PARKER v COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS - [2009] HCA 7 - HCA 2009 case summary — Zoe

CTHHCA

PARKER v COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS

[2009] HCA 7

High Court of Australia|2009-02-12|Before: Mason P, Tobias JA, Basten JA, Simpson J

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At a glance

AI case summary

Result

respondent. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Key principles

Rights of civil appeal under State law are identified by the manner of instituting proceedings pursuant to the exclusions in the Third Schedule to the Supreme Court Act 1970...
The search and seizure powers in s 214(3) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) are not confined to documents relating only to the specific goods identified in the written information on...
The primary consideration when determining admissibility of improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) is whether the contravention...
Where impropriety arises from inadvertence or mistake, the probative value of the evidence, the importance of the evidence to the proceeding, the seriousness of the offence and...

Issues before the court

Whether an appeal from a conviction on a customs prosecution commenced in the Supreme Court by civil process lies to the Court of Appeal or the...
The proper scope of the power to search and seize documents under a warrant issued pursuant to s 214(3) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth)

Plain English Summary

Customs suspected Stephen Parker and his companies of mixing cheap untaxed Australian spirit into imported brandy to dodge millions of dollars in duty. Officers gave written notices requiring production of five years of import and blending records. When Mr Parker arrived, disputed the scope of what was asked for and produced only limited documents, officers immediately executed search warrants and seized boxes of records. Those records proved the evasion charges. Mr Parker argued the notices were too vague, no real time had been given to comply, and the officers had engineered non-compliance so they could raid. He said the documents should be thrown out under the Evidence Act because they were illegally or improperly obtained. The Court of Appeal agreed the notice was imprecise and therefore invalid, but found the officers had not acted in bad faith or deliberately ignored the law. The documents were the heart of the prosecution of a serious, long-running revenue fraud. The trial judge had correctly weighed the factors and admitted the evidence. The appeal was dismissed.

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Deep Dive

2,824 words · generated 24/04/2026

What happened

Between 1987 and 1989 officers of the Australian Customs Service investigated a scheme in which importers were alleged to have "extended" imported brandy with locally produced grain-based spirit on which no duty had been paid. Three companies were at the centre of the inquiry: Lawpark Pty Ltd (importer and distributor), Kingswood Distillery Pty Ltd (processor) and Breven Pty Ltd (operator of a bond store). Stephen Edward Parker was a director and shareholder of both Lawpark and Breven. By March 1990 customs officers believed that all tested bottled stock containing the extended spirit had come from Breven's bond store.

On 6 March 1990 officers attended multiple premises, including those occupied by Lawpark at Wetherill Park, and served notices to produce documents under s 214 of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The notices recited information on oath that a particular bottle of "Cheval Napoleon Old French Brandy" had been illegally dealt with. The notices required immediate production of all books and documents relating to those goods and to all other goods imported or exported by the recipient in the preceding five years. Mr Parker was contacted by telephone, arrived at the premises approximately 30 minutes later, engaged in conversation with the leading officer (Mr Mutton), disputed the breadth of the request, produced some but not all of the records demanded, and ultimately stated that he could not produce documents relating to "extension" because he had none. At 10.10 am, having formed the view that compliance had not occurred, Mr Mutton executed a warrant issued under s 214(2) and seized a large volume of company records.

Those records became the foundation of proceedings commenced in the Common Law Division in 1992 charging Mr Parker with 14 offences under ss 33 and 234 of the Customs Act, involving evasion of duty totalling approximately $3.1 million over nearly three years. The Spirits Act 1906 (Cth), which had initially prompted the investigation, had been repealed by the time of trial. A five-day voir dire was conducted in April 2005 on the admissibility of the seized documents. Simpson J ruled that the evidence should be admitted ([2006] NSWSC 387) and, after a contested hearing, convicted Mr Parker ([2006] NSWSC 390). A subsequent penalty judgment imposed a penalty of 3.25 times the duty evaded (approximately $10 million) plus additional orders.

Mr Parker's appeal was originally brought on numerous grounds but narrowed to four issues concerning the interlocutory admissibility judgment: (i) whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction or the matter should have gone to the Court of Criminal Appeal; (ii) the proper scope of a s 214 warrant; (iii) the extent of any impropriety or unlawfulness in the issue of the notices and execution of the warrants; and (iv) whether Simpson J had properly exercised the s 138 discretion. Mason P and Tobias JA agreed with the lead judgment of Basten JA delivered on 6 December 2007. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Why the court decided this way

The Court first resolved the jurisdictional question by reference to the text and history of the Customs Act, the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Section 247 of the Customs Act required that prosecutions in a Supreme Court "be commenced, prosecuted and proceeded with" in accordance with the usual practice and procedure of the Court in civil cases. Because the proceedings had been instituted by summons rather than by indictment or information, they fell outside the Third Schedule exclusion to s 101 of the Supreme Court Act. Rights of appeal were therefore civil, not criminal, and the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal: [38]. The Court noted that while s 5AA of the Criminal Appeal Act might appear to cover convictions in the Supreme Court's summary jurisdiction, that provision was directed to a different conferral of jurisdiction under the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and did not apply where the Customs Act mandated civil process: [37].

On the substantive search-power question the Court held that the trial judge had erred in following the narrow construction adopted by Dunford DCJ in In the matter of O'Neill. Basten JA analysed the four references to "the goods" in s 214(1). The obligation to produce and hand over documents extended both to those relating to the specific goods identified in the information on oath and to those relating to all other goods imported or exported in the preceding five years. Subsection (3) empowered seizure of documents "relating to the goods" that had not been handed over. A construction that limited the warrant to the specific goods alone would produce the "curious" and "anomalous" result that partial compliance could prevent seizure of the bulk of the documents required by the notice: [49]. The form of warrant in Schedule V did not compel a narrower reading once the triggering "requirement" under s 214(1) was properly understood: [51]. The lacuna concerning the third category of documents (those containing entries or memoranda) was acknowledged but did not justify distorting the principal enforcement mechanism: [52].

The admissibility analysis under s 138 occupied the bulk of the reasons. Basten JA set out the two-step process: first, whether the evidence was obtained improperly or unlawfully; second, whether the desirability of admitting it outweighed the undesirability of doing so. The statutory language and the factors in s 138(3) were traced to the joint judgment of Stephen and Aickin JJ in Bunning v Cross: [58]. The "primary consideration" is whether the breach involved deliberate disregard of the law or was merely accidental or inadvertent: [59]. Deliberate or reckless disregard of constraints imposed to protect individual rights will usually weigh heavily against admission; inadvertent error coupled with high probative value and a serious offence will usually favour admission: [60]-[63].

Applying those principles to the facts, the Court accepted that the notices were insufficiently precise in identifying the goods and were therefore invalid, thereby engaging s 138: [90]. However, the appellant failed to prove any wilful disregard, dishonest motive or improper purpose. The legal advice of October 1989 was not inconsistent with use of s 214 once information on oath concerning a Spirits Act offence had been obtained: [71]. Cross-examination of officers and scrutiny of file notes (including those of solicitor Peter Swinton) did not establish that non-compliance had been engineered to trigger warrant powers; the officers believed the scope of the warrant matched the obligation imposed by the notice: [89]. On the question of reasonable time for compliance, Simpson J was entitled to find that Mr Parker's statements demonstrated no willingness to produce the required documents; once he denied possession of relevant records there was "no point in waiting any longer": [107]. The failure to instruct officers to adopt the narrower O'Neill view was not improper once Customs had received and relied upon contrary advice from the Australian Government Solicitor that O'Neill was wrongly decided: [118].

In the final balancing exercise the Court emphasised the "major invasion" of privacy constituted by the seizure but weighed against it the fact that the documents were "critical" and "compelling", that they constituted virtually the whole of the prosecution case, and that the offences involved deliberate, sustained flouting of revenue laws for commercial gain: [121]-[122]. Because no wilful disregard had been shown, the public interest in accurate fact-finding in a serious prosecution prevailed. No error was demonstrated in Simpson J's reasons; the Court conducted its own rehearing under s 75A of the Supreme Court Act and reached the same conclusion: [127].

Before and after state of the law

Prior to Parker the characterisation of customs prosecutions had been recognised as "unstable". In Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 the High Court held that the criminal standard of proof applied despite the civil procedural framework mandated by s 247. Appellate jurisdiction had been dealt with piecemeal. Appeals from Local Court convictions had gone to the Court of Criminal Appeal via s 5B of the Criminal Appeal Act (Collector of Customs v Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 832), while appeals from Supreme Court decisions had been treated as civil without detailed analysis (Evans v Lynch [1984] 3 NSWLR 567; Evans v Button (1988) 13 NSWLR 57). The interrelationship of ss 247 and 248 after the 1982 amendments had produced conflicting readings; the Queensland Court of Appeal in Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Powell [2007] QCA 106 had preferred a construction that preserved the operation of s 248 for summary proceedings.

On the search-power question, Dunford DCJ in O'Neill had adopted a narrow view limiting seizure to documents relating only to the specific goods identified in the information. That view had not been tested on appeal. The common-law discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence was governed by Bunning v Cross, which emphasised the competing public-policy considerations of convicting the guilty and not appearing to condone unlawful executive conduct. Section 138, enacted after the events but before the trial, substantially codified that approach while adding mandatory considerations.

Parker clarified that, for appeals from Supreme Court customs prosecutions commenced by civil process, the civil appeal route under s 101 of the Supreme Court Act is to be followed. It rejected the narrow O'Neill construction, holding that s 214(3) extends to five-year documents. It confirmed that the Bunning v Cross emphasis on deliberateness remains the "primary consideration" inside the s 138(3) framework. The decision illustrated that technical invalidity (here, imprecision in the notice) does not automatically lead to exclusion where there is no wilful disregard and the evidence is central to a serious offence. Although the Spirits Act and the former s 214 have since been repealed, the principles concerning characterisation of federal regulatory proceedings, the construction of search powers, and the s 138 balancing exercise continue to govern analogous statutes.

Key passages with plain-English translation

Paragraph [38]: "In short, under State law, rights of civil appeal are determined not by the nature of the result (whether a conviction or other form of order) but by the manner of instituting proceedings, pursuant to the exclusions contained in the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Act."
Plain English: It does not matter that the judge ultimately convicted someone; what matters is how the case was started. Because Customs started it with a civil summons, the appeal is a civil appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Paragraph [49]: "Subsection (3) is in more confined terms … once it is accepted that the subject matter of the requirement under sub-s (1) is books and documents relating to one of two categories of goods, it is difficult to see why the reference to books and documents relating to 'the goods' in sub-s (3) should not relate to all of the documents (by reference to both categories of goods) identified in sub-s (1)."
Plain English: The warrant can seize documents about the particular bottle and about everything else the company imported or exported in the last five years. Limiting it to the single bottle would make the law work in a silly and self-defeating way.

Paragraph [59]: "The primary consideration in deciding upon the admissibility of unlawfully or improperly obtained evidence is whether there has been deliberate disregard for the law as opposed to an accidental or inadvertent contravention."
Plain English: The most important question is whether the officers set out to break the law or whether they simply made a mistake. Deliberate breaking usually keeps the evidence out; honest mistakes usually do not.

Paragraph [121]: "In the circumstances, the weighing exercise required under s 138 of the Evidence Act to determine whether evidence should be admitted turned on whether the actions of the Customs officers could properly be described as involving a wilful disregard of legal constraints imposed on their powers."
Plain English: Once you accept there was a technical flaw, you still have to ask whether the officers were deliberately ignoring the rules. If they were not, and the documents prove a serious fraud, the judge was entitled to let the jury (or the court) see them.

Paragraph [124]: "The unlawfulness of the conduct of customs officers turned on the failure adequately to identify the bottle of brandy said to have been illegally dealt with pursuant to the Spirits Act. There was no evidence to indicate that it would not have been relatively easy to comply with that obligation of specificity."
Plain English: The only real legal mistake was that the notice did not describe the bottle clearly enough. That could have been fixed easily, but it was not done deliberately to trap Mr Parker.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

Parker is triggered whenever a regulatory search or seizure under a statutory power contains a technical defect (insufficient particularity in a notice, premature execution of a warrant, or an arguable misconstruction of the enabling section) but there is no evidence of bad faith. The combination of high probative value, centrality of the evidence to the prosecution case, and the seriousness of the contravention (especially sustained revenue fraud) will ordinarily justify admission. It applies with particular force to federal regulatory regimes that blend civil procedure with criminal sanctions, and to situations in which officers have obtained legal advice supporting the course taken even if that advice is later shown to be debatable. The decision is also engaged where an appellant seeks to prove "improper purpose" by reference to internal file notes or cross-examination of officers but cannot demonstrate that compliance was deliberately frustrated or that officers knew the power was unavailable. Fact patterns in which the defendant produces no evidence on the voir dire and merely relies on the prosecution's own witnesses to establish non-compliance with a "reasonable time" requirement are squarely within the Parker principle that the onus remains on the party seeking exclusion.

How later courts have treated it

The judgment itself carefully applied and, where necessary, distinguished earlier authority. It followed the Bunning v Cross emphasis on deliberateness while integrating it into the statutory s 138(3) factors: [58]-[65]. It cited Labrador Liquor for the proposition that classification of customs proceedings as civil or criminal is unstable and should not drive every procedural outcome: [28]. It distinguished O'Neill after demonstrating that the narrower construction produced an "absurdity" inconsistent with the statutory purpose: [50]-[53]. It approved the approach in Ace Custom Services and Ganke to the objective assessment of "failure to comply" and the necessity for a reasonable time: [94].

Because the Court conducted a rehearing under s 75A it was able to reach its own conclusions on the absence of wilful disregard without deferring to Simpson J's credit findings on every point. The decision illustrates that an appellate court will not disturb a trial judge's s 138 balancing where the judge has addressed the mandatory considerations, even if not in a checklist form, provided the underlying factual findings on motive and purpose are not shown to be wrong: [126]-[127]. The judgment's treatment of the Powell decision shows a willingness to prefer a construction of the Customs Act that avoids "drastic constriction" of long-standing procedural provisions: [19]. Overall Parker has reinforced the primacy of the deliberateness inquiry inside the s 138 discretion while confirming that technical defects in regulatory notices do not automatically exclude cogent evidence of serious offending.

Still-open questions

The Court expressly left several matters unresolved. First, the full legislative history of ss 247 and 248 and their interaction with the Judiciary Act was not completely explored; the Court noted that neither party had fully canvassed the pre-1982 position and therefore expressed its conclusion on jurisdiction "on the materials before the Court" with a reservation: [39]. Second, the precise test for "fails to comply" in s 214(3) was not fully argued; the Court left open whether the test differs according to whether an offence is being prosecuted or a warrant executed, and whether the officer's subjective satisfaction or an entirely objective standard applies: [93]-[99]. Third, the interaction between the third category of documents (those containing entries or memoranda) and the enforcement mechanism in s 214(3) was acknowledged as a "lacuna" but not required to be decided: [52].

Although the specific provisions have been repealed, analogous questions remain live under successor legislation conferring broad search powers on regulators. How courts will weigh an officer's reliance on internal legal advice that is later shown to be incorrect, when that advice was not passed to the decision-maker who signed the notice or warrant, is not exhaustively settled. The judgment leaves open whether, in a case where partial but ongoing production is occurring, a point can be reached at which continued dilatoriness itself constitutes "failure to comply immediately". Finally, the precise boundary between "civil" and "criminal" characterisation for the purpose of appeal rights in hybrid federal regulatory schemes continues to generate difficulty, as the Court itself recognised by reference to Labrador Liquor. These questions await further litigation in which the factual matrix or the statutory language differs materially from that considered in Parker.

Judgment (57 paragraphs)

[1]

Appeal Outcome: Appeal dismissed 12 February 2009 [2009] HCA 7

[2]

CITATION: PARKER v COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS [2007] NSWCA 348

[3]

JUDGMENT OF: Mason P at 1; Tobias JA at 2; Basten JA at 3

[4]

CUSTOMS - customs prosecutions - jurisdiction - whether civil or criminal jurisdiction - Customs Act 1901 (Cth), Part XIV

[5]

CUSTOMS - failure to comply with request for documents under Customs Act 1901 (Cth), s 214 - reasonable time for compliance with request for documents CATCHWORDS: EVIDENCE - exclusion of evidence - improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence - power to admit such evidence - discretionary considerations - Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138

[6]

JURISDICTION - appeal from conviction for federal offence - whether brought under Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 101 or Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)

[7]

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 26 Constitution (Cth), s 77 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 10 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), ss 5AA, 5B, Part 3 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 245, 246, Chapter 4, Part 5 Customs Act 1901 (Cth), ss 8, 33, 214, 234, 244, 245, 247, 248, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, Part XIV, Schedule V Customs and Excise Amendment Act 1982 (Cth), s 62 LEGISLATION CITED: Customs Regulations, reg 171 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), ss 68, 79, 80 Justices Acts Amendment Act 1900 (NSW), s 9 Justices Act 1921 (SA) Spirits Act 1906 (Cth), ss 2A, 4, 9, 22 Supreme Court and Circuits Act 1900 (NSW), s 18 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 75A, 101

[8]

Ace Custom Services Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1991) 104 ALR 463 Bunning v Cross (1977-78) 141 CLR 54 Carroll v Mijovich (1991) 25 NSWLR 441 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Powell [2007] QCA 106 Collector of Customs v Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 832 The Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 390 Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 1269 Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203 Evans v Button (1988) 13 NSWLR 57 Evans v Lynch [1984] 3 NSWLR 567 Ex parte Oesselmann (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 149 Ganke v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] 1 NSWLR 252 GH Photography Pty Ltd v McGarrigle [1974] 2 NSWLR 635 CASES CITED: Holmes v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4328 In the matter of O'Neill (unrep, NSWDC, 18 August 1988) Jack Brabham Holdings Pty Ltd v Button (1988) 94 FLR 278 John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 163 CLR 508 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400 Neil Pearson & Co Pty Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1995) 38 NSWLR 443 Ove Arup Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of NSW [2006] NSWCA 28; (2006) 149 IR 193 R v Dalley [2002] NSWCCA 284; (2002) 132 A Crim R 169 R v Skurray (1967) 86 WN(NSW) Pt 1 Regina v Haddad and Treglia [2000] NSWCCA 351; (2000) 116 A Crim R 312 Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612 Rowling v Murray (1993) 116 FLR 125 Stephens v Abrahams (1902) 27 VLR 753

[9]

HNP Wollaston, Customs Law of Australia (1904) William Brooks & Co, at pp 161-163

[10]

PARTIES: Stephen Edward PARKER - Appellant Comptroller-General of Customs - Respondent

[11]

COUNSEL: N C Hutley SC/D R Stack - Appellant D J Fagan SC/G M Elliott - Respondent

[12]

SOLICITORS: Yeldham Lloyd Associates - Appellant Australian Government Solicitor - Respondent

[13]

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

[14]

LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2006] NSWSC 387

[15]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL CA 40324/06 SC 13933/92

[16]

MASON P TOBIAS JA BASTEN JA

[17]

6 December 2007 PARKER v COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS

[18]

From 1987 to 1989, officers of the Australian Customs Service conducted an investigation in relation to suspected breaches of the Spirits Act 1906 (Cth) and the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The suspected breaches involved certain importers of brandy who had been "extending" the product with locally produced grain-based alcohol on which duty had not been paid. Three main businesses were believed to be involved in the scheme: Lawpark Pty Ltd, an importer and distributor of spirits; Kingswood Distillery Pty Ltd, a maker and processor of spirits; and Breven Pty Ltd, the operator of a bond store at which imported spirits were warehoused. The Appellant, Mr Parker, was a director and shareholder of Lawpark Pty Ltd and Breven Pty Ltd.

[19]

In March 1990, customs officers attended a number of premises and requested the production of books and documents in relation to the scheme. On forming the view that there had been a failure to comply with the request, the customs officers executed search warrants issued under the Customs Act. Subsequently, the Appellant, amongst others, was charged and convicted of 14 offences under ss 33 and 234 of the Customs Act.

[20]

The Appellant sought to have certain documents excluded pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The documents had been seized pursuant to a warrant issued under s 214 of the Customs Act. The Appellant argued that both the issue of the warrant and its execution were either unlawful or improper. A voir dire was conducted and Simpson J gave judgment ruling that the evidence should be admitted. The Appellant was convicted, largely on the basis of an analysis of the seized documents. The present appeal is brought from the interlocutory judgment of Simpson J.

[21]

(i) the jurisdiction of the Court in relation to an appeal from a customs prosecution;

[22]

(ii) the scope of the search powers pursuant to execution of a warrant under s 214 of the Customs Act;

[23]

(iii) the extent of the improper or unlawful conduct; and

[24]

(iv) whether the primary judge properly exercised her discretion to admit the evidence.

[25]

The Court held, dismissing the appeal (per Basten JA, Mason P and Tobias JA agreeing)

[26]

Under State law, rights of civil appeal are identified not by the nature of the order but by the manner of instituting proceedings, pursuant to the exclusions contained in the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). As the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) requires that proceedings be commenced by civil process, the right of appeal will arise under the Supreme Court Act: [38]. Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; Jack Brabham Holdings Pty Ltd v Button (1988) 94 FLR 278; Rowling v Murray (1993) 116 FLR 125; Ex parte Oesselmann (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 149; Evans v Lynch [1984] 3 NSWLR 567; Evans v Button (1988) 13 NSWLR 57; Neil Pearson & Co Pty Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1995) 38 NSWLR 443; Stephens v Abrahams (1902) 27 VLR 753; Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Powell [2007] QCA 106, considered.
The appeal was properly instituted in the Court of Appeal: [39].

[27]

Subsection 214(3) of the Customs Act is not restricted to the goods the subject of the written information but includes the goods imported or exported during the previous five years: [49].

[28]

In the matter of O'Neill (NSWDC, 18 August 1988, unrep), not followed.

[29]

The primary consideration in deciding upon the admissibility of unlawfully or improperly obtained evidence is whether there has been deliberate disregard for the law as opposed to an accidental or inadvertent contravention: [59]. Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54, applied.

[30]

Where the impropriety arises from inadvertence or mistake, the higher the probative value of the evidence and the greater the seriousness of the crime, the greater the public interest in its admission. The weight to be given to these considerations cannot be resolved in the abstract but depends upon the circumstances of the case and the interplay between the different factors: [62]

[31]

It was open to the trial judge to reject the suggestion that there was any dishonourable or dishonest motive on the part of Customs in deciding to pursue the investigation through s 214 of the Customs Act: [76]. There is no basis for holding that reliance on s 214 was inconsistent with advice received from counsel, or that such advice was ignored by Customs: [71].

[32]

The Appellant failed to establish that the purpose of the request for notices was not to obtain the production of documents but to trigger the entitlement to execute the warrant, being an improper purpose: [89].

[33]

The notice to produce documents was insufficiently precise in its identification of the goods in question. The notice was invalid and purported reliance on it engaged s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): [90].

[34]

Whether there has been a failure to comply with a request to produce documents depends upon whether a reasonable time has been allowed for compliance: [94]. Ace Custom Services Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1991) 104 ALR 463; Ganke v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] 1 NSWLR 252; Holmes v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4328, considered.

[35]

On the basis of the evidence, it was open to the trial judge to find that Mr Parker had failed to comply with the notice in the sense that he had demonstrated no willingness to produce and hand over all of the documents required by the notice: [107].

[36]

There was no deliberate or reckless disregard of an established constraint on the power of Customs officers in executing a warrant. Customs did not act improperly in failing to instruct its officers to adhere to a narrow view of their powers under s 214 of the Customs Act: [118].

[37]

In the circumstances, the weighing exercise required under s 138 of the Evidence Act to determine whether evidence should be admitted turned on whether the actions of the Customs officers could properly be described as involving a wilful disregard of legal constraints imposed on their powers: [121].

[38]

The Appellant failed to establish any wilful disregard for the law, dishonest motive or improper purpose on the part of Customs: [123]-[124]. Nor was any error established in the reasons provided by the primary judge with respect to the balancing exercise required by s 138(3) of the Evidence Act: [127].

[39]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL CA 40324/06 SC 13933/92

[40]

MASON P TOBIAS JA BASTEN JA

[41]

6 December 2007 PARKER v COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS Judgment 1 MASON P: I agree with Basten JA. 2 TOBIAS JA: I agree with Basten JA. 3 BASTEN JA: Over a period covering 1987-1989 officers in the Australian Customs Service conducted an extensive investigation in relation to suspected breaches of the Spirits Act 1906 (Cth) and the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The officers came to the view that certain importers of brandy, prior to bottling and sale, had been contaminating or "extending" the product with locally produced grain-based alcohol on which duty had not been paid. The scheme was understood to involve three main businesses. Lawpark Pty Ltd ("Lawpark") imported and distributed spirits. Kingswood Distillery Pty Ltd was a maker and processor of spirits in Australia. Breven Pty Ltd ("Breven") operated a bond store at which imported spirits could be warehoused without incurring a liability to pay duty. The present Appellant, Mr Stephen Parker, was a director and shareholder of both Lawpark and Breven. 4 By March 1990, customs officers had formed the view that all of the bottled stock which had been tested and contained "extended" spirit, came from the bond store operated by Breven. On 6 March 1990 officers attended at a number of premises, requested the production of books and documents and, on forming the view that there had been a failure to comply with the request, executed search warrants issued under the Customs Act. An analysis of documents produced as a result of these searches led to charges being laid under the Customs Act against, amongst others, the present Appellant. 5 Proceedings commenced in 1992 in the Common Law Division against Mr Parker and others laid charges of offences under the Customs Act involving the evasion of duty in an amount exceeding $3 million. The charges relating to Mr Parker came on for trial before Simpson J in April 2005 and, in a judgment dated 8 May 2006, Mr Parker was convicted of 14 offences under ss 33 and 234 of the Customs Act: Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 390. 6 Mr Parker appealed against his convictions on numerous grounds, but by the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal, the scope of the challenges had been drastically reduced. The grounds which were pressed were restricted to the admission of company records seized from Lawpark on 6 March 1990. The records were seized pursuant to a warrant issued under s 214 of the Customs Act. Both the issue of the warrant and its execution were said to be either unlawful or attended by impropriety. Accordingly, the Appellant sought to have the documents obtained in the execution of the warrant excluded by the trial judge pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 7 A voir dire was conducted over five days in April 2005, at the conclusion of which her Honour ruled that the evidence should be admitted and the hearing proceeded. Her reasons for so ruling were delivered in a separate judgment of 8 May 2006: Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 387. It is from that interlocutory judgment that the present appeal is brought. 8 The delay in this matter reaching a trial in the Supreme Court appears to have arisen from a stay being ordered on 10 June 1994 in the Common Law Division for reasons which were described by the trial judge as "not apparent, and no longer relevant": [2006] NSWSC 390 at [54]. Over the years that have elapsed there have been significant changes to the law. For example, the Spirits Act 1906, in relation to possible contraventions of which the investigation was undertaken, has long since been repealed, as have the provisions of the Customs Act under which the warrant was issued and the search conducted. In relation to the circumstances surrounding the issue of the warrant, the request for production of documents and the execution of the warrant, the relevant law to be discussed below was that in force in March 1990. The Evidence Act, under which questions of admission of evidence arose, was enacted after the commencement of the proceedings, but before the trial. Key laws relating to the jurisdiction of this Court have, fortunately, not changed between the date of commencement of proceedings in the Common Law Division in 1992 and the date of the appeal. 9 The issues raised on the appeal have been addressed as set out below: Index to Judgment Jurisdictional and procedural issues [10] Issues on appeal [40] Search powers: Customs Act, s 214 [43] Exclusion of evidence: Evidence Act, s 138 [54] Exclusion of evidence: factual findings [66] (a) Decision to pursue investigation through s 214 [67] (b) Issue of notices: improper purpose [77] (c) Reference to offence in notice to produce documents [90] (d) Non-compliance not established [91] (e) Failure to train and educate officers [108] Application of discretion to admit evidence [119] Conclusion [128]

[42]

Jurisdictional and procedural issues 10 Neither the notice of appeal nor the pre-hearing written submissions considered the source of this Court's jurisdiction. A question was raised by the Court at the commencement of the hearing as to whether the proceedings should properly have been brought in the Court of Criminal Appeal. Submissions were subsequently made in relation to this question, both parties contending that this Court had jurisdiction, but agreeing to the necessary steps to have the matter disposed of by a Court of Criminal Appeal constituted by the same bench, should that prove necessary. 11 It was not in dispute that the present proceedings were "Customs prosecutions" for the purposes of Part XIV of the Customs Act: see s 244. The proceedings were instituted by the Comptroller in the Supreme Court, as allowed by s 245(1)(a). This provision constitutes a law of the Parliament investing the Supreme Court with federal jurisdiction, pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court for the purposes of an appeal must be identified in a law of the Commonwealth which either expressly confers that jurisdiction or applies the relevant laws of the State in that respect: see, eg, the general provisions in ss 68, 79, 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). 12 Before considering the operation of such general provisions, it is necessary to consider the specific provisions of the Customs Act. Thus, s 247 of the Customs Act provides: " Prosecutions in accordance with practice rules 247 Every Customs prosecution in a court referred to in subsection 245(1) may be commenced prosecuted and proceeded with in accordance with any rules of practice (if any) established by the Court for Crown suits in revenue matters or in accordance with the usual practice and procedure of the Court in civil cases or in accordance with the directions of the Court or a Judge." 13 This provision does not in terms deal with rights of appeal. The words "commenced prosecuted and proceeded with" are apt to cover a trial. There being no rules of practice in respect of Crown suits in revenue matters in the Supreme Court, the practice and procedure of the Court in "civil cases" would apply. This provision may operate differentially in relation to particular issues. Thus, it does not invoke rules relating to the burden of proof in civil cases: see Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161. 14 Section 248 makes further provision in relation to matters of practice: " State Court practice 248 Subject to the provisions of this Act the provisions of the law relating to summary proceedings in force in the State or Territory where the proceedings are instituted shall apply to all Customs prosecutions before a Court of summary jurisdiction in a State or Territory, and an appeal shall lie from any conviction order for condemnation or order of dismissal to the Court and in the manner provided by the law of the State or Territory where such conviction or order is made for appeals from convictions or orders of dismissal, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the law of the State or Territory, an appeal shall lie from an order of dismissal to any court to which and in the manner in which an appeal lies from a conviction." 15 Although the opening words of s 248 invite attention to other provisions of the Customs Act, there are none of consequence for present purposes, with the possible exception of s 247. Thus, to the extent that s 248 purports to pick up "provisions of the law relating to summary proceedings" in force in a State, it may not be effective to pick up procedure in criminal cases inconsistently with the mandate of s 247. However, it is clear from the composite effect of the opening lines of s 248 that it intends to refer to summary proceedings "before a Court of summary jurisdiction" in the particular State. The term "summary jurisdiction", at least in the context of criminal proceedings, is usually intended to identify a jurisdiction in relation to indictable offences where a trial is to be conducted otherwise than before a judge and jury. The Supreme Court in this State now exercises summary jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter 4, Part 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). However, the fact that s 245(1) distinguishes in par (a) (referring to the Supreme Court of a State) and par (f) (referring to "a Court of summary jurisdiction of a State") between superior courts and courts of summary jurisdiction indicates that s 248, at least in its first limb, was not intended to apply to the exercise of summary jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. (There appears to be no particular consistency in the manner in which these provisions refer to "Court" and "court".) Further support for this view may be obtained from s 26 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which defines "Court of summary jurisdiction" to mean "any justice or justices of the peace or other magistrate … of a State or part of a State … sitting as a court … for the making of summary orders or the summary punishment of offences …". 16 The next question is whether the reference in the second part of s 248 to "an appeal" from "any conviction" is to be understood as limited to the preceding subject matter, namely proceedings in courts of summary jurisdiction, or whether it should be understood to refer to convictions in proceedings brought in any court. 17 If s 247 applies to every court referred to in s 245(1), the purpose of the first limb of s 248 is obscure. An alternative view is that s 247 applies to superior courts, whereas s 248 was intended to apply to courts of summary jurisdiction. The Comptroller-General noted that that approach accorded with Wollaston's, (HNP Wollaston, Customs Law of Australia (1904) William Brooks & Co, at pp 161-163). That is true: however, Wollaston was writing at a time when s 247 was expressly limited to Customs prosecutions "in the High Court of Australia or the Supreme Court of any State". Wollaston was correct when he wrote. Provision for prosecution in the High Court was not removed from sections 245 and 247 until the Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1979 (Cth). After that amendment, section 247 was limited to proceedings in a Supreme Court. The variation of section 247 by omitting reference to a Supreme Court and substituting "court referred to in subsection 245(1)" was only effected by the Customs and Excise Amendment Act 1982 (Cth), s 62. No amendment was made to s 248 and the consequence for that provision of the amendment to s 247 may not have been appreciated. However, the result with respect to s 247 is that it now appears to prescribe the procedure to be adopted in a Customs prosecution in all courts: see Labrador Liquor, [27] (Gummow J). 18 The historical coverage of s 248 is more obscure. In 1901 s 245 identified three courts or categories of court in which proceedings might be brought, namely the High Court (par (a)), the Supreme Court of a State (par (b)), or "any County Court, District Court, Local Court or Court of summary jurisdiction": (par (c)). Section 248, as enacted, picked up the law relating to summary proceedings "before Justices" which was referable to Courts of summary jurisdiction, but would appear not to have applied to a County Court or District Court. Whatever the resolution of that apparent anomaly, the second limb of s 248 has at all stages referred to appeals "in the manner provided by the law of the State". It would have been inapt for that provision to apply to the High Court, or indeed to the Supreme Court if it were intended thereby to pick up rights of appeal to the High Court, not being a matter dealt with by the law of a State. Nevertheless, the fact that there are on any view anomalies removes some of the force from the contention that the second limb of s 248 must be intended to be limited to the subject matter of the first limb. Rather, it seems likely that it was intended to apply to proceedings brought in the County Court or District Court or a Local Court, as well as a Court of summary jurisdiction, for otherwise there would have been no provision in 1901 permitting an appeal by any party from an order of those Courts. 19 The interrelationship of ss 247 and 248 in their current form was discussed by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Powell [2007] QCA 106 (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman J). After a careful consideration of the legislative history of the provisions, including the explanatory memorandum for the 1982 amendments, the Court concluded that at least where proceedings were commenced in a Court of summary jurisdiction, the first limb of s 248 permitted proceedings to be commenced either in accordance with the civil rules or with the rules for criminal offences dealt with in its summary jurisdiction: at [14]-[19]. Their Honours concluded that the 1982 amendment was not intended to cause a drastic constriction of the operation of s 248, so as to make s 247 the sole basis upon which a Customs prosecution could be commenced in a State or Territory court. Although s 248 is required to be read subject to the provisions of the Customs Act, s 247 should not be treated as a provision giving rise to inconsistency. The submissions of the Chief Executive Officer that such provisions as s 251 (no objection for informality), s 252 (conviction not to be quashed for procedural defect or want of form), s 253 (protection to witnesses), s 254 (defendant competent witness) and s 255 (averment of prosecutor sufficient) were examples of provisions to which State summary procedure might be subject: at [10]. As their Honours recognised, this approach was contrary to the view of Gummow J in Labrador Liquor: at [19]. The issue does not need to be addressed further in the present case. 20 There remains a question as to whether s 248 operated with respect to appeals from convictions in the Supreme Court. If it did not, it would appear that such appeals must have been covered by s 247, because, in 1901, there was no other general law applying State laws in matters of federal jurisdiction. Prior to the statutory provisions for appeal in criminal matters, there were limited rights of challenge against conviction available under the common law: see generally Conway v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 203. It may have been assumed that such common law rights would apply in relation to a Customs prosecution brought in a State Supreme Court, whereas it was thought to be necessary to provide for the application of statutory provisions relating to appeal from Courts of summary jurisdiction, such as s 9 of the Justices Acts Amendment Act 1900 (NSW). Further, it was well-established by 1901 that the Supreme Court exercised appellate jurisdiction regulated by statute: see, eg, Supreme Court and Circuits Act 1900 (NSW), s 18. 21 Nor can this problem now be resolved simply by reliance upon the general provisions of the Judiciary Act. That is because they operate only to the extent that another law of the Commonwealth does not otherwise provide and because their operation does not resolve the question as to whether State laws with respect to appeals from criminal convictions or from civil judgments are applicable. 22 The Court's attention was not drawn to any case in which this issue has been addressed. In Stephens v Abrahams (1902) 27 VLR 753 at 756-757, Hodges J held that an order for review available in the Supreme Court of Victoria with respect to a conviction in a Court of Petty Sessions was an "appeal" for the purposes of s 248. A similar conclusion was reached by a Full Court in this State in Ex parte Oesselmann (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 149 (Stephen, Owen and Cohen JJ) in relation to statutory prohibition in respect of a decision of justices. 23 In Evans v Lynch [1984] 3 NSWLR 567, this Court considered an appeal against a decision by a judge in the Common Law Division not to order that proceedings under the Customs Act be tried by a jury. It appears to have been accepted without consideration that an appeal lay in the civil jurisdiction of the Court. 24 More recently, there have been a number of appeals dealt with by this Court, in which comments have been made as to the appropriate characterisation of the proceedings in the Common Law Division, though not for the purposes of considering the right of appeal. Thus, in Evans v Button (1988) 13 NSWLR 57, the Court considered an appeal from a decision by the trial judge to allow an amendment of the summons in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules. Mahoney JA (Priestley and McHugh JJA agreeing) considered that, pursuant to s 247, the trial judge was correct and the appeal was dismissed. 25 In Jack Brabham Holdings Pty Ltd v Button (1988) 94 FLR 278 this Court (Kirby P, Mahoney and Clarke JJA) considered the proper approach to an application for a stay of proceedings on the basis that, as a result of delay, they constituted an abuse of process. All members of the Court noted the difficulty in classifying the proceedings as either civil or criminal; none addressed the question of the classification for the purposes of appeal. 26 Neil Pearson & Co Pty Ltd v Comptroller-General of Customs (1995) 38 NSWLR 443 was concerned with an appeal taken from the Local Court to the District Court with respect to convictions of a number of charges of evading payment of duty. Hosking DCJ in the District Court stated a case pursuant to s 5B of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) for consideration of the Court of Criminal Appeal. (Although the Court is referred to as "Court of Appeal" in the heading of the report, that is clearly an error, the matter being dealt with by Kirby ACJ, Allen and Dowd JJ, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal.) The appropriateness of this course of appeal generally was established in Collector of Customs v Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 832 (NSW CCA, Street CJ, Nagle and Begg JJ). 27 In Rowling v Murray (1993) 116 FLR 125, Debelle J in the Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal from a magistrate challenging the validity of an amendment in the form of an additional charge. His Honour appears to have treated the matter as controlled by s 248 of the Customs Act and applied a section of the Justices Act 1921 (SA) dealing with criminal proceedings. 28 In Labrador Liquor, at [114], Hayne J (in a judgment with which Gleeson CJ and McHugh J agreed) stated: "Arguments founded on classification of the proceedings as 'civil' or 'criminal' as determinative of the standard of proof, must fail. As reference to the historical matters mentioned earlier reveals, the classification proposed is, at best, unstable. It seeks to divide the litigious world into only two parts when, in truth, that world is more complex and varied than such a classification acknowledges." 29 Despite the terms of s 247, the Court in Labrador Liquor unanimously held that the criminal burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt applied. However, as Hayne J also noted, where the proceedings did not seek or result in a conviction, a different approach might be required: at [135]. 30 While this Court has exercised jurisdiction in relation to appeals in similar proceedings on a number of occasions without comment, its judges have also sat in the Court of Criminal Appeal and exercised jurisdiction on appeal from similar proceedings in a Local Court. Although there are separate procedural provisions in ss 247 and 248, it might seem curious if appeals were to be brought in the criminal jurisdiction from a conviction in a court of summary jurisdiction, but in the civil jurisdiction where the conviction was in the Supreme Court and, possibly, in the District Court (or County Court) but only when exercising original jurisdiction. It is also curious that such a dichotomy has been accepted without comment. One possible reason for the failure of the Customs Act to make clear the nature of the appellate jurisdiction in relation to the Supreme Court may have been that, in 1901, there were no separate statutory provisions in Australia with respect to criminal appeals. 31 It is at least theoretically possible that two forms of appeal are available, the aggrieved party having the power to choose. However, that result would appear anomalous and was not proposed by either party in the course of argument. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Judiciary Act. Both ss 79 and 80, which provide for the application of State laws applicable in relevant proceedings, are qualified to the extent that, in the language of s 79, there must be no Commonwealth law which has "otherwise provided". Alternative provision may be made by a Commonwealth law which expressly addresses the subject matter of the State law, or it may be made by another Commonwealth law picking up and applying a State law. Sections 79 and 80 may thus be seen as 'back up' provisions to ensure that there is no failure of procedural or substantive law available in the exercise of federal jurisdiction: see, eg, The Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 at 522 (Gaudron J); and at 554 (Gummow and Kirby JJ). In the present case, that would require first the application of s 68, in relation to laws of a State respecting the procedure for the hearing and determination of appeals arising out of a summary conviction of a person charged with an offence: see s 68(1). However, the State laws will only operate "so far as they are applicable" and accordingly it is necessary to return to the proper construction of the State law which in this context, will be s 5AA of the Criminal Appeal Act. 32 If the order of the trial judge, despite involving convictions, is a civil judgment or order of the Court in a Division, the appeal will lie to this Court pursuant to s 101(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), as applied in federal jurisdiction by ss 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act. A judgment or order to which s 101 applies will not, however, include one made in proceedings specified in the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Act. The Third Schedule excludes: "(a) proceedings in the Court for the prosecution of offenders on indictment ('indictment' including any information presented or filed as provided by law for the prosecution of offenders) including the sentencing or otherwise dealing with persons convicted." 33 The concept of an 'information' in this context should be understood as extending to the means by which a public prosecution is commenced, seeking a conviction for an offence: see John L Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (1987) 163 CLR 508; Ove Arup Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of NSW [2006] NSWCA 28; (2006) 149 IR 193. Nevertheless, because the exclusion from civil jurisdiction effected by the Third Schedule identifies proceedings by way of the means of their commencement, it is arguable that the present proceedings, commenced by civil process, are not excluded. On the other hand, proceedings in the summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are commenced by application, rather than information: see Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 246. A conviction under Part 5 of Chapter 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act (dealing with the summary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and other higher courts) is "taken for all purposes … to be a conviction on indictment" and attracts the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeal, pursuant to s 5AA of the Criminal Appeal Act. That section provides: " 5AA Appeal in criminal cases dealt with by Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction (1) A person: (a) convicted of an offence, or (b) against whom an order to pay any costs is made, by the Supreme Court in its summary jurisdiction may appeal under this Act to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the conviction (including any sentence imposed) or order." 34 Three factors militate in favour of the view that the right of appeal applicable under State law in the present case is to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The first is that, as noted above, the terms of the Judiciary Act require one to consider first laws of the State respecting the summary conviction of persons charged with offences and the hearing and determination of appeal arising out of any such trial or conviction: s 68(1). By contrast, s 79 of the Judiciary Act, which would pick up civil rights of appeal, if applicable, must give way to another Commonwealth law which otherwise provides and which would include s 68. The opening words of s 80 have a similar qualification to s 79. 35 Secondly, an appeal against a "conviction" naturally falls within the language of Part 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act, but would not ordinarily be seen as falling within the phrase "judgment or order" as used in s 101 of the Supreme Court Act, in relation to civil jurisdiction. 36 Thirdly, consistency would favour treating parties in the same way in whichever court the proceedings were commenced. If the second limb of s 248 operates at all, it would appear to pick up appeal provisions relating to criminal offences by use of the term "conviction", at least in relation to appeals from courts of summary jurisdiction. If it applies generally, the State law with respect to appeals from convictions should be the law which would operate, either by force of s 248 itself or s 68 of the Judiciary Act. 37 The contrary considerations are twofold. The first is that ss 247 and 248 of the Customs Act, as originally enacted, adopted civil procedures in relation to the superior courts and provisions relating to summary proceedings (a phrase generally associated with the criminal process) in the lower courts. Thus procedural consistency was not intended and it would not be anomalous if appeal rights were to vary depending upon the court in which the proceedings were commenced. Secondly, for s 5AA of the Criminal Appeal Act to apply, it would be necessary to conclude that the conviction was effected by the Supreme Court "in its summary jurisdiction". That language is apt to refer to the conferral of summary jurisdiction by s 245 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, s 247 of the Customs Act does not (and never did) permit the commencement of proceedings in the Supreme Court under the Criminal Procedure Act (or any earlier equivalent), but rather under the civil procedures of the Supreme Court Act (and its predecessors). That, however, was not in terms part of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of Criminal Appeal with the introduction of s 5AA by the Criminal Appeal (Crimes) Amendment Act 1979 (NSW): in relation to the legislative history of the Court's summary jurisdiction, see Ove Arup Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of NSW [2006] NSWCA 28; (2006) 149 IR 193 at [48]-[54]. 38 In short, under State law, rights of civil appeal are determined not by the nature of the result (whether a conviction or other form of order) but by the manner of instituting proceedings, pursuant to the exclusions contained in the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Act. The Customs Act requires that proceedings be commenced by civil process. It follows that, whatever the nature of the orders made in the Common Law Division, the right of appeal will arise under the Supreme Court Act. Although s 5AA of the Criminal Appeal Act would in terms appear to cover the kind of orders made in the present case, it was introduced to address other circumstances and with a different jurisdiction in contemplation. 39 The preferable conclusion, on the materials before the Court, is that the appeal was properly instituted in this Court. That conclusion follows practice in this State as revealed in the authorities set out above. However, it is desirable to note by way of reservation that the history of the Customs Act was not fully explored in the course of argument and that neither party contended for a different result.

[43]

Issues on appeal 40 Her Honour handed down three judgments, each having the same title, the first being Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 387 (dealing with the admissibility of evidence following a voir dire); the second Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 390 (pursuant to which the Appellant was convicted) and Comptroller-General of Customs v Parker [2006] NSWSC 1269, pursuant to which her Honour imposed a penalty of 3.25 times the amount of duty evaded (being an amount a little in excess of $10 million), a penalty of $12,000 in respect of the unauthorised movement of goods and further ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. The grounds now pressed all relate to the admissibility of the evidence (being substantially the whole of the evidence upon which the charges were prosecuted) pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). No separate challenge was pursued in relation to the reasons for conviction or mounted in relation to the penalty, although both would properly be set aside if the evidence were held to be inadmissible. 41 As explained above, the charges against Mr Parker arose out of a major investigation undertaken by customs officers in relation to the "extension" of brandy. That investigation led to the issue and execution of a search warrant pursuant to s 214 of the Customs Act and the seizure of a large quantity of documents from Lawpark. The charges ultimately laid did not relate to offences under the Spirits Act 1906 (Cth) in relation to brandy, but rather 13 charges relating to evasion of duty payable under the Customs Act, and one charge of unauthorised movement of goods subject to customs control, under s 33(1) of the Customs Act. Of the 13 evasion charges, 11 involved duty in an amount of $143,259.26, another involved an amount of $90,457.95 and the final charge involved an amount of $1,447,061.70, giving a total amount of duty evaded as $3,113,371.40. The offences were committed over a period of almost three years between August 1987 and May 1990. The liquor in relation to which duty was evaded was whisky, and not the brandy the subject of the initial investigation. 42 The circumstances of the initial investigation are of relevance for present purposes in specific respects only. At the heart of the Appellant's case were complaints as to the unlawfulness of the steps which preceded the request for and search and seizure of documents on 6 March 1990. In order to appreciate the nature of the improper conduct alleged and the manner in which it was dealt with by the trial judge, it is convenient to deal first with the search powers conferred by s 214 of the Customs Act; secondly with the proper approach to exclusion of evidence under s 138 of the Evidence Act; and thirdly with the factual findings and application of the principles to the relevant findings.

[44]

Search powers: Customs Act , s 214 43 In March 1990, both the Customs Act and the Spirits Act were administered by the Comptroller-General of Customs: see Spirits Act, s 2A. The investigation into the extension of brandy could have given rise to offences under the Spirits Act. Although there was a particular power to enter premises and take samples pursuant to s 22 of the Spirits Act, general powers of investigation were to be found in the Customs Act, the relevant Parts of which were incorporated into the Spirits Act, so far as applicable: Spirits Act, s 4. The incorporation of Parts XI-XV included Part XII (conferring powers on officers) and thus s 214 which read as follows: " Production of documents etc in cases of seizure 214. (1) Whenever information in writing has been given on oath to the Collector that goods have been unlawfully imported exported undervalued or entered or illegally dealt with, or that it is intended to unlawfully import export undervalue enter or illegally deal with any goods, or whenever any goods have been seized or detained, the owner shall immediately upon being required so to do by the Collector produce and hand over to him all books and documents relating to the goods so imported exported entered seized or detained undervalued or illegally dealt with, or intended to be unlawfully imported exported undervalued entered or illegally dealt with, and of all other goods imported or exported by him at any time within the period of 5 years immediately preceding such request seizure or detention, and shall also produce for the inspection of the Collector or such other officer as he may authorize for that purpose and allow such Collector or officer to make copies of or extracts from all books or documents of any kind whatsoever wherein any entry or memorandum appears in anyway relating to any such goods. Penalty: $1,000. (2) For the purposes of this section, the Comptroller or the Collector of Customs for a State or Territory may issue to any officer of Customs or officer of police a Customs Warrant, in accordance with the form in Schedule V, marked with a Customs stamp. … (3) If any person fails to comply with a requirement by the Collector under this section, an officer of Customs or officer of police, having with him a Customs Warrant in the form of Schedule V hereto, may, at any time of the day or night, break open and enter into any house, premises or place in which any books or documents relating to the goods are or are supposed to be, and search: (a) the house, premises or place; (b) any person therein or thereon; and (c) any chests, trunks or packages therein or thereon; and take possession of, remove and impound any of those books and documents which are found." 44 The first step envisaged by s 214 is the provision of information on oath to the Collector. That officer is defined as "any principal officer of Customs": s 8(1). The information must relate to some unlawful dealing with goods. The goods and the dealing may be assumed, for present purposes, to refer to such goods and dealings as are dealt with under the Customs Act or the Spirits Act. 45 The second step involves a requirement by the Collector that "the owner" produce and hand over books and documents. The term "owner" in respect of goods is broadly defined to include any person "being or holding himself out to be the owner, importer, exporter, consignee, agent, or person possessed of, or beneficially interested in, or having any control of, or power of disposition over the goods": s 4. There is no power of delegation in relation to functions of the Collector, so that any requirement made by the Collector of an owner, if not made by the Collector in person, must be made in writing. The Regulations provide for a form of "notice to produce documents under section 214": Customs Regulations, reg 171. The form of the notice recited the information in writing, or the seizure of goods and stated: "Now, therefore, I, the Collector of Customs for the State of , by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the Customs Act 1901 , do hereby require you to produce and hand over to an officer of Customs duly authorized by me on my behalf to receive the same, all books and documents relating to such goods and relating to all other goods imported ( or exported) by you at any time within the period of five years immediately preceding this request, and I further require you to produce for the inspection of the said an officer of Customs duly authorized by me for that purpose or such other Officer as I may authorize for the purpose, and allow such Officer to make copies of or extracts from all books or documents of any kind whatsoever wherein any entry or memorandum appears in any way relating to any such goods." 46 The obligation of the owner required by the Collector to produce and hand over books and documents was to comply "immediately" with the requirement. A failure to comply triggered the power of the officer to execute a customs warrant in accordance with sub-s 214(3). The form of that warrant, found in Schedule V to the Act, recited the giving of information on oath or the seizure of goods and continued: "You are hereby authorized, in the event of failing to comply immediately with any requirement made in pursuance of section two hundred and fourteen of the Customs Act 1901-1923 , to enter into, at any time of the day or night, and search, any house premises or place in which any books or documents relating to the goods are or are supposed to be; and to break open any such house premises or place and search any person therein or thereon and any chests trunks or packages therein or thereon; and to take possession of, remove and impound any of those books and documents which are found: And for so doing this shall be your sufficient warrant." 47 Despite changes in the structure, the Schedule V warrant replicates the powers set out in sub-s 214(3). The powers of search and removal are restricted to "any books or documents relating to the goods", language which may also be found in s 214(1). However, the words "the goods" appear in four passages in sub-s (1). In the first, the word "goods" are limited to those that have been or are intended to be unlawfully dealt with or seized or detained. This may be identified as the introductory part of the provision. The first operative part, applying to books and documents, is the obligation to produce and hand over books and documents "relating to the goods" which, in its context, is clearly a reference back to the goods which have been the subject of written information or have been seized or detained. The second operative provision appears to pick up another category of books and documents relating to (although the connector is "of") "all other goods imported or exported by him at any time within the period of five years immediately preceding such request seizure or detention". These, it seems, are colloquially referred to as the 'five year documents' but might more accurately be referred to as documents relating to 'the five year goods'. 48 There then follows a third category of documents "wherein any entry or memorandum appears in any way relating to any such goods". The third category appears to envisage a distinction between documents relating to goods and those documents in which an entry or memorandum appears, where the entry or memorandum relates to the goods. (This differentiation was explicit and must have been intentional or the third category of documents would merge into the first.) Books and documents falling into the third category are to be produced for inspection, copying or the preparation of extracts, but, in contra-distinction to the first two categories, are not required to be handed over. The question is whether the reference to "any such goods" in relation to the third category refers only to the goods which were the subject of the written information, or includes the goods imported or exported during the previous five years. The structure of the section, together with the broad language, indicates that both the goods the subject of the written information and the five year goods were intended to be included in the phrase "any such goods". 49 Subsection (3) is in more confined terms. As already noted, it addresses books or documents "relating to" the goods. To the extent that sub-s (1) distinguishes between books and documents "relating to" goods and those containing entries or memoranda relating to goods, it is the former and not the latter which may be the subject of a customs warrant. However, that does not resolve the question as to whether the warrant is restricted to the goods identified in the written information or extends to all other goods imported or exported within the five year period. One possible point of distinction between the first and second categories of documents identified in sub-s (1) is that the former involves documents relating to the goods identified in the information whereas the second category appears, grammatically, to refer to documents "of" all other goods. This change in terminology is curious, but should not be understood as creating some different category of books and documents. However, once it is accepted that the subject matter of the requirement under sub-s (1) is books and documents relating to one of two categories of goods, it is difficult to see why the reference to books and documents relating to "the goods" in sub-s (3) should not relate to all of the documents (by reference to both categories of goods) identified in sub-s (1). To divide the documents into two categories would have curious results. Thus, an owner who handed over documents relating to the goods referred in the written information, but refused to provide further documents, would fail to comply with the requirement in sub-s (1), thus triggering the right to execute a warrant under sub-s (3). The purpose of sub-s (3) is to ensure that, absent voluntary compliance, the warrant will permit a search by officers to obtain books or documents falling within the requirement which have not been supplied. To construe the category of books and documents in sub-s (3) as more limited than the books and documents referred to in sub-s (1) would be to defeat the purpose of sub-s (3) in circumstances where only a handful of the documents the subject of the requirement had been provided, but sub-s (3) was found to be restricted to that very handful. 50 A different view was taken by Dunford DCJ in In the matter of O'Neill (NSWDC, 18 August 1988, unrep). His Honour held that the only documents which could be seized under the warrant were those relating to the goods which were the subject of the written information: Judgment, p 12. In reaching that conclusion, his Honour expressly adverted to the construction of s 214, set out above, recognising that the argument appeared "valid": Judgment, p 11. He also accepted that to adopt the more limited construction of s 214(3) suggested "an absurdity": p 12. However, he thought the alternative construction was compelled by the form of the warrant prescribed by sub-s 214(2) and Schedule V. The form of the warrant requires express reference in its recital to the goods the subject of the written information or which have been seized or detained. Where, in the operative part of the warrant, reference is made to searching the house in which any "books or documents relating to the goods" are supposed to be and taking "those books and documents", his Honour considered that the reference to documents relating to "the" goods must have been a reference to the goods identified in the recital to the warrant. 51 The force of that argument may be conceded: nevertheless, the warrant also refers to failure to comply with "any requirement" made pursuant to s 214. That requirement would involve documents relating to two categories of goods, namely the goods identified in the written information and all other goods imported or exported within the preceding five years. Although the warrant, in its recital, referred to the justification for the requirement (sometimes colloquially identified as the 'notice to produce') it also expressly identified the failure to comply with the requirement as the factor which triggered the obligation under the warrant. That requirement, as already noted, extended to documents relating not only to goods the subject of the written information, but to all goods imported or exported during the preceding five years. The recipient of the warrant would have been conscious of the scope of the requirement and hence the categories of the goods to which the documents sought related. No doubt the warrant could have set out the terms of the requirement in full and thus achieved greater certainty in the terms of its authority. However, the failure to expand the document in that manner does not justify the imposition of an anomalous constraint on the scope of the statute. Nor, as a matter of practical reality, should the recipient of the warrant expect that the warrant would be more limited than the requirement to produce and handover documents, with which he or she has immediately previously failed to comply. 52 The result of this construction is that there is a lacuna in relation to the enforcement mechanism with respect to the third category. However, that category did not involve documents "relating to" any goods, but only documents containing entries or memoranda relating to the goods. The Collector was in any event given more limited powers in relation to those documents. Subsection (3) was confined to documents which could be taken possession of, removed and impounded, in accordance with the requirement under sub-s (1) and did not extend to documents which could only be inspected and copied. In that sense it may be said that a failure to comply with the requirement under sub-s (1) might trigger the execution of a warrant, despite the fact that all the documents relating to the goods had been produced, with the result that nothing further would be seized under the warrant. However, that minor anomaly, if it be seen as such, would not justify the creation, without any substantial justification, of the far greater anomaly of excluding what are likely to be the major part of the documents relating to goods which were required to be produced and handed over under sub-s (1). If the searcher were entitled to inspect and copy documents in the third category, no anomaly would arise. 53 As will be noted below, the trial judge accepted the conclusion reached by Dunford DCJ in O'Neill: [2006] NSWSC 387 at [24], [25] and [39]. In my view that construction was mistaken.

[45]

Exclusion of evidence: Evidence Act , s 138 54 Before considering further the factual circumstances relevant to the appeal, it is convenient to consider the basis on which it was sought to exclude the documentary evidence obtained by execution of the warrant. That was sought pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act, which provides as follows: " 138 Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence (1) Evidence that was obtained: (a) improperly or in contravention of an Australian law, or (b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law, is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained." 55 One difficulty in the construction of s 138(1) is the distinction between conduct which is improper and conduct which is unlawful. Apart from some possible variation in the closeness of the causal connection, there does not appear to be any significant distinction between evidence obtained in contravention of an Australian law and evidence obtained in consequence of a contravention of an Australian law, being the second limbs of pars (a) and (b) respectively. The same intention should be attributed to the first limb of each paragraph, so that there is no significant difference between obtaining evidence improperly and obtaining evidence in consequence of an impropriety. The real issue is to identify the scope of an impropriety which will result in the qualified exclusion of evidence where there has been no unlawfulness, in the sense of a contravention of an Australian law. Putting aside confessional evidence, which is dealt with in sub-s 138(2), the best known example of improper conduct, not amounting to unlawfulness, is the action of an agent provocateur or person who induces another to commit a crime through subterfuge or trickery. This situation was discussed in Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 and, for the purposes of s 138, in Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612 at [16]-[38]. 56 There may be circumstances in which it is not the commission of the crime itself, but the obtaining of evidence of an antecedent crime which is attended by trickery or deception, not amounting to a contravention of a legal prohibition. For example, a police officer may induce the occupant of premises to allow a search to be undertaken voluntarily, in the false belief, induced by the officer, that he or she had a warrant which could be relied upon if consent were not forthcoming. Improper conduct may also occur in circumstances where a police officer has a warrant and seeks to exercise a search based on its authority, knowing that the warrant was for some reason invalid. One can envisage variations on the theme: the warrant may in fact have been invalid for reasons which the police should have been aware of, but were not. The warrant may in fact have been valid, but was believed by the officers to be invalid. Further consideration of such examples need not be pursued in the circumstances of this case. 57 The exercise of the discretionary power conferred by this provision involves two steps. The first is to determine whether evidence sought to be adduced was in fact obtained improperly or unlawfully in one of the senses identified in pars (a) and (b). The second step is to consider whether despite that conclusion, the discretionary considerations favour its admission. The importance of giving appropriate weight to the effect of any impropriety or unlawfulness is reflected by means of a qualified proscription - the evidence "is not to be admitted unless". In carrying out the balancing exercise, the Court is required to take into account the factors identified in sub-s (3) in the following terms: "(3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account under subsection (1), it is to take into account: (a) the probative value of the evidence; and (b) the importance of the evidence in the proceeding; and (c) the nature of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; and (d) the gravity of the impropriety or contravention; and (e) whether the impropriety or contravention was deliberate or reckless; and (f) whether the impropriety or contravention was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ; and (g) whether any other proceeding (whether or not in a court) has been or is likely to be taken in relation to the impropriety or contravention; and (h) the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the evidence without impropriety or contravention of an Australian law." 58 Other factors, relevant to the circumstances of the case, may be taken into account, but the listed considerations are mandatory. No guidance is given in the section as to how the particular matters are expected to affect the outcome. It is clear from the Law Reform Commission report on which the legislation was based that both the policy and the language were derived in significant part from the joint judgment of Stephen and Aickin JJ in Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 74-80: Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 26 (Interim) Evidence, pars 958-964. Their Honours identified the issue as involving two competing requirements of public policy and the need "to resolve the apparent conflict between the desirable goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law": at 74. Often the unlawful conduct involves the collection of evidence in contravention of constraints deliberately imposed by the legislature to protect human rights and freedoms. Their Honours noted at 77-78: "These safeguards the executive and, of course, the police forces, should not be free to disregard. Were there to occur wholesale and deliberate disregard of these safeguards its toleration by the courts would result in the effective abrogation of the legislature's safeguards of individual liberties, subordinating it to the executive arm." 59 In considering the circumstances before them in Bunning v Cross, which involved the admissibility of the results of a breathalyser test where the statutory preconditions for undertaking the test had not been met, their Honours identified the primary consideration as whether the police officers had acted in deliberate disregard of the law or rather as the result of an honest but mistaken belief: at 78. Their Honours noted: "Although such errors are not to be encouraged by the courts they are relatively remote from the real evil, a deliberate or reckless disregard of the law by those whose duty it is to enforce it." 60 This factor is reflected in paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of s 138(3). Accordingly, a deliberate or reckless disregard of legal constraints, involving a contravention of an internationally recognised human right or fundamental freedom, will undoubtedly weigh against admission. On the other hand, if the contravention were accidental or inadvertent and involved no serious contravention of an internationally recognised right, that would tend in favour of admission. 61 Paragraph (h), concerning the ease with which the evidence might have been obtained without contravening a legal protection, was treated in Bunning v Cross as a third consideration, but is closely related to the first, their Honours stating (at 79): "A deliberate 'cutting of corners' would tend against the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained. However, in the circumstances of the present case, the fact that the appellant was unlawfully required to do what the police could easily have lawfully required him to do, had they troubled to administer an 'alcotest' at the roadside, has little significance."

[46]

As in Bunning , it is likely that this factor will often be treated as either neutral or equivocal. 62 The second consideration identified in Bunning v Cross was the effect of the illegality on the cogency of the evidence. This factor does not find explicit recognition in s 138(3), but may be understood as part of the assessment required under pars (a) and (b) of the probative value of the evidence and its importance in the proceedings. The Law Reform Commission, following Stephen and Aickin JJ, noted that the public interest in admitting evidence where other evidence untainted by impropriety is available is weaker than may be the case where there is no untainted evidence. However, the analysis by the Commission in relation to probative value generally, is that the higher the probative value of the evidence the greater the public interest in its admission, in the interests of accurate fact-finding: Report, Vol 1, par 964. However, Stephen and Aickin JJ adopted a somewhat different approach, stating at p 79: "To treat cogency of evidence as a factor favouring admission, where the illegality in obtaining it has been either deliberate or reckless, may serve to foster the quite erroneous view that if such evidence be but damning enough that will of itself suffice to atone for the illegality involved in procuring it. For this reason cogency should, generally, be allowed to play no part in the exercise of discretion where the illegality involved in procuring it is intentional or reckless. … Where, as here, the illegality arises only from mistake, and is neither deliberate nor reckless, cogency is one of the factors to which regard should be had." 63 The weight to be given to these considerations cannot be resolved in the abstract and is likely to depend not only on the circumstances of the case but on the interplay between the different factors. Thus, the subject matter of the proceeding, identified in par (c), will provide both an independent and a comparative element. As an independent element, as the Commission noted, there is a greater public interest in convicting of a serious crime than of a lesser crime: see also R v Dalley [2002] NSWCCA 284; (2002) 132 A Crim R 169. In the comparative sense, it allows for the nature of the alleged wrongdoing to be weighed against the unlawfulness of the conduct involved in obtaining the evidence: see Bunning v Cross, p 80. Thus the probative value of the evidence and its importance in the proceeding (pars (a) and (b)) if high in each case, combined with a serious criminal offence (par (c)), may militate strongly in favour of admission, particularly if combined with an affirmative finding as to the difficulty of obtaining the evidence without impropriety or contravention of the law (par (h)). 64 Paragraph (g) concerns possible disciplinary or other action in relation to the misconduct in obtaining evidence. If a police officer is likely to be disciplined for the impropriety, it may be thought that the "sanction" of excluding the evidence is unnecessary; on the other hand, there may be some incongruity in convicting a person of a criminal offence on the basis of evidence where a disciplinary or even criminal process has been invoked against the officer responsible for obtaining it. Further, it will not always be possible to know whether disciplinary proceedings are likely to be taken: such steps may deliberately have been left until after any criminal proceedings have been completed, so as not to prejudice their outcome. Clear findings in a judgment of contravention of a relevant law may lead to disciplinary proceedings against the offending officer, whether or not the evidence was excluded. No reliance was placed on paragraph (g) in the present case and it need not be considered further. 65 What can be said without equivocation is that obtaining evidence in deliberate, wilful or even reckless disregard of an individual's civil rights is likely to be a strong factor against the exercise of the discretion to admit the evidence.

[47]

Exclusion of evidence: factual findings 66 Against these general comments, it is convenient to turn to the circumstances in which it is contended that s 138 was engaged. They may be addressed chronologically.

[48]

(a) Decision to pursue investigation through s 214 67 The first basis of impropriety alleged by the Appellant was the choice of s 214 as the preferred method of obtaining documents from the Appellant, rather than proceeding under s 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and obtaining a search warrant for particular documents or things. 68 The availability of an alternative power may well have been relevant to the difficulty or ease with which the evidence could have been obtained without impropriety or contravention of an Australian law for the purposes of s 138(3)(h). However, the existence of an alternative procedure does not of itself demonstrate impropriety in the adoption of the chosen procedure: c.f. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400, 407-408. The initial question must therefore be whether the procedure chosen was in fact available in the circumstances. The complaint made at this stage is not that it was unavailable, but that Customs had available to it legal advice that it was unavailable. There was thus impropriety, so it was contended, in relying upon a statutory power which, absent contrary advice, should have been understood to be unavailable. 69 The legal advice, dated 27 October 1989, was obtained by the Collector of Customs for the State of New South Wales, in relation to the operation of Kingswood Distillery Pty Ltd ("Kingswood"). As the advice noted, the suspected offences involved claims by Kingswood, thought to be false, as to the volume of spirit which it purchased and subjected to a process of methylation, as a result of which the spirit ceased to be dutiable. The Collector and his officers had reason to believe that the spirit so treated was sold to Breven which used it to "extend" brandy, as described above. In that context, counsel expressed the view that s 214 did not extend to unlawful activities in contravention of the Excise Act. While he specifically referred to the manner in which s 4 of the Spirits Act 1906 picked up particular provisions of the Customs Act, including s 214, and noted the possibility of an offence against s 9(1)(b) of the Spirits Act, he concluded that, on the instructions available to him, it was not possible to say whether there had been a contravention of s 9(1)(b), which required that activities be undertaken in relation to interstate trade and commerce. However, he concluded that "in so far as it is possible to establish an offence under the provisions of the Spirits Act the Collector would be authorised to issue a notice under section 214 by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the Spirits Act … . The effect of a provision such as section 4 is that the incorporated statutory provisions are treated as being set out in full in the incorporating Act …. Standing in the Spirits Act, the expression 'illegally deal with' in s 214 is apt to include dealing with the goods contrary to the provisions of that Act". 70 On 16 January 1990, a customs officer swore a document providing information to the effect that two bottles of "Cheval Napoleon old French brandy" bearing a label "Imported by Lawpark Pty Ltd" had been purchased in Richlands, Queensland. Chemical analysis demonstrated that the spirit within the bottle included spirit produced from grain or molasses and that the bottle was therefore incorrectly labelled as "brandy". A contravention of s 9(1)(b) of the Spirits Act was alleged. 71 On the basis of that information, reliance upon s 214 of the Customs Act was entirely consistent with counsel's advice. Whether he was correct in thinking that s 214 did not extend to a breach of the Excise Act was, in the circumstances, beside the point. The basis for saying that Customs ignored counsel's advice is therefore not apparent. Any complaint of impropriety on this basis should have been rejected. 72 The trial judge expressed the following view in relation to counsel's advice: "30. Relevantly, the gist of the advice was that an illegality against the Spirits Act would not suffice to permit the use of a Notice to Produce under s 214(1). For present purposes it is unnecessary to explore his reasoning. His advice was given in strong terms, as follows: 'So doubtful is it in my mind that s 214 can in the last resort assist the Collector that it seems to me that the only safe course, that would enable the Collector to obtain documents from the relevant parties before they could be destroyed without substantial doubts as to the legality of his actions, would be to obtain a search warrant under the provisions of s 10 of the Crimes Act …' 31. It appeared, on the present hearing, to be common ground that this opinion was incorrect. For my part, I can see no reason why an illegality under the Spirits Act would not constitute an illegal dealing for the purposes of s 214. However, it is not necessary to resolve that question." 73 With respect, neither limb of this approach should be accepted. First, the advice clearly envisaged that s 214 would be available on facts which supported suspicion of an offence under the Spirits Act. The information which would support such an offence was apparently not provided to counsel and was only reduced to a sworn instrument on 16 January 1990, well after counsel gave his advice. As explained above, counsel expressly envisaged the use of s 214 where the circumstances established an offence under the Spirits Act. Secondly, it was important, for the purposes of the voir dire to resolve, if not the correctness of the opinion, at least the legality of the reliance on s 214. The Appellant's position, as explained in this Court, was not that the opinion was incorrect, but that its correctness was immaterial. However, it was not possible properly to apply s 138(3) of the Evidence Act, and in particular consider the gravity of the impropriety or contravention, until it had been established whether there was a mere impropriety or whether there was unlawful conduct, and if unlawful, in what respects. 74 In the course of the voir dire, the Appellant engaged in extensive examination of various customs officers, for the apparent purpose of establishing that counsel's advice had not been provided to the Collector of Customs for New South Wales before he signed the written request for production of books and documents and before he signed the customs warrant. However, the sting in this attack really depended upon the power being unavailable and being known to be unavailable to responsible officers who then deliberately or recklessly failed to advise their superiors. If the power was in fact available, the complaint that they failed to pass on incorrect advice to the contrary would have lost much of its sting. If the power were available and the advice which was not passed on was to that effect, the whole basis of this challenge disappeared and the extensive cross-examination about the internal processes within the Customs bureaucracy was, to that extent, misconceived and inappropriate. 75 To take an example, the former Collector of Customs for New South Wales, Mr Keith Stilling, was cross-examined at some length on 12 April 2005 in relation to the issue of the documents. He had retired in 1993 and had almost no recollection of the events which had occurred 15 years earlier: Tcpt, p 74(3) and 75(5). Mr Stilling was asked to read counsel's advice and in particular the passage set out by her Honour at [30], repeated above. He was then asked to confirm, on the basis of that paragraph, that had he read it prior to signing the customs warrant under s 214 in March 1990, he would not have signed the document: Tcpt, pp 77(40)-(55) and 78(30)-(40). 76 The trial judge held that it would quite obviously have been "better" had counsel's advice been disclosed to Mr Stilling before he signed the instruments: at [35]. However, as her Honour also noted, if the failure to draw the advice to Mr Stilling's attention was partly caused by the "serious and well-founded doubts about its accuracy" the force of the complaint was, as her Honour held, much diminished. It was open to her Honour, on her understanding of the advice and the evidence given, to reject the suggestion that there was "any dishonourable or dishonest motive on the part of any officer": at [35]. If the advice were both correct and, when read as a whole, supportive of the course taken by Customs, the scope for any dishonourable or dishonest motive effectively disappears. The Appellant's case in this respect depended upon selective extracts from contemporaneous documents which, when read in context, provided no basis for the suggested impropriety or unlawful behaviour.

[49]

(b) Issue of notices: improper purpose 77 Assuming that the procedures under s 214 were available in the circumstances of the case, the Appellant then challenged the issue of the notices on the basis that the purpose of the request or requirement was not to obtain the production of documents, but rather to trigger the entitlement to execute the warrant. This challenge was linked, in a practical sense, with the complaint that the request having been made, insufficient time was allowed for compliance and that non-compliance was assumed in circumstances where it had not occurred. 78 For the purposes of this argument, the Appellant accepted that customs officers were of the view that their powers of search under the warrant were co-extensive with the obligation to produce documents pursuant to a request or requirement of the Collector. Whether that view was correct or not was not in issue for the purpose of this challenge. 79 Some time was spent in cross-examining customs officers, seeking concessions that they believed it would be beneficial to their purposes if the requests for production were not complied with, so that the warrants could be executed. Some support for the view that such a belief was extant was sought to be obtained from memoranda and file notes prepared by Peter Swinton, a principal legal officer with the Australian Government Solicitor. 80 The first document, dated 31 January 1990, was a file note of an attendance on Jeffrey Locker who was the NSW Director of Investigations within Customs. The passage relied upon stated: "They are going to do it over at the end of month on basis of the use of the Interstate Spirits Act breach/s214 Notice. He asked whether a night raid would be preferable but said they have 15 houses they want to raid so had decided on a 9am kick-off so they won't have to get people up in their pyjamas." 81 On 5 February 1990, Mr Swinton made an attendance note in relation to the same matter, although there is no record of the person or persons with whom he spoke. The substance of the note, as it appeared in evidence, was as follows: "Excisable goods are used to extend. (Records) Want to grab all those excisable documents. Need to use circumstantial evidence: too many caps, labels, cartons and packaging would like to take all those records. (Would not) evidence of bottles purchased for the packaging of imported goods be records of imported goods? The basis for an s214 Notice is that imported goods are extended with local product." 82 Those documents provide no support for any improper purpose. They were notes of on-going discussions between Mr Swinton and customs officers which also covered technical difficulties of reliance upon copies of warrants sent by facsimile. Other legal problems were addressed over the ensuing days. A key file note relied upon by the Appellant was that prepared on 26 February 1990 of a conference with Mr Mutton, Senior Inspector, Investigations and Mr Benson, Chief Inspector, Investigations. Part of the conversation related to the ability to execute a warrant at premises other than those to which the notice related. Mr Swinton's note recorded under the "Schedule V warrants on non-compliance": "I said: if you go to Kingswood on s214, and non-compliance warrant invoked at Kingswood, can go at any place. (Based on AGS Adelaide opinion.) Ron [Benson] said AGS Adelaide had said you could go to any place suspected. I agree at first sight. But no good if compliance is given and that's part of the problem. I suggested extra 214 Notices be kept in reserve and used if and only if compliance given." 83 If one leaves out the last sentence of that extract (as did the Appellant's written submissions) there might be an inference drawn that compliance with a request to produce documents would create a "problem": however, read in context, it appears that the perceived problem was the ability to search premises other than the premises at which there had been compliance. 84 On 27 February 1990 Mr Swinton had another conversation with Mr Benson at which various problems relating to the statute under which the relevant offences might have arisen and the extent to which one company or person was an agent of another, were discussed. A passage at the foot of the file note, read as follows: "The Notice to Produce and s214 doesn't ask them, however, to produce all docs relating to goods 'illegally dealt with'. I said that's because it's seeking a total admission thereby - who could comply. Unfortunately he says it could be answered, in absence of importing business, by docs relating to 20% of one 750 ml bottle!!" 85 The thrust of this discussion appears to have been a concern on the part of Mr Benson that the request itself did not require the owner of the goods to identify all documents revealing illegal dealings. Mr Swinton provided a lawyer's explanation. The view expressed by Mr Benson that the notice could be complied with by producing documents in relation to the contents of one bottle was misconceived, for two reasons. The first (which constitutes another part of the Appellant's case) was the difficulty in identifying the particular bottle. The second was that he ignored the obligation to produce documents relating to goods dealt with during the previous five years. By itself, it is difficult to see any inference of an improper purpose being drawn from this record. Rather, what is conveyed by the file notes as a whole is a picture of customs officers faced with a legally and factually complex situation seeking to resolve a range of potential difficulties with their solicitor. 86 What further assistance could be obtained from the oral evidence of the solicitor, Mr Swinton, was somewhat unclear, but significant reliance was placed on it for the purposes of the appeal and in particular the cross-examination on 13 April 2005 at Tcpt 169-178. At p 170(45) the following exchange occurred: "Q. Now, would it be fair to say that Customs' desire in these kinds of cases was such that it preferred non-compliance so that it could exercise the warrant and send in its officers to search for the documents which it believed would assist its case? A. I can't be sure exactly what they want, but I can see that would be of advantage to them." 87 There was further questioning along similar lines, in the course of which Mr Swinton said that he could not recall the events without reference to his notes; that he could not now understand his notes in part; that his recollection of the understanding of the scope of a request under s 214(1) appeared to be incorrect; and, consistently over several attempts to obtain a different answer, that he did not know what Mr Benson and Mr Mutton were thinking. 88 The Appellant also relied upon the cross-examination of Mr Locker, the State Director of Investigations, on 14 April 2005, Tcpt, pp 276-277. The submission that "the cross-examination proceeded on the basis that the wide forensic powers afforded by the warrants constituted an advantage" is correct, as was the assumption that there needed to be non-compliance with the request before the warrant could be executed. However, unless the cross-examiner obtained some form of useful concession from the witness, the basis upon which the questions were put is a matter of no relevance. Her Honour was entitled to ignore it. 89 The Appellant took issue with her Honour's comment: "The point of this was that it was suggested that they had engineered non-compliance with the Notice to Produce in order to enliven the warrant powers. As I have indicated, I see no benefit such as to motivate any of the officers to take this course."

[50]

As her Honour also noted, "[n]o such advantage was elicited during the course of the extensive cross-examination of all officers": at [37]. On the basis that the scope of the request and the extent of the search permitted by the warrant were co-extensive in respect of the documents sought, her Honour's comment is understandable. If there were voluntary compliance, the officers would obtain all the documents which they would be entitled to obtain by way of search (and, in relation to the third category, possibly more). If they believed there had not been full compliance, they would no doubt search for documents not produced. There might of course be a circumstance in which there was the appearance of compliance, but they entertained doubts. In such a situation there might be a desire to carry out a search to check whether there had been compliance, but an inability to do so because they were unable to be satisfied to the appropriate degree that there had been non-compliance. However, that does not appear to have been the point of the cross-examination, or the Appellant's submissions. No further enlightenment is to be achieved by referring to the pages in the cross-examination of Mr Mutton (Senior Inspector, Investigations) who was the leader of a team of customs officers who visited the Lawpark premises in Wetherill Park on 6 March 1990: Tcpt, 14/04/05, pp 213-219; nor does the cross-examination of Mr Locker: Tcpt, 14/04/05, pp 275-277. The grounds relevant to this challenge should be rejected.

[51]

(c) Reference to offence in notice to produce documents 90 The complaint in this respect was that the notice to produce documents merely identified the goods to which the documents related as a bottle of spirits labelled "Cheval Napoleon Old French Brandy", illegally dealt with by Lawpark on or before 31 October 1998. Such a notice was incapable of being complied with; Mr Parker could not reasonably have been expected to locate the relevant documents, because the notice was hopelessly imprecise as to the goods in question. The notice was therefore invalid. That element of invalidity was accepted by the Comptroller for the purposes of the proceedings and was sufficient in itself to invoke the operation of s 138 of the Evidence Act, as recognised by her Honour at [22].

[52]

(d) Non-compliance not established 91 The fact that the request for production of documents was invalid, meant that there could be no valid trigger engaging the power to execute the warrant. To that extent, the search and seizure which followed were also invalid. However, the Appellant separately asserted that there had been no failure to comply with the request, even assuming it were valid, so as to engage the power to execute the warrant, thereby constituting a separate complaint of improper or unlawful conduct. 92 In circumstances where the invalidity of the warrant depended upon failure to specify adequately the goods thought to be the subject of illegal dealing, failure to comply might not be an independent complaint if the failure were based upon the inability to identify the goods and therefore the relevant documents. In order to evaluate the separate claim, it is necessary to consider the legal principle to be applied, the identity of the officer who was responsible for making the relevant decision and the factual material upon which the decision was based. 93 With respect to the legal principle, the power to execute the warrant will arise in circumstances where a person "fails to comply with a requirement" of the Collector under sub-s 214(1): see sub-s (3). The requirement in question is to "immediately … produce and hand over" all books and documents relating to the goods believed to have been illegally dealt with and those relating to all other goods imported or exported within the preceding five years. Failure to comply with that requirement will involve a degree of evaluative judgment: the first question to be answered is by whom the facts are to be assessed, whether the individual officer, or the Court. 94 The power to execute the warrant is conferred, not on the Collector who requires production, but on the officer of Customs or the police having the Customs warrant. In Ace Custom Services Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1991) 104 ALR 463 at 471, Davies J in proceedings brought in the Federal Court to review a seizure of documents under s 214, held that the words "fails to comply" refer to "what occurred in fact, not to the Collector's, or [the officer's] view as to what occurred". His Honour referred with approval to what was said by Nagle J in Ganke v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1975] 1 NSWLR 252 (NSWCA, Street CJ, Nagle and Begg JJ). It may be noted that Ganke was concerned with an offence constituted by a failure to furnish information required by the Commissioner in circumstances where the Commissioner had fixed a period within which the information was to be supplied. The Court held that whether or not there had been a failure depended upon whether a reasonable time had been allowed for compliance and that the reasonableness of the time was to be determined by the Court. However, Nagle J also stated that the matter could equally be approached on the basis suggested by Asprey JA in R v Skurray (1967) 86 WN(NSW) (Pt 1) 1 at 8 that "the word 'fails' itself bears the connotation of a lapse of time to enable compliance with the obligation of performance". 95 By contrast, in Holmes v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4328 at 4339, Davies J adopted the view that a requirement by the Commissioner that the applicant attend at a particular place on a particular date to give evidence on oath before identified officers could only be set aside if the time allowed was manifestly unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense adopted for the purposes of judicial review of administrative actions. In Ace Custom Services, his Honour referred to his own judgment in Holmes, but appears to have adopted a different approach, albeit also in judicial review proceedings. 96 The circumstances envisaged by s 214 of the Customs Act give rise to a somewhat different question from that which arises in relation to the issue of a notice or a warrant pursuant to a statutory procedure: c.f. Carroll v Mijovich (1991) 25 NSWLR 441. The present issue does not concern the commission of an offence, or the issue of the warrant pursuant to a statutory process, but rather the condition for execution of a warrant presumed, for this purpose, to be validly issued. This may engage the example given by Asprey JA in Skurray (p 7): "If a person does not produce a ticket upon the request of an inspector on a railway train, that person can only be said to have failed to produce the ticket if, in the absence of a refusal to exhibit it, he did not do so after the lapse of a period of time to enable him to obtain the ticket from his person or some accompanying luggage." 97 As this example illustrates, separate questions will arise as to whether a person refusing a lawful request has committed an offence or whether the requesting officer will be entitled to execute a warrant. Where compliance with a request is a process, commencement will not necessarily prevent failure, although difficult questions of judgment may arise where there is ongoing production of documents in a dilatory and unreasonable manner. Indeed even a refusal may not involve a failure if, within a reasonable time from the first making of the request, the recipient of the request has a change of heart. 98 In the case of s 214(1) of the Customs Act, failure to comply, sufficient to constitute an offence may be tested differently from a failure to comply sufficient to engage the power to execute a warrant under sub-s (3). However, these questions were not discussed on the appeal. The relevant ground alleged that her Honour should have held that the officers "did not allow a reasonable time for compliance". If by that it is meant that the warrant was executed before the time which would have been reasonably necessary for the production and handing over of all documents answering the notice had elapsed, that may be conceded. Her Honour's rejection of the challenge in relation to execution was that "[o]nce the defendant had denied having possession of any relevant documents there was no point in waiting any longer". 99 There appeared to be some confusion in the written submissions for the Appellant as to the party on whom the burden of proving impropriety lay and whether a subjective or objective test was to be applied. The matter was presented as a question of fact for the trial judge. If the proper test was the reasonable satisfaction of the officer, that was not argued on the appeal or, it would seem, before her Honour. 100 The facts involved two notices, one of which was executed by Mr Mutton at premises occupied by Lawpark at Wetherill Park. The second was executed at premises occupied by Kingswood, by Mr Morrison. 101 The Kingswood search need not be addressed. When Mr Morrison was called, counsel for the Appellant stated (Tcpt, 13/04/05, p 128): "[His affidavit] also deals with, in large part, the seizure that took place on the Kingswood Distillery. We don't make any challenge in relation to any activity of that seizure at Kingswood. We make some criticisms about the notice itself that was issued, but not in relation to Kingswood. Our complaints arise out of the execution of the notice and warrant at the premises of Breven and Lawpark."

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Accordingly, to the extent that the Notice of Appeal and the written submissions sought to resurrect some complaint in that regard, that should be rejected. 102 The issues to be addressed arise with respect to the Lawpark search at Wetherill Park. In relation to burden of proof, the Appellant contended that the evidence of Mr Mutton "did not, of itself, establish that sufficient time for compliance had been allowed": Submissions, par 75. However, it was not for the Comptroller to prove compliance, but rather for the Appellant, as the party seeking to exclude the evidence, to satisfy the court that the evidence was improperly or unlawfully obtained: see Coulstock (1998) 99 A Crim R 143 at 146-7 (Hunt CJ at CL). How the Appellant sought to satisfy this burden is unclear: he gave no evidence himself on the voir dire, nor did he call evidence. No doubt he was entitled to rely upon evidence called by the Comptroller in order to establish his (the Appellant's) case, but it is not sufficient to complain that the Comptroller's evidence did not establish a contrary case. 103 In relation to the search at Wetherill Park, Mr Mutton gave evidence that he entered the bond store at 8.55am on 6 March 1990. He met a person who identified himself as Mr Edward Parker and sought to speak with Mr Stephen Parker. Mr Edward Parker apparently telephoned Mr Stephen Parker, who arrived at the premises at 9.26am. A short conversation took place and Mr Parker was given the 'Notice to Produce Documents'. In an affidavit sworn on 3 May 2004, Mr Mutton gave evidence of a conversation in the following terms (par 39): "He said: 'Is this a special investigation?' I said: 'Yes, you could call it that.' He said: 'Basically what you're saying is that this is a 214.' I said: 'Yes …' … He said: 'Because of only one bottle you're doing all this - you want all the documents for every importation.' I said: 'All documentation relating to the brandy.' He said: 'You're sure it's my brandy.' I said: 'Yes we've had it analysed. It's not wholly produced from grape spirit. It contains grain spirit.' He said: 'You want all documents due to analysis of one bottle of brandy?' I said: 'We also want documents relating to the extension of the brandy.' He said: 'I don't know anything about extension - I refute ever knowingly ever having extended brandy.' I said: "Do you understand the notice?' He said: 'Yes okay. You want all the documents for 5 years.' I said: "I want the other documents relating to the extension. I believe there are some.' He said: 'Jim I don't know what you're talking about - I'm quite happy to give you any documents as long as you specify what they are.' I said: 'In relation to the brandy and the extension. Blending records, bottling etc.' He said: "I can't give you any documents relating to the extension.' I said: 'So you're refusing to comply?' He said: 'I don't refuse to give you any documents but I can't give you something I haven't got.' I said: 'Show me the blending records.'" 104 Although the conversation may have suggested that Mr Mutton would have been satisfied with something less than full compliance, as events unfolded nothing turned on that. The conversations with Mr Stephen Parker and another person working with the company continued until sometime after 10am. 105 At that stage Mr Mutton formed the view that the documents he had been shown were incomplete; that information supplied by Mr Parker was inconsistent with other information he had available to him; that a larger quantity of spirit had been dealt with by Breven than the records showed and that there were no records to account for movement of goods from the bottling plant at Wetherill Park to retail outlets. He also affirmed a belief that such records should have existed. At 10.10am he executed the warrant. In doing so, he told Mr Parker that he was "not convinced you are telling the truth". 106 Mr Mutton was cross-examined on the evidence referred to above. The cross-examination ranged broadly across many aspects of the case. However, in order to establish that there had not been a failure to comply with the notice, it was necessary to demonstrate that Mr Mutton was in error in not believing Mr Parker, presumably by demonstrating that he had been shown the documents he thought were missing, or that no such documents in fact existed or that the anomalies noted by Mr Mutton were otherwise explicable. It does not appear that any such exercise was undertaken. The closest the cross-examination came to that exercise was in the following passage (Tcpt, 14/04/05, p 243): "Q. Let me suggest to you that your position was that, when you attended the premises, you believed Lawpark to be guilty of extending alcohol; is that not so? A. I was very suspicious of it, yes. Q. No, you believed them to be guilty, didn't you? A. I think I mentioned before, if Mr Parker had have been able to come up with some explanation, a reasonable explanation, I - depending on what it was, I might have been happy with that explanation." 107 There ensued further questions in relation to the explanation which Mr Mutton was given and an attempt was made to have him accept that it was a good explanation. He did not do so and there was no evidence called which established the correctness of the explanation proffered. On the basis of this evidence, her Honour was entitled to find that Mr Parker had failed to comply with the notice in the sense that he had demonstrated no willingness to produce and hand over all of the documents required by the notice. Although that exercise, if attempted, might have taken some time, it was open to her Honour to accept Mr Mutton's evidence and to infer that Mr Parker was not engaging upon that exercise. His refusal or even unwillingness to do so constituted a failure to comply immediately with the notice. On appeal, no objective reason for disbelieving Mr Mutton was established. Her Honour formed a favourable view of his evidence and, in those circumstances, was entitled to accept it. No error is demonstrated in her conclusion that the Appellant had not discharged his burden of demonstrating that he had not failed to comply with the notice.

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(e) Failure to train and educate officers 108 The final complaint pressed by the Appellant related to the failure to train and educate customs officers in relation to the scope of a search permissible in execution of a warrant. 109 As noted above, a proper consideration of s 214 does not support the view expressed in O'Neill's Case that the search permitted in execution of the warrant did not entitle customs officers to locate and seize documents in relation to goods imported or exported during the previous five years. However, the Comptroller did not dispute the correctness of O'Neill's Case but rather relied upon the fact that Mr Swinton, who was the solicitor primarily responsible for legal advice in relation to the operation had failed to grasp the significance of the reference to O'Neill's Case in counsel's advice. Accordingly, the complaint that the trial judge failed to address the issue must be addressed on that basis. 110 It is important to note that the complaint relates to lack of training in relation to the legitimate scope of the search and seizure of documents permitted by a warrant under s 214(3): it is not concerned with the scope of the search and seizure themselves. That is presumably because, as noted by Spigelman CJ in Regina v Haddad and Treglia [2000] NSWCCA 351; (2000) 116 A Crim R 312 at [67], "The common law has long accepted that a police officer executing a warrant may seize goods and evidence reasonably believed to relate to a criminal offence, even though the offence is not that for which the warrant was granted". (His Honour identified supporting authority for that proposition including, in this State, GH Photography Pty Ltd v McGarrigle [1974] 2 NSWLR 635 at 645 (Mahoney J).) 111 The complaint that Simpson J did not address this challenge in her reasons is factually correct. However, given the way in which the issue was presented in submissions, her Honour's failure to address it is at least understandable. Thus, in written submissions dated 18 April 2005 (par 100) the complaint was noted in the following terms: "In particular, and notwithstanding that the officers had a copy of the decision of In the matter of O'Neill , it seems perfectly clear that they did not understand the principles summarised in that decision." 112 Those submissions also referred to a letter from the Australian Government Solicitor in South Australia dated 31 July 1989 referring to the "distribution and discussion within your Department" of the correct procedure applicable under s 214. That letter contained a warning that "a submission in any further litigation regarding honest mistakes and ignorance of the legislative provisions would, in my view, not succeed in convincing a court to refrain from excluding illegally obtained evidence". 113 In oral submissions at trial, the point was made in more florid terms (Tcpt, 18/04/05, p 324); after referring to the passage last quoted from in the AGS advice, counsel continued: "Not a bad assessment from the AGS, and yet your Honour has not been favoured with one piece of evidence from anyone which explains why it was that the AGS in Australia could get it so right and New South Wales could get it so wrong, and could not even afford to provide their officers with some summary of this important decision which, indeed, demonstrates, in part, the very illegal conduct of which we complain. O'Neill's case , of course, deals with this obligation to seize only those documents relevant to the particular goods." 114 These submissions were a trifle ingenuous. Following the advice of 31 July 1989, a further letter was sent to the Collector of Customs dated 11 August 1989, also from the AGS in South Australia, but over the signature of a different officer. It is clear that the recipient of the first letter, a Mr Buss, had a telephone conversation with Mr Justin O'Halloran of AGS on 11 August. Mr O'Halloran then wrote on behalf of the Australian Government Solicitor, stating that "I have reconsidered my advice concerning the right of customs officers acting under subsection 214(3) … to take possession of, remove and impound books and documents other than books and documents relating directly to the goods" that had been detained or were the subject of information on oath. Mr O'Halloran opined that "the decision of Judge Dunford In the matter of O'Neill … is wrong". His view, concisely stated, is to the same effect as that addressed above, which had also been raised by Dunford DCJ and rejected. Mr O'Halloran said: "It appears to me that the words 'any books or documents relating to the goods' used in the subsection 214(3) in fact refer not merely to 'all books and documents relating to the goods so imported exported entered seized or detained undervalued or illegally dealt with …' but also to all other goods imported or exported by him at any time in the period of 5 years immediately preceding such request seizure or detention. This interpretation accords with the purpose of the section and accordingly is in my opinion the proper interpretation of that section. The alternative interpretation produces an arbitrary and illogical result. … It seems to me that Judge Dunford allowed the terms of the warrant to determine the meaning of subsection 214(3). In my opinion this approach is wrong." 115 The officer whose knowledge of such matters was relevant for present purposes was Mr James Mutton, who was responsible for the operation at Lawpark's premises. He stated that he had been involved in action taken under s 214 on approximately 12 occasions prior to 6 March 1990 and had undertaken an advanced investigations course in about September or October 1989. He recalled that the decision of Dunford DCJ was discussed in the course but did not recall any reference being made to "anything in the decision concerning the scope of s 214 warrants". 116 Mr Ronald Benson was the Chief Inspector to whom Mr Mutton was answerable and from whom he took instructions. In his affidavit of 3 May 2004, he stated awareness of O'Neill's Case when it was being argued but did not recall seeing or reading the judgment prior to his retirement in 1991. He said: "At some time I was told that Judge Dunford had said in O'Neill's Case that a s 214 warrant could not be used to seize 'five year documents'. I do not recall when I was told this. Such a limitation on the warrants power was never suggested to me from any other judicial source up to the time of my retirement. Throughout my time at Customs I was not aware of the seizure of documents ever having been challenged on that basis in any of the cases in which I was involved." 117 He was cross-examined in relation to the first AGS advice of 31 July 1989, but not the second. He stated (Tcpt, 13/04/05, p 105(45)-(55)): "Q. So by about March 1990 you understood that a warrant was exercised, the only documents which could be seized were the goods relating to the actual goods identified in the notice to produce? A. That was the opinion in the O'Neill case . … Q. And you understood that to be the position by March of 1990; is that not so? A. I understood that to be the position as described in the O'Neill case. I don't believe that the law was settled on that issue at that time." 118 Although the real issue was not presented in detail or with great clarity to her Honour in submissions, it may be accepted for present purposes that there was an issue concerning training of officers in relation to the scope of the warrant which needed to be addressed. However, it is clear that Customs did not ignore the decision in O'Neill but obtained their own advice in relation to it. As Dunford DCJ himself explained in his reasons, there were cogent arguments for both the broader and the narrower view of the power. Customs obtained advice from the AGS favouring the broader view, which advice was neither clearly mistaken, nor based on any misunderstanding of the statutory provision in question, nor of the principles of statutory construction. In any case where the scope of a statutory power is doubtful, an authority which adopts a broader rather than a narrower view may later be found to have exceeded its authority. However, at least in the present circumstances, there was no deliberate or reckless disregard of an established constraint on power, nor can Customs fairly be criticised for not adhering to the narrower view and directing its officers accordingly. It had plausible legal advice supportive of its position. It did not act improperly, for the purposes of s 138, in failing to instruct its officers to operate otherwise.

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Application of discretion to admit evidence 119 Any assessment of the discretionary factors identified in s 138(3) must be undertaken in light of the statutory purpose, which is to provide a context for the resolution of the conflicting public interests noted above. 120 The first consideration is that the seizure of a large volume of documents without consent and without the authority of a valid warrant involved a major invasion of the rights of Lawpark and Breven to be free of such interference in their affairs, without those responsible having lawful justification for their conduct. In terms of par (d) of s 138(3), the consequence of the contravention was a serious intrusion on the rights of the companies. (It was not argued on the appeal that there was any contravention of a right of a "person" recognised by the ICCPR, for the purposes of par (f).) That factor would weigh heavily against the admission of the documents seized. Indeed, if combined with wilful disregard of the legal requirements of the relevant customs officers, the case for rejection of the evidence would be strong, if not overwhelming. 121 There were, however, significant countervailing considerations. Thus it was properly held by the trial judge, and not disputed on appeal, that the evidence was critical to establishing the unlawful conduct of the Appellant (amongst others); it not only constituted virtually the whole of the prosecution case, but it was compelling. Nor was it established that its probative value was diminished by the unlawfulness attaching to the execution of the warrant. Further, for the purposes of par (c), the purpose for which the evidence was to be used was a prosecution of a criminal offence; the offence was, in its own right, serious, involving a deliberate flouting of the revenue laws for commercial benefit over a considerable period. When those considerations are weighed against the unlawfulness involved in the conduct of the customs officers, the significance of the latter is greatly reduced. Ultimately, the weighing exercise required to determine whether the evidence should be admitted must turn on whether the actions of the customs officers could properly be described as involving a wilful disregard of legal constraints imposed on their powers. It was no doubt in recognition of that factor that much effort was exerted by the Appellant at trial in attempting to establish, if not wilful disregard, at least indifference to the legal requirements of the lawful exercise of the powers under s 214. 122 The seriousness of the intrusion on the rights of Lawpark and apparently Breven, through the seizure of their documents, flowed from the extraordinary breadth of the power conferred by s 214. The seriousness of the consequence for the affected businesses of an unlawful exercise of the power warranted careful scrutiny of the conduct of Customs: however, it did not turn genuine attempts at compliance into deliberate disregard or reckless indifference. 123 While the Comptroller accepted that the notice to produce was inadequate in its specification of the subject matter of the offence, so that non-compliance did not engage the power to execute the warrant, he did not concede that the request for production was a charade having only one purpose, namely to provide an apparent trigger for the execution of the warrant. The Appellant sought to establish that improper purpose and to add a further serious impropriety, namely a search and seizure going beyond the understood limits of the power conferred by the warrant. However, the Appellant failed to satisfy her Honour that at any stage there had been wilful disregard of the law, dishonourable or dishonest motives or improper purposes at play. For the reasons set out above, the challenges to her Honour's findings in respect of those matters has failed. 124 In the result, the unlawfulness of the conduct of customs officers turned on the failure adequately to identify the bottle of brandy said to have been illegally dealt with pursuant to the Spirits Act. There was no evidence to indicate that it would not have been relatively easy to comply with that obligation of specificity. However, the fact that it was not done was not due to deliberate cutting of corners or disregard of the legal requirements. On one view, the error arose from a failure to reproduce in the notice requiring production of documents the detailed information supplied on oath for the purposes of s 214(1). 125 Furthermore, it was not demonstrated that, in any practical sense, the vagueness in the notice caused the failure to produce documents. Although the specific documents relating to the particular bottle of brandy might well have been impossible to locate and identify, they would almost certainly have been caught up in the broader category of documents relating to goods imported or exported during the previous five years, unless that brandy had been held for more than two years prior to reaching the retail market. If any prejudice had flowed from the acknowledged error, it might have been demonstrated by evidence proffered by the Appellant: none was. 126 In addition to the issues considered above, the Appellant asserted inadequacy in the reasons provided by the primary judge for reaching her conclusion. However, the appeal being governed by s 75A of the Supreme Court Act has involved a rehearing. Although it is true that her Honour made findings in relation to the motives and state of mind of the customs officers in a global way, without considering the evidence of each in detail, no doubt has been cast on her Honour's conclusions by an analysis of the transcript and the documentary record. The case presented in cross-examination of key witnesses on behalf of the Appellant was simply not accepted by the customs officers, often on the basis that they had no such beliefs, could not speculate about the views of others or could not recall the events in sufficient detail to comment. The documentary record neither demonstrated the Appellant's assertions of wilful disregard of the legal requirements of s 214, nor provided a substantial basis for contradicting the officers. 127 The Appellant also criticised her Honour's reasons in that they failed explicitly to weigh the mandatory factors set out in s 138(3). On a reading of her Honour's reasons, the criticism appeared to have force. However, once the real issues in the case were identified, it is clear that these issues were addressed. Some of the mandatory considerations (such as breach of the ICCPR and the possibility or absence of disciplinary action) simply did not arise on the case as presented at trial. Even if there were deficiencies in the reasons with respect to the balancing exercise required by s 138(3), once the relevant factual basis was accepted, the balancing exercise could as well be undertaken by this Court on a rehearing as by the trial judge. That exercise has now been completed. A challenge to the inadequacy of her Honour's reasons in that respect was beside the point.

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Conclusion 128 Each of the challenges to her Honour's judgment addressed on the appeal should be rejected. The appeal should be dismissed with costs. **********

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DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.