Is an administrator an officer for the purposes of provisions concerning managed investment schemes?
30 The administrators rely upon observations, acknowledged to be obiter, made by Finkelstein J in Norman's Case at [20] - [44]:
20 The foundation upon which the growers build their case, namely that the receivers owe them a duty superior to the duty they owe to the banks, is two provisions (and their associated definitions) in Ch 5C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which deals with managed investment schemes. The relevant provisions are ss 601FC and 601FD. Relevantly they provide that the responsible entity of a managed investment scheme must "act in the best interests of the members and, if there is a conflict between the members' interests and its own interest, give priority to the members' interests" (s 601FC(1)(c)) and that an "officer" of a responsible entity must "act in the best interests of the members and, if there is a conflict between the members' interests and the interests of the responsible entity, give priority to the members' interests" (s 601FD(1)(c).
21 The way the argument runs is as follows:
Step 1: The receivers have been appointed to receive the assets of the responsible entity (FEAP) other than the scheme assets;
Step 2: Each receiver therefore is a receiver of "the property of the corporation" and hence an "officer" within the definition in s 9 of the Corporations Law. This step assumes that a person appointed to receive only some of the property of a corporation is a receiver of "the property" of that corporation, a proposition which is not self-evidently correct but has not been put in issue;
Step 3: Being an officer in accordance with the definition in s 9, it follows that each receiver is an "officer" of a responsible entity for the purposes of s 601FD, owing the duties therein imposed (including the duty to act in the best interests of the members of the managed investment scheme (ie the growers)). This step assumes that there is "no contrary intention" to the application of the s 9 definition, a proposition which is very much in dispute;
Step 4: The performance of the statutory duty imposed by s 601FD(1)(c) relates not only to acts done, or not done, by the receivers on behalf of the responsible entity but also to acts done, or not done, by them in any other capacity (eg as receivers of the assets of another corporation) provided those acts may adversely affect the interests of members of the managed investment scheme. This step has not been expressly articulated but is a necessary step in the grower's argument, for what they complain about is the receivers' proposed actions as receivers of FEA, which is not the responsible entity of any of the schemes;
Step 5: It would be a breach of the receivers' statutory duty to do any act which adversely impacts on the growers; and
Step 6: There would be an adverse impact on the interests of the growers if the receivers of FEA were to take any of the suggested steps with the land for the purposes of reducing (or discharging) the debt due to the banks. It would adversely impact on their interests as it would diminish the growers' rights or make it more difficult for them to find a substitute responsible entity.
22 Bold as this line of reasoning may be, it breaks down in several of the steps. The most significant flaw is step 3 and the assumption that the "officers" of the responsible entity who owe duties imposed by s 601FD(1) include receivers. This assumption would be correct if the s 9 definition of "officer" applies to s 601FD(1) without modification. In my view, however, the enacting history of Ch 5C (a history that occurs before the Corporations Law was repealed and replaced by the Corporations Act) shows a contrary intention.
23 In 1991 the Commonwealth Attorney-General referred to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee for review and report the questions whether the regulation of collective investment schemes was efficient and effective and whether a different operating structure should be provided for those schemes. A "collective investment scheme", a somewhat loose expression, was intended to refer to investments in which the investors' contributions were pooled to acquire an asset from which they would share the profits or losses. At the time the most popular forms of collective investment schemes were "prescribed interests", which were regulated by Ch 7 of the Corporations Law (the securities chapter). A prescribed interest covered a diverse range of investments but, in essence, was a right to participate in the profits of a financial or business undertaking or the profits from any common enterprise.
24 In October 1992 the ALRC and the Advisory Committee published a discussion paper entitled Collective Investment Schemes (Discussion Paper 53), which contained a proposed regulatory regime for collective investment schemes. A key proposal of this regime was that the operation of a collective investment scheme be the responsibility of a single entity. Another proposal was that the Corporations Law contain a minimum set of duties that the responsible entity must comply with. In that regard it was suggested that the responsible entity be subject to the following statutory duties: (1) to hold property for the benefit of investors; (2) to become familiar with the constituting documents and to interpret the rules fairly; (3) to act honestly in all matters concerning the scheme; (4) to avoid conflicts of interest; (5) to act always in the best interests of the investors; (6) to exercise care and diligence; (7) to keep scheme money and assets separate from the responsible entity's money and assets; (8) to exercise discretions only after proper consideration; (9) to act personally and not to delegate; and (10) not to make a profit from the collective investment scheme other than as provided for in the constituting document: see Discussion Paper 53 proposal 4.7.
25 It was also proposed that parallel duties be owed to investors by each member of an unincorporated responsible entity and by each director of an incorporated entity: Discussion Paper 53 proposal 4.8.
26 Following a consultation process, in 1993, the ALRC and the Advisory Committee published their report, Collective Investments: Other People's Money (Report No 65) (the Report). The Report recommended sweeping changes to the existing regulation of collective investment schemes. The Report was accompanied by a draft Bill and a suggested Explanatory Memorandum.
27 As regards the regulation of schemes, the recommendation was that only a public corporation should be the responsible entity in charge of managing a scheme: Report at [10.2]. The Report recommended that the Corporations Law should be amended to set out the obligations that were to be owed by the operator of a collective investment scheme: Report at [10.6]. One obligation was a duty to act in the interests of investors. This was explained (at [10.8]) in the following way:
"Investors in collective investment schemes rely heavily on the operator to act in their best interests. Nevertheless, there will often be a potential for conflict between their interests and those of the operator ... [c]onflicts of interest between scheme operators and investors are inevitable. The Review has concluded that the appropriate formulation of the test is that operators must prefer the interests of investors over their own interests where any conflicts arise. The Review recommends that the Corporations Law should impose an obligation on the operator of a collective investment scheme to exercise its powers and perform its duties as operator in the best interests of investors rather than in its own, or anyone else's, interest, if that interest is not identical to the interests of the scheme investors."
28 The Review also recommended that investors should have obligations owed to them by the officers of the operator: Report at [10.16]. Investors would be entitled to take action against officers to enforce those rights directly, without first proceeding against the company. Those rights were to be modelled on s 232 of the Corporations Law: Report at [10.16]. In summary, s 232 imposed upon an officer of a corporation the obligations to act honestly in the exercise of his/her powers, to exercise a reasonable degree of care and diligence in the exercise of his/her powers, not to make improper use of information acquired by his/her position, and not to make any improper use of his/her position to gain an advantage for himself/herself.
29 In the draft Bill which accompanied the Report, cl 232AA dealt with the additional duties of officers of responsible entities. This is the clause upon which s 601FC was modelled. The duties mentioned in cl 232AA are: (1) to take reasonable steps to ensure that the operator complies with the obligations of the operator; (2) in relation to the exercise of powers, to use the degree of diligence and care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise; (3) to act honestly; (4) not to exercise his/her powers in the interest of himself/herself; (5) not to use his/her position to gain advantage for himself/herself.
30 Clause 232AA(8) contained a definition of "officer" for the purposes of cl 232AA, which was in the following terms:
""Officer", in relation to a body corporate, means a director, secretary or other executive officer of the body corporate."
31 Chapter 5C was introduced in 1998 by the Managed Investments Act 1998 (Cth). Broadly speaking, the new chapter adopted the Review's proposals in relation to what came to be called managed investment schemes. In particular, provision was made for the responsible entity, which was to be a public company (s 601FA), to operate a managed investment scheme (s 601FB). In exercising its powers, the responsible entity was required to observe the duties set out in s 601FC(1). Relevantly s 601FC(1) provided that the responsible entity must:
"(a) act honestly; and
(b) exercise the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they were in the responsible entity's position; and
(c) act in the best interests of the members and, if there is a conflict between the members' interests and its own interests, give priority to the members' interests; and
...
(e) not make use of information acquired through being the responsible entity in order to:
(i) gain an improper advantage for itself or another person; or
(ii) cause detriment to the members of the scheme; and
..."
The duties of the responsible entity imposed by s 601FC(1) overrode any conflicting duty an officer or employee of the responsible entity owed under Pt 2D.1: s 601FC(3). Part 2D.1 was where the general duties of directors and other officers were to be found.
32 The new Chapter also adopted the proposal that duties be imposed upon officers of the responsible entity. That is the function of s 601FD(1), which relevantly provided that an officer must:
"(a) act honestly; and
(b) exercise the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they were in the officer's position; and
(c) act in the best interests of the members and, if there is a conflict between the members' interests and the interests of the responsible entity, give priority to the members' interests; and
(d) not make use of information acquired through being an officer of the responsible entity in order to:
(i) gain an improper advantage for the officer or another person; or
(ii) cause detriment to the members of the scheme; and
(e) not make improper use of their position as an officer to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for themselves or for any other person or to cause detriment to the members of the scheme; and
... "
The duties of an officer overrode any conflicting duties the officer has under Pt 2D.1: s 601FD(2).
33 There was no provision in Ch 5C which contained a definition of "officer". Instead the definition of "officer" in s 9 was amended so that officer:
"(a) in relation to the responsible entity of a registered scheme - means a person who is a director, secretary or executive officer of the responsible entity; or
(b) in any other case - has the meaning given by section 82A."
34 Paragraph (a) of this definition closely followed the language of cl 232AA(8) of the draft Bill. It may be contrasted with the definition of "officer" of a corporation in s 82A of the Corporations Law. That definition included as an "officer" receivers and managers, administrators of the body or entity, administrators of a DOCA and liquidators, but expressly excluded, among others, receivers who are not managers, receivers and managers appointed by the court and liquidators appointed by the court.
35 So, with the introduction of the new regime, including the requirement that a public company be the responsible entity of a managed investment scheme and the imposition of duties on the company and its officers, the duties in s 601FD were not imposed on privately appointed receivers. Now it is argued that this position changed when a new definition of "officer" was introduced by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth). By that Act (Item 113 of Pt 3 of Sch 3) the definition of "officer" in s 9 was repealed and replaced by a new definition. That definition includes as an officer:
"...
(c) a receiver, or receiver and manager, of the property of the corporation; or
(d) an administrator of the corporation; or
(e) an administrator of a deed of company arrangement; or
(f) a liquidator; or
... "
36 The question that arises is whether each of those persons is an officer for the purposes of s 601FD(1). In particular, in this case the issue is whether a receiver (not a receiver who is also a manager) of the property of a responsible entity is an "officer" and hence bound by the duties imposed by s 601FD(1).
37 Once again the answer will be found in the enacting history of the provisions of which the new definition forms a part. In March 1997 the Treasurer announced that as part of the Government's new Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP), reviews would be undertaken in key areas of corporate law policy. One of those areas was directors' duties and corporate governance. Proposals for the reform of directors' duties were contained in CLERP Paper No 3 (Directors' Duties and Corporate Governance) published in late 1997. The proposals included amendments to the Corporations Law that would clarify key aspects of the duties owed by directors and officers in areas such as the duty to exercise care and diligence, the obligation to act honestly and the duty to avoid conflicts.
38 The proposals relating to directors' duties contained in the Paper were enacted by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act as were other CLERP proposals. According to the "Commentary on Draft Provisions" published by the Department of Treasury (at 56):
"71. The draft provisions rewrite the duties of officers and employees in current section 232 of the Law to make it easer for company officers to know what is expected of them.
72. The draft provisions define officer to include a director or secretary as well as certain other persons who may manage the company, but not employees (proposed subsection 1(2)). Where an obligation imposed by the Law applies to employees, as well as officers, the Law will state this."
39 The draft provisions contained the new definition of "officer", which was substantially the same as the definition in s 82A of the Corporations Law. That definition (ie the s 82A definition) was not intended to apply to a responsible entity, as the original legislation made plain.
40 Against this background, it is, in my view, clear that the new legislation did not intend to bring about a change in the regulation of managed investment schemes. Moreover, neither the CLERP reviews nor the recommendations which were adopted by the amendments introduced in the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act, concerned the effectiveness of the operation of managed investment schemes. Indeed, neither these schemes nor Ch 5C were mentioned in any review. For that reason I do not accept that such an important change as is here suggested would be made to Ch 5C effectively by a sidewind.
41 Finally, the conclusion is confirmed by what I see as the object of s 601FD(1). The object is to complement the duties owed by the responsible entity. That is achieved by imposing duties on persons who control the responsible entity's activities in the administration of a managed investment scheme and its dealings with scheme assets. A receiver, particularly a receiver who is not also a manager, plays no part in the administration of a scheme nor in the decisions regarding the investment of scheme assets.
42 A party appointed receiver has different functions. They are, as I have said, to take possession of the charged assets (which in this case do not include scheme assets) and realise them to pay out the debt due to the chargee. There is no reason to bring such a person under the operation of s 601FD(1). A fortiori in the case of court appointed receivers and liquidators who, being court officers, owe their duties to the court that appointed them. Indeed those duties may be in conflict with the duties set out in s 601FD(1).
43 Step 3 is not the only flaw in the growers' case. Another problem is Step 4 - the proposition that the duties imposed on officers of a responsible entity are transported to actions they may take in some other capacity (eg as officers of another corporation). That is not the effect of s 601FD(1). Its operation is simple enough. The section establishes a norm of conduct for officers of a responsible entity. That standard applies to that officer only when he/she is acting in that capacity: ie when the officer's action or non-action can be attributed to the responsible entity by operation of law or can bind the responsible entity under principles of agency. There is no basis for reading into s 601FD(1) an intention to regulate the conduct of an officer when acting in some other capacity.
44 There is yet another false step. The last step - that it is not in the interests of the growers to deal with the leases and profits - is far from obvious. It may be accepted that if there is a real possibility that a new responsible entity could be found to take over the schemes it would be in the growers' interests to maintain the status quo. But the status quo could only be maintained for a short period. Sooner or later the group's debts must be paid and, because the banks hold security for this debt, the security will be realised.
31 In particular, the question which arises is whether in ch 5C, and more particularly s 601FD, an administrator is an "officer". At first blush, the answer to this appears to be "yes", but that is no more than a reflection of the way in which the definition of "officer", in s 9 of the Corporations Act is cast, and without having regard to the overriding qualification, "unless the contrary intention appears". As Finkelstein J demonstrates in Norman's Case, there is a sound basis for believing that there is just such a qualification.
32 It was put, though, on behalf of ASIC that the approach found there is at odds with the way in which any amendment to a definition section of an Act must be approached, as described by Young CJ in equity, in Hawkesbury City Council v Sammut (2002) 119 LGERA 171 at [68]. It was submitted that a vice in the reasoning of Finkelstein J, which I have set out, was that it refused to give prospective operation to the amendment of the definition of "officer" made by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) (CLERP Act) insofar as it concerned s 601FD.
33 There is nothing in any of the secondary materials which underpin the CLERP Act, referred to by Finklestein J in the passage quoted, which provides any occasion for concluding that the Parliament turned its mind at all to how the provisions of ch 5C and in particular a definition of "officer" which, unless the contrary intention appeared, included an administrator, might interact with Pt 5.3A in circumstances where the responsible entity, as is permissible under the Corporations Act, was placed in administration. That is a subject which appears to have passed completely unnoticed and unattended to by the Parliament.
34 That is not to say that the legislation must be construed, as the administrators submitted, as evincing a contrary intention. In Commissioner of Taxation v Multiflex Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 142 at [1], the Full Court made reference to extra judicial observations made by Hill J concerning the limits, so far as revenue statutes are concerned, on the purposive construction of legislation so as to address what are said to be unintended consequences. Those observations apply with equal force in relation to amendments to the Corporations Act which are said to be "reforms". Whilst full measure must be given to a purposive of approach to construction, if the language employed by Parliament is intractable, then the problem, if it be one, albeit unintended, is one of Parliament's creation and one for Parliament to address.
35 That there may be a problem in terms of practical effect is eloquently put in Mr Owen's affidavit having regard to the features of this administration which I have mentioned. When one looks to s 601FD and the paramountcy of obligation it imposes on an officer, and compares and contrasts that with the obligation of control which falls on an administrator under s 437A and the other duties entailed in the conduct of an administration, one sees immediately potential for conflict. In effect, an administrator, if truly he is an officer, as defined, is faced with a kaleidoscope of mirrors. Who is paramount, the members of the investment scheme or the creditors generally?
36 In his reasons for judgment in Norman's Case, Finkelstein J provides a powerful basis for concluding that there is a contrary intention evinced such that an officer "is not to be regarded for the purposes of ch 5C including s 601FD as including an administrator". So to do is not, in my opinion, to commit the vice of refusing to give prospective operation to the definition. Rather, it is giving the definition such operation but recognising that that the definition, nonetheless, entails in its amended form the qualification "unless the contrary intention appears".
37 As to how a contrary intention is discerned, Mahoney JA in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Mutton (1988) 12 NSWLR 104 at 108 collects pertinent authority. His Honour observes that there is no simple formula for determining what is "a contrary intention". That is something of an understatement. His Honour states, and I agree, that a contrary intention may be inferred from a particular provision if, were the definition to be applied, the provisions of or the procedure established by the section would not appropriately work. That is this case. It may also be, as his Honour opines, that a contrary intention is present where if the definition applied it would require a person to take steps where he had in that case no such business. His Honour further opines that it is not necessary that what is laid down by the section in question be impossible of operation. It is sufficient if the result of the application of the definition to a section results in the operation of the section in a way which clearly the legislature did not attend. To adopt the language of Lord Justice Harman in Dealex Properties Limited v Brooks (1966) 1 QB 542 at 551, if "fearful confusion" is the result of an application of the statutory definition, that may provide occasion for a conclusion that there is a contrary intention present. That also is this case.
38 In short then, having regard to the observations made by Finkelstein J in Norman's Case at [20] to [44], I am persuaded that "officer" does not include "administrator" in ch 5C. There is no relevant distinction to be drawn, in my opinion, having regard to the reasoning there found between a position of a receiver and an administrator. It is true that later in his reasons for judgment, his Honour provides an alternative foundation for the conclusion he reached in that case but that does not detract from the force of his earlier reasoning.
39 There was some debate before me as to what to make of the reference by the Full Court in a later chapter of Norman's Case, Norman; Re Forest Enterprises Ltd v FEA Plantation Ltd and Another (2011) 280 ALR 470, to Finkelstein J's earlier decision. The passage concerned is to be found at [207] and [208]:
[207] Those grounds included the contention that the receivers have duties to the growers as well as a contention that FEA is estopped from impeding the rights of the growers to tend and harvest the timber.
[208] Those contentions are misconceived. First, in a related matter Norman v FEA Plantation Ltd (2010) 191 FCR 39; 80 ACSR 517; [2010] FCA 1274, Finkelstein J determined that the receivers do not owe duties to the growers under s 601FD(1)(c) of the Act. His Honour also determined that, even if the receivers were under the duties imposed by s 601FD(1), that would not assist the growers because a duty to act in the best interests of the growers could not be a justification for the responsible entity or its officers to ignore bargains freely entered into: see also in that regard Re Exceel; Worthley v England (1994) 52 FCR 69 at 86-7; 124 ALR 281 at 297-8; 34 ALD 85 at 99-100; 14 ACSR 407 at 422-3; Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Lanepoint Enterprises Pty Ltd (2006) 64 ATR 524; [2006] FCA 1493 at [39]; Forest Marsh Pty Ltd v Pleash (2011) 82 ACSR 164; [2011] FCA 134 at [81]. The growers were a party to that application and did not appeal from his Honour's orders. Moreover, we are not persuaded that his Honour erred in the ultimate conclusion to which he came.
40 In my view, the passage concerned is neutral. It neither expressly supports nor does it expressly refute the reasoning to be found in Finkelstein J's judgment in Norman's Case at [20] through to and including [44]. It certainly does not bind me to hold that a Full Court has disapproved that reasoning. Finding, as I do, that reasoning compelling, and for the additional reasons that I have given, I propose to provide a direction to the administrators that they are not officers for the purposes of ch 5C and, in particular, s 601FD.