subject land required for the freeway.[1]
16 As a result of such acquisition the claimant claims compensation in respect of the market value of the land, together with loss due to severance.
17 It also initially claimed costs associated with replacement of the land but that claim is not now pursued.
18 It further, however, claims loss attributable to disturbance and also claims a series of expenses and interest upon the compensation payable to it.
19 At the request of and with the consent of the parties, the Court has first heard the claim for loss of market value and severance. Such claim is logically distinct from the further claims and it was submitted that if it was resolved by the Court there was some prospect the balance of the claim might be capable of compromise.
20 In summary the acquisition had the following effect on the dimensions of the subject land:
Area unaffected by acquisition or severance as a sliver
Portion of land affected by Design and Development Overlay ("the DDO 2 overlay") adjacent to and consequential on the freeway
Direct Cooper Street frontage prior to acquisition
Propositions of Law
21 It is convenient first to set out critical elements in the statutory framework within which compensation falls to be assessed.
22 Section 40 of the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 ("the LAC Act") defines "market value" in relation to any interest in land on a particular date as meaning "the amount of money that would have been paid for that interest if it had been sold on that date by a willing but not anxious seller to a willing but not anxious purchaser;"
23 This provision reflects the test formulated by the High Court in Spencer's case[2] and articulated by Isaacs J[3]:
"To arrive at the value of the land at that date, we have, as I conceive, to suppose it sold then, not by means of a forced sale, but by voluntary bargaining between the plaintiff and a purchaser, willing to trade, but neither of them so anxious to do so that he would overlook any ordinary business consideration. We must further suppose both to be perfectly acquainted with the land, and cognizant of all circumstances which might affect its value, either advantageously or prejudicially, including its situation, character, quality, proximity to conveniences or inconveniences, its surrounding features, the then present demand for land, and the likelihood, as then appearing to persons best capable of forming an opinion, of a rise or fall for what reason soever in the amount which one would otherwise be willing to fix as the value of the property."
24 The test postulates a reasonably prudent purchaser. In Pastoral Finance Association Ltd v Minister[4] the Privy Council stated:
"Probably the most practical form in which the matter can be put is that [the claimants] were entitled to that which a prudent man in their position would have been willing to give for the land sooner than fail to obtain it."
25 Section 41(3) of the LAC Act provides:
"If less than the whole of the land in which a claimant's interest subsists is acquired or less than the whole of that interest is acquired, the market value of the acquired interest is the difference between the market value of the interest before the acquisition and the market value of the interest after the acquisition."
26 This sub-section requires the assessment of market value in the present case to be undertaken by way of a "before and after" analysis. A before and after analysis will embrace not only the loss of the value of the land acquired but also the effect of the acquisition upon the value of the balance. Loss attributable to severance as defined in the LAC Act is thus embraced by the before and after analysis (at least insofar as the notion of severance applies to the balance of the acquired land).
27 Further, as s.41(2) of the LAC Act reflects, market value is to be assessed by reference to the potential highest and best use available to the land as at the relevant date. Such an approach is necessary to reflect the full value of the land to the owner.[5]
28 In applying this notion the potential highest and best use may itself be to hold the land for a potential future use. Thus, there is a distinction which may be drawn between land ripe for the subdivision and land having the potential for future subdivision.[6]
29 Section 43(1)(a) provides that in assessing compensation the following matters must be disregarded:
"any increase or decrease in the market value of the interest in land which is acquired arising from the carrying out, or the proposal to carry out, the purpose for which the interest was acquired;"
30 This provision reflects the Pointe Gourde principle. As Kirby P stated in Haig v The Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974[7]:
"It is so named after Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565. According to the principle, which is one devised by the judges, in valuing land for resumption purposes, any increase in the land's value which is entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition is to be disregarded. The converse of the principle is also accepted. Any diminution in the value of land which is entirely due to the resumption scheme, or to any blight caused by a step in the resumption process, is to be disregarded in determining the value of the land: see Housing Commission of New South Wales v San Sebastian Pty Ltd [1978] HCA 28; (1978) 140 CLR 196 at 214; ... Thus, where it is found that there is a direct causal connection between a restriction on land use imposed by planning and land use legislation and the proposed establishment of the public works for which the land might be resumed, the extent of such restriction on the value of the land must be ignored. Behind this principle lies a search for a fair valuation and an insistence upon just procedures. If it were not upheld in the determination of the value of resumed land, it would be possible for a resuming authority to use its power or influence, in respect of such matters as zoning, to diminish the value of the land to be resumed, to its own advantage and to the disadvantage of the owner at valuation."[8]
31 The application of the Pointe Gourde principle may give rise to the question whether land is to be deemed to be subject to planning controls which would have applied but for the proposal to carry out the public purpose giving rise to the acquisition.[9] As McLellan CJ stated in Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales:
"In simple terms (it is possible to express the problem in more complex and possibly less helpful ways) the approach which has been traditionally adopted involves the following steps:
(1) identify the zoning of the land at the date of acquisition;
(2) determine whether that zoning was imposed or retained in order to facilitate the implementation of the public purpose for which the land was acquired.
If the answer to question (2) is yes, that zoning is notionally set aside, and the potential of the land and ultimately its market value is assessed by determining how the land would have been zoned, at the date of acquisition, but for the proposal to carry out the public purpose."[10]
32 The effects of the implementation of a public purpose may be direct or indirect. The market value of land may be affected by the impact of the implementation of the public purpose not only upon the acquired land itself but also upon the surrounding area.[11]
33 In the "after" assessment, the statute requires that the impact of the scheme be taken into account.[12]
34 The best evidence of market value will ordinarily be evidence of comparable sales either before or after the acquisition.[13]
35 Where the land that has been acquired is part of a larger parcel the effect of severance may render it appropriate to undertake a hypothetical subdivision analysis to help establish the full extent of severance damage.[14]
36 A valuer like any other expert must reveal the factual and intellectual basis of an opinion. The general principle is that:
"In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of 'specialised knowledge'; there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be 'wholly or substantially based on the witness's expert knowledge'; so far as the opinion is based on facts 'observed' by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on 'assumed' or 'accepted' facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert's evidence must explain how the field of 'specialised knowledge' in which the witness is expert by reason of 'training, study or experience', and on which the opinion is 'wholly or substantially based', applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert's specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight. And an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not based on specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ's characterisation of the evidence in HG v R [1999] HCA 2; (1999) 197 CLR 414, on 'a combination of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise' (at [41])."[15]
37 A valuer may express an opinion of value which is founded in part upon hearsay but he cannot give hearsay evidence of disputed facts which lie outside his own personal knowledge.[16]
38 Regard may be had to evidence of events subsequent to the acquisition as confirming or tending to confirm the foresight which the hypothetical purchaser would have had at the relevant date.[17]
39 Other things being equal if there is a doubt as to the amount properly payable by way of compensation that doubt should be resolved in favour of the more liberal estimate.[18]
Principal Conclusions as to Contentious Facts
40 The assessment of the contextual circumstances relevant to valuation in the present case has given rise to a series of contentious questions of fact. Different views on these underlying factors explain to a significant degree the positions of the parties. Before turning to the valuation evidence it is therefore appropriate to set out my principal conclusions as to contentious underlying facts (recognising of course that there remain other subsidiary questions of fact to be resolved). In my opinion critical elements of the underlying circumstances were as follows.
41 But for the implementation of the relevant public purpose the land would either have been rezoned or have been ripe for rezoning to facilitate employment generating uses ("employment uses") as at the relevant date.
42 Nevertheless the prudent purchaser would have apprehended a significant risk that difficulties with the supply of sewerage to the land would delay the commencement and/or progress of development of the land, and may constrain to some degree the range of potential uses.
43 By reason of this risk the land could not be regarded as ripe for subdivision but had demonstrable potential for future subdivision directed to the accommodation of employment uses and subject to the resolution of sewerage provision.
44 The value of the land was enhanced by the freeway proposal, which enhancement must be taken account of in the after situation.
45 The value of the surrounding area including the Scanlan land was enhanced by the freeway proposal, which enhancement must be disregarded in assessing the before value by reference to comparable sales within that area.
46 The effect of the acquisition was to reduce the after value of the land not only by reason of the loss of value of the land acquired but also by reason of the impact of severance upon the balance.
Zoning
47 Because of the extent of the evidence called with respect to town planning and sewerage issues it is convenient to deal with these matters first before turning to the valuation evidence (including that as to issues of enhancement and severance).
48 Town planning evidence was called from Mr Milner and Mr Mawson on behalf of the claimant and from Mr Whitney on behalf of the authority. Mr Milner and Mr Whitney gave evidence as experienced town planners as to the planning framework in which the case falls to be assessed. Mr Mawson gave evidence as to steps actually undertaken by Coomes Consultants ("Coomes") to achieve a rezoning of the land.
49 There was little disagreement as to the relevant planning history of the area but there was some disagreement in hypothesising the likely before situation if the freeway proposal is disregarded.
50 Relevant elements of the underlying planning context are:
• The subject land formed part of the Epping urban growth area.
• It was at the time of acquisition zoned for rural purposes and such rezoning precluded its subdivision for urban development purposes.
• The subject land was within an area known as the Cooper Street development area designated by policy for rezoning to facilitate employment uses.
• The Scanlan land to the north had been substantially zoned for industrial purposes to attempt to kick start employment uses in the area.
• The resolution of the freeway alignment had been a controversial planning issue.
51 Both Mr Milner and Mr Whitney traced the strategic planning for the area through the 1990s and identified the significance of the Epping Bulge Position Statement of 1995 and the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy of 1996.
52 The first document which was prepared for the City of Whittlesea offered direct support for residential development in Epping North and industrial and employment generating uses in the Cooper Street area. It further gave priority to the allocation of infrastructure capacity to employment generating development.
53 The Cooper Street Precinct Strategy was prepared by consultants for both the Cities of Hume and Whittlesea. It was intended to establish a framework for the future planning and development of the Cooper Street area. It sought to provide a strategy for improving the attractiveness of Cooper Street as a location for industry and other employment generating uses. It recommended a land use and zoning pattern, and associated development controls including streetscape and urban design guidelines. It recommended a "gateway" treatment for Cooper Street.
54 It further recommended the future rezoning of the majority of the subject land to "C2-Corridor B". The purposes of this zone (which predated the new format planning scheme zones now in place) included:
"To designate land where future urban development has been deferred indefinitely and to encourage land use consistent with farming activities."
55 The strategy recommended that the area including the subject land be set aside for "future industrial (medium term)". The area so designated included the Scanlan land to the north which was rezoned for industrial purposes in 1998. The strategy also looked at the area on a precinct basis. The subject site formed part of a sub-precinct (A4) with an area of approximately 244 hectares identified as having potential for light industrial uses; office and commercial buildings.[19] Larger buildings were anticipated fronting Cooper Street.
56 The strategy envisaged that the rezoning process would extend west from the existing urban development of Epping in conjunction with the logical extension of existing physical services.
57 The subject land was identified as falling within a proposed stage 2 zoning dependent on sewer capacity being made available. Part of the Haberfield/McKee land to the immediate east fell within stage 1.
58 In 1997/98 amendment L143 to the Whittlesea Planning Scheme was processed. This rezoned the majority of the Scanlan land lying to the north of the subject land on the other side of Cooper Street from General Farming B to Reserved General Industrial. The amendment occurred despite the adverse report of an independent panel with respect to it. Mr Whitney gave evidence and I accept that there was some force in some of the panel's reservations concerning what is commonly called a "spot rezoning". The panel was of the view the amendment would be premature prior to the resolution of the following matters:
• The draft Municipal Strategic Statement ("MSS") and new format planning scheme;
• The Victoria Planning Provisions (VPPs) and how they related to Whittlesea;
• A full drainage and floodway management scheme for the site and surrounding catchment area;
• A road network plan to service the whole of the Cooper Street employment area which took account of adjacent properties;
• A finalised option for the Hume freeway realignment ;
• A definitive strategy for the widening and duplication of Cooper Street;
• Development of options for use of land adjacent to and opposite the subject site for industrial purposes through the preparation of a local structure plan;
• A framework for approval of a development contributions plan for the Cooper Street proposed industrial area.
The panel considered that if the Council had waited a further six months in proceeding with the amendment a number of the outstanding issues could have been resolved or overcome.
59 The principal matters of concern were, however, ones of timing and sequencing not of doubt as to the strategic intention for the ultimate use of the land. Council supported the amendment (as it was entitled to do) and the Minister in turn accepted Council's position. Council's view was that the amendment would stimulate the implementation of its development strategy for the growth corridor.[20]
60 Between 1998 and 1999 the Council prepared a new format planning scheme as all municipalities within Victoria were required to do. New format planning schemes were intended not only to adopt a more uniform approach to the way planning was implemented in Victoria, but also to better articulate the policy basis for planning controls and planning decisions. The new format planning scheme was approved in mid 1999 and included a MSS which clearly defined the intended role of Epping North as a future residential growth area and the role of the Cooper Street area as an employment generating industrial and business area.
61 In so doing it specifically recognised the provision of sewerage infrastructure as a strategic issue. Clause 21.06-7 stated:
"The key strategic issue in relation to infrastructure provision within the City of Whittlesea is sewer capacity. The Cooper Street precinct, Epping North and Mernda/Doreen ... each require short and longer term servicing strategies to be prepared and implemented.
In the absence of extension of the North Western Trunk Sewer, the City will play a key role in the allocation of existing sewer capacity, in consultation with service providers, to allow development to commence in an integrated and cost effective manner. To ensure that longer term strategies are resolved Council will continue to plan for and define development potential within Cooper Street, Epping North and Mernda/Doreen. Council's 'Wastewater strategy' and 'Epping bulge (Epping North) position statement' will continue to provide policy direction and information for prospective developers and service providers however Council must play an important co-ordinating role between developers, service providers and other levels of government."
62 Council's strategies for achieving its objectives included:
"Pursue urban rezonings in Cooper Street and Epping North to raise the status of the area and to provide the impetus for servicing agencies to resolve outstanding servicing requirements."
63 The MSS also specifically identified the resolution of the Hume freeway alignment as a threshold issue requiring resolution before rezoning of the Cooper Street precinct.
64 At cl.21.06-2 under the heading "Managing Urban Growth" the objective stated was:
"To effectively manage urban growth in a manner that maximises beneficial relationships between compatible land uses and which avoids inappropriate incursions into non-urban or environmentally sensitive areas."
65 The strategies stated for achieving the objective included:
"Pursue urban zonings in Cooper Street and Epping North following resolution of the Hume freeway alignment." [My emphasis]
66 In turn other provisions of the MSS relating to employment and economic development specifically envisaged that the Council would:
• Implement the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy pending the finalisation of the alignment of the Hume freeway.
• Following definition of the Hume freeway alignment review the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy as required and pursue rezoning of land in accordance with the strategy.
67 These provisions are to be understood in the light of the conclusions of the independent panel which considered the new format scheme before its approval. The panel stated (Exhibit QA, p.36):
"Essentially the Panel is concerned that the impact of the freeway alignment between the ring road and the Hume freeway on the future planning and zoning of this area has been substantially underestimated. Depending on the alignment chosen, accessibility to various land parcels will be seriously affected; the land required for the connection and interchange with Cooper Street itself may be significant; it will affect arterial road planning in the precinct; it may have a significant effect on drainage; and it may change the location of Council's proposed 'gateway' in this location.
Having considered these issues and the relevant submissions, the Panel has formed the view that a two stage process is required.
In the short term (i.e. before the new planning scheme is adopted and approved), the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy should be reviewed for incorporation in the revised municipal strategic statement. The Special Use Zone should be used to identify sites for extractive industry ... the Cooper Street development plan overlay should be removed. There should be a moratorium on further rezoning in this area, accepting that the Scanlan land has recently been zoned for industrial purposes which should accommodate any short term demands for industrial land.
This approach will provide a holding pattern pending resolution of the freeway alignment.
Once that alignment has been set, the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy should be reviewed obviously taking into account the implications of the chosen alignment. Based on that revision, appropriate zones, overlays and schedules can be introduced into the scheme by a further amendment process."
68 The history of the uncertainty affecting the freeway alignment is described by Mr Milner as follows:
"Between 1995 and 2002, whilst there was cumulative support generated by various pieces of strategic work, at the same time there was increasing doubt as to the location of the freeway alignment. In early 2000, there was still good reason to suggest that the review site would not be affected by the freeway alignment.
It took until the publication of the first Advisory Committee report in July 2000 for any public statements to be made or information to be revealed about the F2 freeway alignment. Prior to the Committee's recommendation no one could reasonably have foreseen that option 5 would have been recommended ..., given the higher costs associated with this route. No one would have anticipated the appointment of a second Advisory Committee, that further options would be considered, or that the submissions made by environmentalists on the Cooper Street grasslands would have made such an impact. In retrospect, even the Council did not anticipate that option Y alignment would eventually be recommended by the second Committee, and adopted as the route of the freeway, thus affecting the review site directly. ...
All in all, it took until February 2001 until the final alignment of the freeway was known. Urban development plans for the land in the municipality were thus hindered and yet an urban development plan and rezoning of land in Cooper Street was consistently delayed from 1997 until finalisation of the F2 alignment."
69 It follows that at the time the claimant purchased the subject land on 1 February 2000, the land was squarely designated for rezoning to facilitate employment uses but it confronted two problems which continued through the period leading up to the acquisition. These were firstly, the resolution of the freeway alignment and secondly, the resolution of sewerage infrastructure questions.
70 Mr Whitney usefully summarised the situation as follows:
"The overall policy context was quite clear in its intent. The policy context within which consideration may have been given to the use and development of land at the relevant date may be paraphrased as follows:
• Rurally zoned land should be used for rural purposes and its fragmentation prevented;
• The rezoning of the Cooper Street precinct area for employment uses would be pursued upon resolution of the route of the Craigieburn bypass;
• The rezoning and development of the area should occur in accordance with the reviewed Cooper Street Precinct Strategy;
• Provision of physical infrastructure should be provided in an efficient, equitable and timely manner;
• The management of growth should follow a strategic approach and not be compromised by incremental decision making;
• The future development of the area may require the imposition of development contributions and the application of Council's subdivision design policy."
"There were at the time of the preparation of the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy (November 2001) only two matters that impacted upon the timing of the rezoning. These were the resolution of the final alignment of the Craigieburn bypass, and the ability to provide sewerage to the large central portion of the precinct including the subject land."
72 Consistently with this view Mr Whitney also stated:
"Everything kicked off again when a final decision on the bypass had been made."
73 It is submitted on behalf of the claimant that but for the freeway scheme, the subject land could have been rezoned together with or shortly after that of Scanlan. The difficulty is that no attempt was made to rezone the land by the then owners and what may then or may not have been able to be achieved is speculative. What is clear, however, is that the claimant purchased rural land and in my view the critical question is what the claimant could have achieved but for the freeway proposal prior to the relevant date.
74 The claimant submits that but for uncertainty as to the freeway alignment it would have obtained a rezoning by the relevant date. That question falls to be considered in part by reference to the further planning history of the subject land.
75 Following the acquisition of the land the claimant retained Coomes to prepare a "vision statement" for its own land and the adjoining land to the east. It put forward a proposal for one of the sub-precincts previously identified in the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy.
76 The vision put forward was one for development which comprised residential use in the southern portion of the land as an extension of existing residential development to the south and east. Employment uses were envisaged in the northern portion of the land fronting Cooper Street. Mr Mawson had identified a natural depression traversing the land which on one view provided a logical reserve and boundary between the proposed uses. There was ongoing discussion between Council officers and both Mr Dickey of the claimant company and his consultants. Despite the acknowledgement by officers of some matters advanced on behalf of the claimant the proposal was not well received.
77 The vision statement reflected in part the land use identified in the contract of sale pursuant to which Murdesk purchased the subject land. The contract provided by special condition C:
"The purchaser will use its best endeavours, at its own expense, to obtain a planning rezoning of the property by the City of Whittlesea or other relevant planning authority from the current non-residential (rural) zoning to residential 1 zoning free of any planning overlay or other like planning qualifications as may, in the purchaser's opinion, reduce the financial outcomes of its proposed residential subdivision project so as to make it financially non-viable."
"In the event the purchaser determines in its absolute and unfettered discretion that, notwithstanding its best endeavours, there are factors present which indicate that VicRoads or the City of Whittlesea or available procedures external to them affecting their decision making are unlikely to result in the favourable entertainment of efforts by the purchaser to achieve either or both of the objects set forth in special conditions B and C or may result in a favourable entertainment of the said objects but with restriction/s that would have the effect or likely effect of making the proposed residential subdivision project financially non-viable, the purchaser may, at any time prior to the expiration of a date 15 months from the date hereof, give written notice to the vendors or their solicitors that it withdraws from this contract whereupon this contract shall be at an end null and void and all monies paid hereunder shall be refunded in full.
This contract is subject to and conditional upon:
... The planning rezoning referred to in special condition C; within 15 months of the date hereof. This special condition is a condition and is an essential term of the contract."
79 The payment of the full deposit of $500,000 was also conditional upon satisfaction of special conditions B and C "provided however that the purchaser shall have the right to effect payment of the residue of the price on 30 June 2000 by giving written notice to that effect to the vendors and/or their solicitors."
80 Despite the obligation of the purchaser to use its best endeavours to procure a residential rezoning the contract did not prevent a response by way of an alternative form of zoning in the context of the pursuit of such best endeavours. Furthermore, it is apparent that the conditions in issue were fundamentally intended to be for the benefit of the claimant. It was open for the claimant to proceed with the purchase of the property as it in fact did despite the failure to obtain a residential rezoning.[21]
81 In November 2001 Council resolved to exhibit documentation for a planning scheme amendment which would implement the strategy for development of the Cooper Street precinct. It was proposed the subject land would be placed in a comprehensive development zone and that the zoning would be supported by a series of overlays which would guide development. The Council officer's report supporting the resolution specifically referred to the MSS requirement that the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy be reviewed following determination of the alignment of the Craigieburn bypass.
82 On 27 August 2002 after a further process of clarification of constraints, Council again resolved to exhibit the necessary documentation for a planning scheme amendment being amendment C31. The officer's report forming the basis of this resolution stated in part:
"Since the report to Council in November 2001, the outcomes of significant strategic investigations by authorities such as VicRoads, Melbourne Water and the Department of Infrastructure have been incorporated into the plan.
This has resulted in alterations to the plan that Council endorsed as an attachment in November 2001 as being suitable for public exhibition. ...
The outcome of investigations undertaken by VicRoads which have influenced the amended plan include the following:
• The location of O'Herns Road interchange with the Craigieburn bypass (the subject of a separate planning scheme amendment to be undertaken by VicRoads);
• The alignment of the Edgars Road extension to Cooper Street;
• The location for signalised intersections along Cooper Street;
• The location of boulevard planting within the Cooper Street duplication and abutting properties.
The location of the transport corridor between Lalor station and the Epping North residential development has been further defined by the Department of Infrastructure and one of the preferred options is now incorporated in the plan.
Other changes to the plan include:
• Repositioning of some wetlands and drainage channels so that the plan is consistent with the most up to date version of Melbourne Water's Edgars Creek drainage scheme;
• The realignment of some minor roads to provide for improved traffic connections and to allow for the repositioning of drainage infrastructure.
The strategic significance of these investigations effectively prevented the plan from being exhibited as the location of road connections and land uses was dependent upon resolution of these major strategic issues."
83 Ultimately Council did not exhibit the amendment until June 2004.
84 As against this it may be observed that the matters identified by the officer's report as significant features of changed circumstances are at least to some substantial degree related to the freeway proposal and its impact on O'Herns Road and Cooper Street. In my view it is clear that the simple announcement of the freeway alignment did not fully resolve all associated planning issues affecting Cooper Street and the precinct containing the subject land. Mr Mawson's evidence further confirms this and in particular his evidence that the consequences of the freeway interchange for access to the subject land were not resolved until August 2001.
85 The authority submits that the rezoning was not held up by the bypass proposal for a series of reasons:
(a) The absence of a bypass proposal may have resulted in a slower rezoning process: the area to be rezoned may have been significantly greater, with more land owners to deal with, different environmental conditions and difficult extractive industries issues to manage.
86 In my view this proposition is speculative. The Scanlan rezoning demonstrates that the claimant's land (particularly if coupled with adjoining land as it was in the vision statement) cannot be rejected as comprising a unit which was inadequate. Likewise the Cooper Street precinct plan demonstrated that it could be regarded as reasonably capable of rezoning as part of a logical precinct. That plan also envisaged that rezoning would occur in stages and implicitly recognised that land to the west of the subject land might have to await rezoning until after the rezoning of the subject land (albeit that the subject land itself was placed in stage 2 of the proposed zoning only).
(b) The L143 panel identified eight reasons other than the bypass alignment as to why the Scanlan land should not be rezoned. These were relevant to the area generally.
87 An examination of the reasons which I have set out above shows that they were substantially resolved by the acquisition date.[22] Moreover, those reasons did not preclude rezoning of the Scanlan land and it is difficult to see that such remnant force as they may have had after such rezoning would preclude rezoning of the claimant's land. Furthermore, one of the reasons stated by the panel might be said to support the rezoning, namely the resolution of zoning for the land opposite the Scanlan land.
(c) There was no pressure for the rezoning of the area. The determination of the freeway alignment provided impetus for the development of the area. Although the Scanlan land had been rezoned for a number of years, it was not until the freeway alignment was announced that McMullin proceeded with the purchase of the Scanlan land.
88 Council's stated and active policy was to attempt to encourage development by rezoning. It did not require demonstrated demand for the proposed uses. It wished to encourage those uses for its own strategic purposes. Further, although I accept that the implementation of the freeway upon its final alignment enhanced the value of the Scanlan land and indeed the subject land, this does not imply that no rezoning would have taken place in the absence of this enhancement.
(d) A comprehensive sewerage strategy was only released in October 2000. That was after a significant review had been carried out by Montgomery Watson. Sewerage servicing uncertainty was an issue identified by the L143 panel as a significant reason for the Scanlan rezoning not proceeding.
89 October 2000 preceded the relevant date. I accept sewerage servicing uncertainty was a significant issue affecting the capacity to develop the land for reasons which I shall elaborate shortly. The planning evidence of Mr Milner and Mr Whitney ultimately favours the view, however, that rezoning may have occurred prior to the finalisation of sewerage infrastructure arrangements for the rezoned land. This was after all the policy specifically declared in the MSS prepared by Council and approved by the State Government. This is not of course to say that sewerage questions may not have affected the value of the land even if it were rezoned. The substantial difficulty confronting development at the relevant date was that of sewerage infrastructure. Resolution of this difficulty was, however, potentially capable of postponement until after rezoning. Such an approach would give effect to the policy articulated in Council's MSS. It would give the hypothetical purchaser rezoned land but no final development approval.
90 The City of Whittlesea's Cooper Street Development Plan of 2001 envisaged rezoning prior to finalisation of sewerage arrangements and stated as follows:
"With regard to the extent of rezoning a fundamental question to be considered is servicing capacity. As discussed in a range of related reports on the Cooper Street and Epping North areas there is a limited amount of sewer capacity which can be made to develop land. With regard to 'allocation' of available sewer capacity via the land planning system Council has previously indicated a consistent position that preference will be given to allocation of available capacity to employment land over residential land and that the extent of rezoning will be limited to that amount of land which can be provided with reticulated services. While Yarra Valley Water has prepared a servicing strategy for the area it is clear that all the land, or even a substantial amount of land, within the development plan area can not be immediately provided with reticulated sewerage. This being the case it is appropriate for Council to continue to indicate a preference for employment based land uses by delaying the rezoning of the future residential areas. With regard to the extent of rezoning of land for employment purposes it is considered that there may need to be a deviation from Council's earlier position.
Given the increasingly high profile nature of the Cooper Street area taking into account construction of the Craigieburn Bypass and duplication of Cooper Street, pressure needs to be exerted to ensure broad scale augmentation of services occurs so that the land can be provided with reticulated sewer and water. From a servicing authority perspective whether the land is zoned can be a significant indication as to whether the land is likely to be developed in the short to medium term. Taking this issue into account, it is proposed that the area bounded by the Craigieburn Bypass to the west, the O'Herns Road deviation to the north, the boundary of the land currently zoned industrial and the residential suburb of Lalor to the east and the residential land and the Whittlesea Gardens to the south be rezoned to a suitable urban zone."
91 Both Mr Milner and Mr Whitney expressly contemplated a situation where subsequent to rezoning, the grant of permits to develop would depend upon sewer availability. In my view this is the position that Council would have implemented at the relevant date if it could have. In my view if so requested by the claimant shortly after the purchase of the land, Council would have sought to expedite rezoning but for the difficulty created by uncertainty as to the freeway alignment. In the first instance it is likely this would have involved the rejection of any suggested residential component. Again it is likely that the claimant would have accepted this rejection as the price of a rezoning given that Council's position would squarely accord with the relevant strategies. Mr Whitney gave evidence that such a process would not necessarily materially delay a rezoning
(e) The actual experience of the C31 rezoning process confirms the complexity and consequent slowness of rezoning this area.
92 It is difficult to treat the history of delay in implementing amendment C31 as materially detracting from the above conclusions. In particular, the initial history of the C31 rezoning itself was, as I have already said, directly affected by the working out of the consequences of the freeway alignment. Its subsequent history has been complicated by other factors.
93 On the evidence as a whole I am satisfied that if no uncertainty relating to the freeway alignment had affected the land, it is likely that after purchase of the subject land by the claimant an amendment would have proceeded to the point either of implementation or substantial implementation by the relevant date. I accept the claimant's submission that the probable zoning would be that of comprehensive development zone and I accept Mr Whitney's evidence that any such zoning would have been accompanied by comprehensive overlays.
94 It is not possible to be positively satisfied that the rezoning process would have been completed. It is likely that the commonly experienced delay of 12 to 18 months in the amendment process of which evidence was given would be complicated by the positions adopted by other land holders and in particular the owners of the Scanlan land and the owners of the Haberfield/McKee land. It would be open to such owners to either support the rezoning as potentially beneficial to them or to oppose it. The evidence does not persuade me positively as to the likely position of such land owners in the situation hypothesised. Having said this, the delay that might be occasioned by the risk of at least one committed opponent leads to a realistic time frame for rezoning on the evidence in the order of two years.
(f) The MSS provided that the rezoning of the area was to follow the resolution of the bypass alignment. It does not follow that the rezoning of the area was held up by the alignment process. The reasons identified by the L143 panel and Whitney go beyond the alignment.
95 It is difficult to give great weight to the reasons of the L143 panel. Firstly, as I have said its concerns were substantially resolved by the relevant date. Secondly, they were not found by the planning authority or the Minister to be persuasive.
96 Moreover, the evidence as a whole leads to the conclusion that the rezoning was in fact held up by the alignment process. The evidence shows that the claimant was specifically advised by its consultant that resolution of the freeway alignment was a precondition to rezoning. There are a number of references in the documents to this effect and Mr Mawson's evidence confirmed that such advice was given. The claimant's approach to Council for a part residential rezoning took place in this context. The claimant was not initially faced with any realistic prospect of a rezoning in the short term. The exploration of what it viewed as the highest and best use of the land is entirely understandable in this context.
97 The consultants' advice that the resolution of the freeway alignment was a precondition to rezoning was on the whole of the evidence (including that of Mr Whitney) correct. The terms of the MSS were plain and reflected the advice of an independent panel. The new format planning scheme thus elevated the freeway alignment issue to a threshold issue of structure planning for the area. In turn, Council documentation reflects the fact that it was the clear view of Council planning officers that the finalisation of the freeway alignment was a precondition to a planning scheme amendment.
98 It was also submitted on behalf of the authority that the resolution of access arrangements to the land was independently delayed by the review of Council's Cooper Street strategy. This strategy was itself critically dependent on finalisation of the freeway alignment and I am not persuaded that finalisation of the freeway alignment was not the critical impediment to rezoning during the period at issue.
(h) Overlays
99 It was submitted that Mr Whitney's evidence should be accepted and that the historic evidence supports the view that Council would not have supported the rezoning without a detailed outline development plan rather than simply a more general local structure plan. I am not persuaded that absent the uncertainty concerning the freeway alignment an adequately resolved outline development plan could not have been formulated.
100 It follows that in my view, although the land was not zoned for urban purposes at the relevant date, its status was in substantial part a result of the delay in implementing the freeway proposal. Further, as I have said, I am satisfied that as at the relevant date but for the freeway proposal the land would either have been zoned or the process of rezoning would have been substantially implemented.
Sewerage
101 As the planning history set out above demonstrates, the availability of sewerage infrastructure was clearly identified as a key factor constraining development of the Cooper Street area in the period leading up to the date of acquisition.[23]
102 On 29 May 2006 the engineering experts retained by the parties[24] reached agreement as to the answers to a series of questions and endorsed a joint report. They did so in part as the result of advice received from two officers of Yarra Valley Water, Mr Hart and Mr Pearson. The first question and the answer to it were as follows:
"(1) At the relevant date, what would an independent consultant have told a hypothetical purchaser of the land as (to) the availability of reticulated sewerage services to the land?
Response: An independent consultant would have told a hypothetical purchase or vendor the following:
(a) The Yarra Valley Water Cooper Street Strategy included as Appendix F in Jordan 1[25], sets out the current servicing arrangements at the relevant date.
(b) The inquiry at Yarra Valley Water would have revealed that sewer (Cooper Street East branch sewer) is possibly available which would service the northern catchment of the property subject to advised capacity limitations.
(c) A temporary pumping station was available to connect to the existing sewers but was constructed by Northpoint and would require agreement from Northpoint for access. (Subsequent advice from Mr Pearson and Mr Hart was that access would be made available to the pump station by Yarra Valley Water.)
(d) Sewerage services for the southern section of the land would require the connection of sewer to the Haberfield (Edgars Creek) and golf course (Central Creek/Merri Creek) systems.
(e) It is expected that the consultant would negotiate with Yarra Valley Water to optimise the available capacity and reduce the costs to the developer."
103 The effect of these answers is that at the relevant date development of the northern portion of the subject land fronting Cooper Street may have been capable of sewering to the east along Cooper Street via the Cooper Street East branch sewer (which in turn connected with a main along the Edgars Creek running to the south and joining the Edgars Creek sewer).
104 Sewering of the central portion of the subject land would require connection to the east across the Haberfield land to the Edgars Creek sewer.
105 Sewering of the southern portion of the land would require construction of a sewer to the south linking up with the Central Creek/Merri Creek systems to the south and west.
106 The conclusions of the joint report were further addressed and elaborated in evidence called on behalf of the complainant from Mr Hunter, Ms Hamila and Mr Hawkins. No engineering evidence was called by the authority. It relied on the terms of the joint report, background documentation and evidence elicited in cross-examination as to the sewerage context at the relevant date.
107 The central dispute between the parties in respect of sewerage matters is the evaluation of the possibility that the northern portion of the site might be sewered via Cooper Street. Such sewering would facilitate an initial stage of development in the optimal location for business/industrial uses.
108 The dispute arises from the fact that the Cooper Street branch sewer had a limited capacity and was also "possibly" available to other land owners who might materially take up such capacity.
109 Further such capacity constraint had led to flow conditions being placed on the supply of sewerage to the Northpoint industrial subdivision on the northern side of Cooper Street. If part of the subject land were sewered along Cooper Street such conditions would also have been imposed (hence the reference to advised capacity limitations in the joint report answer set out above).
110 The engineers' joint report subsequently addressed hypothetical plans of subdivision for the land which envisage the creation of new lots in the northern portion of the land (in different configurations).
111 The engineers further agreed:
"It is reasonable to assume that the sharing of costs of works in Cooper Street would have been agreed between Northpoint and the subject land."
112 In evidence Ms Hamila elaborated this conclusion as follows:
"The starting assumption was that the first stage of Northpoint, the 7.7 hectares or 110 lots had been effectively, if you like, secured by Northpoint and so the works were in place, being the branch sewer, for the first stage, the temporary pump station, the temporary rising main and a connection to an existing sewer near Yale Drive further east along Cooper Street. Yarra Valley Water told us for Murdesk to connect to that branch sewer he would need to upgrade the temporary pump station, construct the flow control facility and extend the temporary rising main further east to a second connection point. That would provide a servicing arrangement for 36 hectares of land, and it was agreed that that would be split equally between the Murdesk land and the Northpoint land."
113 At the relevant date an offer (dated 20 December 2001) had been made to Northpoint for the first stage of sewerage connection to its land. That offer was accepted on 12 February 2002 the day after the relevant date.
114 At the relevant date therefore a finite capacity had been identified for the Cooper Street branch sewer and part of that capacity had been offered to Northpoint and would have been understood by an informed purchaser as likely to be taken up by it.
115 The terms of the December offer to Northpoint further envisaged that thereafter Northpoint might take up the whole of the capacity of the branch sewer. The offer imposed conditions with respect to the whole of the Northpoint land. It stated in part:
"4.2.2. The following comments are related to the proposed plan of subdivision ... The current plan of subdivision is specifically creating lot 21 which is to be used by a high water user Aquarium Industries Pty Ltd. Also being created are four super lots.
In discussions with the developer and Aquarium Industries in relation to the proposed lot 21 and stage 1 of the development it has been agreed that up to 7.7 hectares and 86.4 KL/day maximum daily flow be allowed, and that this area be serviced by a temporary pumping station (TPS) and temporary detention storage in the development sewers. The maximum development for stage 1 is subject to the achievement of low infiltration rates. The allowance of 1% has been allowed for a fully aged catchment. Note that infiltration performance of the sewer system will be monitored and assessed during the development of the project and higher than allowed infiltration may severely impact on the allowable future connection.
Design of stage 2 works i.e. permanent flow control facility (FCF) will be undertaken by YVW when this offer is accepted by the developer and will take 24 months to deliver.
Works required: The following works are required:
(1) Temporary pumping station and rising main connected to a new manhole within 300 Cooper Street ...;
(2) Cooper Street East branch sewer and Scanlan Drive branch sewer ...;
(3) Temporary detention storage of 350 KL in the development's sewer system between the TPS higher level alarm and the ERS spill level;
(4) Two vent stacks installed on the branch sewers together with nearby suitable sites set aside for odour scrubbing boxes; and
(5) A site for the permanent FCF and pumping station fully approved by all authorities and acceptable to YVW ..."
116 The offer further required that flow capacity be based on a discharge rate of 0.13 L/s/Ha. It foreshadowed an encumbrance on each allotment created for the Northpoint land limiting maximum average dry weather flow. It stated that developers would be required to commit to notifying all potential property owners of flow restrictions in the estate and the ramifications of this on their proposed individual lot developments. Conditions were specified for future contracts of sale.
117 The relevant functional design statement and the offer contemplated that following the construction of stage 1 further sewerage infrastructure could be provided by way of a series of stages to the whole of the Northpoint land.
118 The offer to Northpoint was made in the context of a sewerage strategy which emerges from the following matters.
119 In 1995 the Epping bulge position statement had referred to Melbourne Water's "well known" advice that the Epping area under consideration had a known spare capacity for additional lots. It further stated that Council had a fundamental objective that the distribution and use of sewer capacity should service the future employment land in the vicinity of Cooper Street.
120 In 1996 the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy envisaged staged rezonings and noted:
"Stages 2 and 3[26] zonings are based on additional sewer capacity being made available either through additional mains capacity, the establishment of a local treatment plant and/or the redirection of existing residential sewerage into a local treatment plant enabling the mains systems to be used for additional industrial development."
121 In 1997 amendment L143 was put forward on the basis that it would utilise existing limited sewerage capacity. The independent panel report with respect to the amendment noted that Yarra Valley Water had advised that existing downstream sewers had the capacity for the equivalent of 3,000 additional residential lots provided that waste water was stored during wet weather conditions and only discharged to the mains system during off peak dry weather periods. It appeared to the panel that the amendment raised three main sewerage issues, namely the allocation of existing sewerage capacity, mechanisms to manage waste water discharge levels and planning to achieve an optimum solution for sewerage infrastructure. In its view further work was required to resolve a sewerage reticulation strategy for the amendment land and the surrounding area.
122 Council adopted the amendment recognising that the allocation of the 3,000 lot capacity would ideally be shared across several land owners but noting that only one land owner (Scanlan) had been prepared to actively pursue redevelopment to that point in time. In so doing it sought to create a "circuit breaker" to make things happen.
123 As already indicated in my analysis of the planning controls, in 1999 the MSS recognised the significance of sewerage infrastructure as a key strategic issue.
124 In February 2000 Montgomery Watson consulting engineers advised Yarra Valley Water as to the appropriate strategy for the area containing the subject land as follows:
"5.5 Recommended Strategy
STAGE 1: Initial Development (2001-2005, 950 lots) - into Edgars (750) & Central Creek (200)
Both Edgars Creek and Central Creek detention facilities are required to maximise the development area in the immediate vicinity of existing infrastructure, minimising the cost of works. In summary the following works are required;
• Detention facility with controlled discharge to Edgars Creek - to service development north of Childs Road, up to a total of 750 equivalent residential lots initially. Of the land holdings predicted for initial development it is expected the Haberfield, Scanlon or Porta land would consume this in the early stages of development. Other smaller detention tank options have been identified and are available options to Yarra Valley Water and developers if the location and number of lots serviced is suitable. The larger detention tank option (Option 1A) is recommended as a part of this strategy due to its use in the long term servicing strategy and the reduced operating and maintenance requirements associated with one tank compared with several in the area. This is not to rule out the possibility that a developer and Yarra Valley Water may agree to adopt a more local detention tank to the north of that proposed (i.e. site in the Epping North area that could be utilised in the future as a pump station).
• Detention facility with controlled discharge to Central Creek (Merri System). It is proposed this would serve the development of the Lalor Golf Course area and development south of Childs Road, up to a total of 200 equivalent residential lots initially. Whilst serving part of the development of the golf course it is envisaged some of this land will be acquired to locate the detention facility and the required buffer zones."
125 Following the purchase of the subject land by the claimant in February 2000 a series of meetings was held between the claimant's consultants, and officers of the sewerage authority or officers of the Council.
126 From the outset it was apparent that there may be serious competition for the available sewerage infrastructure. Minutes of a meeting between the claimant's representatives and Council officers of 15 February 2000 record:
"Scanlan's 120 acres or so are ready to go. Scanlan has been working on this industrial subdivision for 10 years. 2,000 of the available 3,300 sewerage lot capacity has been allocated to his land. Another 800 would be offered to the proposed Porta 105 acre resi [sic] subdivision."
127 On 1 March 2000 the claimant's consultants advised it in terms that expressly recognised that there might be competition between land owners for the available Cooper Street branch sewer capacity.
"It seems evident that given Council's commitment to Scanlan industrial we need to present a case that identifies benefits too in all the timely and shared cost of the provision of sewer infrastructure. Something that would not be achievable should Bell [subject land] be industrial as Scanlan would probably not work co-operatively with a competitor. ..."
128 On 10 October 2000 Yarra Valley water relevantly advised the claimant's consultants:
"Yarra Valley Water has not allocated the available capacity of the neighbouring systems to any particular land holder. This capacity is available to the first developer ready to connect. However, Yarra Valley Water does not question the right of the planning authority (City of Whittlesea) to decide which areas will be rezoned and therefore utilise this capacity."
129 On 12 October 2000 Yarra Valley Water released the Epping North/Cooper Street sewerage servicing strategy. It is this document which the joint report of the engineers in this case identifies as setting out the servicing arrangements current at the relevant date. The strategy applied both to residential development north of O'Herns Road of approximately 1,300 hectares and predominantly industrial development of approximately 800 hectares south of O'Herns Road. The Epping North East section would discharge south to the Darebin Creek system and the Epping North West section would discharge south to the Merri Creek system. The strategy put forward an indicative branch sewer network to service future development. It identified capacity available in the existing downstream sewerage system at a number of locations. This capacity was expressed in terms of residential lots and a total capacity of 4,750 lots was identified. It was proposed the capacity would be accessed through detention storages upstream of each of the connection points, to hold flows during periods of peak dry weather flow and wet weather flow. Development exceeding the 4,750 lot capacity would require the extension of the Merri Creek main sewer which ran generally north south to the west of the subject land. The strategy placed the subject land into three or four sub-catchments:
(1) The north west corner of the site graded towards Cooper Street and would be serviced by the Cooper Street East branch sewer east to pumping station (PS1), the rising main outfall south along Edgars Creek, and a flow control facility near the discharge point on the Edgars Creek sewer;
(2) The central catchment would be serviced by the Haberfield branch sewer east to a pumping station (PS7) and a rising main running north to pumping station 1.
(3) The south eastern catchment would be serviced by the golf course branch sewer south to pumping station 2 and stage flow control facility with initial connection to the Central Creek sewer and later rising main transfer south to the Merri Creek sewer.
(4) The south western catchment would be serviced by the golf course north branch sewer which would connect to the golf course branch sewer south of the site.
130 The strategy thus identified an initial sewerage capacity in the Edgars Creek system available to the area containing the subject land and providing for a maximum of 750 residential lots. It further identified potential for 200 lots to be connected to the Central Creek system and 1,300 lots to be connected to the Merri Creek system.
131 On 25 October 2000 Yarra Valley Water advised the claimant's consultants that any works not part of the strategy would be treated as temporary works at full cost to the developer. It further advised:
"A functional design has been prepared for connection of 750 lots to the Edgars Creek system, including the option of relocating PS1 to Cooper Street. A works offer has been issued for the proposed development for Scanlan land (360 Cooper Street) but this has not been accepted at this stage. If the 750 lots capacity is taken up by the Scanlan development, temporary works may be required to utilise the 1,300 lot capacity of the Merri Creek system."
132 This advice canvassed the servicing of both the subject land and the adjoining Haberfield/McKee property.
133 In or about November 2001 Yarra Valley Water again issued a functional design statement for up to 750 equivalent lots as the basis for proposed sewerage servicing arrangements for the Scanlan development.[27] Sewerage was said to be required for the proposed 92 lot industrial subdivision of the land at 360 Cooper Street and land immediately to the east having a total of approximately 84 hectares.
134 This functional design statement led to the offer of 20 December 2001 which I have quoted above. The offer imposed conditions relating to the whole of the Northpoint land but offered connection only with respect to stage 1 of the development.
135 As a result as Ms Hamila stated:
"As at the relevant date (11 February 2002) the position was that sewerage was available to the subject land and other development in the Cooper Street area up to the level of the available capacity of 2,250 residential lots or equivalent." (My emphasis)
136 Again, as I have stated, the offer to Northpoint was accepted on 12 February 2002. Subsequent to this further communications took place between the claimant's consultants and Yarra Valley Water. By letter of 15 August 2002 Yarra Valley Water advised in part as follows:
"Yarra Valley Water intends to review and refine the servicing strategy this year taking into account new information available such as the Craigieburn Bypass proposal and the metropolitan strategy.
...
The developer of the Northpoint Enterprise Park has installed sections of the Scanlan and Cooper Street East branch sewers within that property and also a temporary pumping station and pressure main connection to the local reticulation sewers to the east in Cooper Street. This temporary pumping scheme is not available to the subject land without the consent of the Northpoint developer.
Yarra Valley Water will be responsible for the design and construction of the key assets forming part of the ultimate servicing scheme i.e. pumping stations/pressure mains and flow control facilities and sewers greater than 450 [millimetres] diameter. This work will be funded by developers subject to reimbursement policy. The developer would be responsible for branch sewers 450 millimetres diameter or less and reticulation sewer outfalls to PS1, PS2 or PS7.
...
If development of the subject land proceeds prior to the installation of permanent pumping stations and flow control facilities, suitable temporary servicing arrangements for development of the land would need to be discussed with Yarra Valley Water. No allowance has been made for temporary works in the current New Connection Charges and would need to be fully financed by the developer
...
As an alternative to connecting to the existing sewerage system, the property could be serviced by a local sewage treatment plant, with winter storage and full reuse of treated effluent."
137 In my view it is clear that at the relevant date a hypothetical purchaser would have been satisfied that there was a real prospect of access to some of the capacity of the Cooper Street branch sewer.
138 Nevertheless, such prospect was attended by material uncertainties:
(a) If Northpoint was sewered initially in accordance with the offer that had been made to it, the temporary pumping station envisaged in the offer might be taken up by it alone. This after all is what the letter of offer envisages.
(b) Subsequent works required the further design of permanent pump station facilities. The authority had estimated the time required for this exercise at two years. It claimed responsibility for the design and construction of key assets. Hence uncertainty attended the question of whether this process could be expedited.
(c) Subsequent access to the branch sewer might also be subject to conflicting claims by Northpoint (the rezoning of the Northpoint land had proceeded on the basis it would have access to sewer capacity and both the functional design statement and the offer made by Yarra Valley Water envisaged that it would have such access) and Haberfield (Haberfield being designated by a planning strategy as appropriate for development at a prior stage to the subject land and having land abutting Cooper Street at its northern end which might be regarded as having an equal or better claim to access to the branch sewer to that of the claimant).
(d) Access to the sewers nominated in the strategy for the central and southern portions of the subject land would require substantially greater works of uncertain cost and timing traversing the land of third parties.
139 The sensitivity of these matters is corroborated by a valuation report prepared by Mr Dudakov in respect of part of the Scanlan land acquired compulsorily for the purposes of the widening of Cooper Street. This referred not only to the designation of existing sewerage infrastructure for the Scanlan land as at 5 October 2001 but also to the advantageous delay as a consequence to the development of other properties by up to three to five years.
140 There is no evidence prospective purchasers of the subject land in 2002 were in fact advised by the Council or Yarra Valley Water that sewerage was immediately available to the property and some hearsay evidence directly to the contrary.[28]
141 As against the matters of uncertainty noted above it was reasonably possible that the provision of pumping facilities might be expedited by cost sharing agreements with Northpoint (as the joint statement of engineers in this case envisages) or Haberfield. The upfront capital cost of such facilities could be split between developers.
142 Further, it was possible that engineering solutions might become available other than in accordance with the strategy. In particular additional capacity might be found for the Cooper Street area if less demand were placed on the system as a whole by development in the Epping North area. Alternatively, technical solutions such as on site treatment might be developed. Whatever the ultimate outcome of sewerage arrangements was to be, however, it was likely to involve delay.
143 In my view it is not possible to precisely quantify the delay but a prudent purchaser would allow for the risk of delay and the market perception of the likely flow restrictions. The evidence supports the view a purchaser would conclude that the delay in sewerage servicing would in all probability be at least two years and possibly longer.
144 There was a further probability of the imposition of flow restrictions on the land as had occurred in the Northpoint offer, also affecting the potential marketability of the land.
145 Further, the difficulty and risk as to the provision of sewerage infrastructure was such that the prudent purchaser would not have regarded the land as immediately ripe for subdivision even if it was zoned or about to be rezoned to facilitate urban development. Rather the prudent purchaser would have regarded the land as having demonstrable potential for future subdivision and development for employment generating purposes.
146 The claimant submits that weight should be given to Mr Dickey's understanding of sewerage proposals within the Epping North area as at the date of acquisition. In my view it is not Mr Dickey's expectation that is relevant but that of the prudent hypothetical purchaser.[29] For the reasons I have stated the evidence demonstrates considerable uncertainty as to the actual mode and timing of sewerage infrastructure for the subject land as at the relevant date. Moreover, Mr Dickey's evidence as a whole corroborates the view that sewerage infrastructure issues bore directly on the value of the site. Thus he noted after discussions with Council officers on 21 September 2001:
"Estimated infrastructure cost of this site makes it uncompetitive with the west for purely industrial and large space uses."
147 Likewise, the subsequent history of sewerage infrastructure on the Northpoint land does not detract, in my view, from the risks a prudent purchaser would have acknowledged at the relevant date.
148 The engineers' joint report should be accepted with respect to two basic propositions. Firstly, the hypothetical purchaser would have evaluated the availability of sewerage infrastructure by reference to the Yarra Valley Water Cooper Street Strategy of 12 October 2000. Secondly, the hypothetical purchaser would have had regard to the offer made to Northpoint on 20 December 2001 and the terms of that offer. These documents support the conclusions I have reached.
The Valuation Evidence
149 The claimant called valuation evidence from Mr Holland and Mr Wallace and the authority from Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown.
150 Mr Holland ultimately assessed the before value at $10 million and the after value at $5.5 million resulting in compensation of $4.5 million.
151 Mr Wallace ultimately assessed the before value at $10,952,300 and the after value at $6,072,300 resulting in compensation of $4,880,000.
152 Mr Dudakov ultimately assessed the before value at $9,216,000 and the after value at $6,922,000 resulting in compensation of $2,294,000.
153 Mr Brown ultimately assessed the before value at $6 million and the after value at $3.75 million resulting in an assessment of compensation at $2.25 million.
154 I have come to the view that the framework of Mr Dudakov's assessment of valuation is to be preferred to that of the other valuers but that the adjustments made within this framework require some revision having regard to the evidence as a whole. The net effect of these adjustments is to lift the compensation payable.
155 Before turning to Mr Dudakov's evidence, however, it is appropriate to say something further as to my reasons for rejecting the opinions of the other valuers.
Mr Holland
156 In the course of his evidence Mr Holland produced the following assessment of compensation.
BEFORE ASSESSMENT
ASSESSED COMPENSATION $6,100,000
157 This substantially reflected the methodology of earlier valuations but included additional developmental costs in the sum of $1,395,000. Ultimately Mr Holland, however, specifically adopted a before value of $10 million and an after value of $5.5 million resulting in compensation of $4.5 million as reflecting "a balanced view of things".[30]
158 Mr Holland produced both a Turner analysis and an Estatemaster hypothetical subdivision analysis in support of his valuation, and further referred to comparable sales.
159 I do not accept his opinion for the following reasons:
(a) For reasons already stated I do not accept that the land was ripe for subdivision as at the relevant date or that the ongoing process of subdivision was free from further risk of interruption and delay after its initial commencement. As a consequence the hypothetical subdivisional calculations undertaken by Mr Holland are not capable of being regarded as sufficiently reliable to produce a true indication of value.
(b) The reports produced by Mr Holland in evidence proceed on the basis that his reliance on comparable sales was as a check upon his primary subdivisional analyses. Although he sought to move from this position in his evidence in chief and assert that his opinion was ultimately based upon comparable sales, I am not satisfied that it was so based. At best he selected comparable sales by reference to parameters derived from hypothetical subdivision calculations.[31]
(c) Mr Holland's use of the Estatemaster program was fundamentally flawed in that he did not solve for value.
(d) Mr Holland valued the two lots 4 and 5 on title separately, which for reasons I shall elaborate, did not reflect their highest and best use at the relevant date.
(e) Mr Holland did not allow adequately for risks of delay in the development of the land.
Mr Wallace
160 Mr Wallace hypothesised a three lot subdivision of the subject land into super lots as constituting the highest and best use of the land as at the relevant date. In the before situation he hypothesised three lots, one having an area of 7.171 hectares fronting Cooper Street (lot A), one having an area of 6.568 hectares fronting Cooper Street (lot B) and one having an area of 60.840 hectares fronting Cooper Street to the west of the first two lots and extending to the south over the balance of the land (lot C). In the after situation he hypothesised lot A would have an area of 7.172 hectares, lot B would have an area of 7.777 hectares and lot C to the south would have an area of 40.270 hectares. The net realisation in the before situation would be $15,680,000 less development costs of $4,727,700 resulting in a figure of $10,952,300. In the after situation the net realisation figure would be $10,760,000 less anticipated development costs of $4,687,700 resulting in a figure of $6,072,300. The difference between the before and after figures was $4,880,000.
161 For reasons I shall elaborate I do not accept the hypothetical subdivision into super lots constituted the highest and best use of the land.
162 Further, Mr Wallace did not base his valuation upon sales evidence relating to land of comparable size namely, sales of land of 5 or 6 hectares or greater as super lots.
163 At one point he stated in cross examination:
"What I did was to look at all the sales in Northgate Estate, Thomastown. All the sales in Austrak Business Park, Somerton and the Stanley Drive, Somerton, sales, look at the range and look at the area and then consider the possible configuration of Lot A in terms of its future opportunity and derive what I considered an appropriate figure for that."
164 The basis of this derivation was not however made clear, other than the exercise of what Mr Wallace called his "skill, judgment and feel". I am not persuaded his figures were satisfactorily grounded in comparable sales evidence.
Mr Brown
165 Mr Brown adopted a comparable sales approach to the valuation of the subject land. His initial valuations of the land proceeded on the basis that it was to be treated as both unzoned for development and unsewered at the relevant date.
166 In my view the starting point for his levels of values derived from comparable sales does not allow adequately for the uplift in value which occurred in the vicinity of the subject land by the relevant date.
167 Having said this Mr Brown's analysis of the impacts of the acquisition upon the land has much to recommend it and his adjustment for severance in the "after" situation was significant.
168 Mr Brown also undertook analyses of the agreed plans and costings the results of which were not the subject of cross-examination and which confirmed the problematic value of subdivision in accordance with the plans and costings agreed by the joint report of the experts.
Mr Dudakov
169 Mr Dudakov undertook a valuation on 30 September 2004 which involved the following critical steps.
(a) He recognised the designated potential for urban development and use of the land and quoted Mr Whitney's opinion in this regard including the proposition that:
"The rezoning of the Cooper Street precinct area for employment uses would be pursued upon resolution of the route of the Craigieburn bypass;"
...
"There were at the time of preparation of the Cooper Street Precinct Strategy only two matters that impacted upon the timing of the rezoning. These were the resolution of the final alignment of the Craigieburn bypass, and the ability to provide sewerage to the large central portion of the precinct including the subject land;"
(b) He analysed the purchase price paid for the subject land pursuant to a terms contract of $5 million in January 2000 as having a cash equivalent of $4,491,740 (reflecting approximately $67,000 a hectare).[32]
(c) He had regard to development plans demonstrating potential subdivision facilitating employment generating uses representative of the ultimate highest and best use of the land.
(d) He recorded a series of advices as to when sewerage would be likely to be available and expressed the opinion that a prudent purchaser would be "conservative" and would expect either a lengthy delay, or to provide temporary sewerage arrangements at their own cost.
(e) He relied upon advice from engineering consultants that the earliest date for the upgrade of sewerage infrastructure would be 2009.
(f) As a result of the above matters he concluded there was some potential for an initial stage of development of the subject land along Cooper Street once planning permission was obtained but that this relied upon temporary sewerage arrangements being economically viable.
(g) He adopted a direct comparison approach as his primary method of valuation because in his view a prospective purchaser at the relevant date would have considered the long term potential of the property and purchased the property with a view to development once sewerage infrastructure in particular was available.
(h) He identified the sale of 360 Cooper Street, Epping to Northpoint Enterprise Park in July 2001 for a price of $13,164,139 equivalent to $224,162 per hectare ("the Northpoint sale") as "the best indicator of value, although adjustment must be made for the fact that the land is zoned and had sufficient sewerage capacity available to enable immediate development."[33]
(i) He discounted the comparable sale price of $224,000 per hectare by 10% per annum for 82 months being the time period before which the hypothetical purchaser would assume development could occur (i.e. January 2009). As a result he arrived at a value of $113,425 per hectare. It can be seen this discount effectively halves the value first identified by comparison.
(j) He checked the level of discount against analysis of the price paid in February 2002 for a parcel of residential land not sewered or zoned but located within the same growth corridor in O'Herns Road, Epping. The analysis reflected a 42% discount.
(k) Having regard to this check he adopted $125,000 per hectare as the value of the developable area of the property and 50% of that rate for the portion of the land subject to a gas pipe easement.
(l) The full value of the property as at February 2002 was calculated to be:
Unencumbered land
71.2245 hectares @ $125,000 per hectare $8,903,062
plus
Encumbered land
3.337 hectares @ $62,500 per hectare $ 208,562
$9,111,624
Adopted $9,110,000
(m) Finally he undertook a hypothetical development exercise which demonstrated that there was no advantage in undertaking stage 1 development by funding temporary sewerage works.
(n) In the after situation he attributed an enhancement of 5% to the effect of the freeway and in particular to the lots fronting Cooper Street "which will be suited to some form of bulky goods or quasi retail use." The enhancement resulted in a land value of $131,250 per hectare.
(o) He reduced this assessment to $130,000 per hectare for the developable land to reflect the impact of the design and development overlay (DDO 2) which would affect potential uses by requiring noise attenuation measures in the affected area.
(p) He calculated the after value as follows:
Unaffected land
54.14 hectares @ $130,000 per hectare $7,168,200
plus
Severed land 2.9415 hectares @ $10,000 per hectare $ 29,415
$7,197,615
Adopted $7,200,000
(q) This resulted in an assessment of compensation as at 11 February 2002 as follows:
Before value $9,110,000
After value $7,200,000
$1,910,000
170 This valuation was refined following the provision of the engineers' joint report.
(a) Mr Dudakov remained of the view that the most likely purchaser of the subject land in both before and after situations would be a developer/speculator prepared to await the uplifted value which would follow comprehensive rezoning of the precinct and sequential development, while reducing the likelihood of significant upfront costs. (Mr Holland agrees and says such a purchaser would be mindful but not unduly concerned about potential delay in sewerage supply).
(b) Because the land was not ripe for subdivision the appropriate valuation method is an assessment of comparable broad acre sales.
(c) Nevertheless the revised plans and costings prepared after the joint conference of engineers were of assistance in that they demonstrated the following matters:
• That the land affected by the gas easement can be effectively incorporated within the subdivision at the rear of allotments, thereby reducing its impact. Despite this Mr Dudakov considered that there was some diminution arising due to the easement for two reasons:
― The plans show that there will be two road crossings over the easement. Based on engineering advice and past experience, the crossing costs would be greater than for a "normal" road
― Notwithstanding that the easement would be at the rear of lots there would continue to be some market resistance due to occupational health and safety issues.
On balance he resolved to apply a discount of 25% below unaffected value to the easement affected land (as against his previous reduction of 50%).
• In the event that development of the subject land were to proceed prior to the development of other holdings, fixed upfront costs would be incurred, which in the after situation would necessarily be amortised over a lesser area thereby giving rise to the possibility of severance.
• The shape of the front land in the after situation is somewhat more irregular and as a result, subsequent subdivision may require the construction of a one sided road. This would again give rise to higher costs in the after situation. Offsetting these matters would be the benefit the lots would have due to their exposure to the freeway.
• While in the after situation there would be fewer lots fronting Cooper Street. These lots would achieve a premium above the before values due to the proximity of the freeway interchange.
171 The first three points noted in (c) above were agreed to in evidence by Mr Holland and substantially agreed to by the other two valuers. The principal disagreement between the valuers was not as to the fact of severance impacts but as to the manner in which they should be evaluated.
172 Mr Dudakov continued to be of the view that reduction in size in the after situation and proximity to the freeway were enhancements which should be taken into account.
173 He considered whether the fact that the land was comprised in two lots at the relevant date added to its value. He did not consider that it did because each lot was relatively long and thin making development in isolation less feasible and because he doubted that price maximisation could be achieved on the basis of separate hypothetical purchases of each lot. (Mr Holland was of the view that the fact of two existing allotments would add value to a purchaser because it would inter alia facilitate financing of future development).
174 Mr Dudakov maintained his previously adopted unaffected value of $125,000 per hectare but increased his assessment of the easement affected land to $93,750 per hectare.
175 In the after situation he adopted the same unaffected value of $125,000 per hectare for the reduced area of land. He no longer adopted a $5,000 per hectare premium in the after situation due to the reduced size of the holding and the proximity of the land to the freeway. He discounted this enhancement because of the possibility that the after costs of development would be greater on a developable area basis, and the uplift of lot prices arising from the freeway may not fully offset such costs.
176 He maintained a value of $10,000 per hectare for the severed land.
177 Accordingly, his revised calculations were as follows:
Before value
Unencumbered land
71.2245 hectares @ $125,000 per hectare $8,903,062
Easement affected land
3.337 hectares at $93,750 per hectare $ 312,844
After value
Land east of the freeway
55.14 hectares @ $125,000 per hectare $6,892,500
Severed land
2.9415 hectares @ $10,000 per hectare $ 29,415
$6,921,915
Say $6,922,000
178 Hence his revised compensation assessment was:
$2,294,000
179 On the whole of the evidence I am satisfied Mr Dudakov was correct in concluding:
(a) That the highest and best use was sale of the land as broad acre land with potential for development.
(b) The correct method of valuation is by reference to comparable sales.
(c) The best indicator of value is the Northpoint sale which should be relevantly adjusted.[34]
(d) The land is to be valued as a single parcel and not as two separate lots.
(e) The gas easement does occasion some loss of value to the "before" land.
180 Insofar as Mr Dudakov was the subject of some criticism as to his treatment of sales evidence initially used by him for the purposes of hypothetical subdivision analyses, it can be seen that such criticism does not bear directly on the method of valuation ultimately adopted by him and which I have accepted. Moreover, I do not accept any direct or unexplained inconsistency was established between his valuations of the Scanlan land and the subject land.
181 I shall elaborate my reasons for these conclusions below but before doing so it is convenient to turn to the question of appropriate adjustments. In my opinion the evidence supported the conclusion that:
(a) The Northpoint sale is properly regarded as an "after" sale and the before value calculated by reference to it should be discounted for enhancement by a factor of 10%.
(b) The discount for zoning and sewerage considerations adopted by Mr Dudakov in both the before and after situations is excessive. In my view the appropriate discount is 25%.
(c) An allowance should be made for severance in the after situation of 15%.
182 I shall also elaborate my reasons for each of these conclusions. They produce the following result.
Before value
Unencumbered land ($224,000 per hectare less 10%
for enhancement and 25% for sewerage risks)
71.2245 hectares @ $145,600 per hectare $10,370,287
Easement affected land ($145,600 per hectare less 25%
for gas easement)
3.37 hectares @ $109,200 per hectare $ 368,000
$10,734,687
Say $10,734,700
After value
Land east of freeway
($224,000 per hectare less 25% for sewerage risks
and 15% for severance)
55.14 hectare @ $134,400 per hectare $ 7,410,816
Severed Land
2.9415 hectares at $10,000 per hectare $ 29,415
$ 7,440,231
Say $ 7,440,200
183 It can be seen that this calculation results in a before value within the range identified by the claimant's valuers, but results in an after value closer to that postulated by Mr Dudakov.
Highest and Best Use
184 It follows from my conclusions as to the uncertainty concerning the supply of sewerage infrastructure at the relevant date that the land cannot be regarded as ripe for subdivision at that date.
185 Mr Wallace[35], Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown were all of the view that its highest and best use was for sale for the purpose of holding pending future development[36]. In my view the evidence as a whole supports this conclusion including not only the evidence as to sewerage infrastructure but also the evidence as to the rate of progress of the Northpoint subdivision.
186 I am fortified in this conclusion by the fact that it was independently arrived at by three of the four valuers called to give evidence.
Comparable Sales
187 It is well established that if sufficiently comparable in globo sales data is available such data will ordinarily provide the best basis on which to value broadacre land.[37]
188 In Coastal Estates v Bass Shire Council[38] Gobbo J was faced with a case in which it was an admitted fact that there could not be effective subdivision of the subject land until reticulated sewerage was provided (the same conclusion flows from the evidence in the present case). At the relevant date in the Coastal Estates case it was estimated that it would take some three years for sewerage to be provided and although in the event this estimate had subsequently proved optimistic his Honour held the matter was not to be determined by hindsight.
189 It was argued that a hypothetical subdivision analysis method of valuation was appropriate provided the land was ripe for residential subdivision and that the three year estimate did not render it inappropriate. His Honour rejected this submission and observed[39]:
"The discussion in the present case has focused too much on the issue of time and the debate as to whether three years delay is or is not decisive. In my view the passage of time is not always decisive and the analysis method may be inappropriate even in cases where the time delay is less than three years.
It is a question of fact in each case as to what is the appropriate method and it is unwise to seek to lay down prescriptive rules in this matter. At the same time, it is reasonable to regard a period of three years before any significant development and sale as raising a very real doubt as to this method because of the uncertainties involved in use of current estimates of sale prices and costs. In my view the starting point is that the valuation should, if possible, be founded on sales of comparable land. This is subject to the following qualifications and the particular circumstances of the case. (a) Where there are no comparable sales then the use of the analysis method is necessary; (b) Where there is little evidence by way of comparable sales, then use of the analysis method as a check is appropriate; (c) Where the subject land that has been acquired is part of a larger parcel and issues of severance and injurious affection and enhancement arise, it will be necessary that an analysis exercise be carried out if there are grounds for believing that a before and after valuation will not meet these issues. Thus, if there are significant differences in lot yield or in development costs between the before and after parcels then usually a full analysis should be carried out as a check. I say 'usually' because sometimes the matter can be satisfactorily dealt with by an allowance that reflects differences of cost. This may occur where the cost factor is readily isolated and it can be said that there is only one disadvantage, for example, the need for additional drainage or a longer road, that is peculiar to the before or after parcel. The reason why the broadacre sales approach rather than analysis should ordinarily be the primary or even sole approach is that the task of valuation is to be addressed by an analysis of comparable sales. The alternative view submitted on behalf of the claimants is that in every case of valuation of land that is more or less ripe for subdivision, the land should be valued by the use of the hypothetical analysis method. There is some support for this argument in those cases which discuss the use of the hypothetical analysis method where the land is ripe for subdivision. See, for example, Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways [No 2] (1973) 6 SASR 541; 32 LGRA 170 at 181-2; Turner v Minister of Public Instruction [1956] HCA 7; (1956) 95 CLR 245; Waalt Homes Pty Ltd v Road Construction Authority (1987) 64 LGRA 346. But even in land that is clearly ripe for subdivision, it does not follow that the analysis method must always be employed. This is so, where the entire holding of subdivisional land was acquired so that no issues of severance, injurious affection or enhancement could arise and where there was ample sales evidence as to what was being paid at the relevant time by subdividers for equivalent parcels of land. In such an example, the broadacre sales approach should in my view be preferred, for it will reflect a valuation that is founded on sales evidence."
I respectfully adopt his Honour's observations.
190 In Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways [No 1][40] Wells J stated at 181:
"The circumstances in which it is proper to invoke the hypothetical subdivision method were also much debated. In particular, it was put, on the one hand, that, unless the land was ripe for immediate subdivision, the method could only lead to an erroneous valuation, and, on the other hand, that it was not essential that the land should be so characterized, but that it was enough that it should be suitable for subdivision, and that appropriate allowances should be made for such delays in realization as might be likely to occur.
The evidence leaves me in no doubt that, once again, the question resolves itself into one of degree. Plainly, a calculation based on a hypothetical subdivision will not be vitiated simply because some very slight delay might be experienced before realization could begin, but an inordinate delay of, say, several years could, equally plainly, render the whole undertaking so speculative that a conclusion as to value would be wholly unreliable. In between those two extremes, the skilled valuer will have to decide at what stage the speculative element looms so large that the method becomes unsafe. His decision will depend on all the circumstances of each particular case."
191 Accepting that the question is one of fact in each case, the above statements fortify me in the view that the approach adopted by Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown as their primary approach is the correct approach to valuation in this case.
192 In the present case there is comparable valuation data available (to which I shall shortly come). There is also real uncertainty attending the date on which the land would in fact have been ripe for subdivision in the eyes of the hypothetical purchaser. The sewerage evidence indicates that a delay of at least some two years was likely for the initial supply of sewerage but this date was itself uncertain. Further supply of sewerage to subsequent stages of development was also attended by uncertainty and the prospect of further delay.
193 In my view the approach of Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown of valuing the land by reference to comparable sales with adjustments, was appropriate subject to the proviso accepted by both Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown that a hypothetical subdivision analysis could assist to test some of the potential parameters of loss due to severance.
194 I do not accept Mr Wallace's approach was correct, namely to hypothetically create super lots providing in advance for potential stages of future development. It may be that such a scheme would appeal to a purchaser of the whole of the land but as at the relevant date the highest and best value was to be achieved by the sale of the whole of the land to a purchaser having flexibility as to its ultimate form of development and the capacity to seek to maximise the yield from the land in conjunction with the subsequent resolution of sewerage infrastructure supply.[41]
195 In this regard I accept Mr Brown's evidence that major developers do not ordinarily sell super lots to competitors. They generally control the land and preserve their bargaining position. Further, a sale of three lots to three individual owners as at the relevant date would materially increase the risks faced by at least two of such owners, that development of any part of their land would be materially delayed by competition for infrastructure with the third.
196 In addition, as Mr Brown pointed out the creation of super lots could itself result in the loss of primary production status, and attract higher land tax rates and charges on the land, without facilitating further subdivision at that point in time.
197 Likewise, I do not accept Mr Holland's primary valuation methods based firstly, on a conventional "Turner" hypothetical subdivision analysis and secondly, on a more complex hypothetical subdivisional analysis using the Estatemaster computer program. I do not accept this approach firstly because of the view I have reached as to the highest and best use of the land at the relevant date and secondly, because I am persuaded on the whole of the evidence that the fundamental approach adopted by Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown is appropriate and involves less risk of error due to variables. As Mr Brown said:
"As can be appreciated any delay in developing the land by way of rezoning or waiting for connection to sewer will impact significantly upon the value of the parcel of land by way of additional holding costs, interest charges and profit and risk allowance."
198 Having said this I accept Mr Dudakov's opinion that the hypothetical plans of subdivision prepared after the joint conference of engineers do enable the impact of the gas easement upon the valuation of the land to be better assessed. For the reasons given above, a 25% adjustment is appropriate with respect to the land encumbered by the easement. Mr Holland made a like adjustment.
The Northpoint Sale
199 The claimant's case was both opened and put in closing submission on the basis that the Northpoint sale was the best general indicator of value of the subject land.
200 The Scanlan land was sold in two stages. The first stage of the sale comprised a parcel in the south east corner of 17.62 hectares which was sold in February 2001 for $3,430,000 yielding a rate of $194,665 per hectare for land zoned industrial and having designated access to sewerage.
201 In the second stage the balance of the Scanlan land which abutted the first stage to the west and north was sold in July 2001 for $9,734,139. The area was 43.33 hectares yielding a rate of $222,495 per hectare.
202 This sale ("the Northpoint sale") was referred to as relevant and relied on as such in different ways by all four valuers.
203 Mr Dudakov said of it:
"Given that 360 Cooper Street sold within [eight] months[42] of the relevant date, we consider it to be the best indicator of value, although adjustment must be made for the fact that the land is zoned and had sufficient sewerage capacity available to enable immediate development."
204 Mr Dudakov identified 360 Cooper Street as the most comparable sale after having examined a range of other sales including:
• The stage 1 sale of the Scanlan land (also relied on by Mr Brown).
• Cnr Hume Highway and Somerton Road, Craigieburn, March 1998 sale of 81.91 hectares of industrially zoned land for $10,200,000 yielding $124,527 per hectare a sale relied on by both Mr Dudakov and Mr Holland.
• 130 Hume Highway, Somerton February 2000 a sale of 13 hectares of industrially zoned land for $2,000,000 yielding $153,846 per hectare a sale relied on by both Mr Dudakov and Mr Holland.
205 I am satisfied that the examination of these and the other sales relied on by Mr Dudakov support his conclusion that the Northpoint sale is the best indicator of value of the subject land at the relevant date subject to appropriate adjustments. Factors tending to support this conclusion are:
(a) It is a sale of land adjacent to the subject land separated from it by Cooper Street;
(b) It is of a parcel of broadly comparable size;
(c) It was of land within the same area designated by planning policy for employment generating land use;
(d) It was proposed to be sewered pursuant to the same sewerage strategy applicable to the subject land; and
(e) Its relationship to the freeway proposal was mirrored in the subject land;
(f) It was regarded by Mr Holland as the most comparable sale[43] and relied on by all the valuers although they differed from Mr Dudakov in their analysis of it.
206 Nevertheless, it is apparent that a series of adjustments are necessary to the value which might otherwise be derived from the sale. As Hope JA said in Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Ltd[44]:
"The need to make adjustments to values deduced from sales in order to arrive at the true valuation of the land to be valued does not preclude the court which has the task of valuing the land from relying upon the sales as comparable in the relevant sense, nor from the making by the court or by valuers of adjustments which may be nothing more than the best guess that can be made."
207 It was contended on behalf of the claimant that the subject land should be regarded as better than the Northpoint land in three respects. First, it was said that at the time of the Northpoint sale a 150 meter wide strip of land adjacent to the proposed freeway alignment remained in a rural zone. This is true but it was clear that it had no sensible future use save as an adjunct to the industrial land and that its rezoning would be a matter of course. I do not regard it as having been in a materially different position from that which I have hypothesised would have been the position of the subject land but for the freeway proposal.
208 It was next said that the Northpoint land required a substantial body of fill. The evidence in this regard was unsatisfactory and there was no direct evidence of the fill requirement. Consequently, I am not persuaded it should be regarded as a material factor. The valuers gave widely different hearsay evidence concerning this aspect of the matter and I am not persuaded a sensible basis for adjustment has been established.[45]
209 It was also submitted that the comprehensive development zoning of the subject land would give it a higher value than the industrially zoned Northpoint land. A comprehensive development zone would facilitate both industrial and business uses. The valuation evidence does not, however, enable this potential advantage to be quantified satisfactorily. Further, I accept the evidence of Mr Brown that industrial use may include substantial office use coupled with warehousing, and the division between industrial and business use may be one of degree.
210 It was further put that the Northpoint sale occurred eight months prior to the relevant date in a rising market. While I accept that in general terms this is true, this factor requires evaluation in the context of the other matters e.g. enhancement, which I will elaborate. Ultimately, I am not persuaded this factor can be demonstrated to require adjustment[46].
Adjustment
211 I turn then to a series of further matters potentially requiring adjustment. As Mr Dudakov said, the parameters for such adjustment can notionally be seen as the market price paid for the land by the claimant and the value derived from the Northpoint sale.
Two Lots
212 Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown valued the land as a single parcel. In my view they were correct to do so although it was divided into two lots both having frontage to Cooper Street as at the date of the acquisition.
213 Once it is accepted that the highest and best use of the land at the relevant date was to be held for further subdivision the presence of two lots made no material difference to its value. The capacity to subdivide presumes the capacity to change the title scheme and better achieve an appropriate sequence of development. Whether and in what form the land was in the first instance subdivided into super lots would be a matter for the developer and as Mr Dudakov said would involve little relative cost. Hence there is no real advantage inherent in the existence of two preceding lots in the circumstances which would arise once rezoning was achieved.
214 It would not be sensible to sell the two lots separately as at the relevant date, because as Mr Dudakov observed their elongated and relatively thin shape materially inhibited their individual subdivision. Separate sales would also create individual risks arising from competition for sewerage infrastructure.
Enhancement
215 The price paid for the Northpoint land reflects enhancement as a result of the freeway proposal. The same enhancement affected the subject land at the relevant date. Once the freeway alignment was finalised both the Northpoint land and the subject land became parcels of land adjacent to the freeway and a proposed diamond interchange at Cooper Street. The enhancement from the freeway would not fully crystallise until it was constructed in what might be anticipated to be three to four years after the relevant date. Thus the holding of the land during this period would also result in a benefit in this regard. As the highest and best use of the land was to hold it for future development the freeway proposal may be regarded as having materially enhanced its value. For like reasons the impact of the freeway construction period on the value of the subject land would not have the adverse impact upon a hypothetical purchaser asserted on behalf of the claimant.
216 The sales evidence at a series of locations referred to by the valuers including Somerton and Derrimut demonstrates ready access to freeway or other major transport infrastructure (such as fixed rail) enhanced the value of industrial land at the relevant date.
217 The evidence also shows there are categories of industrial/business uses to which such access is beneficial and other categories of uses which may be benefited by the visual exposure offered by a site adjacent to a freeway.
218 The claimant itself relies on the fact of expressions of interest in the subject land by Honda prior to the acquisition. The land offered by the claimant to Honda in November 2000 was an elongated parcel running down from Cooper Street along the western boundary of the subject land immediately adjacent to the then anticipated freeway alignment. It was intended that a variety of uses would be accommodated within this parcel of land all benefiting from the prominence of the site and its ease of access. The choice of abuttal to the freeway for the proposal was plainly deliberate. Indeed Mr Dickey sought a premium on this basis.
219 Insofar as the subject land as a whole is concerned the evidence discloses there were a number of potential purchasers who expressed interest to the claimant in the whole of the land after the freeway alignment was finalised and none who expressed such interest beforehand.
220 The Northpoint sale itself was not finalised until after the freeway announcement and despite hearsay evidence as to the alleged background to the sale, the price paid was paid in the context of certainty as to the freeway location and in the expectation of the inconvenience of freeway construction. Furthermore, following the freeway announcement Northpoint sold the south western corner of the Northpoint land facing Cooper Street and adjacent to the freeway off-ramp for the purpose of development of a BP service station. The terms of the sale fixed the obligation for settlement by reference to the (anticipated) freeway completion date. It is apparent the site was not simply selected because it was on Cooper Street but because it was adjacent to the freeway exit.
221 The claimant itself considered the possibility of a service station development on its land after the relevant date. I am satisfied that the freeway announcement facilitated a series of uses such as service stations benefiting directly from the freeway interchange.
222 The process of development of the Scanlan land has been slow and did not take off until after the freeway announcement despite the attributes of the area described in evidence by the claimant's valuers.
223 I reject the evidence of Mr Wallace that the freeway proposal should not be regarded as materially enhancing the value of the land. I accept the evidence of Wallace that within an industrial subdivision land immediately adjacent to a freeway may not sell as well as other land suffering lesser amenity effects but having good road access. This general proposition, however, does not detract from the strength of the fundamental proposition that the potential use of both the Northpoint land and the subject land was materially enhanced by finalisation of the freeway proposal and its implementation.
224 Mr Wallace also contended that the subject land was well served in any event by major arterial roads running north south and connecting with the ring road in that it had the Hume Highway to the west and Edgars Road (which was proposed to be upgraded as at the relevant date) located to the east. I do not accept these routes offered comparable access or exposure to that which a hypothetical purchaser would anticipate would be provided by the freeway.
225 Mr Holland allowed a figure of 10% enhancement in his calculations because in the after situation the subject land was "nearer" to the proposed freeway interchange. This implicitly reflects an even higher enhancement deriving from the freeway proposal as a whole.
226 Mr Holland arrived at this figure despite the view that enhancement would be offset by detriment during the freeway construction period. He also agreed in the course of his evidence that there was a sudden jump in values in the area following the announcement of the freeway alignment.
227 Mr Dudakov's September 2004 valuation attributed a 5% enhancement factor to the freeway proposal. In his final valuation he regarded this as off-set by the possibility that the after costs of subdivision would be greater on a developable area basis. Mr Brown noted that holding the land would create additional holding costs in that rezoning would trigger a supplementary valuation and potentially higher Council rates and land tax charges. As against this one of the benefits the land would achieve if it were held would be the development of the freeway infrastructure. This would enhance the value of the general locality as has been experienced in other industrial sectors of metropolitan Melbourne. Mr Brown did not identify a specific factor for enhancement.
228 In my view a figure of 10% for enhancement as at the date of acquisition is appropriate, although it is apparent that further enhancement would have occurred upon completion of the freeway and the highest and best use of the land was to hold it for future development after some years, during which it could be anticipated the freeway would be progressively constructed.
229 The 10% should be deducted in the before situation.
Zoning and Sewerage
230 For the reasons I have stated I am satisfied no material discount should be given for the fact the land was not rezoned at the relevant date. It should be regarded as probable that, but for the freeway proposal, the land would either have been rezoned or very substantially advanced in the rezoning process towards a comprehensive development zone as at the relevant date.
231 Likewise, for the reasons I have stated, however, I am of the view that a substantial risk still attended the timely provision of sewerage to the land and hence the capacity to subdivide.
232 Mr Dudakov applied a discount on the basis that the land would not be capable of being sewered before 2009. This conclusion was not supported by engineering evidence to this effect, although I accept he was so advised by engineers who were not called to give evidence. In my view the hypothetical purchaser as at the relevant date would have considered that sewerage could not be provided in less than two years, but there was a real and substantial risk that both the initial provision and progressive augmentation of such supply might be subject to further delays.
233 The engineers who signed the joint report also reported on the feasibility of a potential before and after plan of subdivision. The before and after plans ultimately agreed as feasible and forming the subject matter of agreed costings, provided for some 24 lots in the northern portion of the site in the before situation and some 17 lots in the after (although there was some disagreement as to whether the internal subdivisional figuration adjoining the freeway reserve was optimal). It was agreed the northern portion of the subject land was within the Edgars Creek drainage scheme and costs were based on:
• Costing prepared as if development proceeded at the acquisition date of 11 February 2002.
• Servicing conditions applicable at the relevant date or shortly thereafter.
• Concept design alternative before plan - staging plan prepared by Coomes dated 9 June 2006.
• Draft Cooper Street strategy plan version 2002.
• Construction rates and standards taken from relevant industrial developments in the northern areas of Melbourne applicable at the relevant date.
234 Other assumptions included:
• Assuming the north west corner of the site drained to Cooper Street.
• Allowing for a temporary sediment trap, litter trap and construction of main drain along the Haberfield frontage to proposed wetland (which was assumed to be reimbursable).
• Assuming the central area drained east to Edgar Creek.
• Allowing temporary sediment traps, litter traps and temporary outfall.
• Assuming the north west catchment will connect to proposed sewers in Cooper Street and allowing for an outfall along the south side of Cooper Street.
• Assuming the first stage of sewerage works would service up to 18 hectares.
• Allowing new temporary pumping station and extension of temporary rising mains and joint funding of the Cooper Street flow control facility.
• Assuming the second stage of works to service the north west and central catchments, subject to sewer loadings and uptake of available capacity.
• Allowing an upgrade of the pump station and rising main outfall to Edgars Creek sewered at Charles Road.
• Allowing for a temporary pumping station located in the central catchment and rising main to Cooper Street.
• Assuming an upfront reimbursement discounted to 15%for the Cooper Street facility and outfall at Charles Road and 30% for internal branch sewers.
235 On the assumptions stated the average cost of servicing the northern portion of the land in the before situation was estimated to be $41.70 per square metre of saleable land. The equivalent cost in the after situation was $47.90.
236 Mr Brown noted that the reduction in the size of the subject land might be regarded as reducing the potential risk that sewerage would not be available to an initial stage of development in the northern portion of the site:
"As we understand it there is capacity to develop approximately 33 hectares of industrial land at the relevant date in the locality of the subject property.
The 'before' plan provides for a developable land area of 35.70 hectares which we understand includes the gas easement land which cannot have sewerage facilities placed upon it.
In the 'after' plan there is approximately 24.45 hectares of developable land as per the agreed plan.
As it would appear from the above no guarantees can be given in relation to the capacity available to service the 'before' land and in our view there is a risk that the whole of the capacity would not be able to be obtained by Murdesk at the date of acquisition.
There would appear to be a greater chance of obtaining this capacity for the 'after' land given that the 'after' area is significantly below the available capacity."
237 As against this the joint report of engineers stated that:
"(a) There was more land available before the bypass was proposed. As a result of the bypass there is less land available. This means that the cost of moving to the next catchment for sewer services is brought forward as there are less lots in each catchment on the subject land. The infrastructure arrangements would be the same before and after the bypass acquisition.
(b) Before the acquisition there was more land available to take up capacity but also more potential for others to contribute to infrastructure costs."
238 Having regard to the evidence as a whole it seems to me that both Mr Brown and Mr Dudakov were correct in allowing for an adjustment with respect to the valuation of the subject land because of the probable delay and uncertainty as to the implementation of sewerage infrastructure.
239 It was also true that the hypothetical purchaser of the subject land at the relevant date was confronted with the likely imposition of limitations on sewerage flow at the time of subdivisional permits. But this same limitation was known to affect the Northpoint land at the date of the Northpoint sale and hence does not call for any further adjustment.
240 Mr Brown dealt with the factor of delay and uncertainty in the provision of sewerage by utilising comparable sales of unzoned and unsewered land as the underlying basis of his valuation.
241 Mr Holland acknowledged the significance of the sewerage factor by valuing the westernmost of the two existing lots at significantly less than the easternmost, because the western lot was less well placed in terms of access to sewerage infrastructure.
242 Mr Wallace proposed the sequential subdivision of super lots and in so doing he also recognised the significance of infrastructure supply to the land.
243 In the ultimate I have concluded that Mr Dudakov's approach of explicitly adjusting the Northpoint sale for sewerage considerations is appropriate, but in my view the evidence supports an adjustment of 25% at the relevant date rather than the substantially greater adjustment which he made. The adjustment which should be made reflects a not insignificant risk, but it is not capable of precise mathematical modelling.
Severance
244 In the after situation the land was reduced in size, reduced in its frontage to Cooper Street, and altered in its overall shape and relative dimensions so as to create a more constrained area for development in terms of its east west dimensions.
245 As a result of the acquisition the subject land was reduced from 74.50 hectares to 55.14 hectares (leaving aside the severed splinter of 2.9415 hectares).
246 The valuation evidence demonstrated that ordinarily reduction in size would lead to a higher value per unit. In the present case, however, this is counterbalanced by evidence that at the relevant date land bankers were seeking large parcels of land with appropriate potential such as the subject land.[47] Moreover, the acquisition did not radically change the order of size of the site in the sense that it changed its potential range of future use in any fundamental respect.
247 On the other hand the reduction in size meant that if development of the land proceeded in advance of other land holdings in the immediate area, fixed up front infrastructure costs might have to be amortised over a smaller area.
248 Save for this latter risk I am not persuaded the change in size materially affected the value per hectare of the after land.
249 The acquisition also resulted in a reduction of frontage to Cooper Street reducing such frontage to some 350 metres, of which only 272 potentially had relatively direct access[48]. Whilst it can be said the visual exposure of the subject land as a whole was improved by the prospect of lateral exposure to the freeway and exposure to the interchange at its north west corner in particular, it is nevertheless clearly correct that the direct exposure to Cooper Street available to business uses was reduced. Likewise, although the evidence supports the view that most lots having a frontage to Cooper Street in the before situation would have been likely to have been accessed via a service road, the potential number of business uses with direct vehicular access to Cooper Street would also be reduced.
250 The acquisition produced an irregular western boundary and reduced east west dimensions both absolutely and in proportion to the depth of the subject land. The before and after plans produced following the joint experts conference demonstrate the potential cost of the initial stages of subdivision might as a result be materially increased particularly if it became necessary to build a less efficient road layout due to the more constrained site.
251 Subdivisional costing at the relevant date (including sewerage), showed $55.84 per square metres in the before situation and $70.80 per square metres in the after situation subdivision as at the relevant date, resulting in a cost differential in the order of $1.4 million.
252 I do not accept that this cost is capable of any precise assessment because I do not accept the land was ripe for subdivision as at the relevant date. Its potential for future development must be regarded as quite fluid. Thus there is no satisfactory basis on which a hypothetical purchaser would realistically exclude potentially larger land users such as Honda and it is difficult to postulate a particular form of subdivision as a satisfactory basis for assessing future costs. Further, unless the date for subdivision can be confidently predicted it is difficult to model future costs. In addition the costings do not cover the whole of the land and cannot necessarily be directly translated to a before and after valuation of the whole of the land. They include the cost of works such as the signalised intersection to Cooper Street which would benefit the whole of the land, but involve significant upfront cost in the initial subdivision. Hence this is a case where the hypothetical subdivision analyses undertaken demonstrate a significantly higher potential cost of subdivision[49] but they cannot be used as a direct basis for quantifying the effect on value as at the relevant date.
253 As I have set out above Mr Dudakov acknowledged that the hypothetical plans of subdivision demonstrate that the shape of the front of the land in the after situation is more irregular and results in the possibility of having to construct a "one sided" road, giving rise to higher costs in the after situation. He also acknowledges the reduction in potential for lots fronting Cooper Street. As I have also said, however, he sees these matters as being off-set by other factors.
254 In my view the countervailing factors which he identifies and the set-off which he adopts do not adequately adjust for these matters.
255 Mr Brown made an adjustment for severance equivalent to 15.5% of significantly less land values than those adopted by Mr Dudakov and reflecting an allowance in the order of $690,000.[50]
The DDO 2 Planning Overlay
256 The claimant's valuers also contend that a further adjustment should be made for the DDO 2 overlay. The effect of this overlay is to impose a permit control intended to ensure adequate construction standards are adopted to protect noise sensitive uses adjacent to the freeway.
257 I accept the view of Mr Dudakov and Mr Brown that at the relevant date the hypothetical purchaser would have had some concerns as to the market perception of this overlay but it would not in fact materially constrain future use and development. Accordingly it gives rise to some but not significant severance impact. Further, the Northpoint sale reflected this factor in any event and no other sales, evidencing a negative impact were adduced. I do not accept the view of Mr Holland and Mr Brown that the DDO 2 overlay justifies a 5% deduction from the value of the land affected.
Conclusion
258 On the evidence as a whole I am satisfied that an adjustment of 15% should be made to Mr Dudakov's calculation to allow for severance in respect of factors relating to size, dimensions, subdivisional potential, the interface with Cooper Street and insofar as necessary the effect of the DDO 2 overlay.
259 For the above reasons the compensation payable with respect to loss of market value and severance should be assessed at $3,294,500 in accordance with the conclusion set out at [182] above.
[1] Appendix A shows a plan of the subject land and the acquired portion.
[2] Spencer v Commonwealth [1907] HCA 82; (1907) 5 CLR 418
[3] Above at 441
[4] [1914] UKPC 77; [1914] AC 1083 at 1088
[5] Turner [1956] HCA 7; (1956) 95 CLR 245 at 264; March v City of Frankston [1969] VicRp 44; [1969] VR 350 at 356.
[6] Crompton v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 32 LGRA 8 at 25.
[7] 85 LGERA 143 at 149
[8] See also King v Minister for Planning and Housing [1993] VicRp 11; [1993] 1 VR 159 at 183; Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2004] NSWLEC 315; Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority v Walker Corporation Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 251; (2005) 63 NSWLR 407; Broken Bay Peninsular Pty Ltd v Minister Administering the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 [1997] NSWLEC 165.
[9] Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales, [2005] NSWLEC 438 and the cases there cited.
[10] At [63].
[11] Road Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Mosca [2006] NSWCA 159 and the cases there referred to at [50]-[54].
[12] Section 41(e) and see the definition of "loss attributable to severance" in s.40.
[13] Coastal Estates v Bass Shire Council [1993] VicRp 92; (1993) 2 VR 566 at 577-579; Vicgrain Assets Pty Ltd v Hindmarsh City Council [1999] VSC 47 at [62].
[14] Coastal Estates v Bass Shire Council [1993] VicRp 92; (1993) 2 VR 566 at 577-579.
[15] Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] 25 NSWLR 705 at 743-744, [85].
[16] Wright v Sydney Municipal Council (1916) 16 SR NSW 348; English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd (1973) 1 All ER 726; Bromley v Housing Commission New South Wales (1985) 3 NSWLR 407.
[17] Housing Commission of New South Wales v Faulkiner [1981] 1 NSWLR 547 at 558 and 563; Minister for the Army v Parbury Henry & Co [1945] HCA 52; (1945) 70 CLR 459 at 514.
[18] Commissioner of Succession Duties SA v Executive Trustee and Agency Co of SA Ltd [1947] HCA 10; (1947) 74 CLR 358 at 374; Gregory v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1971] HCA 2; (1971) 123 CLR 547 at 565.
[19] This precinct included the land known as the Haberfield/McKee land to the east and south of the subject site.
[20] The Council officer's report articulating the basis of its position expressly acknowledged sewerage constraints identified by the panel, a matter to which I shall return. It noted that Council had made a conscious decision not to rezone the whole Cooper Street precinct given among other things that zoning all the land industrial would require a solution to the long term servicing (sewerage) issue, which could not be determined at that stage.
[21] On 12 September 2000 the claimant waived its rights pursuant to the above conditions and paid a further deposit of $250,000. The purchase was subsequently completed.
[22] At the relevant date the MSS and new format planning scheme were in place, drainage for the Scanlan land was further resolved, the road network was better resolved, the freeway alignment was finalised, the options for adjacent land would be clarified by rezoning the subject land, and further work had been done on the provision of sewerage infrastructure.
[23] See e.g. cl.21.06-7 of the MSS quoted above.
[24] Mr Jordan and Mr Wright on behalf of the authority and Mr Hunter, Mr Hawkins and Ms Hamila on behalf of the claimant
[25] dated October 2000
[26] The subject land fell in stage 2 and land to the west in stage 3.
[27] It appears this statement went through a series of iterations.
[28] Contained in the claimant's contemporaneous records of discussions with the prospective purchasers.
[29] I do not accept that the C12 panel proceedings resulted in an actual recommended allocation of sewerage capacity from Epping North to the Cooper Street redevelopment area prior to the relevant date.
[30] It is difficult to see how it could be proper both to deduct additional development costs and apply a substantial deduction for severance.
[31] He stated: "Your Honour, developers use plans to help them determine an indicative level of value at - when they're looking at buying land. Often times they don't have all the information available to them and neither do valuers often so they use it as a tool to understand what the likely parameters are. We then reference our analysis to sales of broad acre land which have similar potential and it is a preferred approach to, where you can, rely on sales of land which has potential which has already been sold. What I've been - what I attempted to do in my valuation was analyse the land in question and refer it to sale of other parcels of land in order to form my opinion."
[32] As Mr Dudakov emphasised in evidence this reflected a significant discount for unzoned and unserviced land, when compared with other sales, particularly the sale of land on the corner of Cooper Street and the Hume Highway referred to further below.
[33] The Scanlan land was sold in two stages. The first in February 2001 and the second in July 2001. Mr Dudakov combined the two to arrive at the total price stated. Although the rate per hectare is derived from the second stage of the sale.
[34] Mr Dudakov stated in evidence: "... essentially the valuation of the subject land boils down to the purchase of the subject itself earlier, the sale of the serviced and zoned land immediately opposite and how you make appropriate adjustments with those two givens with the balance of the evidence is the task."
[35] Even assuming the land was rezoned and sewerage available to it, Mr Wallace said at [23] and [24] of his Affidavit sworn 26 November 2005:
"[23] Although the form of the plans was consistent with the future development of the subject land which might have been permitted, in my opinion the selling period would have been too long, given:
(a) the extent of time needed to reach a 'break even point' with regard to land and development costs, and the uncertainty associated with estimating and reliably reflecting the appreciation in realisable prices of lots over the selling period;
(b) the uncertainty associated with the estimating and reliably reflecting a profit and risk factor associated with development and sale of the land, over the various stages;
(c) the uncertainty with regard to the conditions on which services would be available, over the relevant period;
(d) the uncertainty with regard to the likely interest on holding charges.
[24] Moreover such detailed and extensive hypothetical subdivision was not consistent with the reality of the market place as at the relevant date, and the development and marketing strategy which would have been adopted by a competent developer to achieve the highest and best use of the property."
[36] Mr Holland agreed in cross examination that if the land required rezoning, and may have to wait two years for sewerage, it would be a land banking proposition.
[37] E.g. Riverbank Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia (1970) 48 ALGR 483
[38] [1993] VicRp 92; (1993) 2 VR 566
[39] Ibid at 576 - 577
[41] Although the Scanlan land was released in stages, the developer's continuing interest in the whole of the land was maintained through a joint venture arrangement. Further, Mr Wallace gave evidence that the joint venture was "happy to deal with you on a turnkey basis but not necessarily to sell you the land".
[42] As clarified in cross-examination.
[43] Mr Holland derived a rate of $20 per square metre from this and other sales.
[44] (1981) 48 LGRA 409 at 434
[45] Insofar as the claimant also called engineering evidence as to the typical cost of fill at the relevant time this was also not persuasive.
[46] Mr Holland's evidence was that the rising market was a very difficult thing to quantify.
[47] Mr Holland stated in evidence that developers would be willing to "punt it" and buy land such as this and hold it for the long term. He stated that developers often pay very large sums of money to land bank especially in areas which are seen to be great opportunities and where there is a constrained supply and where there is rapidly emerging activity in the precinct.
[48] The slip lane alignment and tree reserve associated with the freeway interchange intruded across the north western corner of the land towards the east.
[49] Cf. Gobbo J in Coastal Estates at 576 quoted above.
[50] $80,000 per hectare reduced by $12,500 per hectare for severance.
Murdesk Pty Ltd
Roads Corporation [2006] VSC 363
(1978) 140 CLR 196
(1999) 197 CLR 414
(1973) 6 SASR 541
(1956) 95 CLR 245
(1907) 5 CLR 418
(2005) 63 NSWLR 407
(1993) 2 VR 566
(1985) 3 NSWLR 407
(1945) 70 CLR 459
(1947) 74 CLR 358
(1971) 123 CLR 547