RELEVANT AUTHORITIES
11 The respondents have referred me to the discussion of "interests" for the purposes of s 84(5) by Greenwood J in Chippendale on behalf of the Wuthathi People #2 v State of Queensland [2012] FCA 310 at 14 where his Honour said:
[Section 84(5)] provides that the Federal Court may at any time join any person as a party to the proceedings, if the court is satisfied that the person's interests may be affected by a determination in the proceedings, and it is in the interests of justice to do so. The notion of "interests" for the purposes of s 84(5) is a broad conception, not confined to the statutory understanding of the term "interest" in s 253 as that term applies in relation to land or waters. The interests asserted by an applicant for joinder need not be proprietary, legal or equitable in nature; must rise above an interest that an ordinary member of the public might hold; must be genuine; must reflect an effect upon the person's interests beyond a mere emotional, conscientious or intellectual interest; and, must not lack substance: Byron Environment Centre Inc v Arakwal People (1997) 78 FCR 1; Woodridge on behalf of the Gomilaroi People v Minister for Land & Water Conservation (NSW) (2003) 108 FCR 527; Dann (on behalf of the Amangu People) v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1249.
(cf Sumner v State of South Australia [2014] FCA 534; AD (deceased) on behalf of the Mirning People v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 1000; Far West Coast Native Title Claim v South Australia (No 5) [2013] FCA 717; Chienmore v State of Western Australia [2013] FCA 727).
12 Further, in Wakka Wakka People #2 v State of Queensland [2005] FCA 1578 Kiefel J observed that an applicant for joinder must demonstrate a prima facie case that he or she has an interest within the meaning of s 84(5).
13 These statements set out key aspects of the law in respect of s 84(5) of the Native Title Act.
14 As a general proposition the Court will rarely permit joinder of dissentient members of a native title claim group to the claim. This is because, inter alia:
decisions of the claim group such as authorisation pursuant to s 251B require a decision either in accordance with traditional laws and customs, or in accordance with a decision-making process agreed to by the claim group, and unanimity of the claim group is not a pre-condition;
such an outcome results in more respondents with whom negotiations must be conducted; and
finally as a general proposition, dissentient members would be able to assert their own status or role intramurally: Starkey v South Australia (2011) 193 FCR 450 at [55].
15 In this case, of course, Ms Johnson and Ms Hunter cannot be described as "dissentient members of the claim group" although they have previously been members of that group.
16 The native title applicant submits that a former member of the claim group, seeking to challenge the anthropological evidence otherwise relied on by the claimant group, should not, on that basis alone, be joined. It is useful to turn to the authorities which have considered issues similar to those currently before the Court.
17 In Combined Dulabed and Malanbarra/Yidinji People v Queensland [2002] FCA 1370 there was no dispute that party seeking the interlocutory orders, Mr Morgan, was a member of the relevant native title claim group. The orders he sought included that he be joined in those proceedings as a party on behalf of a separate traditional owner group. The primary reasons for dismissal of the interlocutory application related to the breadth of the orders sought by Mr Morgan, including that all activity by the native title applicant cease, and that certain persons identified as members of the claim group be declared as not being so. At [7] Drummond J observed:
The concern that has provoked Mr Morgan to bring this application is his non-acceptance of the anthropological evidence that supports the contention raised long ago in the original claim, and reflected in the combined claim, that the people referred to in par 4 of his notice of motion are entitled to be members of the claim group: Mr Morgan does not accept that they have any sufficient connection to the relevant portion of the claim area. There is no evidence before me to support Mr Morgan's assertion that this particular subgroup of people have in truth no connection with the relevant part of the claim area. As I have said, the anthropological material is to the contrary effect.
18 In Combined Dulabed and Malanbarra/Yidinji People v Queensland (2004) 139 FCR 96 Spender J considered a further application by Mr Morgan seeking thirty-one orders in respect of the native title claim in that proceeding. At [44]-[45] his Honour discussed circumstances where a member of the native title claim group becomes dissatisfied with the way the interests of that person or that group of persons are being represented by the applicant on the claim, and continued:
[45] I prefer the view of Ryan J that there is, in such a circumstance, power under s 84(5) of the Act to make the dissentient group a party to the proceedings as a respondent. Whether the discretion that is conferred by s 84(5) of the Act is to be exercised in the circumstances of a particular case must depend on the circumstances of that case, including the history of it.
19 Later his Honour said:
[49] In my opinion the discretion to join parties given by s 84(5) of the Act should not be exercised to join either Mr Michael Morgan or Mr Denny Morgan. The position is now no better than it was when Drummond J declined to join Mr Morgan as part of the joint applicant in November 2002. A considerable time ago the matter looked to be approaching a consent determination. Mr Morgan has effectively halted that process, because he disagrees with the anthropological evidence.
20 In AD (deceased) on behalf of the Mirning People v State of Western Australia (No 2) the joinder applicant, Mr Laing, gave evidence that he was the grandson of Mr Gordon Nacey, who in turn was the son of a full-blooded Mirning woman, and relied on various historical and anthropological reports to substantiate his claim that "the Naley family share Mirning cultural rights and interests". Mr Laing gave detailed evidence supporting the proposition that his family was, and was recognised by Mirning elders as, Mirning. Materially, however, Mr Laing's ancestor Mr Gordon Naley was not recognised as an apical ancestor in the Mirning Claim, and it followed that the claim group description did not include Mr Laing. Mr Laing claimed that he had interests which could be affected by the determination and that he was entitled to be joined.
21 McKerracher J examined the evidence and a similar earlier analysis conducted by Dowsett J in Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 625. In particular McKerracher J observed as follows:
66. More importantly, perhaps, it should be stressed that being recognised as Mirning, as Mr Laing indicates he is, is a different thing from being a member of the native title claim group. The native title claim group must comprise the persons who, according to their traditional laws and customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprised in the claim. In Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 625 Dowsett J held (at [256]) that read together, ss 253, 61(1) and 251B NTA provide that it is the claim group which must determine its own composition and that any final decision in that regard must be taken pursuant to either of the alternative processes identified in s 251B NTA.
67. However this is not to suggest that by some arbitrary or capricious whim, membership is validly excluded on grounds completely unrelated to traditional laws and customs. The process of consideration of acceptance and the basis of such consideration are not irrelevant considerations.
68. In Aplin, Dowsett J spoke of the importance of recognition when assessing who is in and who is out of the claim group and who does the recognising. His Honour noted (at [256]) that:
[a] claim group cannot arrogate to itself the right arbitrarily to determine who is, and who is not a member. As to substantive matters concerning membership, the claim group must act in accordance with traditional laws and customs. As to matters of process the claim group must act in accordance with traditional laws and customs or, in the absence of relevant laws and customs, pursuant to such process as it may adopt.
69. After citing Mabo v The State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (at 61), Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v State of Victoria (2001) 110 FCR 244 (at [108]) and Sampi on behalf of the Bardi and Jawi People v State of Western Australia (2010) 266 ALR 537 (at [45]), his Honour noted (at [260]):
[T]hese cases clearly demonstrate that membership must be based on group acceptance. That requirement is inherent in the nature of a society. However the society may accept the views of particular persons as sufficient to establish group acceptance.
70. His Honour concluded on the question of whether a proposed apical ancestor (Minnie) and her descendants were part of the claim group (at 267]-[268]):
[267] This question is more difficult to answer. As a matter of fact I have held that Minnie identified as a Waanyi person (believing that she was descended from at least one Waanyi parent) and was accepted by Waanyi people at Burketown and at Lawn Hill as being Waanyi. However the case really addresses the entitlement of Minnie's descendants to Waanyi identity. That question depends upon group acceptance of each of them as being of Waanyi descent which question, in turn, depends primarily upon whether the present Waanyi people accept that Minnie was a Waanyi person. As the applicant asserts, the claim group must determine that question. To date they have refused so to recognize her. I cannot take that decision for them. Nor can I find that during her lifetime, the Waanyi people, as a whole, accepted her as being Waanyi. My findings as to such acceptance are limited to the position as it was at Lawn Hill and at Burketown. It is for the claim group to determine whether that is a sufficient basis for accepting that she was a Waanyi woman, descent from whom is a basis for Waanyi identity. However I should make a few comments about how the matter might be addressed.
[268] In my view the present problem has arisen in a way which makes it difficult to resolve rationally. At a time when a Native Title determination is imminent, the members of the Minnie family have emerged as possible members of the claim group. There are many of them. For reasons of history, mixed descent and geographical dispersal, many Waanyi people do not recognize the family as Waanyi. There are conflicting views on the subject. It is no doubt difficult for the claim group to marshal the various views in order to assess their persuasiveness.
(emphasis added.)
71. Importantly, in my view, Dowsett J added (at [270]) the following:
Although resolution of this matter is primarily for the claim group, any decision may not necessarily be beyond review, given its significance under the Native Title Act. There is, as far as I am aware, no precedent upon which to base a decision as to the availability of judicial relief in the event that persons who, according to traditional laws and customs, are entitled to Native Title rights and interests, are wrongfully excluded from membership of the claim group. Relief may be available, perhaps by analogy to that available for fraud on the power. See Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 at 438, Cachia v Westpac Financial Services Ltd (2000) 170 ALR 65 at [74] and Gambotto v WCP Pty Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432. In the latter case, McHugh J identified the fact that the doctrine had been used as the basis for granting relief against oppression of the minority of company shareholders. See also Alexander v Automatice Telephone Company [1900] 2 Ch 56 at 69 and Menier v Hooper's Telegraph Work (1873-74) LR 9 Ch App 350 at 353-4. Statutory relief has long been available for oppression of minority shareholders, thus removing the need for further development of equitable doctrine in that area.
(emphasis added.)
72. More recently in Graham on behalf of the Ngadju People v State of Western Australia [2012] FCA 1455, Marshall J reiterated (at [13]) that:
The identity of the claimant group is a matter for it, and is based on the relationships within that group and the manner in which members recognise and associate with one another.
73. It is true to say, as Mr Laing does, that the 'native title claim group' is not the group of people who are listed in the Form 1 as being members of the claim group but rather they are the persons who 'according to their traditional laws and customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprising a particular native title claimed'. This is the test for the purpose of s 61(1) NTA: see, for example, Rita Augustine v State of Western Australia [2013] FCA 338 per Gilmour J (at [214]-[215]):
214. However, as the State submits, correctly in my view, in such cases it will often be tempting for members of the group to seek separate and conflicting determinations. However, the existence of a native title claim group does not depend upon the contemporary degree of cordiality, or lack thereof, demonstrated by members of a claim group. Rather, a native title claim group is defined by the traditional laws and customs which confer rights and interests in a group. Any definition of a native title claim group should properly be based on an analysis of those traditional laws and customs and not on the contemporary state of relations between members of the group.
215. A claim group is not an entity which is created by a determination application: Turrbal People v State of Queensland [2008] FCA 316 at [15]; Akiba (on behalf of the Torres Strait Islanders of the Regional Seas Claim Group) v Queensland (No 2) (2010) 270 ALR 564 at [913]. By s 61 of the NTA, the native title claim group is the group of "persons who, according to their traditional laws and customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprising the particular native title claimed". The native title claim group has an existence independent of any determination application, which existence depends upon the traditional laws and customs which give the claim group common or group rights and interests. Subject to s 84D of the NTA, a determination application can only be successful if the group identified in the application is in fact the group which holds native title: Hazelbane v Northern Territory of Australia [2008] FCA 291 at [36]; Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1 at [1206]-[1225]; Edward Landers v State of South Australia [2003] FCA 264.
22 Later in the judgment and in considering whether to exercise discretion in Mr Laing's favour his Honour continued:
92. In short, it is not sufficiently to the point that a person such as Mr Laing may describe himself as a Mirning man or be recognised as Mirning by persons outside each respective native title claim group or whether they know the country or practice traditional Mirning activities outside each respective claim area. That recognition and those activities do not amount to constituting status in any portion of traditional Mirning country other than the native title claim into whose native title claim group description they fit. The way in which the Mirning Claim and the Far West Coast Claim respectively have been constituted make it clear that no members of one have any native title rights or interests in the other unless specifically named in each of them.
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95. The actual nature of his interests is also not without difficulty. Mr Laing asserts that he has descended from a full-blooded Mirning woman from Mundrabilla in Western Australia and her son, Mr Naley, also born at Mundrabilla. This is the basis of his asserted unique rights and interests - descent from persons born at Mundrabilla. Mr Laing says that he therefore has an 'ongoing physical, spiritual and cultural connection with the Native Title Claim Area', meaning the Mirning claim area. However, the expert support for that is in respect of a much broader Mirning area. The Mirning lands described by Mr Laing's expert evidence go well beyond the claim area. As previously observed, it was significant that Mr Laing's only apparent visit to the Mirning claim area was in 2006, with other visits being to the Far West Coast claim area.
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99. Although Mr Laing points to ill-treatment by the Mirning Applicant in the sense that he is allowed to attend claim group meetings but he is not given any speaking or voting rights, such circumstances would accord with Indigenous recognition that he has elements of Mirning identity but not connection per se to the Mirning claim area.
23 His Honour accordingly did not accept that it was in the interests of justice that Mr Laing be joined as a respondent, and dismissed the claim.