Plaintiff v Defendant

Plaintiff v Defendant - [2005] VSC 306 - VSC 2005 case summary — Zoe

[13]

8 The NII representations were made to the plaintiff orally, in or around Sydney, in June 2003. One or more of the NII representations was made to each group member before they executed their respective NII contract and was relevantly relied upon by them. Each of the NII representations was a misrepresentation. The plaintiff and each group member has thereby suffered loss and damage.

9 The plaintiff and other group members also entered into individual loan agreements with AFD, pursuant to which AFD agreed to lend them the amount of the NII course fee ("the AFD credit contracts"). The AFD credit contracts were in writing and in "substantially identical form" to the plaintiff's AFD credit contract.

10 Each AFD credit contract was a "credit contract" within the meaning of, and was therefore governed by, the relevant Consumer Credit Code applicable to each group member ("the Code"). AFD was a "linked credit provider" of NII, within the meaning of s.117(1) of the Code and s.73(14) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 ("TPA"). Each AFD credit contract was a "tied loan contract" within the meaning of s.117(3) of the Code and s.73(14) of the TPA. Pursuant to s.119 of the Code and s.73(1) of the TPA, AFD is liable to the plaintiff and each group member for loss caused by the NII representations.

11 Further and alternatively, before the plaintiff and each group member executed their NII contract and AFD credit contract, a servant or agent of NII represented to them that they could withdraw from the program at any time and would receive a full refund of any money they had paid to AFD pursuant to the AFD credit contract, and would not be liable to pay AFD any more money ("the AFD credit contract representation"). NII engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct, contrary to s.52 of the TPA, in making the AFD credit contract representation. Pursuant to s.118 of the Code, the plaintiff and each group member has the same right to recover damages from AFD as they would from NII.

12 Further and alternatively, there was an agreement between AFD and NII that AFD would not advance to NII the entire amount of finance or credit borrowed by each group member ("the holdback agreement"). Instead, in the case of the plaintiff and all group members, AFD retained an amount referred to as an "interest-free holdback". In circumstances where the borrower did not meet AFD's lending guidelines, a further amount referred to as a "high-risk holdback" was also withheld. The existence and amount of the holdbacks were not disclosed to group members. The holdbacks constituted "interest" within the meaning of the Code and should have been disclosed to the borrowers. By entering into the holdback agreement with NII, and failing to disclose the interest and certain other information to borrowers, AFD has contravened ss.15(B), 15(C)(a), 15(D) and 15(E) of the Code.

13 Further and alternatively, at the time the plaintiff and each group member entered into their AFD credit contract, AFD failed to disclose the holdback agreement to them and represented that it would pay the whole of the course fee to NII ("the AFD holdback misrepresentation"). AFD engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct, contrary to s.52 of the TPA, in making the AFD holdback representation. The plaintiff and group members claim damages or seek to have their AFD credit contract set aside or varied, pursuant to s.87 of the TPA.

14 Further and alternatively, by reason of the holdback agreement, the amount advanced by AFD to the plaintiff and group members is less than the amount referred to in the AFD credit contracts. In the circumstances, AFD is only entitled to recover the amount paid by it on behalf of the plaintiff and group members to NII, plus interest.

15 Finally, each AFD credit contract was "unjust" and is liable to be re-opened pursuant to s.70 of the Code.

Section 33C

16 Section 33C(1) sets out the threshold requirements for a group proceeding under Part 4A of the Act.

"33C Commencement of Proceeding

(1) Subject to this Part, if-

[29]

30 These questions are common and substantial. But are they in issue? AFD submitted that both of these questions have already been the subject of determination by VCAT and are therefore not in issue.

31 In the VCAT proceeding, AFD was the respondent to an application brought by the Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria.[9] The Director sought declarations of contravention of the Code and the imposition of civil penalties. The tribunal member found that the holdback agreement was entered into and that AFD had breached ss.15(B), 15(C)(a), 15(D) and 15(E) in retaining the holdback amounts. AFD obtained leave to appeal that decision to this court. On 17 December 2004, Kaye J upheld the tribunal member's finding in relation to s.15B of the Code, but not the other alleged breaches.[10]

32 AFD submitted that, upon final determination of the VCAT proceeding and all appeals therefrom, the successful party would be capable of registering the judgment throughout the Commonwealth, and that questions (f) and (g) would no longer require determination. This avenue is said to arise from the operation of s.108 of the Code. AFD argued that questions (f) and (g) are therefore not substantial questions in this proceeding. In my opinion, that submission is flawed for several reasons.

33 Section 108 of the Code is of far more limited scope than contended for by AFD. It permits the registration with a court in one jurisdiction of an order made in another jurisdiction under a provision corresponding to ss. 102 or 105 of the Code, both of which deal with civil penalties under the Code. It does not purport to deal with issues other than civil penalties nor to bind persons other than the parties to such proceedings.

34 Furthermore, s.108 allows for the registration of a decision on the application of AFD or the Director, not by the plaintiff or group members. AFD submits that it is likely that either AFD or the Director will register the final decision in that case once any appeal avenues have been completed. That may well be so. However, the group members are not parties to the VCAT proceeding or the appeal therefrom. Those proceedings are not binding on or enforceable by the group members.

35 Accordingly, questions (f) and (g) are in issue and otherwise satisfy the requirements of s.33C.

[37]

46 AFD argues that the court should exercise its discretion under s.33N and order that the proceeding no longer continue as a group proceeding. It says the court should do so because the real controversy in this case will involve the separate examination of some 2,318 individual sale and loan transactions to ascertain which, if any, of the alleged oral representations were made by one or more of some 90 sales consultants, and to determine questions of individual reliance and damage. AFD says that group proceedings are not suitable for resolving claims which are fundamentally individual.

47 The plaintiff argues that the application pursuant to s.33N should be refused both because it is premature, and because there is no basis for an order under s.33N in any event.

48 Sub-sections (a) and (b) of s.33N(1) may be disposed of shortly. There is simply no evidence before me such as would entitle me to make any finding as to the likely costs of a group proceeding compared with the costs of a large number of separate proceedings by individual group members.[11] Nor has it been established that all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a group proceeding.[12]

49 AFD's argument apparently focussed on sub-sections (c) and (d), which raise issues of efficiency and effectiveness, and the appropriateness of the claims being pursued by means of a group proceeding.

50 The fact that a proceeding will at some stage involve an examination of numerous individual contracts or transactions has not prevented courts from allowing the common issues to be determined in the group proceeding. What is efficient, effective or appropriate will obviously vary from case to case, as the various authorities put forward by both sides illustrate.

51 I accept the plaintiff's submission that it is "too early to make any of the decisions called for by [section 33N]".[13] Even assuming that AFD files a defence which removes by its admissions some of the common questions referred to earlier, in my opinion, other substantial common questions will remain on the plaintiff's current pleading. It also became apparent during the course of oral submissions that the plaintiff may seek to amend some parts of the claim[14], or to provide further and better particulars of existing allegations.

52 In Bright v Femcare, the Full Federal Court warned against exercising the court's power under s.33N before at least the utility of the group proceedings regime had been exhausted by resolution of the common issues.[15] The following general observations in that case are relevant and equally apposite here:

[38]

"Whether or not it is in the interests of justice to make such an order has to be weighed against the public interest in the administration of justice that favours class actions. That requires one to consider the principal objects of the class action procedure. They are: (1) to promote the efficient use of court time and the parties' resources by eliminating the need to separately try the same issue; (2) to provide a remedy in favour of persons who may not have the funds to bring a separate action, or who may not bring an action because the cost of litigation is disproportionate to the value of the claim; and (3) to protect defendants from multiple suits and the risk of inconsistent findings."[16]

"The applications under s.33N were made at a procedurally early stage. Defences have not yet been filed. In substance, the applicant commenced a representative proceeding, which ex hypothesi, the legislature intended she be entitled to commence because of the presence of substantial common issues of law and fact, yet the court was immediately asked to accept that the proceeding would not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claim of the group members. I do not mean to suggest that an application under s.33N at such an early stage of a properly commenced representative proceeding would always be premature: if there were an incompatibility or conflict between the representative party's case and the cases of the represented parties... or if the only substantial common issue were one of law on which a decision in the case of one group member would bind the others, it may be thought not efficient or effective for the representative proceeding to continue. But ordinarily one would expect that, in an attempt to give effect to the legislative intention, a means will be sought, by case management techniques, to enable a representative proceeding to continue to the stage of resolution of the substantial common issues on the basis that after that stage is completed, an order under s.33N or directions under s.33Q will be made...."[17]

[67]

71 There is no factual dispute as to the accuracy of the matters set out in paragraphs (a)-(g) and (i) above. However, witnesses who reside in NSW, but are not employed by or within the control of AFD, can be brought to this court under subpoena. Similarly, execution could be levied against the plaintiff's assets in NSW in the event that he is unsuccessful in this proceeding and ordered to pay costs. Of course, there may be additional expense and inconvenience for AFD in doing so. However, it has not been established that any additional costs of doing so would be "grossly disproportionate", to adopt the term used by Callinan J in Schultz.

72 As far as paragraph (h) is concerned, AFD conceded that not all of the issues which arise in this proceeding are raised in the Local Court proceeding. Nor has it been established that all issues in this proceeding would be capable of being dealt with by the Local Court.

73 This proceeding could only be cross-vested to the NSW court, not to the Local Court. However, counsel for AFD suggested that the Local Court proceeding could be uplifted to the NSW court.

74 AFD says that the only connecting factor to Victoria is that the plaintiff's solicitors are conducting the matter from their Melbourne office. However, I agree with the comments of Gillard J in Ewins, that in the present day no "real weight" should be given to the location of either party's lawyers.[30] That is especially so in the present case, where both parties are represented by substantial firms with Melbourne and Sydney offices. The distance between the two cities is, by Australian standards, not great.

75 Were this a proceeding involving only the plaintiff and AFD, I have no doubt that the above-mentioned factors could be persuasive in determining the cross-vesting application and requiring the proceeding to be transferred to the NSW court.

76 However, this is a group proceeding, not a simple claim by one plaintiff against one defendant. That raises important additional considerations. Neither party referred me to a case in which cross-vesting legislation has been considered in the context of a group proceeding. My researches have revealed only a handful of such cases, which will be discussed shortly.

77 It is not uncommon for group members to reside in more than one State or Territory. Some group proceedings involve several lead plaintiffs or subgroups of group members.[31] It may be fortuitous in a particular group proceeding that the lead plaintiff or plaintiffs happen to live in one State rather than another. In this case, the lead plaintiff happens to reside in NSW. This proceeding could have been commenced with one of the many group members who reside in Victoria as plaintiff.

78 One cannot in my view, divorce consideration of the connecting factors present in the plaintiff's case from those existing in the group proceeding more generally. Not only would such an approach fail to give practical effect the reality of the litigation as presently constituted, but it would have the unfortunate effect of promoting "plaintiff shopping" to increase group members' prospects of obtaining a favourable forum. Consideration of the "connecting factors" present in the case of group members is not unique. In McLean v Nicholson[32], Bongiorno J ordered the transfer of a group proceeding from this court to the Supreme Court of Queensland pursuant to s.5 of the cross-vesting Act. His Honour stated that:

[78]

95 In the alternative, AFD seeks to have this proceeding stayed pursuant to r.23.01(1)(c), on the basis that it is an abuse of the process of the court. AFD argues that it should be stayed because NSW is the "natural and appropriate forum" for the resolution of the dispute between the plaintiff and AFD, and because the Local Court proceeding was commenced first and is likely to be able to be heard and determined first.

96 The plaintiff argues that his claim in this proceeding is not identical to the issues raised in the Local Court proceeding. He says that this is a group proceeding which could not be brought in New South Wales and includes causes of action and issues not raised in the Local Court proceeding.

97 The question of a stay of proceedings on the ground of appropriateness of forum should be determined in accordance with the test stated by Scott LJ in St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath & Chaves) Ltd.[41] That approach was endorsed by Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay.[42] In Oceanic Sun, the High Court said that a mere balance of convenience is not ground for a stay. To secure a stay, a defendant must show that continuance of the proceeding would work an injustice, because it would be vexatious or oppressive to the defendant or would be an abuse of the process of the court in some other way, and that a stay would not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

98 In Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd,[43] the High Court approved the principles as enunciated by Deane J in Oceanic Sun. It held that a plaintiff who has regularly invoked the jurisdiction of the court has a prima facie right to insist upon its exercise, and a stay will not be granted unless the court is clearly so inappropriate a forum for the determination of the dispute that it would be oppressive or vexatious for the proceeding to continue.

99 Following Voth, there was a degree of judicial uncertainty about whether the "clearly-inappropriate forum" test applied in circumstances where the contest as to which forum is appropriate is between two Australian courts rather than an Australian and foreign court.[44] That ambiguity appears to have been resolved by the decision in Schultz. In particular, Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ articulated the distinction between an application for a stay of proceedings and an application to transfer proceedings under section 5 of the cross-vesting Act:[45]

[80]

100 In discussing the precise application of the "clearly inappropriate forum" test, their Honours drew no distinction between disputes between two Australian courts and disputes between an Australian and international court. Instead, the joint judgment confirmed that the proper question in an application for a stay of proceedings on inappropriate forum grounds is whether the court can justify its refusal to entertain the proceeding on the basis that it is clearly the inappropriate forum.

101 Here, the court must consider whether the continuation of the proceeding in this court would be vexatious (in the sense of productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment) and oppressive to AFD (in the sense of being seriously and unfairly burdensome) by reason of the inappropriateness of the forum chosen.[46]

102 AFD commenced the Local Court proceeding on 17 February 2004, claiming a debt due under Mr Hall's AFD credit contract. Mr Hall filed a defence in that proceeding on 9 June 2004, the day before filing this proceeding. That defence, which is in the nature of a counterclaim, seeks damages under s.119, and the termination of his AFD credit contract under s.125, of the NSW Code. AFD has not established that either the delay of almost 4 months in issuing this proceeding, or the fact that the Local Court proceeding might be ready for trial before this proceeding, would amount to oppression or vexatiousness in the relevant sense.

103 As mentioned earlier, not all of the issues raised in this proceeding are raised in the Local Court proceeding. It is also not apparent that the Local Court would have jurisdiction to deal with the full range of issues between the plaintiff and AFD. More importantly, there is no suggestion that the Local Court has any jurisdiction at all to deal with a group or representative proceeding.

104 AFD has not discharged the onus of establishing that this court is clearly so inappropriate a forum for the determination of the dispute that it would be oppressive or vexatious for the proceeding to continue. Nor has it established that a stay would not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

[83]

108 One relevant discretionary consideration in applications for security for costs in non-group proceedings is whether the proceeding is essentially defensive in nature. Although apparently not the subject of any decision so far, there seems to be no reason in principle why this matter ought not be able to be taken into consideration in a group proceeding.

109 AFD's solicitor, Mr Ryan, deposed that AFD's party-party costs from the date of this application until the completion of the hearing of all common issues and the plaintiff's individual claim would be in the vicinity of $155,000 to $180,000. The plaintiff accepts that I may proceed on the basis of those figures for the purpose of determining whether or not security should be ordered.[58]

110 The plaintiff is employed as a policeman by the New South Wales Police Force. He has net assets of between $70,000 and $100,000, comprised of equity in his house, a car and assorted furniture. His income is in the vicinity of $700 net per week.[59]

111 Although he is not impecunious, it is apparent from this evidence that the plaintiff would not have sufficient assets of his own to meet an adverse costs order in this proceeding. However, it is said that he could meet an adverse costs order from two sources, one being a fund set up by his solicitors and the other being a fund set up by Mr Neil Jenman and "the Jenman Group"; these funds will be discussed in more detail shortly.

112 I turn then to consider the application of the relevant principles to the facts in this case.

113 It was not suggested that the claims of the plaintiff and group members were other than arguable and bona fide.

114 The group members are all natural persons. They are all persons who borrowed money in order to participate in investment seminars. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that I could infer that the group members were not wealthy individuals, as they had borrowed from AFD to pay their course fee. Whilst that may be the case in relation to some members, it does not necessarily follow that it is the case for all members; some individuals may have chosen to borrow their course fee in order to obtain a taxation benefit, rather than because they were unable to fund the fee otherwise. The evidence simply does not allow me to draw any conclusions as to the wealth of group members, either in absolute terms, or in relation to the plaintiff.

115 There is no evidence, and it was not suggested, that the plaintiff has been deliberately selected in order to defeat any costs order that might be made against him in the proceeding. Although a man of limited assets, he is not "a man of straw". Furthermore, there is no evidence, and it was not suggested, that he has been chosen as the lead plaintiff to shield wealthy group members.

116 There is also no evidence that the proceeding is being funded by someone who stands to benefit from it in the relevant sense.

117 The plaintiff's solicitors, Slater & Gordon, are conducting this proceeding on a "no win no fee" basis. The evidence before me reveals that they have entered into the following arrangement with group members:

[85]

118 Mr Jenman is a director of "the Jenman Group", which is apparently a company "which designs business systems which focus upon ethics in real estate." He has publicised that he is "working behind the scenes to help victims of Henry Kaye and his now defunct company [NII]." According to Mr Jenman, the Jenman Group has established a fund entitled "the Homesellers and Homebuyers Protection Fund" which is "supporting the current proceeding, by providing an indemnity for the lead plaintiff from any adverse costs order awarded against the lead plaintiff that exceeds the amount group members have contributed to a trust account established for this purpose."

119 Mr Jenman is not a group member. He has deposed that he has no financial interest in this proceeding other than those described above. It may be that there will be some indirect advantage to the Jenman Group's business arising from its support of this proceeding, for example through publicity or contact with group members as prospective clients. However, I do not find that the action is being brought primarily for the benefit of the Jenman interests and I am certainly not satisfied that the action is not being brought for the plaintiff's benefit.

120 I was informed by the plaintiff's counsel that $59,500 is currently held on trust by Slater & Gordon to indemnify the plaintiff. According to one newspaper article, there is in the vicinity of $500,000 in the Jenman Group's "legal war chest". However, there is no evidence before me as to the assets and liabilities of either of the funds. Nor is there any material identifying the trustees of these two funds, or disclosing the terms of any trust deeds or the nature and limitations of any rights of indemnity.

121 It seems that both funds exist for the benefit of the plaintiff, not AFD. There is no suggestion that AFD would have any right of direct recourse to the funds.

122 I also agree with the plaintiff's submission that the nature of the plaintiff's claim in this proceeding is largely defensive. AFD has issued debt collection proceedings against the plaintiff and at least 75 group members, seeking recovery of amounts said to be owing under the AFD credit contracts.

123 Finally, there is no evidence that ordering security for costs would in fact stifle the litigation.

124 Counsel for AFD conceded that this is an unusual case, not covered by existing authority, but submitted that security should be ordered in the following situation:

[91]

[1] NII was placed in receivership on 25 November 2003 and in liquidation on 18 February 2004.

[2] Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 48; (1999) 199 CLR 255 at [30].

[3] At [27] and [28].

[4] Wong v Silkfield at [29].

[5] Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd v Nixon [2000] FCA 229; (2000) 170 ALR 487; Wong v Silkfield at [26]; Bright v Femcare Ltd [2002] FCAFC 243; (2002) 195 ALR 574.

[6] Questions (d) and (h).

[7] Given my findings that s.33C has been satisfied at least in respect of the seven questions specified below, and that it is only necessary for there to be one such question, it is not necessary for me to resolve whether all of the remaining questions are common and substantial.

[8] In the VCAT proceeding, it was common ground that the Code applied to AFD and that the credit contracts were contracts to which the Code applied. Further, AFD conceded that in respect of NII it was a linked credit provider within the meaning of Part 7 of the Code. The position remained the same in the subsequent appeal to this court, discussed below.

[9] Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Australian Finance Direct Limited 23 July 2004 [No M 115 of 2003].

[10] Australian Finance Direct Limited v Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria [2004] VSC 526.

[11] Section 33N(1)(a).

[12] Section 33N(1)(b).

[13] Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd at 268 per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ approving a passage by Foster J in the Federal Court below; see also Finance Sector Union v Commonwealth of Australia and Bright v Femcare at 580 [18] per Lindgren J and 605 [149] per Finkelstein J.

[14] Paragraph 31 of the claim was identified as one such paragraph; there may be others.

[15] Per Lindgren J at [18]; per Kiefel J at [129]; per Finkelstein J at [149].

[16] Per Finkelstein J at [152].

[17] Per Lindgren J at [18].

[18] [2004] HCA 61.

[19] [2005] VSC 4.

[20] At [13] and [14].

[21] See [14] and also Gummow J at [77].

[22] At [15] and [16].

[23] Schultz per Gummow J at [62]-[63].

[24] Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711 at 714 per Court of Appeal.

[25] Schultz at [13].

[26] Schultz at [71].

[27] Ewins at [23].

[28] Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. See also the observations of Rogers, AJA at pp727-79 in Bankinvest and the joint judgment in Schultz at [18]-[19].

[29] At [19].

[30] Ewins at [39(viii)].

[31] I accept that at present there is no suggestion that there may be sub-groups in this particular case.

[32] [2002] VSC 446 at [25].

[33] [1995] HCA 9; (1995) 182 CLR 398.

[34] Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 48; (1999) 199 CLR 255 at 260-261.

[35] [2002] HCA 27; (2002) 211 CLR 1.

[36] At 27.

[37] At [171].

[38] At [15] and [16].

[39] At paragraph [21].

[40] See generally, Schultz at [147] per Kirby J.

[41] [1936] 1 KB 382.

[42] [1988] HCA 32; (1988) 165 CLR 197.

[43] [1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538.

[44] Compare Schmidt v Won [1998] 3 VR 435 and Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Bentley [2001] FCA 671; (2002) 112 FCR 580.

[45] See paragraphs [7] -]14].

[46] Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 558.

[47] Section 33ZD(b) of the Act, which is subject to ss.33Q and 33R.

[48] Section 33ZF confers on the court the general power to make "any order the Court thinks appropriate or necessary to ensure that justice is done in the proceeding."

[49] Ryan v Great Lakes Council [1998] FCA 646; (1998) 155 ALR 447 at 456; Woodhouse v McPhee [1997] FCA 1509; (1997) 80 FCR 529 at 533.

[50] Bray op cit at [252] per Finkelstein J; Melville v Craig Nowlan & Associates Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 32; (2001) 54 NSWLR 82 at 88-9, 118; Woodhouse v McPhee op cit at 534; Nendy Enterprises Pty Ltd v New Holland Australia Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 852 at [7].

[51] Bray v F Hoffman La Roche Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 207 at [252].

[52] Ryan v Great Lakes Council op cit at 455-6.

[53] Ryan v Great Lakes Council op cit at 456; Nendy Enterprises Pty Ltd v New Holland Australia Pty Ltd op cit; Woodhouse v McPhee op cit at 534; Tobacco Control Coalition Inc v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd [1997] FCA 1509; (1997) 80 FCR 529; Bray op cit per Carr J.

[54] Bray op cit at [251-2] per Finkelstein J.

[55] Andrews v Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd [1982] FCA 42; (1982) 40 ALR 305; Upton v TVW Enterprises Ltd [1984] FCA 385; (1984) 57 ALR 361; Nord v Truitt (1987) AIPC 90-457.

[56] Woodhouse v McPhee op cit at 532; Nendy Enterprises Pty Ltd v New Holland Australia Pty Ltd op cit; at [8]; Melville v Craig Nowlan & Associates Pty Ltd op cit at 89, 116; Bray per Carr J at [142], per Branson J at [214].

[57] Finkelstein J in Bray at [252].

[58] The plaintiff has reserved the right to file and serve his own affidavit material on quantum, in the event that I determine to order the provision of security.

[59] The only evidence before the court as to Mr Hall's income was an application form dated 16 June 2003, which he provided to AFD in support of his loan application. There was no evidence before me that his income has changed substantially since then.

[60] AFD's outline of submissions at [39].

[61] [1995] VicRp 9; [1995] 1 VR 150.

[62] At 252.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (91 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (8)

Cases Cited (15)