MOTION TO STRIKE OUT NOTICE TO PRODUCE
46 In accordance with O 16 r 2(2)(b) of the Rules, Telstra's statement in answer to the interrogatories was verified by affidavit of Tamara Joanne Paatsch sworn 14 August 2007 in the following terms:
1. I am a solicitor employed by Telstra Corporation Limited as Legal Counsel, Dispute Resolution, Telstra Legal Services and have had day to day carriage of this matter on behalf of the Respondent since I commenced my employment with the Respondent in April 2006. I am authorised to make this Affidavit on behalf of the Respondent.
2. I have no personal knowledge of any of the matters raised by the Applicant in the notice to answer interrogatories annexed to the orders of the Court made on 12 June 2007 ('Interrogatories').
3. The Respondent's answers to the Interrogatories are based on:
(a) my review of relevant documents known to be in the possession of the Respondent to the extent that they were identified and available for my review;
(b) my review of relevant documents which were in the possession of third parties contracted by the Respondent in relation to Telstra's systems and to the extent that they were identified and available for my review;
(c) enquiries made by me of current employees of the Respondent to the extent that I expected them to be in possession of material information and to the extent that they were available for such enquiry;
(d) enquiries made by me of former employees or contractors of the Respondent to the extent that I expected them to be in possession of material information and to the extent that they were available for such enquiry;
4. Having made the enquiries set out in paragraph 3 of this Affidavit, the Respondent's answers to the Interrogatories are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.
47 On 26 September 2008, Optus served a notice to produce on Telstra seeking production of, relevantly:
1. 'All documents recording or being
(a) the enquiries made by Ms Paatch referred to in paragraphs 3(c) and (d) of Ms Paatch's affidavit verifying the Respondent's Answers to Interrogatories dated 14 August 2007; or
(b) Communications between Ms Paatch and any other person created, made or entered into for the purposes of responding to the Interrogatories annexed to the orders of the Court made on 12 June 2007'.
48 On the second day of the hearing, I heard a motion by Telstra, by notice filed on 3 October 2008, to set aside the notice to produce, and I acceded to that motion. At the time, I indicated that I would give my reasons for setting aside the notice to produce as part of these reasons, and I now do so.
49 Telstra sought to set aside para 1 of the notice to produce on the ground that it was an abuse of process:
(1) Being, in effect, an application to go behind the affidavit verifying the answer in circumstances where the affidavit is conclusive and no basis has been demonstrated for going behind the affidavit;
(2) being, in effect, an application for further and better answer to interrogatories, which is defective in form and baseless in substance; and
(3) being issued in circumstances where the documents sought are, and must be known by Optus to be, protected by legal professional privilege.
50 Optus conceded that the communication between Ms Paatsch and any persons for the purpose of answering the interrogatories was properly the subject of a claim for legal professional privilege, but argued that the filing of the affidavit amounted to a waiver.
51 Optus did not expressly identify which of the answers to the interrogatories prompted it to issue the notice to produce, however, it became apparent in the course of submissions of senior counsel of both parties that it was the answer to para 3(e) which was the catalyst.
52 The interrogatory relevantly read:
3A. Look at paragraphs 35(a), 36(a), 38(a), 39(a), 41(a), 42(a), 44(a), 45(a), 47(a), 48(a), 50(a), 51(a), 53(a), 54(a), 56(a), 57(a), 60(a), 62(a), 63(a), 65(a), 66(a), 68(a), 69(a) of the Defence and answer the following in respect of each such paragraph:
…
(e) Was the particular market Share Report referred to in that paragraph used:
(i) For the purpose of marketing, including considering or developing strategy for marketing, products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers? Or
(ii) For the purpose of promotion, including considering or developing strategy for promotion, of products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers? Or
(iii) Or for the purpose of selling, including considering or developing strategy for selling, products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers?
53 The answer relevantly read:
3B. Having made enquiries of:
ź for the purposes of paragraphs 3B(a) to 3B(d) of the Interrogatories, current and former employees and contractors of the Respondent including those who have knowledge of Telstra's systems and processes; and
ź for the purposes of paragraphs 3B(e) of the Interrogatories; current and former employees of the Respondent including those who received or were likely to have received the particular Market Share Report referred to in paragraphs 35(a), 36(a), 38(a), 39(a), 41(a), 42(a), 44(a), 45(a), 47(a), 48(a), 50(a), 51(a), 53(a), 54(a), 56(a), 57(a), 60(a), 62(a), 63(a), 65(a), 66(a), 68(a), 69(a)
the Respondent, in respect of each of paragraphs 35(a), 36(a), 38(a), 39(a), 41(a), 42(a), 44(a), 45(a), 47(a), 48(a), 50(a), 51(a), 53(a), 54(a), 56(a), 57(a), 60(a), 62(a), 63(a), 65(a), 66(a), 68(a), 69(a) of the Defence, answers as follows:
…
(e) the Respondent is unable to answer paragraph 3(e) of the Interrogatories as none of the persons who were the subject of the Respondent's enquiries could recall if the particular Market Share Report referred to in each paragraph was used for at least one of the following purposes:
• for the purpose of marketing, including considering or developing strategy for marketing, products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers; or
• for the purpose of promotion, including considering or developing strategy for promotion, of products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers; or
• for the purpose of selling, including considering or developing strategy for selling, products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers.
54 However, on the question of the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory, it was established 125 years ago that the whole of the affidavit in answer had to be referred to, not just the answer to a particular interrogatory: Lyall v Kennedy (1884) 27 CLD 1 at 15 per Cotton LJ.
55 In the present case, the interrogatory in para 1(e) relevantly read:
1A. Look at paragraphs 12(b), 16(a), 18(a), 22(a), 25(a), 28(a), 30(a) and 33(a) of the Defence to the Third Consolidated Amended Statement of Claim filed 5 March 2007 ('Defence') and answer the following in respect of each such paragraph:
…
(e) Were any of the Market Share Reports referred to in that paragraph used:
(i) for the purpose of marketing, including considering or developing strategy for marketing, products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers? Or
(ii) for the purpose of promotion, including considering or developing strategy for promotion, of products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers? Or
(iii) for the purpose of selling, including considering or developing strategy for selling, products or services of Telstra to existing or prospective customers?
56 The answer relevantly read:
1B. Having made enquiries of:
ź for the purposes of paragraphs 1B(a) to 1B(d) of the Interrogatories, current and former employees and contractors of the Respondent including those who have knowledge of Telstra's systems and processes; and
ź for the purposes of paragraph 1B(e) of the Interrogatories, current and former employees of the Respondent including those who received Market Share Reports as defined in paragraph 10 of the Defence,
the Respondent, in respect of each of paragraphs 12(b), 16(a), 18(a), 22(a), 25(a), 28(a), 30(a) and 33(a) of the Defence, answer as follows:
…
(e) Yes.
57 The sufficiency of the answer to the interrogatory in para 3(e) has to be read in this context, that is, in the context of the answer to the interrogatory in para 1(e) and so read, there cannot be any doubt, in my mind, as to its sufficiency.
58 In determining whether a party should be required to make further answer to interrogatories the court considers whether the existing answer is sufficient and not whether it is truthful: Lyall v Kennedy at 21; McBride v Sandland [1917] SALR 249 at 262. The requirement of sufficiency is now embodied in O 16 r 8 of the Rules.
59 In determining the sufficiency of an answer, the Court may only look to:
(1) The pleadings;
(2) the whole of the answers themselves;
(3) documents referred to;
(4) the nature of the interrogatory.
60 Interrogatories are a form of discovery. An affidavit verifying answers to interrogatories has the same status as an affidavit as to documents verifying discovery. The general rule in relation to such an affidavit is that it is conclusive unless it is self-evident that the discovery is insufficient: see Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 at 343 per Menzies J.
61 That is not this case. I agree with Telstra's submission that the issue of the notice to produce was a 'backdoor' attempt to overcome the conclusiveness of Ms Paatsch's affidavit; in substance, an abuse of process and on that ground alone I set it aside, para 2 of the notice no longer being in issue.
62 While it was not material to my conclusion, I would add that contrary to the submission that was pressed on me by senior counsel for Optus, I am not persuaded that Ms Paatsch's verification of the answers to the interrogatories by affidavit in accordance with O 16 r 2(2)(b) of the Rules works some waiver, under s 122 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), of the privilege attaching to documents regarding or being the enquiries referred to by Ms Paatsch in paras 3(c) and (d) of her affidavit and communications between Ms Paatsch and any other person made for the purposes of responding to the interrogatories.
63 Under s 122 of the Evidence Act, privilege will be waived where the party concerned consented to the document being adduced, or if the party 'knowingly and voluntarily disclosed to another the substance of the evidence'. Certain exceptions apply to the latter, including (but not limited to) if the disclosure was under compulsion of law (s 122(5)(a)(iii)).
64 Senior counsel for Telstra submitted that there was no voluntary disclosure because the Rules (O 16 r 2(2)(b)) mandated the verification of the answers by affidavit; indeed, he submitted that the disclosure was made under compulsion of law and so fell within the exception specifically referred to in [63] above. He further submitted that he was not seeking to read Ms Paatsch's affidavit and that contrary to Optus' submission, he was not deploying an answer, based on privileged communications, 'for forensic or commercial purposes'; Bennett v Chief Executive of the Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101 at [68] per Gyles J.
65 On the other hand, I think there is a more fundamental response to Optus' submission that there has been a waiver of any privilege in the documents referred to in [62] above.
66 First, para 3 of Ms Paatsch's affidavit says no more than that Telstra's answers to the interrogatories are based on her review of relevant documents and enquiries of current and former employees of Telstra.
67 Second, it may be accepted that implied waiver at common law will occur where:
[T]he privilege holder's conduct is inconsistent with the continued confidentiality of the communication because he or she has put in issue the character or contents of the communication in pursuing a right or claim, or has created a situation where another party must reasonably do so by way of a defence.
(Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341 at [54])
68 Earlier, the same Full Court said at [52]:
These authorities show that, where issue or implied waiver is made out, the privilege holder has expressly or impliedly made an assertion about the contents of an otherwise privileged communication for the purpose of mounting a case or substantiating a defence. Where the privilege holder has put the contents of the otherwise privileged communication in issue, such an act can be regarded as inconsistent with the confidentiality that would otherwise pertain to the communication.
69 Third, nothing in Ms Paatsch's affidavit put the contents of an otherwise privileged communication in issue, in the sense of mounting a case or substantiating a defence. The contrast with Rio Tinto is exemplified by what the Full Court said at [71] and [72]:
[71] By his answers to Rio's requests, the Commissioner disclosed that the eight privileged scheduled documents were relevant to reaching his state of satisfaction and exercising his discretions. Although the validity of his state of satisfaction and the exercises of his discretion are key issues in the substantive proceeding, as indicated earlier, the mere acknowledgement of the relevance of privileged documents to the key issues does not amount to an act inconsistent with the maintenance of privilege. As we have seen, so far as the Commissioner was concerned the relevant inquiry was whether, having regard to the material before the decision-maker, the contested decisions were vitiated on Avon Downs grounds. If the particulars merely disclosed that the Commissioner took into account legal advice in reaching his state of satisfaction and exercising his discretions, then that disclosure would not be inconsistent with the maintenance of privilege.
[72] The Commissioner has not, however, simply said that the eight privileged scheduled communications were relevant to reaching his state of satisfaction or exercising his discretions. Nor has he said that he took them into account in so doing. We interpolate that a document may be relevant to a decision without evidencing any matter taken into consideration in the making of it (as, eg, an instrument conferring authority to make the decision). The Commissioner could have identified his bases for satisfaction and exercises of discretion by listing the matters he took into account in each case, but he did not do so. Instead, he identified his bases for satisfaction and exercises of discretion as the matters evidenced in the scheduled documents. In so doing, the Commissioner did more than make an assertion about the relevance of these communications. In his particulars, the Commissioner has said that he took into account the matters evidenced by numerous documents, including the eight privileged scheduled documents. In so doing, the Commissioner has made an assertion that puts the contents of these eight documents in issue, or necessarily lays them open to scrutiny, with the consequence that there is an inconsistency between the making of the assertion and the maintenance of the privilege.
(Emphasis added.)
70 For these reasons, I am of the view that there was no waiver of any privilege in any documents of the kind referred to in [62] above.