Issue 2 - Damages for vexation, distress and inconvenience following breach of contract
169.In giving my reasons for allowing the appeal from the decision of the CTTT, I reviewed the authorities along the lines of Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344 concerning the availability of an award of damages for vexation and distress : Patel v CTTT & Malaysian Airlines Australia [2010] NSWDC 38 at paragraphs [110] to [113]. To that review I would also add a reference to Leitch & Ors v Reynolds [2005] NSWCA 259.
170.In Leitch , at paragraphs [113]-[114], Santow JA, with whom Young CJ in Eq and Campbell AJA (as their Honours then were), rejected a submission that mere disappointment due to breach of contract, and vexation related to the litigation rather than to the underlying tortious act, represented an insufficient basis for an award of damages, following the decision of the High Court in Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon.
171.In final submissions, on behalf of Malaysian Airlines, it was submitted that no damages were awardable for the vexation and the like that emanated from the course of this dispute. On the basis of the authority of Leitch that I have cited, I reject that submission.
172.Accordingly, the principles guiding the availability of damages for vexation, disappointment and distress remain as stated in Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon, which followed the remarks by Bingham LJ in Watts v Morrow [1991] EWCA Civ 9 ; (1991) 1 WLR 1421 . I will therefore proceed to assess damages in this case in accordance with those principles, subject to relevant statutory considerations.
173.In this case Mr Patel took the trouble to contractually secure a higher than usual baggage allowance for the travel of his children to India and return. He did so in order to secure peace of mind as to the transport of their luggage home to Australia, in the expectation that they would be returning home with gifts from their large family in India.
174.That contractual expectation, which was secured in NSW, was not met in Mumbai. In fact it was breached and not honoured due to avoidable error on the part of the staff at the Malaysian Airlines counter in Mumbai, who wrongfully informed Mr Patel's children their check-in baggage allowance was limited to 20kgs each in addition to their carry on allowance of 7kgs. Not only was the information to this effect in Mumbai admittedly wrong, but I consider that it was also misleading and deceptive conduct within the meaning of s 52 of the TP Act 1974.
175.When the relevant circumstances of the luggage allowances are viewed as a whole, it seems to me that there were misleading and deceptive representations as to those allowances, both at the time of contract when Malaysian Airlines took the bookings at which time the airline's agents, the Flight Centre, accepted Mr Patel's payment for the fares, and also at the time when airline staff in Mumbai misleadingly asserted there was no entitlement to check in 30kgs of luggage per passenger.
176.I find that at the time Mr Patel paid for the fares he acted on the representation that there would be a 30kg per passenger check-in luggage entitlement. That representation was clearly a relevant misrepresentation as the airline staff did not honour it, and repudiated it wrongfully.
177.On behalf of Malaysian Airlines it was argued that the TP Act had no extra territorial effect in Mumbai, even though the airline trades in this jurisdiction and has submitted to this jurisdiction. It was further argued that as the consent of the Minister had not been obtained by Mr Patel as was required by s 5(1)-(4) of the TP Act in respect of relevant conduct occurring outside of Australia, Mr Patel could not in this instance, maintain an action for damages under s 82 of the TP Act . On reviewing the foregoing submission I accept it as correct. If Mr Patel had taken the opportunity to avail himself of pro bono legal assistance, the position may well have been different, had the consent of the Minister been obtained.
178.However, I consider that it is not necessary for me to examine the authorities concerning any argued extra territorial operation of the TP Act both on that account and because of my finding that there was a relevant misrepresentation that occurred at the time of purchase of the tickets in NSW.
179.In view of the fact that the tickets in question were commercially purchased from an airline operating passenger flights for reward, it cannot be reasonably maintained that the transaction in which the misrepresentation occurred, did not take place in the course of trade or commerce. Similarly, since Mr Patel was the purchaser, in my view it cannot be reasonably maintained that Mr Patel was not a relevant consumer within the meaning of the TP Act .
180.In my view, these matters enliven a claim based on breach of s 52 of the TP Act so as to require damages to be assessed pursuant to s 82 of the TP Act , without the need to consider issues concerning the absence of consent of the Minister.
181.As a consequence of the events complained of which occurred in Mumbai, Mr Patel's children, who were without sufficient funds to pay for excess baggage charges, and who were without other forms of resources or assistance that would have enabled them to transfer any removed portions of their luggage to others for safekeeping or forwarding, felt compelled to discard a total of 20kgs of such luggage in order to enable themselves to be checked in and to board their pre-booked flight home to Australia.
182.As to the events themselves, a consequence of the described events in Mumbai, I accept that Mr Patel's children found they were unable to advocate for themselves. I find that as a consequence his children became upset, tearful and distressed. I find that this led to them having an upset and unpleasant flight home. I also find that in these events, they suffered sleeplessness, anxiety and a loss of appetite as claimed.
183.I find that as a consequence of these events, on their arrival home to Australia, they then related the details of the foregoing events to Mr Patel, who himself then became upset, distressed, inconvenienced and significantly vexed, on learning of the detail of these matters.
184.I also find that as a consequence the foregoing events, progressively from that time, and continuing to the present time, a period of almost 2 years, Mr Patel has continued to harbour a legitimate sense of grievance and injustice concerning the manner in which his children were wrongfully dealt with at Mumbai Airport by airport staff acting on behalf of Malaysian Airlines.
185.I find that Mr Patel's sense of grievance and injustice has continued to cause him significant vexation, distress, disappointment, inconvenience and has left him in what he describes as " a sad " situation. I find that these feelings have become magnified for him because of the way he has perceived his claims were met by what I consider to have been an initial stonewalling of his claim on the part of Malaysian Airlines. He feels, legitimately, in my view, that in this case, his claims were not taken seriously. I find that as a result, he harbours the feeling that he has had to take on a battle of David v Goliath type proportions against a well-resourced defendant, which, notwithstanding an early apology conveyed to him for the breach of contract, has continued to contest his claim for compensation.
186.I find that in these events, not unnaturally, Mr Patel feels that his honour and his integrity, and that of his family, has been unjustifiably questioned, thus perpetuating and magnifying his feelings of vexation.
187.I find that but for the admitted neglect and breach of contract on the part of the Malaysian Airlines staff, and but for the misrepresentation made to him at the time of the purchase of the tickets and concerning the luggage allowances, Mr Patel would not have been beset and burdened with such distracting feelings. It follows that he would not have felt compelled to embark upon the pursuit of his claims for compensation, first by taking the issue up with the Department of Fair Trading, then with the CTTT, and then on appeal to this court in order to have the CTTT orders set aside, following what I find to have been his extreme dissatisfaction with the course of, and with the result of that hearing, which compelled him to proceed to seek a re-hearing of his claims in this court, in his quest for justice.
188.It is plain from the lengths to which Mr Patel has gone in order to seek redress, and from the volume, content and detail of the material he has progressively assembled over time in order to support his cause, that he has expended a very significant amount of time and emotional energy in his pursuit of the findings that he seeks. I find that he has done so to the point of obsession, and in this regard, in my assessment, his character and disposition is such that he is prepared to relentlessly pursue what he believes to be right and fair in the face of perceived injustice. I find that these matters have consumed his energies to a very significant degree over the past 23 months.
189.In my view, in an assessment of damages for inconvenience, distress, disappointment and vexation, arising as they do from breach of contract in the circumstances described, leads me to the view that Mr Patel is entitled to a significant award of damages for non-economic loss as compensation for such matters. In my view, where I have accepted his evidence in its totality, as I have, save for that aspect of his claim made in the absence of medical opinion to the effect that his health has been adversely affected, an award of damages of this kind is not dependent upon medical evidence. In consider that this is so because matters of inconvenience, distress, disappointment, vexation and sadness are not medical diagnoses, and can be readily assessed by the court as matters of fact, as I have found to be the case here.
190.I consider that after having due regard to the evolving state of Mr Patel's vexation, distress, inconvenience, disappointment and his view of his sad situation, including his need to commit himself, his time and his efforts, to pursuing this litigation, the compelling conclusion is that he has suffered a significant distraction from the normal and everyday amenity and enjoyment of his life, and this has progressively remained a feature of his day to day life for the past 23 months.
191.As I have found the relevant conduct giving rise to TP Act remedies arose at the time of purchase of the tickets and not at Mumbai, I consider that the statement in Insight Vacations Pty Ltd at [76] must be distinguished. This leads to the conclusion that s 16 of the CL Act is the required statutory framework within which non-economic damages should be assessed. In this regard I accept the submission made on behalf of Malaysian Airlines to that effect.
192.In those circumstances, having regard to the impact of the events on Mr Patel as described by him, I consider that the appropriate range for assessment of s 16 damages for non-economic loss pursuant to the CL Act is between 17 per cent and 19 per cent of a most extreme case. On account of the factors I have already reviewed as relevantly affecting Mr Patel as a result of the events in question, I reject the submission that the plaintiff's circumstances would not have met the minimum threshold for an award of damages. I therefore assess damages at the mid-point of the range I have identified, at 18 per cent of a most extreme case, in the amount of $12,500. No interest on past non-economic loss damages is awardable for damages assessed pursuant to s 16 of the CL Act .
193.In coming to this view, to allow for the possibility of an appeal, and to allow for the possibility that it may be held on appeal that I have erred in distinguishing the applicability of Insight Vacations Pty Ltd at [76], I take the opportunity to briefly record my views on the range of non-economic damages that I consider would have applied to Mr Patel's circumstances if such damages were to be assessed according to common law principles, unfettered by CL Act considerations.
194.In those circumstances, whilst attempting to be fair to Mr Patel, and not unfair to Malaysian Airlines, I consider that an appropriate award of damages for non-economic loss according to common law principles, taking into account the above matters as they impacted on Mr Patel over the 23 months, would have been in the range of $15,000 to $20,000. On that basis I would have assessed such damages at the mid-point of the identified range, in the amount of $17,500.
195.Had I been required to assess interest on those damages, I would have apportioned all of the damages so assessed to the past, as I find that once these proceedings have been concluded, and in the absence of medical evidence to the contrary, I consider that Mr Patel will have been vindicated, and will no longer have cause to feel distressed, inconvenienced, vexed or sad as a consequence of the events in question. Accordingly, there will be no future component of non-economic damages.
196.In those circumstances, in accordance with conventional common law principles, I would have assessed interest at the half average rate of 2 per cent on $17,500 over 1.9 years in the amount of $665 : MBP (SA) Pty Ltd v Gogic [1991] HCA 3; (1991) 171 CLR 657 at [11].