Mr Strang authorised AGS to seek the advice of counsel on this, and another, presently immaterial, issue.
29 Mr Peter Swinton, of AGS, forwarded a Brief to Advise to Mr Rowling of counsel on 28 September 1989. It is not entirely easy to discern the specific issues on which Mr Swinton asked Mr Rowling to advise. Mr Rowling provided his advice on 27 October 1989.
30 Relevantly, the gist of the advice was that an illegality against the Spirits Act would not suffice to permit the issue of a Notice to Produce under s214(1). For present purposes it is unnecessary to explore his reasoning. His advice was given in strong terms, as follows:
"So doubtful is it in my mind that s214 can in the last resort assist the Collector that it seems to me that the only safe course, that would enable the Collector to obtain documents from the relevant parties before they could be destroyed without substantial doubts as to the legality of his actions, would be to obtain a search warrant under the provisions of s10 of the Crimes Act ..."
31 It appeared, on the present hearing, to be common ground that this opinion was incorrect. For my part, I can see no reason why an illegality under the Spirits Act would not constitute an illegal dealing for the purposes of s214. However, it is not necessary to resolve that question. That is peripheral. What is of importance is that the advice had been given, and given in strong terms, and was known to some Customs officers. I might add here that, even when delivered, it was not universally accepted as correct. A number of senior Customs officers, some of them holding legal qualifications, frankly disagreed. Mr Swinton himself considered it to be "very debatable": he was reported to have described it as "overly legalistic and on balance probably too conservative". This advice was never drawn to the attention of Mr Stilling when he was presented with the Information on oath and invited to issue the Notice to Produce and the Schedule V warrant. This, it was contended on behalf of the defendant, disclosed mala fides on the part of the various Customs officers who were involved in the preparation of the Information and its submission to Mr Stilling.
32 At this point it is apposite to observe, that, of all the Customs officers who gave evidence on the voir dire, there was not one whose evidence I do not accept as having been given truthfully and with integrity. Each was, to my observation, a conscientious officer. The attempt to impugn them as having been involved in some sort of conspiracy to achieve their ends failed. In this respect it is to be recalled that they were giving evidence at a time fifteen years after the events concerned.
33 However, the present issue is whether there is any mala fides in the course of action they took such as to infect the evidence obtained.
34 As I have indicated, there was quite a lot of debate and disagreement about the effect of Mr Rowling's advice. Nevertheless, most, if not all, of the officers who gave evidence accepted that the advice should have been drawn to the attention of Mr Stilling at the time he was asked to issue the Notice to Produce and the warrant. What was not clear was whether, or the extent to which, that was in fact done. Mr Stilling himself had no recollection of having seen the advice prior to issuing the documents, and said that he would not have issued them had he known of the advice unless he had received clarification, qualification, or alternative advice sufficient to satisfy him that the s214 procedure was appropriate.
35 Quite obviously, it would have been better had the Rowling advice been disclosed to Mr Stilling before he issued the documents. It would have been better had the position as to the scope of s214 been clarified before that occurred. However, I am quite satisfied that the omission (if it existed) to draw the advice to Mr Stilling's attention was not brought about by any dishonourable or dishonest motive on the part of any officer. It was brought about by a combination to two things: firstly, the serious and well-founded doubts about its accuracy; and, secondly, a lack of clarity about the identity of the person whose responsibility it was to ensure that Mr Stilling was aware of it.
36 Another matter raised on behalf of the defendant concerned the clear resistance to the use of the alternative available procedure, that provided by s10 of the Crimes Act. A number of officers gave evidence that they preferred to use the s214 power if it were properly available to them. This was, in short, because s10 required the involvement of the Australian Federal Police. There was, perhaps, an issue of territoriality in that the Customs officers wished to retain control of the investigation, which they might have lost had the Australian Federal Police become involved. Further, some had doubts about the relative capacities of the Australian Federal Police compared with those of Customs officers to identify the documents caught by the warrant. It seems to me that these concerns were probably well founded. Operation Ludwig had been a major and sustained investigation, involving many officers and a great deal of work. One would expect that the officers involved would be better versed in what they were looking for on execution of the warrant than would police officers who had previously been uninvolved.
37 Another matter that was argued, concerning the motivation of Customs officers, concerned what was said to be their preference for seizure of documents pursuant to a warrant over voluntary production of the documents pursuant to a Notice to Produce. In this context it should be recalled that there was little, if any, understanding or awareness of what was disclosed by the decision in O'Neill's case, that is, the narrower scope of documents available to be taken pursuant to a warrant. Customs officers at the time believed that a warrant was as extensive as a Notice to Produce. Even so, I can see no possible advantage to Customs officers in obtaining documents pursuant to a warrant over obtaining them pursuant to a Notice to Produce. No such advantage was elicited during the course of the extensive cross-examination of all officers. It was merely put to them that they had a preference for executing a warrant rather than securing production pursuant to a Notice to Produce. The point of this was that it was suggested that they had engineered non-compliance with the Notice to Produce in order to enliven the warrant powers. As I have indicated, I see no benefit such as to motivate any of the officers to take this course.
38 It was also argued that the execution of the warrant was improper because there was no basis for concluding that the defendant had not complied with the Notice to Produce. The evidence was that the defendant had claimed that no relevant documents existed. The officers were not, in my opinion, bound to accept such a statement - to hold otherwise would be to render meaningless the power to execute a warrant in any case where a recipient of a Notice to Produce claimed not to be in possession of the relevant documents. It was also put that the officers did not allow a reasonable time for compliance. This cannot be sustained. Once the defendant had denied having possession of any relevant documents there was no point in waiting any longer.
39 Other matters raised were an allegation that documents unconnected with French brandy were seized. This was, really, covered in what I have said earlier: on the basis of O'Neill's case, with which I respectfully agree, documents extraneous to those authorised to be taken by the warrant were in fact taken. However, I am quite satisfied that this came about by reason of a lack of understanding of the complexities, and, indeed, anomalies, of s214, and not by reason of any ill will, collateral purpose, or mala fides on the part of any Customs officer.
40 The final point made was that Customs officers failed adequately to record what was seized. The evidence does not enable me to reach a final conclusion as to this, and, given the vast amount of documentation that was taken, it may well be that recording was less than optimal. However, again I am satisfied that, if this did occur, it was not done with ill intent.
41 S138 of the Evidence Act requires, in effect, a balancing of a number of matters. One of these is the nature of the offences and subject matter of the proceedings in which the evidence is sought to be tendered; against that has to be weighed, inter alia, the gravity of the impropriety or contravention, whether it was deliberate or reckless, and the extent (if any) of the intrusion into the rights of individuals.
42 As I have made clear, I am satisfied that the impropriety in the collection of the evidence was not such as should be met with exclusion of the evidence so obtained. The offences alleged against the defendant are serious, and the evidence is important. I am not in a position to judge at this stage its probative value, except to repeat that, as I understand it, the evidence so obtained amounts virtually to the whole of the prosecution case.