(a) for loss in relation to incomplete residential building work - within 12 months from:
(i) the contract date; or
(ii) the date provided in the contract for commencement of work; or
(iii) the date work ceased on the project,
whichever is the latest;
(b) for loss relating to heads of claim in clause 5(1)(d) or (e) incurred in rectifying major structural defects or in repairing damage to the dwelling that has occurred in consequence of major structural defects - within 6 months after the beneficiary first becomes aware of the defect, but not later than 7 years from:
(i) the commencement of insured building work which is not also insured owner-builder work; or
(ii) the date of issue of the owner-builder permit for insured owner-builder work;
(c) for loss relating to heads of claim in clause 5(1)(d) or (e) other than those referred to in paragraph (b) - within 6 months after the beneficiary first becomes aware of the defect, but not later than 3 years from:
(i) the commencement of insured building work which is not also insured owner-builder work; or
(ii) the date of issue of the owner-builder permit for insured owner-builder work; or
(d) …
7. (2) The Corporation may extend the time specified in sub-clause (1) if it is satisfied that the delay in notification was due to circumstances outside the control of the beneficiary." (Emphasis added)
16 Under Clause 7 the beneficiary becomes entitled to the insured benefits, which the Scheme provides, when the beneficiary provides written notice of matters that could give rise to the losses in the Scheme. This reference to "could" is of importance in this application.
17 Clause 10 of the Scheme provides that "despite" clause 7(2) FTAC has no further liability under the Scheme more than 10 years after the commencement of the residential building work in relation to which the Scheme applies for any reason attributable to that work.
Adoption of the referee report - legal principles
18 The applicable legal principles are well settled and there is no substantial dispute between the parties in relation to them. There is a concise summary of the relevant principles in the judgment of Gleeson CJ in Super Pty Ltd v The SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 at 562-563 where His Honour made the following observations:
o There is no rule that a party dissatisfied with a referee's report is entitled to as a right to require the judge to reconsider and determine afresh all issues whether of fact or law which that party may desire to contest before the judge.
o Decisions can be reviewed for error of law, perversity or manifest unreasonableness. But there is no general right of review or appeal by way of rehearing.
o It is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the rules and productive of delay, expense and hardship that the practical effect of appointing a referee should simply add an extra level to the hierarchy of decision-makers in a given case.
o It is important to bear in mind the modern trend to encouragement of alternative dispute resolution to avoid or minimize litigation and achieve a final and binding result.
o The above views are consistent with the right of a referee to conduct a reference as he or she thinks fit unconstrained by the rules of evidence. And the judge reviewing the report and deciding whether to adopt, vary or reject it has a judicial discretion to exercise in a manner consistent with the purpose of the rules and the broad setting referred to above.
o In so far as the subject of dissatisfaction with the referee's report is a question of law or the application of legal status to establish facts then a proper exercise of discretion would require the Court to consider and determine the matter afresh. It is undesirable to attempt closely to confine the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised. Some matters to take into account are the nature of the complaints made about the report, the type of litigation, the length and complexity of proceedings before the referee.
o It would frustrate the purpose of achieving a whole or partial resolution of disputes alternative to orthodox litigation to allow the reference to be treated as some kind of warm-up for the real contest.
o Judicial review may be granted if there is an error of principle, an absence or excessive jurisdiction, or some patent misapprehension of the evidence that may be a reason for rejecting it, as would perversity or manifest unreasonableness in fact finding. These principles have been followed in a number of subsequent cases including Walter Construction Group Ltd v The Walker Corporation Ltd [2001] NSWSC 283; (2001) 47 ATR 48 and Abigroup v Peninsula Balmain [2001] NSWSC 752; (2002) 18 BCL 15.
19 FTAC refers to the decision of Studdert J McCallum Developments Pty Ltd v The Owner's Corporation Strata Plan 53098 [2002] NSWSC 1103 for the proposition that Clause 7 places an obligation on a claimant under the Scheme to notify matters that could give rise to the losses in question. His Honour there observed that the language of the clause should not be construed narrowly because of the beneficial nature of the legislation.
20 FTAC refers to one of the purposes of the Scheme as being to ensure that the fiscal impact of the Scheme has a minimal effect on the public purse and it refers to the public policy and practical reasons for the imposition of the statutory time limitations. FTAC says that if it is possible to recover any monies paid under the Scheme from a builder it must be able to investigate the claim and prove breach by the builder which in turn requires that there be timely knowledge of the actual complaint. FTAC says that the notification to it must be such as to identify the broad headings of damage sufficient to enable investigators to locate and understand the problem.
FTAC's case
21 FTAC submits that Ms Grey erred in finding that the defects identified years later, and in some cases, more than 10 years since the time period began to run on commencement of the building work, were covered by the Scheme because they represented "systemic" defects in the construction.
22 In so doing, it is submitted she failed to properly take into account the fact that the evidence disclosed that only some parts of the premises were affected by the defects and others were unaffected. Her conclusion, it is said, was unsupported by the evidence, and her decision failed to disclose the reasoning process she adopted in finding that the defects were "systemic." Also, her reasoning is said to be so flawed that it constituted an error of law.
23 In addition, FTAC says that Ms Grey failed to take proper account of the impact of clause 10 of the Scheme which removes further liability on the expiry of 10 years after the commencement of the work for any reason attributable to that work. FTAC says that this clause operates to disallow any claim for defective work made 10 years after commencement of the building. By way of example, FTAC refers to the fact that of the 156 units in the premises the plaintiff asserted that 74 had defective hobs and 89 had defective wall cavities. One result of the defective hobs and wall cavities was said to give rise to water penetration and associated damage. However, only 12 of the hobs and 14 of the cavities had been notified within the prescribed time limits. This, it is said, was an error because the referee wrongly accepted that the cause of all the defects was systemic failure notwithstanding that the defects were only manifested in many units after the passage of 10 years from the date of registration of the strata plan. The reasons given by Ms Grey were manifestly wrong. It says that the intention of the legislation was to close the Scheme and extinguish all further liabilities of whatever kind after the passage of 10 years from the date of commencement of the building works from any cause. Otherwise, the builder and insurer would be liable for the indefinite future for any defect which the owner could link to a notified defect.
The Referees Report
24 After setting out the factual background and the relevant sections of the Scheme, Ms Grey referred to the "beneficial nature of the Scheme." Ms Grey referred to a decision of Burchett AJ in Fair Trading Administration Corporation v Owner's Corporation SP 43551 [2002] NSWSC 624, where His Honour observed at [24] in relation to notification under s 7 of the Scheme:
"It is important to note that the six months is measured from the first awareness by the beneficiary (not someone else) of "the defect", although what must be notified is described as " matters that could give rise to the losses ", not the actual defects that , in a precise sense, are the causes of those matters . A degree of imprecision in a notice seems to be contemplated by provision so framed. " (Emphasis added)
25 Ms Grey noted that the Schedule to the Home Building Regulations defined "major structural defect" as follows:
"An inherent or damaged induced defect:
(a) in an element that provides essential supporting structure to the whole of or any part of a dwelling, for example, a footing beam, column or suspended slab which renders the element inadequate for its structural purposes; or
(b) in a substantial functional element essential to the habitability of a dwelling (for example, a panel wall, masonry veneer wall, or slab on ground) which is of such a kind that the element itself does not have an adequate structure for its purpose." (Emphasis added)