Consideration
18 In broad summary Telstra contended that a stay of the costs order should be granted because:
(a) the hearing of its application for leave to appeal and any appeal (should leave be granted) was imminent and their detailed submissions in relation to the appeal indicated that their case is bona fide or arguable;
(b) there is a real prospect that Telstra will be unable to recover the certificate sum from PDCA should Telstra be successful on appeal because PDCA's sole function was to hold trade marks and it only has paid up capital of $100;
(c) there will be no prejudice to PDCA if the proposed orders are made as:
(i) PDCA has the benefit of interest pursuant to r 40.32(3) of the Rules for any period during which the costs certified in the certificate of taxation remain unpaid after service of the certificate;
(ii) there is no suggestion by PDCA that Telstra will not pay the certificate sum if its appeal is unsuccessful. Telstra has confirmed that should its appeal be unsuccessful and the costs order remain in force it will pay the certificate sum together with interest within 7 days of disposition of the appeal;
(iii) the orders sought provide that Telstra is to pay the certificate sum into an interest bearing account of the Court within 7 days. If PDCA succeeds on appeal interest will have accrued to it.
Telstra argues that there can be no real issue as to whether PDCA will be paid the certificate sum if Telstra is unsuccessful in the appeal. It also says that PDCA will not be deprived of compensation as a result of its inability to access the certificate sum in the meantime.
19 As I have said, since submissions were filed the appeal has been heard and judgment is reserved. It is inappropriate for me to offer any view as to whether Telstra's appeal is arguable and I proceed on the assumption that it is. I do not, however, accept Telstra's contention that there is any real prospect that it will be unable to recover the certificate sum from PDCA should the Costs Order be overturned on appeal. Other discretionary factors point to the same result.
20 I start with Mr Mackellar's evidence which I accept. He deposed that:
(a) PDCA is a company in the Local Directories Group of companies which group carries on the business of producing and distributing printed and electronic directories and related goods and services;
(b) PDCA is the owner of the Australian trade marks used in relation to the business of the Local Directories Group;
(c) Local Directories is a company in the Local Directories Group which has, since 2008, produced and distributed the print and electronic directories and provided the related goods and services from which the group derives advertising revenue.
It is clear from Mr Mackellar's evidence and from the evidence in the two proceedings before me that PDCA and Local Directories are closely related corporations.
21 First, I note that PDCA and Local Directories have been engaged in extensive litigation with Telstra since 2007. I accept Mr Mackellar's evidence that Local Directories has paid in excess of $6 million in legal fees and disbursements in relation to the litigation. In itself this shows that Local Directories has substantial resources and it has been prepared to advance those resources to support PDCA.
22 Second, I accept Mr Mackellar's evidence that Local Directories had a turnover of approximately $57 million in the financial year ended 30 June 2014, and that there has been no material change in the turnover of its business. There can be no real question that a business with such a substantial turnover has the financial capacity to pay the certificate sum if Telstra is successful in its appeal.
23 Third, while PDCA's sole function is to hold trade marks and it only has paid up capital of $100, the trade marks it holds are valuable assets. They are valuable to PDCA because they are used by Local Directories in its generation of revenue of about $57 million per annum. They are likely to have a value well beyond both the certificate sum and the costs of the proceeding overall, and they could be sold for a significant sum.
24 In my view the proposition that PDCA's trade marks may be of insufficient value to satisfy its costs obligations if Telstra is successful in its appeal does not withstand examination. I find it difficult to accept that a company with Telstra's will, experience and resources would genuinely consider itself at a real risk of being unable to recover $406,627 from a company which owns such valuable trade marks.
25 Fourth, it is quite unlikely that Local Directories would allow PDCA to fail through a refusal to pay Telstra's costs. Allowing that to occur would interfere with Local Directories' ability to continue to generate substantial revenue through its use of the trade marks. Local Directories' interest in the continuing operation of PDCA can be seen in its offer to guarantee payment of PDCA's cost obligations if Telstra is successful in its appeal.
26 It is true that Local Directories has effectively withdrawn the offer of a guarantee, but I infer that it did so because Telstra overreached in its claim for confidential information about PDCA's and the Local Directories' financial situation. In my view PDCA or Local Directories were not obligated to hand over such information to their bitter trade rivals.
27 Fifth, the procedural background points away from the grant of a stay. I note that:
(a) Telstra consented to the form of the Costs Order so as to reflect the substantive judgment.
(b) Mr Watson's evidence, which I accept, was that over the course of more than 12 months PDCA paid about $35,000 in order to have the quantum of costs assessed by a Registrar of the Court.
(c) Under rr 40.32, 39.02 and 41.04 of the Rules, Telstra was required to pay the certificate sum within 14 days of being served with the certificate of taxation but it failed to do so.
In my view, if Telstra considered there was a proper basis for its concern regarding PDCA's capacity to repay the certificate sum if Telstra was successful in its appeal, it should have sought a stay of the Costs Order in April 2014 or shortly after the order was made. Doing so would have meant that PDCA would not have spent about $35,000 on having its costs assessed.
28 Sixth, the fact that the litigation has been protracted is another reason why PDCA should have its costs now rather than awaiting the result in the appeal: see Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] FCAFC 172 (Heerey, Sundberg and Bennett JJ). It is not clear to me when the present dispute actually started but I note that Telstra applied to register the word "yellow" as a trade mark in 2003, PDCA opposed registration and after a hearing the Registrar of Trade Marks approved the registration in May 2011. PDCA appealed to the Court in 2011 and I handed down judgment in its favour in April 2014. It is also relevant that, since 2007 the Local Directories has spent $6 million in legal proceedings opposed to Telstra in which it has been largely successful. Given the prolonged nature of the dispute and PDCA's huge expenditure on legal costs there should be no further delay in its receipt of its costs.
29 Telstra has not demonstrated an appropriate basis for the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant a stay of the Costs Order. Having been successful in the prolonged litigation PDCA should be paid its costs pursuant to that order. In my view it has already had to wait too long. I refuse the orders sought.
30 PDCA sought its costs of the application on a solicitor-own client basis to be taxed and paid forthwith. I consider a solicitor-own client costs order is appropriate in all the circumstances. In large part this is because I consider the application for a stay had more to do with Telstra putting further financial pressure on PDCA and laying a blow in the parties' ongoing fight rather than Telstra having a real concern that it would be unable to recover $406,627 from PDCA if it is successful in its appeal. Telstra should not have made the application.
I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Murphy.