Issues on the application
33 In the authorities there are two formulations of the test to be applied on an application for an order under s 15(1) of the ADJR Act. It is clear enough that the applicant is not required to show 'special' or 'exceptional' circumstances before he or she is granted a suspension or stay. The wording of s 15(1) does not suggest such a high hurdle.
34 One formulation of the proper test is to apply the test applied on an application for an interlocutory injunction, namely, whether there is a serious question to be tried and, if so, where does the balance of convenience lie.
35 The other formulation of the appropriate test is that an order may be made under s 15(1) of the ADJR Act if the applicant satisfies the Court that it is just in all the circumstances to make such an order. That was the approach suggested by Keely J in Perkins v Cuthill (1981) 34 ALR 669 at 671 and favoured by French J in Snow v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1987) 14 FCR 119 at 131.
36 In Faingold v Zammit (1984) 1 FCR 87 the Full Court of this Court considered the two formulations and said that, in practical terms, there may be very little difference between them. It held that the trial judge in that case had not erred in applying the test appropriate on the application for an interlocutory injunction.
37 In Snow v Deputy Commission of Taxation (supra), French J said that there may be cases where an order under s 15 of the ADJR Act will not be made, even though the test for the granting of an interlocutory injunction is satisfied. His Honour said (at 129):
'In my opinion however there may be cases where, for reasons peculiar to the administration of the Judicial Review Act and the particular legislative scheme on which it is operating, the establishment of a "serious question" to be tried and a balance of convenience in favour of an applicant, ordinarily sufficient to justify the grant of an interlocutory injunction, will be insufficient to warrant the making of an order under s 15.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to attempt an exhaustive definition of the boundaries within which the powers conferred by the two sections may operate.'
Allowing for that possibility, French J said that it would be preferable to adopt the test formulated by Keely J in Perkins v Cuthill (supra).
38 In many cases, including the present, the application of the test for an interlocutory injunction is the proper test to be applied on an application under s 15(1). Both parties to this application argued the application on the basis that the two requirements for an interlocutory injunction were both necessary and sufficient and I will proceed on that same basis.
39 I turn to consider whether there is a serious question to be tried.
40 The operation of the decision should not be suspended if there is no serious question to be tried. The applicants' submissions on this issue were brief. Furthermore, a number of their grounds of challenge appear to be an attack on the merits of the decision.
41 The applicants applied to amend their application for an order of review to add additional grounds during the course of submissions on the application for an order suspending the operation of the decision. The additional grounds raised a number of matters, one of which was the fact that the examination report upon which the Registrar acted had not been concluded. The Registrar opposed the applicants' application to amend, but, in fact, she complained only of the proposed amendment raising the allegation that the Registrar had acted on a draft report. That was, submitted the Registrar, plainly not correct when regard is had to the evidence of the examiner that he advised the delegate in late February 2006 that the examination report which had been sent to him was the final report (see [28] above). There is force in that contention, but in view of the absence of any prejudice to the Registrar, I decided to allow the application to amend.
42 As I have said, the applicant alleges that in appointing the administrator, the Registrar committed an error of law, exercised the power improperly and acted in breach of the rules of natural justice. Under the rubric of the allegation of exercising the power improperly, the applicants allege that the Registrar took certain irrelevant considerations into account, failed to take certain relevant considerations into account, exercised the power unreasonably, in a manner which no reasonable person could, and in bad faith.
43 To successfully challenge the Registrar's decision, the applicants must make out one of the above grounds in the context of a power the exercise of which is conditioned on the Registrar being satisfied of one of the grounds in s 71(2) of the Act. The question of the limits that this fact places on the scope of a challenge to a decision has been considered in a number of authorities, but it is unnecessary to pause on this point on this application: Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110; Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ at 628-629.
44 As I have said, a number of matters raised in the application appear to be relevant to the merits of the decision and not to raise errors of the type identified in s 5 of the ADJR Act. An example is the allegation that the Registrar erred in law in not concluding that there had been a proper and adequate response to the notice to show cause.
45 The applicants did emphasise various matters which occurred in the period leading up to the decision.
46 The Registrar authorised the preparation of the examination report pursuant to s 60. The examiner spoke to certain persons for the purposes of preparing the examination report. The applicants contend that there were persons the examiner should have spoken to, to whom he did not speak. The notice to show cause is based on the findings of the examiner, as set out in his report. As I have said, it seems that the delegate of the Registrar had a copy of the examination report before preparing the notice to show cause, but the examination report was marked 'Draft'. It was not until some time after the service of the notice to show cause that the delegate was told the examination report marked 'Draft' was in fact the final report. There is evidence before me that the delegate was told this some time in late February 2006. The conclusions of the delegate for the purposes of his decision to appoint an administrator were based on the findings of the examiner. The applicants asked for a copy of the examination report before responding to the notice to show cause, but it was not provided. I doubt that the failure to provide the examination report amounts to a breach of the rules of natural justice: see Jameson v Guri Wa Ngundagar Aboriginal Corporation [2001] FCA 1104. The applicants pointed to the fact that the Registrar did not raise any further concerns that she had despite their invitation by letter dated 5 April 2006 to do so.
47 It is not clear to me that there is a serious question to be tried. Had the fate of this application turned on that issue, I would have been disposed to allow the applicants to make further submissions on the issue. Although they have already had an adequate opportunity to do so, the decision is an important one from the applicants' point of view. As it is, I have reached the conclusion that the balance of convenience clearly favours the refusal of the application and it is unnecessary to pursue the issue of whether there is a serious question to be tried any further.
48 I turn now to consider the balance of convenience.
49 In private law litigation, the Court considers the respective positions of the plaintiff and the defendant and, sometimes, the effects on third parties (see Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, 2002) at [21]-[375]). In this case, there is the corporation and the members of the governing committee on the one hand, and the Registrar on the other. It is not contended that the Registrar will be personally affected by the granting or refusal of an order for suspension. However, under s 71, the Registrar has the power to consider the interests of the corporation, its members, the creditors of the corporation and the public interest. I think that I can have regard to the interests of those groups when considering the balance of convenience on this application.
50 The effect of the appointment of an administrator is to take the responsibility for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation out of the hands of the governing committee and place it in the hands of the administrator. That is no doubt a significant step. If it should subsequently be found that the appointment was invalid and should be set aside, the operation of the decision to appoint the administrator in the meantime may have the following effects:
1 It may reflect adversely on the governing committee, which is likely to be seen to have been incapable of properly conducting the affairs of the corporation.
2 It may reflect adversely on the reputation of the corporation and affect its ability to conduct its business in the usual way.
3 It may affect adversely the ability of entities or bodies associated with the corporation to carry on their activities, including their financial activities, in the usual way and, in this case, I include in that group the college and the companies in the WU Group.
4 There would no doubt be a measure of inconvenience in the administrator replacing the governing committee and then within a relatively short period of time the governing committee again assuming control of the affairs of the corporation.
51 These considerations are significant. Furthermore, insofar as there might be irregularities in terms of the register of members, the holding of annual general meetings, the election of members of the governing committee, record keeping and the lodging of annual returns, I do not think that these matters are strong reasons in favour of not suspending the operation of the decision. That is not to make light of the irregularities if they are subsequently made out. However, they appear to represent relatively long-standing practices of the corporation and they are not such as to constitute pressing reasons for the appointment of the administrator to take effect.
52 As far as the so-called dispute between representatives of the corporation and Mr Folds, the principal of the college, is concerned, as I have said, I cannot decide the rights and wrongs of that dispute. However, what is clear and what I think is significant on the balance of convenience, is that the relations between representatives of the corporation and senior management of the college (ie Messrs Folds and Lynch) are not good. On the corporation's own evidence, there have been issues concerning Mr Folds' performance for several months. It seems to me that the immediate installation of the administrator is more likely to resolve this problem than leaving the governing committee in control of the affairs of the corporation.
53 As far as the issue of the corporation's solvency is concerned, I cannot, on this application, determine whether the corporation is solvent or insolvent. In fact, as I understand it, the Registrar does not assert that the corporation is insolvent. Rather, she asserts that she does not know whether the corporation is insolvent, but submits that the facts raise a real question as to solvency.
54 In my opinion, two matters relevant to the financial position of the corporation are established by the undisputed evidence. First, the corporation experienced financial difficulties in 2005 and those difficulties have continued to recent times. Those financial difficulties may or may not amount to insolvency. It is clear that the corporation was trading at a loss for a substantial period of time and that it required substantial cash injections. If for no other reason, the fact that the corporation was experiencing financial difficulties is established by the reference by WU Pty Ltd to the 'financial difficulties' of the corporation and the fact that the cash payments were made. The fact that the corporation was trading at a loss is established by the evidence of Mr Loader.
55 The second significant matter is that the loan-back practice was not disclosed in the corporation's financial statements. It does not seem to be disputed by the applicants that it should have been. For example, I note that in his affidavit sworn on 10 May 2006, Mr Schrader states:
'These amounts reflect a 20 per cent distribution to the first applicant, without noting the agreed loan back from the first applicant to Wana Ungkunykja of an equivalent amount. More accurately, the first applicant's accounts might have reflected these loans at least until they were released.'
56 These two considerations, which relate to the financial operations of the corporation and which suggest that there are difficulties, and the fact that the relationship between the representatives of the corporation and the college are unsettled, led me to conclude that the balance of convenience clearly lies in favour of the administrator immediately assuming the conduct of the affairs of the corporation.