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[2013] FCA 235
Federal Court of Australia
2013-03-19
Gordon J
Original judgment source is linked above.
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Date of hearing: 7, 8, 9 and 12 November 2012
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr C M Scerri QC and Mr M Borsky
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N J Young QC and Mr S H Parmenter
Solicitor for the Respondents: King & Wood Mallesons
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION VID 356 of 2012
JUDGE: GORDON J DATE OF ORDER: 19 MARCH 2013 WHERE MADE: MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY GENERAL DIVISION VID 356 of 2012
JUDGE: GORDON J DATE: 19 MARCH 2013 PLACE: MELBOURNE
INTRODUCTION 1 The Applicant, Norcast S.Ár.L (Norcast), sold Norcast Wear Solutions, Inc (NWS), a Canadian mining consumables company to 0913034 B.C. Ltd (BC), a special purpose subsidiary of Castle Harlan, Inc (Castle Harlan), for approximately US$190 million on 6 July 2011. Previously on 6 July 2011, Bradken Operations Pty Ltd (Bradken Operations), a subsidiary of the First Respondent, Bradken Limited (Bradken), had entered into a Subscription, Governance and Purchase Agreement (SGPA) with, among others, BC. Pursuant to the SGPA, Bradken Operations subscribed for 89.7% of the share capital in BC. Bradken Operations also acquired the right to call for the remaining shares in BC. Within hours of the sale by Norcast of NWS to BC, Bradken Operations exercised its right and acquired the remaining shares in BC. The total amount paid to Castle Harlan entities by Bradken was approximately US$212.4 million. The result - Bradken acquired NWS, its global competitor in the manufacture and supply of grinding mill liners. Grinding mill liners are consumable products used in the mining industry. 2 Norcast complains about Bradken's and Castle Harlan's conduct on and before 6 July 2011. Norcast alleges that the events on 6 July 2011 were the result of a bid rigging arrangement between Bradken and Castle Harlan, whereby Castle Harlan agreed to bid for NWS and Bradken agreed not to bid for NWS (Bid Rigging Arrangement) in contravention of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the CCA). Had Bradken and Castle Harlan not entered into the Bid Rigging Arrangement, Norcast contends that Bradken would have made a bid for NWS in excess of the approximately US$190 million which BC ultimately paid for NWS. 3 Norcast further alleges that Castle Harlan and Bradken engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct during the course of the NWS sales process (Misleading or Deceptive Conduct) in breach of s 18 of Pt 2-1 of Sch 2 of the CCA (referred to as the Australian Consumer Law, the ACL). Norcast alleges that the Second Respondent, Mr Nick Greiner, and the Third Respondent, Mr Brian Hodges, were persons involved in either or both of the Bid Rigging Arrangement and the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct. 4 For the reasons set out below, both the Bid Rigging Arrangement claim and the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct claim are established. 5 This proceeding was commenced as a Fast Track proceeding. The disputed factual and legal issues are complex. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were informed that the Court would be unable to deliver judgment within six weeks of the conclusion of the trial: cf Practice Note CM8. The delay in delivery of the judgment was inevitable because the Minister did not provide the necessary consent for the extended territorial application of s 82 of the CCA and s 236 of the ACL until 14 March 2013: see [231] below. 6 The balance of these reasons for judgment are structured as follows: DESCRIPTION PARA(S) A The Statutory Scheme [7]-[17]
B THE ISSUES 18 The issues may be divided into two general categories - the Bid Rigging Arrangement claim and the Misleading or Deceptive Conduct claim.
Norcast, NWS and Pala 22 Norcast has no premises, employees or Board of directors. It was incorporated in Luxembourg as a holding company for NWS and other related entities. Pala Investments Limited (Pala) is its ultimate holding company. Pala, like Castle Harlan, is a private equity fund. 23 Mr Michael Barton, a senior Vice President of Pala, gave evidence (Barton). Mr Richard Wilson, the former Chief Operating Officer of NWS (Wilson), and Mr Alan Bulckaert, the former President of NWS, also gave evidence (Bulckaert). There was evidence about two other key decision-makers within NWS and Pala: Mr Rick LaBelle, the former Chief Executive Officer of NWS (LaBelle), and Mr Jan Castro, the Chief Executive Officer of Pala (Castro). LaBelle and Castro did not give evidence. Contrary to Bradken's contention, there is no relevant adverse inference to be drawn against Norcast arising from its failure to call Castro. 24 Barton gave evidence about decision-making within NWS, Norcast and Pala. Barton's evidence was that, within Pala, there was a "manager" who was responsible for each investment. Prior to the sale of NWS, the manager responsible for Norcast (and NWS) was Mr Martyn Buttenshaw. Buttenshaw reported to Barton. Buttenshaw did not give evidence. 25 The decision to sell NWS was made following a recommendation from the management of NWS to the Board of NWS that they believed that it was an appropriate time to seek a disposal. That recommendation was referred to the ultimate shareholder, Pala. Once the decision had been made to sell NWS, Barton's evidence was that he was responsible for instructing NWS' advisers and conducting the sale, but that Castro was also involved and, on occasions when Barton was unavailable, Castro made decisions in his absence.
Bradken 26 Bradken is an Australian-based mining consumables company with various aspects of its business operating all over the world. It is listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (the ASX). 27 At the relevant time, Brian Hodges was the Managing Director of Bradken (Hodges) and Nicholas Greiner was a Director and Chairman of its Board of directors (Greiner). Both gave evidence. Mr Bradley Ward (Ward) also gave evidence. Ward held various positions within Bradken throughout the course of the events described below. Between September 2004 and September 2008, he was the General Manager, Mineral Processing based in Newcastle. In September 2008, he was appointed President, Bradken Products and Integration based in Kansas City. In July 2009, he was appointed President, Bradken Resource Products, again based in Kansas City. Ward currently holds the position of Executive General Manager - Mineral Processing and has done so since June 2012. There was evidence concerning other Bradken employees, including Mr Bruce Arnott, then Bradken's Chief Financial Officer, (Arnott) and Mr Stephen Bone, then General Manager, Mineral Processing (Bone). Arnott and Bone were not called to give evidence.
Castle Harlan and CHAMP 28 Castle Harlan is a New York-based private equity fund. Several Castle Harlan employees were involved in the acquisition of NWS, including Mr Leonard Harlan (Harlan), Mr Howard Morgan (Morgan) and Mr Anand Philip (Philip). Harlan was the Chairman of the Executive Committee of Castle Harlan. Morgan was a Co-President of Castle Harlan. Philip was a Vice-President of Castle Harlan. 29 Castle Harlan has an interest in a private equity fund in Australia called Castle Harlan Australia Mezzanine Partners Pty Limited (CHAMP). Castle Harlan owns Castle Harlan Australia LLC which is, in turn, a 50% shareholder in CHAMP. CHAMP and Bradken have a long history. In late 2001, entities associated with CHAMP (as part of a consortium) purchased Bradken from Smorgon Steel. Bradken was listed on the ASX in August 2004. Greiner is also a Non-Executive Director and Deputy Chairman of CHAMP. Prior to Bradken listing on the ASX, Greiner was a CHAMP nominated director of Bradken.
Other players 30 Three investment banks were involved, in one way or another, in the sale of NWS. Hodges gave evidence of his dealings, between 2009 and 2011, with Mr Gautam Chari of Merrill Lynch (Chari). Merrill Lynch was Bradken's investment banking adviser at the time. Chari was not called to give evidence. 31 Barton and Hodges also gave evidence regarding Mr Sean Walsh of Goldman Sachs (Walsh). Hodges's evidence was that he knew Walsh because Walsh replaced Chari when Chari left Goldman Sachs. Barton met Walsh during a business trip in late February 2011. Walsh told Hodges of the NWS sale process. Both Norcast and Bradken subpoenaed Walsh, but neither party called Walsh to give evidence. 32 Finally, UBS was retained by NWS to conduct the sale process. There was evidence concerning several UBS' employees, including Mr Michael Kousaie, an Executive Director (Kousaie), and David Han, an Associate (Han). Neither Kousaie nor Han were called to give evidence.
(Emphasis added.) 60 At the same time, Bradken was considering NWS as a potential acquisition target. In a perfect world, the two would have collided. They did not. On 1 October 2010, Hodges spoke by telephone with Chari of Merrill Lynch on a range of topics including NWS. Chari told Hodges that there was a new person at Merrill Lynch who was ex-NWS who wanted to talk to Hodges about NWS. Chari also told Hodges that NWS was doing fine, with an EBITDA of $20 million following the acquisition of the Swanmet assets, and that he expected a sale in the middle of 2011. Chari also told him that NWS had run an unsuccessful sale process in 2009. Finally, Chari told Hodges that Castro did not like Bradken on two fronts - over the anti-dumping investigation and the fact NWS thought that Bradken would only pay a price equivalent to 7 times NWS' EBITDA: see [59] above. Consistent with Chari's advice, on 12 October 2010, Joe Belan of Merrill Lynch telephoned Hodges. Belan had recently left NWS. Belan told Hodges that Pala would be selling NWS in the first half of 2011. 61 In late October 2010, UBS and another potential adviser, Scotiabank, each made presentations to Pala and NWS. The UBS presentation noted the risk of confidentiality in the sale process and listed Bradken as "Potential Buyer: Sensitive". Then, on 2 November 2010, [company F] wrote to LaBelle and offered to buy NWS for $170 million. Barton was cross-examined regarding the [company F's] letter. Barton's evidence was that the letter was received as a result of LaBelle's unauthorised discussions with potential buyers. Encouraged by LaBelle, [company F] had contacted Barton in late 2010. Barton gave evidence that he told [company F] that NWS would be offered for sale in early 2011 but, if [company F] submitted a "significant" offer, [company F] might be able to curtail that process. The [company F] letter was, in Barton's view, [company F's] attempt to submit a "significant" offer. 62 In November 2010, Chari telephoned Hodges and told him that Pala had been approached with a "knock out offer" for NWS in the mid $170 millions and Pala was thinking of "exiting by a selective process". Hodges' evidence was that he understood the reference to a "selective process" to mean that NWS would be sold by a similar method to the selective process in 2009. 63 Six days later, on 8 November 2010, Barton rejected [company F's] offer: Unfortunately, the maximum value you indicate in your letter is, at best, the minimum value we would consider in any sale process. As such, it would not make sense for us to deviate from our existing plan at this point in time, as we are confident of generating more value either within a sale process or by continuing with the next stage of our strategy. 64 On 14 December 2010, Psihogios of NWS emailed UBS. Psihogios told UBS that NWS had been continuing to prepare for an "exit process in early 2011". Psihogios requested a follow up to the October meeting. Psihogios outlined the essential elements at that stage as follows: Process: We have decided to go with a comprehensive, yet tightly controlled strategic sale only. We are no longer interested in a dual track process. Timing: Targeting first contact to buyers (teaser) in late January 2011, and a full CIM to follow in mid February. Financial Advisor: To be upfront, we are approaching a select group of advisors to present to us. We are looking for the right team, experience, and commitment at a competitive fee. (Emphasis added.) Bradken submitted that this document evidenced a tightly controlled but selective sales process. I reject that description. The document speaks for itself. The decision was to adopt "a comprehensive, yet tightly controlled strategic sale". The question was: what did that mean?
Introduction 208 Bid rigging is sometimes referred to as "collusive tendering". It may take many forms. 209 The provisions now found in the CCA which prohibit bid rigging were originally introduced into the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (the TPA) by amending legislation in 2009: Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) (the TP Act). The TP Act received royal assent on 26 June 2009 and the relevant provisions commenced on 24 July 2009. The primary purpose of the TP Act was to "introduce criminal penalties and parallel civil sanctions for serious cartel conduct": Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Bill 2008 at [1.1] (the EM). The EM explained that "serious cartel conduct" was a term which incorporated what the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defined as "hard core" cartel conduct, namely, "an anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce": EM at [1.3]. 210 However, the TP Act also sought to codify some forms of "serious cartel conduct" (including bid rigging) which had previously been caught by s 45 of the TPA: EM at [1.4]-[1.6]. The TP Act introduced a revised structure. Division 1 was inserted immediately before the former s 45: EM at [1.13]. Division 1 included the criminal and civil prohibitions on "serious cartel conduct". The TP Act also introduced the notion of a "cartel provision", now found in s 44ZZRD. 211 As explained earlier, s 44ZZRD sets out two conditions that must be satisfied for a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding to be a cartel provision - one of the two forms of the purpose condition and the competition condition. There was no dispute that the particular relevant conditions in the present case were those in sub-ss 44ZZRD(3)(c)(i) and 44ZZRD(4)(a), (b) and (j). 212 For there to be a contravention of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK, there were a number of hurdles that Norcast had to overcome.
Was there a request for bids within the meaning of s 44ZZRD(3)(c)? 213 An essential element of the purpose condition in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) being relevantly satisfied was "the event of a request for bids in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services": see [13] above. 214 Norcast submitted that the "request for bids" comprised the sale process for NWS established by UBS during February 2011, together with the confidential sales materials prepared by UBS and provided to potential buyers of NWS during February and March 2011. 215 Bradken submitted that: 1. there was no request for bids; 2. it genuinely believed it had been excluded from the sale process; and 3. there was no request for bids in Australia nor any request for bids in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services in Australia. I will deal with each limb in turn.
In the event of a request for bids 216 Bradken's primary submission was that the Court must find that there was relevantly a "request for bids" in the NWS sale process to Bradken. Bradken submitted that the "request for bids" referred to in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) must, as a matter of statutory construction, be a request directed to the parties to the alleged contract, arrangement or understanding. 217 There were two limbs to Bradken's submission. First, Bradken submitted that for there to be a "request", there must be some "act of asking for something to be given, or done", or some communication asking for something to be provided. Bradken referred to the Macquarie Dictionary and cited two authorities in support of that proposition: ECH Incorporated v Halliday (2011) 192 FCR 281 at [36] and Pileggi v Australian Sports Drug Agency (2004) 138 FCR 107 at [35] and [37]. 218 Second, Bradken submitted that the expression "request for bids" in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) denotes a request directed to more than one person for them to participate in a bidding process of some kind. Bradken further submitted that the persons referred to in paragraph (3)(c)(i) to (v) are persons to whom the request may be directed, and they must be persons who are able to bid in response to that request. So, for example, Bradken submitted that as a whole, sub-s (3)(c) contemplates a competitive process, with the bids to be made, received and considered pursuant to the procedure established for that process. Bradken submitted that the concern of the cartel conduct provisions in this context was to ensure that that competitive bidding process was not manipulated by bidders or potential bidders who were within the scope of that process by means of a proscribed contract, arrangement or understanding. At a practical level, Bradken submitted that it "would be an error" for the Court to conclude that the concept of a request for bids would apply simply where there was some knowledge about a sale process. 219 Bradken's submissions are rejected. The first submission does not assist in the resolution of the proper construction of s 44ZZRD(3)(c). The authorities referred to by Bradken are of limited utility. In each case, the statutory language and the statutory context was different. Similarly, Bradken's reference to dictionary definitions of the word "request" is an exercise of limited utility: cf XYZ v The Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 227 CLR 532 at [19]; R v Campbell (2008) 73 NSWLR 272 at [49] and General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (NSW) [1982] 2 NSWLR 52 at 55. In the end, it is the whole phrase that is to be construed in the context of the CCA and in a manner consistent with the policy and purpose of the legislation: s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]. 220 What then is the proper construction of s 44ZZRD(3)(c)? As a matter of statutory construction, there must be a "request for bids". As Bradken submitted, the provision does not apply where there is an offer (or a "bid") uninitiated by, or not responsive in some way to, a call for bids, as there would be no relevant "request". But there is nothing in the language of the section that requires a request directly or individually to each of the parties to the alleged contract, arrangement or understanding. Such a construction is not supported by the statutory language. The section does not stipulate to whom any request need be made. Why? Because it refers to a singular "event of a request for bids", not requests for bids. 221 Further, and contrary to Bradken's submission, that construction of the section is consistent with the purpose of the provision which is to prohibit per se bid rigging between competitors, including potential competitors. Again, there is nothing in the language of the section (or the EM) to suggest that the bid rigging prohibition is somehow restricted to only those bidders or potential bidders who were within the scope of that process: see EM at [1.2] and [1.39]-[1.42]. Put another way, if Bradken's construction of the section was the preferable construction, it would frustrate the statutory purpose because the prohibition would be inapplicable to arrangements involving a person who had not been individually invited or requested to bid in circumstances where that person may nevertheless have made a bid (but for the arrangement sought to be impugned). Such an arrangement would still be bid rigging and no less objectionable on competition grounds. 222 As Norcast submitted, the circumstances of this case highlight the absurdity of Bradken's construction. Put bluntly, Bradken's argument rises no higher than a bid rigging arrangement involving Bradken and Castle Harlan is not caught by the bid rigging prohibition because neither Bradken nor Castle Harlan received an individual invitation or request from Norcast to enter the sale process and make a bid, even though Castle Harlan did in fact make a bid. One only has to state the proposition to reject it. If it were otherwise, the per se prohibition would not apply to open requests for bids which take the form of an advertisement in the Government Gazette or a newspaper because none of the bidders in that case receive a personal invitation to bid. 223 Here, there was a competitive sale process for NWS conducted by UBS which was "the event of a request for bids" within the meaning of s 44ZZRD(3)(c) of the CCA. 224 Even if the construction of s 44ZZRD(3)(c) propounded by Bradken was the preferable construction (contrary to the view formed), that construction of the CCA would not assist Bradken because, in relation to the sale of NWS, there was a "request for bids" directed to both Bradken and Castle Harlan. Section 44ZZRD(3)(c) requires the existence of a request for bids (which there was). It does not require an individual invitation to join in any request for bids. Walsh of Goldman Sachs (with authority from Norcast) informed Bradken of the sale process (see [31] and [79] above). Castle Harlan was then informed of the sale process by Bradken (see [95] above), invited to bid (see [100] and [113] above) and, ultimately, did bid for NWS: see [134] and [171] above.
Bradken's alleged exclusion from the sale process 225 Bradken devoted a large portion of its written submissions to the allegation that it had been excluded from the NWS sale process. The findings above are a complete answer to any contention that Bradken was excluded.
Request for bids in Australia 226 Bradken also submitted that it was clear from the nature, purpose and structure of the CCA that any relevant "request for bids" within the meaning of s 44ZZRD(3)(c) of the CCA must be "a request for bids" in Australia. That contention is rejected. 227 That construction finds no support in the language of s 44ZZRD(3)(c). The sub-section states: (3) The purpose condition is satisfied if the provision has the purpose of directly or indirectly: … (c) ensuring that in the event of a request for bids in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services: (i) one or more parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding bid, but one or more other parties do not; … (Emphasis added.) 228 If the legislative intent had been to impose a territorial limitation in relation to the "request for bids" condition in s 44ZZRD(3)(c), then words to that effect would have been included in the provision expressly or by reference: cf the definition of "trade or commerce" in s 4 and the definition of "market" in s 50A. 229 As noted earlier, s 44ZZRD expanded the operation of s 45. Section 45 contains a territorial limitation: s 45(3). It provides that "competition" for the purpose of s 45 means: in relation to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding or of a proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, means competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party to the contract, arrangement or understanding or would be a party to the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding, or any body corporate related to such a corporation, supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, goods or services or would, but for the provision, supply or acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, goods or services. (Emphasis added.) Section 4E provides that, unless the contrary intention appears, a "market means a market in Australia". The law on what constitutes a "market in Australia" is unsettled: see, eg, Auskay International Manufacturing & Trade Pty Ltd v Qantas Airways Ltd (No 5) [2009] FCA 1464 at [35]-[36]. It is unnecessary to consider the point, however, since no similar territorial limitation is to be found in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) and no limitation should be implied. 230 What then is the territorial coverage of s 44ZZRD(3)(c)? It is governed by s 5 of the CCA. Section 5, entitled "Extended application of this Act to conduct outside Australia", relevantly provides: (1) Each of the following provisions: (a) Part IV; … (c) the Australian Consumer Law (other than Part 5-3); … extends to the engaging in conduct outside Australia by: (g) bodies corporate incorporated or carrying on business within Australia; or (h) Australian citizens; or (i) persons ordinarily resident within Australia. … (3) Where a claim under section 82, or under section 236 of the Australian Consumer Law, is made in a proceeding, a person is not entitled to rely at a hearing in respect of that proceeding on conduct to which a provision of this Act extends by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) of this section except with the consent in writing of the Minister. … (5) The Minister shall give a consent under subsection (3) or (4) in respect of a proceeding unless, in the opinion of the Minister: (a) the law of the country in which the conduct concerned was engaged in required or specifically authorised the engaging in of the conduct; and (b) it is not in the national interest that the consent be given. (Emphasis added.) 231 There are a number of matters to be noted. First, s 5(1) is a conduct nexus requirement. It provides that the CCA may extend to conduct occurring outside Australia provided there is a connection between the corporations or persons engaging in the conduct and Australia. For corporations, the requirement is that the corporation be incorporated in Australia or carry on business in Australia. In the present case and to the extent necessary, Bradken would satisfy both limbs. It is incorporated in Australia and carries on business in Australia. The nexus between Castle Harlan and Australia is considered at [242]-[256] below. Second, where damages under s 82 of the CCA or s 236 of the ACL are sought, s 5(3) provides that conduct occurring outside of Australia and otherwise within the scope of s 5(1) may not be relied upon except with the consent in writing of the relevant Minister. The Minister is required to give consent under s 5(3) unless, in the opinion of the Minister, the law of the country in which the conduct occurred required or specifically authorised the conduct and it is not in the national interest for consent to be given. Norcast sought the Minister's consent prior to the hearing of the proceeding. Norcast sought and provided to the Minister advice concerning the laws of the country in which the conduct occurred, which was to the effect that the conduct was not required or specifically authorised by those laws. It was not necessary for the Minister's consent to have been obtained prior to the commencement of the hearing. However, it was necessary for the outcome of Norcast's request for consent to be known prior to the delivery of judgment. The Minister ultimately provided consent on 14 March 2013.
Supply or acquisition of goods or services in Australia 232 Next, Bradken submitted that not only must there be an "event of a request for bids" in Australia but that event must be a request "in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services" in Australia and that requirement was absent. 233 Again, the section does not state that the "supply or acquisition of goods or services", must be in Australia. The territorial coverage of s 44ZZRD(3)(c) has been addressed earlier. 234 However, there was a further issue. Section 44ZZRD(3)(c) provides that the event must be a request for bids "in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services" (emphasis added). The parties did not directly address this issue in their written or oral closing submissions. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Court requested that the parties provide further short written submissions directed to answering the following question: "Goods" and "services" are defined in s 4 of the CCA. In the present case, what was the relevant supply or acquisition of goods or services? 235 The parties filed further written submissions. It was common ground that the request for bids was not in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods. Norcast submitted, however, that the request for bids related to the supply and/or acquisition of services, being the shares in NWS. Norcast's submission relied upon the definition of "services" in s 4 of the CCA, which includes: any rights (including rights in relation to, and interests in, real or personal property), benefits, privileges or facilities that are, or are to be, provided, granted or conferred in trade or commerce … 236 Norcast contended that: (a) shares in NWS are "rights in relation to, and interests in … personal property" and so fall within this definition. The [CCA] does not define "personal property" and only defines "share" as "includes stock". However, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) defines shares as personal property and they have been held to be choses in action, which are a form of personal property; and (b) in any event, the shares in NWS are, plainly, "rights", "benefits" and/or "privileges", that are "conferred in trade or commerce". For example, it has been held that "[a] share is a right to a specified amount of the share capital of a company" (emphasis added) and shares in companies are "a right to receive certain benefits from a corporation". (Emphasis added, citations omitted.) 237 Bradken agreed and submitted that the "better view" appeared to be that the shares in NWS were services, for the purpose of s 4 of the CCA. Bradken's further written submissions principally focused on whether the request for bids was in Australia or the supply or acquisition of goods or services was in Australia, or Bradken and Castle Harlan would have been, or would have been likely to be, in competition in a market in Australia. Those submissions have been addressed. 238 Norcast's submissions on these issues are accepted. At the very least, a share is a right and is a chose in action. That is sufficient. It is therefore unnecessary to decide whether the shares in NWS were also rights in relation to and interests in, among other things, the real or personal property then owned by NWS. 239 Second, the shares in NWS were also "benefits" and/or "privileges" that are "conferred in trade or commerce". In Sydney Futures Exchange Limited v Australian Stock Exchange Limited (1995) 56 FCR 236 at 255, Lockhart J described the nature of a share as follows: A share is a right to a specified amount of the share capital of a company, carrying with it rights and liabilities when the company is a going concern and in the course of its winding up. A share is a chose in action entitling its holder to the rights and subjecting him to the liabilities provided by the memorandum and articles of association and by legislation. 240 However, in Trade Practices Commission v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1990) 22 FCR 305 at 314, Lockhart J noted, without further explanation, that "shares are neither 'goods' nor 'services'". The parties did not refer the Court to any later or binding authority on the question. It is unusual to refer to shares, or the rights conferred upon a shareholder, as "services". However, in light of the definition of "services" in the CCA, the shares in NWS were "services" for the purpose of s 44ZZRD(3)(c). It follows that there was an event of a request for bids in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services within the meaning of s 44ZZRD(3)(c). 241 For that reason, the purpose condition in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) is capable of being satisfied in this case. As a result, there is a "cartel provision" for the purpose of Pt IV of the CCA.
Castle Harlan carrying on business in Australia 242 Norcast alleged that each Respondent was a person involved (within the meaning of s 75B of the CCA and/or s 2(1) of the ACL) in contraventions by Castle Harlan. The primary claim was that Castle Harlan contravened ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK of the CCA and s 18 of the ACL. A claim for accessorial liability must fail if the primary claim is not maintainable: Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 118 FCR 236 at [154]. 243 Castle Harlan is a New York-based private equity fund. Norcast must establish, among other things, that Castle Harlan carried on business within Australia: s 5(1)(g) of the CCA. Bradken submitted that it did not. 244 The facts relevant to that issue may be divided into four categories. First, Castle Harlan's interest in CHAMP. CHAMP was incorporated on 31 December 1999. A press release issued in New York on 20 October 1999 by Castle Harlan described the formation of CHAMP in the following terms: Castle Harlan, Inc., the New York merchant bank, announced today it had agreed to acquire a 50 percent stake in the business of private equity manager Australian Mezzanine Investments Pty. Limited (AMIL) in order to make private equity buyout investments in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere in Asia. Terms of the transaction were not disclosed. AMIL, based in Sydney, is one of Australia's oldest and most prominent private equity firms. The new management company to be formed by the two entities will be called Castle Harlan Australian Mezzanine Partners Pty. Limited (CHAMP) and will be based in Sydney. Castle Harlan said that it and CHAMP had each launched separate buyout funds that will raise $300 million in the aggregate from Castle Harlan, AMIL, their associates and investors in their existing funds. John Castle, chairman of Castle Harlan, said, "We at Castle Harlan look to this first expansion of Castle Harlan outside the United States with great enthusiasm and great optimism." [Harlan], Castle Harlan's president, added, "We identified AMIL as the pre-eminent private equity manager in Australia, and we support this partnership with all of our resources." AMIL's principals, Bill Ferris and Joe Skrzynski, commented: "We feel the hybrid vigor of Australian Mezzanine Investments and Castle Harlan will combine the best of Australian and U.S. private equity managers to create a clear leader in Australasian private equity." They said AMIL's existing investment funds would not be affected by the joint venture, but all future AMIL investment funds will be organized under the umbrella of CHAMP. Castle Harlan will continue to organize and manage private equity investment funds outside of Australasia. [Morgan], a Castle Harlan managing director, will relocate to Sydney next year to assist in the establishment of CHAMP. 245 CHAMP's website described CHAMP as "the result of a joint venture initiated in 2000 between AMIL [Australian Mezzanine Investments Pty Limited] and [Castle Harlan], a mid market Buy Out specialist in the United States". 246 The next category of facts may be described as the activities Castle Harlan undertook with, or in conjunction with, CHAMP. There was evidence of the following activities: 1. Castle Harlan's co-investment with CHAMP in Austar on 2 February 2004. An announcement stated: In a series of transactions first announced last April, Castle Harlan Partners IV, a US$1.163 billion private-equity investment fund raised by Castle Harlan, Inc., co-invested in Austar with CHAMP 1 Funds, a A$500 million private-equity investment fund raised by Castle Harlan and its Sydney-based affiliate, Castle Harlan Australian Mezzanine Partners (CHAMP). The acquisition price was approximately A$0.16 per share; the stock closed on the Australian Stock Exchange today at A$.075. Austar has exclusive pay television rights in all but the major Australian cities and sparsely settled Western Australia. … Castle Harlan also invests in Australia, New Zealand and the broader Australasian region through its Sydney-based affiliate, CHAMP, which is one of Australia's oldest and largest private equity firms. 2. Castle Harlan and CHAMP raised over a billion dollars of Australian investment funds, including funds named "CHAMP I" and "CHAMP II". In relation to CHAMP II, on 2 August 2005, Castle Harlan announced that: … it and CHAMP, its Australian affiliate, had raised new investment funds with aggregate commitments of A$950 million (US$730 million), making the CHAMP II Funds substantially larger than any other independent private equity funds managed in Australasia. 3. a press release dated 7 May 2006 recorded that "[Castle Harlan] is currently managing private equity funds, including its Australian affiliates, in excess of $3 billion"; 4. a press release dated 28 July 2008 records that: Until it went public in August 2004, Bradken had been a portfolio company of Castle Harlan's Australian affiliate CHAMP Private Equity in Sydney. … Castle Harlan, founded in 1987, invests in controlling interests in the buyout and development of middle-market companies in North America, Europe and, together with CHAMP Private Equity, in Australasia. … CHAMP Private Equity was formed in 2000 as Castle Harlan Australian Mezzanine Partners by the founders of CHAMP Private Equity's predecessor and Castle Harlan. CHAMP Private Equity and its predecessor have made more than 60 investments since 1987 in companies operating in Australia and New Zealand. CHAMP Private Equity currently maintains offices in Sydney, Australia and Singapore. Please refer to its website at www.champmbo.com. 5. a promotional brochure for Castle Harlan stated that "[t]he members of our financial and administrative team also maintain constant contact with their counterparts at CHAMP to assure a smooth and productive relationship that benefits both parties"; and 6. in the "about us" section of Castle Harlan's website, a statement that: Since our inception, Castle Harlan has participated in eight private equity funds, five domestically and three in Australia. … We have also joined forces with one of Australia's leading private investment firms to create CHAMP - Castle Harlan Australian Mezzanine Partners. Together Castle Harlan and CHAMP employ more than 35 investment professionals. 247 Specific examples of Castle Harlan and CHAMP jointly using funds they manage to make investments in, and sales of investments to, companies operating in Australia were also in evidence. The first took place in February 2004 and involved Austar, as recorded in the press release set out at [246] above. The second example involved United Malt Holdings (UMH). In a press release on Castle Harlan's website dated 12 September 2006 it was stated that: Castle Harlan, Inc., the New York-based private-equity investment firm, and CHAMP Private Equity, its affiliate based in Sydney, Australia, announced today that private-equity investment funds they manage have acquired Great Western Malting, Canada Malting Company, Barrett Burston Malting and a 60 percent interest in Bairds Malt to create United Malt Holdings ("UMH"), one of the world's largest producers of malt for use in the brewing and distilling industries. UMH has revenues in excess of US$400 million. It operates in the United States, trading as Great Western Malting; Canada, trading as Canada Malting Company; Australia, trading as Barrett Burston Malting; and the United Kingdom, where it owns a 60 percent interest in Bairds Malt. … 248 UMH was subsequently sold to an Australian company, GrainCorp Ltd. Castle Harlan announced the sale on 5 October 2009. The announcement stated that: Castle Harlan, Inc., the New York private equity investment firm, and CHAMP Private Equity, its affiliate based in Sydney, Australia, confirmed today that they have agreed to sell United Malt Holdings (UMH), one of the world's largest producers of malt for the brewing and distilling industries, to GrainCorp, Ltd., a major Australian bulk-grain handler. The transaction would be valued at US$655 million (A$757million). 249 A further announcement dated 13 November 2009 stated that: The two firms had acquired UMH in September 2006 from Conagra Foods, Inc., a U.S. company, and Tiger Brands of South Africa. The price they paid at the time was not disclosed, but they invested a total of $90.54 million in equity, approximately 55 percent from Castle Harlan Partners, and 45 percent from CHAMP. 250 The third category of facts concerns Castle Harlan's involvement in the acquisition of NWS. Several Castle Harlan employees were involved in the acquisition of NWS, including Harlan, Morgan and Philip. Harlan was the Chairman of the Executive Committee of Castle Harlan. Morgan was a Co-President of Castle Harlan. Philip was a Managing Director of Castle Harlan. Many of the activities took place in Australia. 251 The fourth category of facts concerns what might be described as the "practical" links between CHAMP and Castle Harlan. CHAMP's directors include Castle (the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Castle Harlan), Harlan and Morgan. Morgan relocated to Sydney in order to establish CHAMP, was its Executive Director in its early years and travelled to Australia regularly thereafter. Morgan and Harlan are members of the Executive Committee of CHAMP, which meets at least monthly in Sydney: cl 3.5(a) of the CHAMP Shareholders Agreement. The quorum and voting rights of the Executive Committee are such that Castle Harlan (through its wholly owned subsidiary, Castle Harlan Australia LLC) is able to exercise three of the six votes on the Executive Committee, even if only a single Castle Harlan representative attends an Executive Committee meeting: cll 3.5(d) and (e) of the CHAMP Shareholders Agreement. 252 As Morgan, Co-President of Castle Harlan and a Director and Executive Committee member of CHAMP, was reported as having said: [Castle Harlan's] relationship [with CHAMP] is a two way street … [w]e've learned a lot from each other and benefited from each other's relationships to the point where they're now collective relationships. 253 Greiner was cross-examined regarding a document titled "CHAMP - Financial Reporting Pack, YTD May 2011". Greiner's evidence was that he had never previously seen the document. The document stated that CHAMP had budgeted to receive $4.9 million of fees which were described as "[Castle Harlan] Advisory Fee" and had in fact received $3 million as at the date of the document. Greiner's evidence was that, in his view, those fees related to funds provided by Castle Harlan which were invested and managed by CHAMP. 254 Carrying on business in Australia is not defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act). It is amplified in s 21 of the Corporations Act and includes having a "place of business" in Australia and administering, managing or otherwise dealing with property situated in Australia as an agent, legal personal representative or trustee, whether by employees or agents or otherwise. That definition is itself not exhaustive. There remains scope for the operation and application of territorially-based concepts of carrying on business derived from the general law: Re Application of Campbell; Gebo Investments (Labuan) Ltd v Signatory Investments Pty Ltd (2005) 54 ACSR 111 at [36]. 255 At general law, carrying on a business generally involves conducting some form of commercial enterprise, systematically and regularly with a view to profit: Gebo Investments at [38]. It is unnecessary to restate the "usual elements" of a finding of carrying on business in Australia. It is, however, necessary to point out that a company may be found to carry on business in Australia even though the bulk of its activities are conducted elsewhere (Gebo Investments at [38]-[41]) and that it conducts its activities in Australia by reason of its control over or connection with an Australian company: Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433 at 530 and Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1 at [60]-[63]. 256 Castle Harlan was a co joint venturer in CHAMP, an Australian company. It (with CHAMP) raised over a billion dollars of Australian investment funds by way of multiple raisings over a period of years. It (with CHAMP) acquired and then sold for profit at least two Australian companies - Austar and UMH. Monthly Executive Committee meetings of CHAMP were held in Sydney. Indeed, Morgan moved to Sydney to establish CHAMP. Castle Harlan's activities in Australia were not isolated but were repetitive and with a view to profit. Greiner's oral evidence about Castle Harlan's role in CHAMP (that it was advisory in nature) is rejected. It was inconsistent with the contemporaneous documentary record: see [244]-[249] and [251]-[253] above. Those facts establish that Castle Harlan carried on business within Australia itself and, further or alternatively, through CHAMP.
Were Bradken and Castle Harlan in competition or likely to be in competition with each other in relation to the acquisition of NWS (ie, was the competition condition satisfied)? 257 Norcast accepted that it was required to establish under s 44ZZRD(4) of the CCA that, but for the Bid Rigging Arrangement, Bradken and Castle Harlan would have been, or would have been likely to be, in competition with each other in relation to the acquisition of the relevant services, the shares in NWS. 258 Bradken submitted that the competition condition was not satisfied for two reasons. First, neither Bradken nor Castle Harlan were included in the NWS sale process and, therefore, as a matter of fact, they were not in competition with each other in relation to the acquisition of shares in NWS. Second, even if Bradken and Castle Harlan would have been likely to be in competition with each other in relation to the acquisition of the shares in NWS, the competition condition referred to in s 44ZZRD(4) requires, as a matter of statutory construction, that competition must be in respect of a market in Australia. Both contentions are rejected. 259 The likelihood of parties being in competition with each other is a question of fact: J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 172 ALR 532 and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Pauls Ltd (2003) ATPR 41-911. As noted earlier, "likely" includes "a possibility that is not remote": s 44ZZRB. 260 Castle Harlan bid for NWS. It wanted to acquire NWS for resale at a profit. Bradken wanted to acquire NWS - it was the logical purchaser. Absent the arrangement between them, it is at least possible that Castle Harlan and Bradken would have competed with each other in bidding for NWS. 261 The second limb of this argument, that, even if Bradken and Castle Harlan would have been likely to be in competition with each other in relation to the acquisition of the shares in NWS, the competition condition referred to in s 44ZZRD(4) requires, as a matter of statutory construction, that competition must be in respect of a market in Australia is also rejected. No limitation is to be found in s 44ZZRD(4) and no limitation should be implied. If the legislature had intended to impose such a territorial limitation, then words to that effect would have been included. That conclusion is also arguably supported by authority: see ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Limited (No 2) (1991) 27 FCR 492 at 497-8, where, like s 44ZZRD(4), s 4D required parties to a proscribed contract, arrangement or understanding to be competitive with each other but did not expressly require the competition to be in a market in Australia. A territorial limitation of the kind contended for by Bradken is unnecessary and inappropriate.
Did Bradken and Castle Harlan make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding in relation to bidding for NWS (the Bid Rigging Arrangement)? 262 The Bidding Provision was a cartel provision. It is then necessary to deal with Norcast's contention that Bradken and Castle Harlan made a contract or arrangement, or arrived at an understanding, in relation to bidding for NWS (the Bid Rigging Arrangement), which contained the Bidding Provision. Bradken submitted that, at no time prior to 17 June 2011, had the parties committed to an on-sale of NWS by Castle Harlan to Bradken. 263 The relevant applicable legal principles may be summarised as follows: 1. an arrangement or understanding is apt to describe something less than a binding contract or agreement: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344 at [75]; see also Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 98 CLR 1 (Privy Council) cited with approval in Top Performance Motors Pty Ltd v Ira Berk (Queensland) Pty Ltd (1975) 5 ALR 465 at 469; 2. the elements of an arrangement or understanding are: 2.1 evidence of a consensus or meeting of the minds of the parties, under which one party or both of them must assume an obligation or give an assurance or undertaking that it will act in a certain way which may not be enforceable at law: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2008] FCA 678 at [10] and the authorities cited; 2.2 a hope or mere expectation that as a matter of fact a party will act in a certain way is not itself sufficient to establish an arrangement or understanding, even if it has been engendered by that party: ACCC v CFMEU at [10] and the authorities cited including Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) 159 FCR 452 at [45] and Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 118 FCR 236 at [79]; 2.3 the necessary consensus or meeting of minds need not involve, though it commonly will in fact embody, a reciprocity of obligations: ACCC v CFMEU at [10] and the authorities cited; 2.4 in relation to whether or not mutual obligation is a necessary ingredient of an arrangement or understanding, it has been suggested that it is difficult to envisage circumstances that would be an understanding within s 45 of the TPA involving the commitment by one party without some reciprocal obligation by the other party: Trade Practices Commission v Service Station Association Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 206 at 230-1 and 238. That statement applies equally to ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK of the CCA; 2.5 an arrangement may be informal as well as unenforceable with the parties free to withdraw from it or to act inconsistently with it, notwithstanding their adoption of it: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Lutovi Investments Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 434 at 444; 3. whether there is a difference between an arrangement and an understanding has not been resolved: Trade Practices Commission v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1985) 6 FCR 1 at 22-6 but cf Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Medical Association Western Australia Branch Inc (2003) 199 ALR 423 at 460. However, the concept of an understanding is broad and flexible: cf L Grollo & Co Pty Ltd v Nu-Statt Decorating Pty Ltd (1978) 34 FLR 81 at 89 and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 183 at [54]; 4. whether or not an arrangement or understanding has been reached will depend on the view formed of all of the circumstances. A meeting of minds may be proved by independent facts and from inferences drawn from primary facts including, without limitation, evidence of joint action by the parties in relation to relevant matters, evidence of parallel conduct and evidence of collusion between the parties. As Isaacs J said in R v Associated Northern Collieries (1911) 14 CLR 387 at 400: Community of purpose may be proved by independent facts, but it need not be. If the other defendant is shown to be committing other acts, tending to the same end, then though primarily each set of acts is attributable to the person whose acts they are, and to him alone, there may be such a concurrence of time, character, direction and result as naturally to lead to the inference that these separate acts were the outcome of pre-concert, or some mutual contemporaneous engagement, or that they were themselves the manifestations of mutual consent to carry out a common purpose, thus forming as well as evidencing a combination to effect the one object towards which the separate acts are found to converge. See also News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited (1996) 64 FCR 410 at 573-4. 264 However, where proof of an arrangement or understanding rests on inferences to be drawn from primary facts, it is not sufficient for the circumstances to give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability: Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 359-60. 265 In the present case, the evidence establishes that Castle Harlan and Bradken entered into the Bid Rigging Arrangement no later than 8 March 2011. The Bid Rigging Arrangement was informal and unenforceable. Either party could withdraw from it or even act inconsistently with it. Hodges himself contemplated doing so in mid-June of 2011: see [188] above. But that does not detract from the finding that the Bid Rigging Arrangement: 1. was entered into by Castle Harlan and Bradken; and 2. was given effect to by Castle Harlan and Bradken. 266 The finding that Castle Harlan and Bradken entered into the Bid Rigging Arrangement no later than 8 March 2011 is founded on direct and express communications between the parties to the arrangement, namely Castle Harlan and Bradken: see [84], [86], [90], [95], [96], [100], [103], [104], [106] and [107] above. 267 Even if, contrary to the view formed, those direct and express communications were insufficient to found a finding that Castle Harlan and Bradken entered into the Bid Rigging Arrangement no later than 8 March 2011, that finding is open having regard to the inferences to be drawn from the circumstances that existed: cf News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited at 573-4 citing R v Associated Northern Collieries at 400. 268 The circumstances included: 1. Bradken's interest in acquiring NWS: see [37], [38], [39], [42], [44], [45], [49], [51], [52], [60], [71], [79], [95], [103]-[106] and [111] above; 2. that Bradken knew that Pala had launched a sale process for NWS: [79], [81], [82] and [83]; 3. Bradken's response to becoming aware that Pala had launched a sale process for NWS was first to contact Castle Harlan to tell it about the NWS sales process and that Bradken was interested in acquiring NWS and then to contact Merrill Lynch: see [84]-[94] above; 4. upon being told about the NWS sales process and that Bradken was interested in acquiring NWS (see (3) above), Castle Harlan immediately took steps to enter the sales process and having done so, immediately provided information it obtained from that process to Bradken: see [97], [100], [104], [110], [112], [113], [118]-[121], [126]-[128], [146] and [148] above; 5. despite itself not entering the sales process, Bradken undertook and obtained detailed analyses of NWS to ascertain what NWS might be worth, including from Merrill Lynch, which it provided to Castle Harlan: see [87], [88], [93], [94], [99], [101]-[103], [105], [108], [123], [126]-[128], [133], [144]-[147], [150], [162] and [179] above; 6. Hodges maintained control over the number and identity of those who knew about Bradken's interest and indirect participation in the sale process: see [94], [114], [126], [127], [132] and [160] above; 7. Bradken made enquiries about the cost Bradken might have to pay to Castle Harlan if Castle Harlan should succeed in acquiring NWS and Bradken then acquired NWS from Castle Harlan: see [105] and [107] above; 8. Castle Harlan negotiated an amendment to the NDA with UBS to remove the need for Castle Harlan to disclose the identity of its "advisers". The only adviser (at that time) was Bradken: see [112]-[114] above; 9. Bradken took steps to keep its involvement in the NWS sales process a secret: see [112], [113], [114], [118]-[122], [126], [127], [156], [171] and [174] above; 10. Castle Harlan was concerned about its reputational risk from its involvement in the "arrangement" and the "paper trail" and sought indemnities to protect itself: see [107], [119], [122], [129], [130], [181], [182], [183], [192], [193] and [194] above; 11. immediately prior to making the initial bid, Bradken assisted Castle Harlan to analyse the value of NWS: see [128], [131] and [133] above; 12. Bradken knew the initial bid was going in. It is to be inferred that Bradken knew the contents of the bid and it was for that reason that Bradken wanted to know the result: see [135], [136] and [137] above; 13. Bradken maintained direct contact with Castle Harlan at all relevant times and that included contact which referred, directly or indirectly, to the Bid Rigging Arrangement: see [84], [86], [90], [95], [96], [103], [104], [106]-[108], [110], [113], [115], [128]-[131], [133], [135]-[138], [143], [146], [149], [150], [155], [161]-[163], [167], [168], [174]-[178] and [181]-[197] above; 14. Bradken's adviser, Merrill Lynch, was aware of the Bid Rigging Arrangement: see [142] above; 15. Bradken continued to assist Castle Harlan in submitting the Final Offer to Pala: see [143], [144], [146], [149], [150], [155], [161], [162], [163] and [168eg] above; 16. prior to the submission of Castle Harlan's Final Offer, Bradken sought funding advice from Merrill Lynch (see [145] above), who presented to the Board of Bradken (see [147] above), and the Board subsequently authorised a capital raising: see [165] above; 17. Castle Harlan made false statements to NWS and its representatives about its involvement with Bradken in the NWS sales process: see [154] and [157]-[159] above; 18. on 2 June 2011, the day after Castle Harlan and Norcast entered into exclusive negotiations, Bradken Operations and Castle Harlan entered into a confidentiality agreement: see [174] above; 19. in a paper prepared for the 17 June 2011 Board meeting, Hodges and Ward misrepresented the nature of Bradken's involvement in the acquisition of NWS, either because they knew that its involvement would arouse the Board members' concerns or because they planned to discuss the true nature of the arrangement during the meeting without leaving a "paper trail": see [195] above; 20. Bradken was concerned that its arrangement with Castle Harlan would need to be disclosed to the ASX before Castle Harlan completed its acquisition of NWS and therefore structured the on-sale of NWS to avoid that obligation: see [176] and [177] above; 21. on 17 June 2011: 21.1 Bradken Operations entered into the deposit agreement with Castle Harlan: see [199] above; and 21.2 Norcast and BC entered into the SPA whereby BC agreed to pay US$190 million for all the shares in NWS: see [200] above; 22. on 22 June 2011, Bradken executed a side agreement which committed it to the terms of the SGPA between Bradken Operations and Castle Harlan that would be executed on closing between Norcast and Castle Harlan: see [201] above; 23. on 5 July 2011, Bradken drafted false answers to questions about the timing of its involvement in the sale of NWS: see [202] above; and 24. on 6 July 2011: 24.1 Bradken Operations executed the SGPA with BC, whereby Bradken Operations subscribed for 89.7% of the shares in BC and acquired the right to call for the remaining shares in BC; 24.2 Pala closed the sale of NWS to BC at US$190 million; 24.3 Bradken Operations exercised its right and acquired the remaining shares in BC; and 24.4 the total amount paid to Castle Harlan entities by Bradken was US$212.4 million, see [205] above. 269 Bradken's submissions, which addressed the state of an agreement regarding the eventual on-sale of NWS by Castle Harlan to Bradken, were beside the point. The existence of the Bid Rigging Arrangement did not depend upon the parties having reached a concluded agreement regarding the on-sale of NWS to Bradken. Further, each of the matters listed in [268] above is evidence not only of the existence of the Bid Rigging Arrangement, but to the extent that those matters occurred after 8 March 2011, is evidence of Bradken and Castle Harlan giving effect to the Bid Rigging Arrangement.
Did the Bid Rigging Arrangement contain a provision which had the purpose of directly or indirectly ensuring that in the event of a request for bids in relation to supply or acquisition of goods or services, one party would bid but the other would not (ie, was the purpose condition satisfied)? 270 The requirement in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) that a cartel provision must relate to a request for bids "in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services" was considered earlier: see [234]-[241] above. However, the purpose condition also draws attention to the purpose of the alleged cartel provision (in this case, the Bidding Provision). 271 Bradken submitted that there were two matters which precluded a finding that the purpose condition in s 44ZZRD(3)(c) was satisfied. First, Bradken submitted that the purpose condition required that the Court must find that the operative, subjective purpose of the parties to the Bid Rigging Arrangement was to ensure that, in the event of a request for bids, one party bid but the other did not. Second, Bradken further submitted that the requirement of "ensuring that … one or more parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding bid, but one or more other parties do not" (emphasis added) could not be satisfied unless there was a degree of reciprocity to the Bid Rigging Arrangement. 272 In relation to the first submission, Bradken submitted that none of the relevant individuals at Bradken or Castle Harlan had the subjective, operative purpose of entering into an arrangement that had the objective of ensuring that Bradken would not bid, but instead Castle Harlan would bid, for NWS. In Bradken's submission, Hodges and Greiner believed that Bradken had been excluded. The approach to Castle Harlan was therefore made simply to preserve the possibility of an acquisition of NWS at some point in the future. 273 I accept that the purpose condition, which requires that "the provision [have] the purpose of directly or indirectly … ensuring that in the event of a request for bids in relation to the supply or acquisition of goods or services … one or more parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding bid, but one or more other parties do not", directs the Court to consider the subjective, operative purpose of the parties to the relevant arrangement: EM at [1.33]-[1.34]; News Limited v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited (2003) 215 CLR 563 at [18], [43], [63] and [212] and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TF Woolam & Son Pty Ltd (2011) 196 FCR 212 at [61]ff. The subjective, operative purpose may be inferred, however, from the nature of the arrangement, the circumstances in which it was made and its likely effect: News Limited v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited at [44] and News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited at 576. 274 Here, the parties to the Bid Rigging Arrangement were Bradken and Castle Harlan. The relevant subjective, operative purposes to be considered were those of Hodges, Greiner, Harlan and Morgan, which could be imputed to their respective corporate principals. 275 I reject Bradken's contention that Hodges and Greiner did not have a purpose of ensuring that Bradken would not bid, but instead Castle Harlan would bid, for NWS. As Gleeson CJ held in News Limited v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited at [18], "[t]he purpose of conduct is the end sought to be accomplished by the conduct". The belief that Bradken had been excluded from the NWS sales process is not inconsistent with that purpose. In fact, it is entirely consistent with that belief, and a logical extension of it, that Hodges and Greiner would seek to achieve a situation whereby another party (namely Castle Harlan) would lodge a bid on Bradken's behalf. A natural corollary of such a belief is that Bradken would not lodge a bid itself. As considered at [104] above, Hodges said on 5 March 2011 that he was "definitely hoping [Castle Harlan] can bid for the business". Indeed, it must be recalled that Bradken's submission proceeded on the stated premise that Castle Harlan would bid for NWS. That is not surprising because the evidence demonstrated that was their precise stated purpose. Once it is understood that Bradken and Castle Harlan intended that Castle Harlan would bid, it is inconceivable that Hodges would have made that statement on 5 March 2011 while still hoping that Bradken would also bid. It is equally inconceivable that Castle Harlan would have agreed to enter the NWS sale process, at Bradken's suggestion and with Bradken's assistance, in circumstances where Bradken still reserved the right to itself bid for NWS. Finally, Bradken's contention that the Court should accept Hodges' oral evidence that he was open to making a bid if Bradken had been included in the process is rejected. It was self serving, speculative and inconsistent with the contemporaneous documentary evidence: see, by way of example, [84], [86] and [89] above. 276 Further, Greiner's subjective, operative purpose was equally to ensure that Castle Harlan made a bid: see [86], [89], [90], [100], [104]-[107], [168], [186] and [187] above. Again, as a corollary to that purpose and consistent with his stated belief that Bradken had been excluded, I accept that Greiner's purpose was also to ensure that Bradken did not bid. 277 Harlan and Morgan were not called to give evidence. It is open to the Court to infer, based on the nature of the arrangement, the circumstances in which it was made and its likely effect, that their subjective, operative purposes, to be imputed to Castle Harlan, were that Castle Harlan would bid for NWS. As mentioned above, it is simply inconceivable that they would hold that purpose consistent with anything other than a desire to ensure that Bradken did not bid. 278 In relation to the second submission, I have already considered the contention that an arrangement (for the purpose of s 44ZZRD(3)) requires a degree of reciprocity: see [263] and [265] above. Bradken's submission is rejected. As set out above, the purpose of the Bidding Provision was to "[ensure] that in the event of a request for bids … one or more parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding bid, but one or more other parties [did] not".
Does s 44ZZRU of the CCA apply with the result that the cartel conduct prohibitions in ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK are not engaged? 279 The CCA has created exceptions that carve out conduct from the operation of the cartel provisions where that conduct is governed by another prohibition in the CCA. One of the anti-overlap exceptions concerns the acquisition of shares or assets. The overlap provision is ss 44ZZRU. It relevantly provides: (1) Sections 44ZZRF, 44ZZRG, 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK do not apply in relation to a contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel provision, in so far as the cartel provision provides directly or indirectly for the acquisition of: (a) any shares in the capital of a body corporate; or (b) any assets of a person. … (Emphasis added.) The prohibitions under s 45(2) against exclusionary provisions and the substantially lessening of competition provisions are subject to a similar exception: s 45(7) and EM at [4.40]-[4.41]. 280 The acquisition of shares or assets exceptions (ss 44ZZRU and 45(7)) are intended to ensure that mergers and acquisitions are subject to s 50 of the CCA and not the cartel provisions (Div 1 of Pt IV) or other anti-competitive agreements provisions (s 45): SA Brewing Holdings Ltd v Baxt (1989) 23 FCR 357 at 372. As a result, s 44ZZRU provides that the prohibitions in ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK do not apply in relation to a contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel provision in so far as the cartel provision provides directly or indirectly for the acquisition of shares in the capital of a company. Section 44ZZRU "define[s] a boundary between the fields of operation" of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK and s 50: SA Brewing at 372. 281 A number of matters should be noted. First, s 44ZZRU expressly provides for the primacy of the prohibition against a contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel provision. The carve out from the prohibition in s 44ZZRU is then set out. It is limited in two respects. It is limited to a contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel provision in so far as the cartel provision provides directly or indirectly for the acquisition of shares in the capital of a company. In other words, the prohibition continues to apply to balance of the contract, arrangement or understanding containing a cartel provision except to the extent that the cartel provision provides directly or indirectly for the acquisition of shares in the capital of a company. The language of the section is "provides" not "relates to". It is specific in its terms. 282 Next, the carve out is limited by the fact that the application of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK to the relevant contract, arrangement or understanding is preserved by the words "in so far as". So long as the relevant contract, arrangement or understanding can stand with the excluded provision being severed, the balance can and will contravene those prohibitions: SA Brewing at 372. That construction is consistent with the structure of the CCA that it is s 50 which primarily regulates anti-competitive acquisitions. Put another way, matters that involve a substantial lessening of competition - completed acquisitions of shares - should remain subject to s 50. Other matters - such as the rigging of bids - remain and should remain subject to Div 1 of Pt IV. 283 In applying the s 44ZZRU exception to alleged cartel conduct, a three step analysis may be appropriate: 1. identify the cartel provision in the contract, arrangement or understanding; 2. identify the provision that provides directly or indirectly for the acquisition of the NWS shares; and 3. determine whether the cartel provision in (1) is severable from the provision in (2). See Beaton-Wells, C and Fisse, B, Australian Cartel Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 301 and SA Brewing at 372. 284 In the present case, the cartel provision (called the Bidding Provision) was, and formed part of, the Bid Rigging Arrangement. It was a provision that Castle Harlan would bid for the NWS shares and Bradken would not bid. The provisions that provided directly for the acquisition of the NWS shares by Castle Harlan and Bradken were contained in the SPA and in the SGPA, respectively. Put another way, at the time of the making of the Bid Rigging Arrangement, no provision in that arrangement or understanding between Castle Harlan and Bradken could have provided directly or indirectly for the acquisition of shares. Neither of them owned the NWS shares at that time. The question which arises is whether the Bidding Provision provided "indirectly" for the acquisition of the NWS shares. The answer is no. The Bidding Provision related to the two stages of the NWS sales process (see [72] above), not to the eventual acquisition of the shares. Once stage 2 was complete, and Castle Harlan had lodged a final bid and Bradken had not, the work of the Bidding Provision was complete. For the same reason, s 50 did not and could not apply to the Bidding Provision in the Bid Rigging Arrangement - the provision did not directly or indirectly effect any acquisition. In the present case, the third step in the analysis does not arise.
Is Norcast able to rely upon the conduct of Bradken and Castle Harlan engaged in outside of Australia and, further, can Norcast establish that Castle Harlan was carrying on business within Australia (see s 5 of the CCA)? 285 The reach of s 5 of the CCA has been addressed earlier: see [230]-[231] above. Further, and for the purpose of its claim under s 82 of the CCA, the Minister provided consent for Norcast to rely upon conduct engaged in outside of Australia: see [231] above. For those reasons, Norcast is able to rely upon the conduct of Bradken and Castle Harlan engaged in outside of Australia. Moreover, Norcast established that Castle Harlan was carrying on business in Australia: see [242]-[256] above.
Was Bradken a person involved in Castle Harlan's contraventions within the meaning of s 75B of the CCA? Were Greiner and/or Hodges involved in either or both of Bradken and/or Castle Harlan's contraventions? 286 Norcast alleged that Bradken was involved (within the meaning of s 75B of the CCA) in Castle Harlan's contraventions of ss 44ZZRJ and/or 44ZZRK and that Greiner and Hodges were involved (within the meaning of s 75B of the CCA) in one or both of Bradken's and Castle Harlan's contraventions of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK. 287 As mentioned above, there can be no finding of accessorial liability where the primary contravention is not established. Here, the primary contravention has been established. It is then necessary to consider Norcast's contentions about Bradken's, Greiner's and Hodges' involvements in the Bid Rigging Arrangement. 288 Section 75B is procedural. It provides: (1) A reference in this Part to a person involved in a contravention of a provision of Part IV or IVB, or of section 95AZN, shall be read as a reference to a person who: … (c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or … 289 Section 75B extends the operation of other provisions including ss 82 (damages) and 87 (other orders). A person will only be regarded as involved in a contravention within the meaning of s 75B if the person intentionally participated in the contravention. A person includes a body corporate: s 2C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). Intentional participation requires actual, not constructive, knowledge of the essential matters that make up the contravention: Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 at 4-5; Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 and Quinlivan v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2004) 160 FCR 1 at [9]. There are two important qualifications. It is unnecessary to prove that the respondent knew that his or her actual participation was a breach of the CCA and, secondly, where there is a combination of suspicious circumstances and a failure to make enquiry, it may be possible to infer knowledge: Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Merry at 5. Norcast's amended pleading of knowledge included some particulars of constructive knowledge. Constructive knowledge is not sufficient and those claims are rejected. Of course, the pleading of actual knowledge is unaffected. 290 The Respondents submitted that none of them were involved in the relevant contraventions. They relied upon two grounds. First, that the principal Bid Rigging Arrangement claim failed. It is not in dispute that a claim for accessorial liability must fail if the primary claim is not maintainable: Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 118 FCR 236 at [154]. Here, the claim succeeds: see [208]-[278] above. 291 If the principal Bid Rigging Arrangement claim was maintainable (and it is), Bradken did not submit that there was any other ground or grounds tending against a finding that it knowingly or intentionally participated in Castle Harlan's contraventions of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK. That is not surprising. If (as I have found) there was a principal contravention constituted by Bradken's and Castle Harlan's conduct in making and giving effect to the Bid Rigging Arrangement, Bradken was necessarily involved (within the meaning of s 75B of the CCA) in Castle Harlan's contraventions (and vice versa). Bradken's conduct, referred to above, establishes it had knowledge of the essential elements of Castle Harlan's contraventions. 292 It is then necessary to deal with Greiner and Hodges. The second ground relied upon by them was that neither of them knowingly or intentionally participated in any contravention by Castle Harlan or Bradken "in the sense of them having actual knowledge of the essential elements that make up the alleged contravention and a level of involvement". These contentions are rejected. 293 Each knew of the essential facts and had more to do with the subject matter of the complaint constituting the contravention than simply having some knowledge of the matter: cf Yorke v Lucas at 670. 294 In the case of Greiner, his role and knowledge included that: 1. Greiner was Bradken's Chairman and a non-executive director and Deputy Chairman of CHAMP (see [29] above) and, as Chairman of Bradken, Greiner knew NWS was a strategic acquisition opportunity for Bradken: see [42] above; 2. in February 2011, Hodges told Greiner NWS was for sale. He then agreed with Hodges that Bradken would not bid but would tell Castle Harlan so that Castle Harlan would be interested in the sale: see [86] above; 3. he made the initial contact with Morgan at Castle Harlan about NWS: see [90] above; 4. he obtained the NWS teaser from Morgan and told Morgan he looked forward to discussing further when Morgan received the IM: see [100] above; 5. he had knowledge of critical steps including in early March 2011, when he and Hodges were asked by Morgan whether the "talk further on [NWS]" should wait for the IM to arrive: see [104] above. Hodges responded two minutes later to Morgan and Greiner - "[y]es definitely hoping [Castle Harlan] can bid for the business". Thirty five minutes later, Greiner replied to Morgan asking him to call him over the weekend as it "might cut thru a bit": see [104] above; 6. by 7 March 2011, Greiner had received a financial analysis concerning NWS which Hodges explained to Greiner and then asked "[c]an we discuss how we might work with [Castle Harlan] on this as I think this is best, likely only chance": see [105] above. The idea that Bradken had to "work with" Castle Harlan was discussed between Hodges and Greiner at about this time and, in particular, they discussed the minimum cost that Bradken might have to pay to Castle Harlan should Castle Harlan succeed in acquiring NWS and Bradken then acquired NWS from Castle Harlan; 7. to facilitate the arrangement, on 8 March 2011, Greiner met with Harlan in Sydney. Greiner could not recall the precise terms of the conversation but did recall that Harlan said that he would speak with Morgan and said words to the effect that he would "be keeping an eye on [NWS], and hope[d] … some mutually satisfactory deal [could] be done": see [106] above. Next, Greiner met with Ferris, the Chairman of CHAMP, to seek to ascertain how much the arrangement was going to cost Bradken: see [107] above. Then, Greiner immediately reported to Hodges on his discussion with Harlan: see [107] above. Greiner told Hodges that Harlan had said that Castle Harlan "would be happy to do a transaction of any sort with Bradken and had complete faith in [Greiner] and [Hodges]". There were two issues - reputational risk to Castle Harlan associated with the arrangement that Hodges and Greiner had discussed with Castle Harlan and the cost of Castle Harlan's involvement. Greiner told Hodges that the primary discussion was to be between Hodges and Morgan: see [107] above; 8. on 20 March 2011, Greiner was told by Hodges that there were "information issues for Bradken": see [121] above. These were solved: see [127] above; 9. Greiner attended the Bradken Board meeting on 21 April 2011 when the NWS acquisition was considered. An analysis undertaken by Merrill Lynch was presented to the Board. It was detailed. The analysis was predicated upon a NWS "enterprise value" of between $200 to $230 million and "fees and expenses" of $20 million. Greiner's evidence was that he could not recall where Merrill Lynch had obtained the figures from. The presentation begins with a statement that: "Neutron assumptions and synergies based on Bradken management forecasts": see [147] above; 10. on 14 May 2011, Greiner's (and Hodges') roles and involvement were clear. Greiner told Hodges that Morgan was concerned if Greiner and Hodges "both go under a bus": see [160] above; 11. on 27 May 2011, the day the final bids for NWS were due, Greiner sought confirmation from Harlan that "the [Castle Harlan]/Bradken arrangements are satisfactory": see [168] above; and 12. Greiner was the person who resolved the "pens down" position adopted by Castle Harlan and ensured that the deal proceeded: see [185]-[186] above. Put simply, Greiner was involved and had knowledge of the essential elements from the start to the finish. 295 In the case of Hodges, his role and knowledge was more extensive. He was one of the architects (along with Greiner) of the arrangement (see [84]-[86] above) and then the principal who controlled and directed the arrangement. His control extended to every aspect of the arrangement - personnel (see [94], [114], [126], [127], [132] and [160] above), the steps taken and not taken (see [79], [84]-[87], [89], [93]-[96], [98]-[105], [108], [110]-[115], [118], [120], [121], [124]-[127], [132], [138], [139], [142], [145], [149], [150], [162], [165], [167], [176], [179], [180], [185], [188], [192]-[195], [196]-[199], [202] and [205] above) and the secrecy not only of the arrangement itself but also of the distribution of information Bradken obtained from Castle Harlan (see [100], [114], [118]-[122], [126] and [127] above). 296 The fact that proceedings were not commenced against Castle Harlan does not preclude the Court making appropriate findings and orders against Greiner and Hodges: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Limited (2001) 110 FCR 1 and Matheson Engineers Pty Ltd v El Raghy (1992) 37 FCR 6. 297 Accordingly, I find that each of Greiner and Hodges were involved (within the meaning of s 75B of the CCA) in both Castle Harlan's and Bradken's contraventions of ss 44ZZRJ and 44ZZRK.
What was Norcast's loss and damage? 298 Norcast claimed damages from the Respondents. Norcast submitted that the damages were to be quantified as the difference between the amount that Norcast received for its sale of the shares in NWS (US$190 million) and the amount that Bradken, as the likely highest bidder, but for the contraventions, would have agreed to pay to acquire those shares directly from Norcast. Norcast quantified that difference as at least equal to the US$22.4 million premium Bradken agreed to pay and did in fact pay to Castle Harlan. 299 Norcast further submitted that the price may well have been considerably higher, having regard to the fact that Bradken had valued NWS at more than A$300 million, on the basis of $40 million in additional earnings from synergies which Bradken expected to be able to capture post-acquisition and that, according to Morgan, the US$190 million base price agreed with Norcast was "at least $10m below the top of [Hodges'] range". 300 The Respondents filed extensive submissions to the effect that Norcast suffered no loss or damage. 301 Section 82 has at least five discrete elements: Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Limited (1998) 196 CLR 494 at [95]. One element is that only a person who has suffered loss or damage may rely on the section: I & L Securities Pty Limited v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Limited (2002) 210 CLR 109 at [42]-[45]. Another element is the causal requirement that the injury be sustained by the contravention: Marks at [95]. If the Court finds that damage has occurred, it must do its best to quantify the loss even if a degree of speculation and guess work is involved: Enzed Holdings Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd (1984) 57 ALR 167 at 183. Of course, loss or damage includes economic or financial loss as well consequential loss which is a direct result of the conduct in question: Wardley Australia Limited v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 and Frith v Gold Coast Mineral Springs Pty Ltd (1983) 65 FLR 213 at 232. 302 What then is the position here? The Respondents submitted that Norcast suffered no loss or damage because it was happy with the bid it received from Castle Harlan, Norcast would not have otherwise achieved a higher price and Bradken would not have agreed to pay more than US$190 million. I reject those contentions. 303 Damages are assessed at the difference between the US$212.4 million including costs and expenses which Bradken did in fact pay to acquire NWS and the US$190 million Norcast received from Castle Harlan. In assessing the loss or damage, there is necessarily a degree of estimation. However, that assessment proceeds on the basis of some established facts. First, the sale process was competitive. Despite Bradken's assertions to the contrary, an assessment of loss or damage should not take into account the possibility that Bradken would have been able to "discover" the other bids before making its own bid in a competitive bid process. Second, the bidding process was confidential. As a result, the contention that underpinned much of this section of Bradken's submissions, that it would have known that US$190 million was the price against which it had to bid, falls away. Third, as the factual analysis demonstrates, there were significant strategic considerations (including synergies) for Bradken in seeking to acquire the business: see [37], [38], [42], [88], [99] and [101]-[104] above. Even Greiner acknowledged that because there were synergies between Bradken's and NWS' businesses, Bradken was able to be "a little more aggressive" in terms of the multiple of NWS' EBITDA which it was prepared to offer. 304 Moreover: 1. as early as March 2011, Hodges told his staff that he would have to pay nearly $200 million to purchase NWS: see [101] above. That was not an uninformed statement. Hodges knew in November 2010 that Pala had been approached with a "knock out offer" for NWS in the mid $170 millions which led to Pala to consider "exiting by a selective process": see [62] above; 2. the US$190 million price paid by Castle Harlan "was at least $10m below the top of [Hodges'] range": see [189] above; 3. a price of US$212.4 million was within the UBS proposed range of US$180 million to US$220 million; 4. in its presentation to the Bradken Board, prepared on instructions from Bradken management, Merrill Lynch included a range of US$200 million to US$230 million as the range of potential prices for the NWS acquisition: see [147] above; 5. a price of US$212.4 million was value accretive to Bradken; 6. in Greiner's view, the price of US$212.4 million was "a good deal" for Bradken; and 7. during cross-examination, Hodges would not swear that he would not have paid US$212.4 million to Norcast directly. 305 Accordingly, I find that Norcast suffered loss or damage and assess that loss or damage at US$22.4 million (being the difference between the US$212.4 million including costs and expenses which Bradken did in fact pay to acquire NWS and the US$190 million Norcast received from Castle Harlan).
E. MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT CLAIMS 306 Norcast relied upon three instances of alleged misleading or deceptive conduct. First, Norcast relied upon Bradken's silence about the Bidding Provision, the back to back sale arrangement with Castle Harlan and the fact that it and Castle Harlan were cooperating for the purpose of acquiring NWS, between late February 2011 and 6 July 2011. Second, Norcast submitted that Castle Harlan's silence as to those matters also constituted misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the ACL. 307 Finally, Norcast submitted that Castle Harlan made the following express representations which were misleading or deceptive: 1. on 12 or 13 May 2011 that it did not have plans to sell NWS to Bradken and that it would not do so; and 2. on 27 May 2011 that: 2.1 the final bid was made on behalf of Castle Harlan and its associated entities; 2.2 Castle Harlan intended that the entity to acquire the shares in NWS would be a corporation controlled in the sole investment discretion of Castle Harlan's associated entities; 2.3 the entity to acquire the shares in NWS would be a corporation controlled in the sole investment discretion of Castle Harlan's associated entities; 2.4 Castle Harlan and its associated entities did not expect to require, or intend to obtain, any funding for the acquisition of the shares in NWS from non-associated entities of Castle Harlan; and 2.5 Castle Harlan and its associated entities would not require, and would not obtain, any funding for the acquisition of the shares in NWS from non-associated entities of Castle Harlan, (collectively, the Representations). 308 In relation to the claims made against Castle Harlan, Norcast alleged that Bradken, Greiner and Hodges were persons involved within the meaning of s 2(1) of the ACL. Norcast further alleged that each of Greiner and Hodges were persons involved with Bradken's misleading or deceptive conduct within the meaning of s 2(1) of the ACL.
Did Bradken engage in misleading or deceptive conduct by its silence? 309 Silence may amount to misleading or deceptive conduct. The categories of conduct are not closed. As Black CJ said in Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 at 32: Silence is to be assessed as a circumstance like any other. To say this is certainly not to impose any general duty of disclosure; the question is simply whether, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, there has been conduct that is misleading or deceptive or that is likely to mislead or deceive. See also Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Limited (2010) 241 CLR 357 at [16]-[18]. 310 A duty to disclose is not essential in order to establish that silence constitutes misleading or deceptive conduct: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Mehta (1991) 23 NSWLR 84 at 88. However, unless there is a duty to disclose relevant facts, or the circumstances are such that there is a reasonable expectation that a relevant fact would be disclosed if it exists, it is difficult for silence to constitute misleading or deceptive conduct. 311 In Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v Hambros Australia Limited (1992) 39 FCR 97 at 114, Hill J put it in the following terms: Obviously, it is difficult to see how a mere silence could, of itself, constitute conduct which is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. However, if the circumstances are such that a person is entitled to believe that a relevant matter affecting him or her adversely would, if it existed, be communicated, then the failure to so communicate it may constitute conduct which is misleading or deceptive because the person who ultimately may act to his or her detriment is entitled to infer from the silence that no danger of detriment existed. 312 In the context of a bargaining process, full disclosure in commercial negotiations is not necessarily required: cf Lam v Ausintel Investments Australia Pty Ltd (1989) 97 FLR 458 at 475. Instead, the purpose of s 18 is to ensure that the bargaining process is not viewed as a licence to deceive: CCP Australian Airships Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (2005) ATPR 42-042 at [33] citing Poseidon Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1991) 105 ALR 25 at 26. 313 In this context, ss 4(2)(a) and (c) of the CCA are sometimes relevant. They provide that: (a) a reference to engaging in conduct shall be read as a reference to doing or refusing to do any act, including the making of, or the giving effect to a provision of, a contract or arrangement, the arriving at, or the giving effect to a provision of, an understanding or the requiring of the giving of, or the giving of, a covenant; … (c) a reference to refusing to do an act includes a reference to: (i) refraining (otherwise than inadvertently) from doing that act; or (ii) making it known that that act will not be done; and … Inadvertence does not invoke these provisions; the relevant refusing or refraining must be engaged in deliberately: Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 477. 314 Bradken submitted that neither it nor Castle Harlan engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by silence because neither was obliged to disclose Bradken's identity as a potential purchaser of NWS. As noted earlier, that is not the test. Further, that was not the alleged misrepresentation pleaded by Norcast: see [306] above. 315 The question is whether, by its silence, Bradken failed to disclose the three matters referred to at [306] above so as to "deceive" Norcast. The answer is yes. 316 Bradken knew of the NWS sale process but did not seek to enter it: see [79] above. With that knowledge, Bradken took steps to ensure that Norcast did not learn of the "connection" between Castle Harlan and Bradken in relation to Castle Harlan's acquisition of NWS: see [118]-[122], [126] and [127] above. The steps were deliberate and designed to deceive Norcast. Bradken and Castle Harlan reached an arrangement or understanding, the Bid Rigging Arrangement, which included the Bidding Provision. Bradken and Castle Harlan cooperated and partnered for the purposes of acquiring NWS. The acquisition of NWS was Hodges' "plan" or "ultimate goal" and why he arranged or at least "encouraged" Castle Harlan to bid. The cooperation and partnering included (but was not limited to): 1. entering into the Bid Rigging Arrangement: see [265]-[269] above; 2. reviewing and analysing confidential due diligence materials at Castle Harlan's offices in circumstances where Bradken knew that its use of those materials was ostensibly restricted to assisting Castle Harlan to acquire NWS: see [118]-[122], [126], [127] and [129] above; 3. selecting the identity of the foundry consultant to accompany Castle Harlan on the site visits and then ensuring that the consultant was not made aware of the connection between Castle Harlan and Bradken: see [126] and [127] above; 4. taking steps to reduce the "paper trail" which documented the extent of the cooperation and partnering: see [119] and [149] above; and 5. seeking to avoid entering into an agreement with, or making a payment to, Castle Harlan which would require disclosure to the market, until after Castle Harlan had acquired NWS: see [177], [186], [202] and [203] above. 317 Those deliberate and deceptive steps were taken by Bradken to prevent disclosure of its direct involvement in Castle Harlan's acquisition of NWS. In doing so, by its silence, Bradken represented that it was not involved in Castle Harlan's acquisition of NWS. That conduct was misleading and deceptive. Contrary to Bradken's contention, the claim for misleading or deceptive conduct was not predicated on Norcast establishing the existence of the Bid Rigging Arrangement. Even in the absence of the Bid Rigging Arrangement, in all the circumstances, Bradken and Castle Harlan's silence constituted misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of the ACL. 318 Bradken further submitted that Bradken's silence was not misleading or deceptive in circumstances where Norcast knew that it was not uncommon for a private equity business to resell a company it had acquired. Norcast's general awareness of the likelihood that Castle Harlan might, at some time in the future, sell NWS cannot and does not cure Bradken's misleading or deceptive conduct by silence.
Did Castle Harlan engage in misleading or deceptive conduct? 319 Two forms of misleading or deceptive conduct were alleged against Castle Harlan - silence and positive representations. 320 First, Castle Harlan, by its silence, failed to disclose facts and matters so as to "deceive" Norcast. Castle Harlan itself took steps to ensure that Norcast did not learn of the "connection" between Castle Harlan and Bradken: see [112], [118], [119], [154], [157] and [159] above. Again, those steps were deliberate and designed to deceive Norcast. Those deliberate and deceptive steps were taken by Castle Harlan to prevent disclosure of the Bidding Provision and of Bradken's direct involvement in Castle Harlan's acquisition of NWS. In doing so, Castle Harlan represented that there was no arrangement or understanding between it and Bradken and that Bradken was not involved in its acquisition of NWS. That conduct was misleading and deceptive. 321 Second, the positive representations (the Representations) can be divided into two categories: those made by Morgan during the site visits to Singapore and Malaysia on 12 or 13 May 2011 and those made in the Final Bid Letter. In each case, Bradken submitted that the Representations were not made and, if they were, they were misleading or deceptive. 322 The evidence established that Castle Harlan made the Representations: see [157]-[159] above (in relation to the site visits in Singapore and Malaysia) and [171] (in relation to the contents of the Final Bid Letter). I reject Bradken's submission that Morgan's responses on 12 or 13 May 2011 did not convey that Castle Harlan did not have plans to sell NWS to Bradken and that it would not do so. The representations were conveyed over the course of a discussion. In answer to a question from Wilson as to whether Castle Harlan had plans or intentions to sell NWS, Morgan responded that Castle Harlan did not. That answer was false. In the context of Morgan's false answer to that question, Wilson further asked whether Castle Harlan was planning to sell NWS to Bradken. Bradken's submission was that Morgan did not answer the question, but instead went on to explain the AmeriCast transaction. Bradken submitted that "[n]o such representation was made in so many words". I reject that submission, for two reasons. First, in the context of Morgan's false answer to the first question, his response to the second was quite disingenuous and, one can only conclude, deliberately designed to deflect attention away from Castle Harlan's true intentions and plans, by providing an innocent explanation for what Morgan perceived to be the source of NWS' concerns, the AmeriCast transaction. Second, as mentioned above, Wilson's contemporaneous report of the discussion noted that "[Morgan] was pretty straightforward in saying no": see [157] above. Wilson's witness statement did not include such a remark. It was not put to Wilson that there was an inconsistency or that his report was false. I accept that Morgan's response was in fact more emphatic than Wilson's witness statement would otherwise suggest. 323 Turning to the Representations in the Final Bid Letter, I reject Bradken's submissions. I accept Norcast's submissions that the Final Bid Letter contained representations that: 1. the final bid was made on behalf of Castle Harlan and its associated entities: see the words "[Castle Harlan], on behalf of Castle Harlan Partners V, LP. ("CHPV"), is pleased to present this proposal in response to your letter, dated April 26, 2011, relating to the acquisition of [NWS] and its subsidiaries" at [171] above; 2. Castle Harlan intended that the entity to acquire the shares in NWS would be a corporation controlled in the sole investment discretion of Castle Harlan's associated entities: see the words "[t]he acquiring entity would be a corporation controlled in the sole investment discretion of CHPV" at [171] above; 3. the entity to acquire the shares in NWS would be a corporation controlled in the sole investment discretion of Castle Harlan's associated entities: as for (2) above; 4. Castle Harlan and its associated entities did not expect to require, or intend to obtain, any funding for the acquisition of the shares in NWS from non-associated entities of Castle Harlan: see the words "[w]e would not require any financing conditions to consummate this transaction" (see [171] above) which was a response to UBS' requirement that Castle Harlan provide: … clear statements with respect to the following: … a description of all the sources of funding for the purchase of the Company and an indication of the timing and status of funding commitments. If applicable, your Final Offer should include fully committed financing letters, capable of being executed, and a list of contacts, with telephone numbers, for your source(s) of financing, with whom any financing arrangements can be discussed in detail. (see [148] above); and 5. Castle Harlan and its associated entities would not require, and would not obtain, any funding for the acquisition of the shares in NWS from non-associated entities of Castle Harlan: as for (4) above. 324 Further, each of the Representations was misleading or deceptive: 1. in relation to Morgan's responses during the site visits on 12 or 13 May 2011, those representations were misleading or deceptive having regard to the extent of Bradken's and Castle Harlan's cooperation and partnering prior to that date: see [95]-[98], [100], [103], [104], [106]-[108], [110], [112], [113], [115], [118]-[122], [126]-[130], [133], [135], [136], [138], [139], [143], [144], [146], [148], [149], [150], [155] and [156] above. To the extent they were representations as to future matters, they will be taken to be misleading or deceptive unless Castle Harlan had reasonable grounds for their making: s 4 of the ACL. Bradken submitted that Castle Harlan had reasonable grounds to make the representations. I reject that submission. In the context of the matters referred to above, there could be no reasonable basis for Castle Harlan to represent that Castle Harlan would not sell NWS to Bradken; 2. in relation to [323(1)] above, that representation was misleading or deceptive. The final bid was made on Castle Harlan's and Bradken's behalf, and to describe it as being made solely on Castle Harlan's behalf was disingenuous in light of the dealings between it and Bradken prior to that date: see [95]-[98], [100], [103], [104], [106]-[108], [110], [112], [113], [115], [118]-[122], [126]-[130], [133], [135], [136], [138], [139], [143], [144], [146], [148], [149], [150], [155], [156], [160], [161], [162], [163], [167], [168] and [170] above; 3. in relation to [323(2)] above, that representation was misleading or deceptive. Bradken was in the process of raising approximately A$150 million to be used to fund the acquisition of NWS (see [165] above). Castle Harlan knew that and knew that Bradken would provide sufficient funds to "effectively de-risk the deal" and would "co-operate on the question of where the money flows": see [168] and [170] above; 4. in relation to [323(3)] above, the representation was a representation as to future matters and, in light of the matters referred to at (3) above, it was made without a reasonable basis; 5. in relation to [323(4)] above, that representation was misleading or deceptive. Castle Harlan knew that it would require, and intended to obtain, funding for the acquisition of the shares in NWS from Bradken: see [168] and [170] above; and 6. in relation to [323(5)] above, the representation was a representation as to future matters and, in light of the matters referred to at (5) above, it was made without a reasonable basis. 325 In all of the circumstances, the Representations were misleading or deceptive. Further, on 17 June 2011, Castle Harlan provided a letter which restated that it was to be "CHP V … (together with certain or its affiliates)" which would make an equity contribution of US$190 million on the closing date: see [200] above. Norcast submitted that the 17 June 2011 letter repeated and affirmed the Representations as continuing at that later date. Given the earlier finding that the Representations were misleading or deceptive when made, and remained so on 17 June 2011, it is unnecessary to consider the additional effect, if any, of the 17 June 2011 letter, save that it may be relevant to the consideration of reliance: see [327] below.
Did Norcast rely upon Bradken and/or Castle Harlan's representations? 326 In order to recover damages, Norcast must establish that it suffered loss or damage "because of" Bradken's or Castle Harlan's conduct in breach of s 18 of the ACL: s 236 of the ACL. The use of the words "because of", as with the use of the word "by" in s 82 of the TPA, should be understood to import the traditional notion of causation as a question of fact to be determined by reference to common sense and experience into which policy considerations and value judgments necessarily enter: Wardley Australia Limited v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514; E & MH March v Stramare Pty Limited (1991) 171 CLR 506. It is not always necessary to establish reliance in order to prove causation: Janssen-Cilag Pty Limited v Pfizer Pty Limited (1992) 37 FCR 526 at 529-30 cited in Marks v GIO at 528 and SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS Qld Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1116 at [211]. 327 Here, Norcast's Amended Fast Track Statement pleaded that: 26. Relying on the faith and truth of the representations referred to in paragraphs 24A [the 12 or 13 May 2011 representations] and 25 [the Representations] … and induced thereby, Norcast accepted the 27 May bid and agreed to enter the exclusive negotiation period with Castle Harlan and its associated entities. … 28. Relying on the faith and truth of the representations, repeated and affirmed as continuing, and induced thereby, Norcast executed the SPA and proceeded on 6 July 2011 to complete the sale of the shares in NWS to BC pursuant to the SPA for a price of US $190 million. … 47. But for the making of the representations and the non-disclosures: (a) Norcast would not have accepted a price of US $190 million for the shares in NWS; (b) the material terms of the SPA would have been agreed differently; and (c) Norcast would have sold the shares in NWS directly to Bradken or its associated entities for a higher price. A careful reader will notice that Norcast did not plead reliance upon the representations said to have arisen by Bradken's and Castle Harlan's silence, although paragraph 47 suggests that, had it known of the matters not disclosed, it would have done things differently. 328 Norcast submitted that it did, in fact, rely upon Bradken's silence, Castle Harlan's silence and the Representations. It submitted that its reliance was established on evidence from Barton, Wilson and Bulckaert that: 1. Bradken was perceived as the most obvious and likely highest bidder for NWS; 2. on 5 May 2011, Bulckaert asked Morgan whether Castle Harlan was representing Bradken and Bulckaert believed what Morgan said; 3. on 12 or 13 May 2011, Wilson specifically asked Morgan whether Castle Harlan was planning to sell NWS to Bradken, Barton read and relied upon Wilson's report of his discussion with Morgan, both Barton and Wilson believed what Morgan said; 4. Barton and Wilson first heard of Bradken's involvement in Castle Harlan's acquisition of NWS when they read Bradken's ASX release on 6 July 2011; and 5. had Barton been aware of Bradken's involvement, he would have sought to negotiate a substantially higher price for NWS with Bradken. 329 Bradken submitted that Norcast had failed to explain what it would have done differently had the truth of Bradken's involvement become known. Bradken posed a series of hypothetical questions designed to undermine the conclusion that Norcast would have done anything differently. Presumably, Bradken's submission was that, if Norcast had known of Bradken's involvement, it still would have accepted Castle Harlan's 27 May 2011 bid, entered into an exclusive negotiation period with Castle Harlan, executed the SPA and proceeding to complete the transaction on 6 July 2011. Bradken further submitted that Norcast could not establish reliance in circumstances where neither Castro nor either of the Lims (the 25% owners of NWS) gave evidence. 330 I reject Bradken's submissions. The evidence at [328] above is sufficient to establish that Norcast relied upon Bradken's silence, Castle Harlan's silence and the Representations. Had Norcast known of the true position, it would have sought to negotiate a sale of NWS with Bradken. The addition of Bradken into the NWS sale process would have resulted in an increased sale price. It is not necessary, for the purpose of s 236 of the ACL, to consider all of the permutations of the hypothetical scenario in which Bradken's involvement was known to Norcast. As Lockhart J said in Kabwand Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1989) ATPR 40-950 at 50,378 (in relation to s 52 of the TPA): For present purposes it is sufficient to say that a person claiming damages must show either that he has been induced to do something or to refrain from doing something which gives rise to damage or has been influenced to do or refrain from doing something giving rise to damage by the conduct contravening s 52. Barton's, Wilson's and Bulckaert's evidence is sufficient to conclude that Norcast was induced to take the steps referred to above "because of" the Representations. 331 Further, as Kiefel J concluded in Hanave Pty Ltd v LFOT Pty Ltd (formerly Jagar Projects Pty Ltd) (1999) 43 IPR 545 at 555-6 (with whom Wilcox J agreed): The question of causation can sometimes be resolved not by direct evidence as to what part a misrepresentation played in the process of entry into contract, but by a court determining what effect must be taken to have resulted. Indeed this course may sometimes be preferable to one which rested solely on evidence later given on the point. Were it necessary to do so, I would conclude that the effect of Bradken's silence, Castle Harlan's silence and the Representations was that Norcast took the steps referred to above. That is the effect which must be taken to have resulted. 332 Even if reliance was not established, however, I would find that Norcast had suffered loss or damage "because of" Bradken's silence, Castle Harlan's silence and the Representations. Here, where the silence was engaged in deliberately and, in Castle Harlan's case, in conjunction with express misrepresentations, there is a sufficient nexus between the representations and Norcast's loss and damage.
Was Bradken a person involved in Castle Harlan's contraventions within the meaning of s 2(1) of the ACL? Were Greiner and/or Hodges involved in either or both of Bradken and/or Castle Harlan's contraventions? 333 Section 2(1) of the ACL defines "involved" as: a person is involved, in a contravention of a provision of this Schedule or in conduct that constitutes such a contravention, if the person: (a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; or (b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; or (c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or (d) has conspired with others to effect the contravention. 334 Section 2(1) of the ACL reproduces s 75B(1) of the CCA: see [288] above. The principles applicable to s 2(1) of the ACL (definition of 'involved') are the same as those applicable to s 75B of the CCA, considered at [288]-[289] above. There can be no finding of accessorial liability where the primary contravention is not established. Here, the primary contravention has been established. It is then necessary to consider Norcast's contentions about Bradken's, Greiner's and Hodges' involvements in the contraventions of the ACL. 335 Bradken prompted Castle Harlan to enter the NWS sale process. Bradken and Castle Harlan entered into the Bid Rigging Arrangement. The conduct referred to at [316] above evidences Bradken's intention, shared with Castle Harlan, that Bradken's involvement in the NWS sale process should be kept secret from NWS. In that sense, I accept that Bradken aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention constituted by Castle Harlan's silence. Further, Bradken had more to do with the subject matter of the Representations than merely having some knowledge of the matter. Bradken knew that Castle Harlan planned to attend the management presentation and site visits: see [126]-[127] above. Bradken took steps to ensure that its involvement remained secret during the management presentation and site visits: see [126]-[127] above. It is open to infer that Bradken and Castle Harlan shared a desire that Bradken's involvement should not be disclosed at the management presentation and site visits and that the secrecy should extend, in Ward's words, "everywhere": see [127] above. In that sense, I accept that Bradken was knowingly concerned in the contraventions constituted by the Representations. 336 Both Greiner and Hodges were involved in Bradken's misleading or deceptive conduct. The conduct summarised at [316] above was engaged in by Greiner and Hodges. As to Hodges' conduct: see [295] above. As to Greiner's conduct: see [294] above. I accept that Hodges and Greiner aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention constituted by Bradken's silence, or at least were knowingly concerned in it. 337 Finally, both Greiner and Hodges were also involved in Castle Harlan's silence and the Representations. Each of the acts of Bradken referred to in [335] above was an act of Hodges or Greiner, or both. As to Hodges' conduct: see [295] above. As to Greiner's conduct: see [294] above. Hodges gave evidence that it was not communicated to him that Morgan would deny Bradken's involvement and that it was not in Hodges' contemplation that Morgan would do so. I reject Hodges' evidence. It is self-serving and contrary to the contemporaneous facts. Secrecy was an essential part of the Bid Rigging Arrangement; it was a requirement which Hodges expressly communicated to Ward. It is open to infer that Ward communicated Hodges' desire to Castle Harlan and that Castle Harlan, acting on Hodges' instructions through Ward, took steps to conceal Bradken's involvement, including in response to direct questions from Wilson and Bulckaert. Further, it is not necessary for Hodges or Greiner to have been aware of the terms of the Final Bid Letter. The terms of the letter were crafted to conceal Bradken's involvement to give Castle Harlan's final bid the appearance of a bid made only on Castle Harlan's behalf. That was consistent with the instructions which Hodges gave to Ward, which I accept that he gave to Castle Harlan. It was also consistent with Greiner's conduct. I accept that Hodges and Greiner aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contraventions constituted by Castle Harlan's silence and the Representations, or at least were knowingly concerned in them.
Were either or both of Bradken's and/or Castle Harlan's representations conduct "in trade or commerce" either within Australia or between Australia and places outside Australia? 338 The CCA applies to conduct engaged in outside Australia by certain persons. One category is bodies corporate carrying on business in Australia: s 5(1) of the CCA. Bradken is incorporated and carries on business in Australia. Castle Harlan carries on business in Australia: see [242]-[256] above. For the purpose of Norcast's claim for damages under s 236 of the ACL, the Minister provided the relevant consent to enable Norcast to rely upon conduct which was engaged in outside of Australia: see [231] above. 339 Bradken further submitted that the misleading or deceptive conduct claims fail because of the territorial limitation imposed by the phrase "trade or commerce" in s 18 of the ACL. 340 The phrase "trade or commerce" is defined in s 2(1) of the ACL as: (a) trade or commerce within Australia; or (b) trade or commerce between Australia and places outside Australia; and includes any business or professional activity (whether or not carried on for profit). 341 Bradken's submissions are rejected. It is not to the point that the representations themselves were not "within Australia" or "between Australia and places outside Australia". Section 18 of the ACL prohibits misleading or deceptive conduct "in trade or commerce" (emphasis added). It is not the representations themselves which must constitute the "trade or commerce", but they must occur in the context of some "trade or commerce". Here, the relevant "trade or commerce" was the sale of NWS by Norcast to Castle Harlan and the potential on-sale of NWS by Castle Harlan, outside Australia, to Bradken, within Australia. 342 Bradken's silence and Castle Harlan's silence and making of the Representations were conduct by them in trade or commerce "between Australia and places outside Australia".
Does s 32(1)(d) of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), which extends the operation of that Act to "persons otherwise connected with this jurisdiction", assist Norcast? 343 Given the views formed (see [338]-[342] above), this issue does not arise.
What was Norcast's loss and damage? 344 Norcast suffered loss or damage and the Court assesses that loss or damage at US$22.4 million (being the difference between the US$212.4 million including costs and expenses which Bradken did in fact pay to acquire NWS and the US$190 million Norcast received from Castle Harlan): see [298]-[305] above. Of course, Norcast is not entitled to recover the same loss or damage twice.
If Bradken, Greiner and/or Hodges are liable as persons involved in Castle Harlan's contraventions, should there be an apportionment of liability between them and Castle Harlan and, if so, in what proportions? 345 The Respondents submitted that the proportionate liability provisions of the CCA (Pt VIA) apply to the accessorial liability claims in relation to the misleading or deceptive conduct of Castle Harlan. In particular, the Respondents submitted that: 1. each of the accessorial liability claims against the Respondents is an "apportionable claim" within the meaning of s 87CB(1) of the CCA; 2. Castle Harlan is a "concurrent wrongdoer" within the meaning of s 87CB(3) of the CCA in relation to each of those claims; and 3. as a consequence, the liability of each of the Respondents in relation to each of those claims is limited to an amount reflecting only that proportion of the damage or loss claimed that the Court considers just having regard to the extent of that respondent's responsibility for the damage or loss pursuant to s 87CD of the CCA. 346 In support of the allegation that, in those circumstances, Castle Harlan is a concurrent wrongdoer, the Respondents relied upon the same matters as those relied upon by Norcast in its claim and submitted that any liability should lie principally upon Castle Harlan as the 'active wrongdoer', with the consequence that any liability of the Respondents should be significantly reduced. 347 Those contentions are rejected. First, Bradken started the process: see [79] and [82]-[91] above. The principals of Bradken (Hodges and Greiner) were the authors of it: see [84], [86], [89] and [90] above. It was the Respondents whose actions caused the damage or loss that is the subject of the apportionable claim: s 87CB. Having regard to the extent of the Respondents' responsibility for the damage or loss, it is just that there be no reduction in their liability: cf s 87CD(1)(a).
F. CONCLUSION 348 Given the complexity of the issues, the parties bring in orders to give effect to these reasons for judgment by 4:00pm on 26 March 2013. If the parties are unable to reach agreement, each should file and serve a copy of the proposed orders supported by a two page written submission. I certify that the preceding three hundred and forty-eight (348) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gordon.
Norcast S.Ár.L
Bradken Limited
(2005) 159 FCR 452
(1991) 27 FCR 492
(2000) 169 ALR 344
(2003) 199 ALR 423
(2001) 110 FCR 1
(2004) 141 FCR 183
(2011) 196 FCR 212
(2002) 118 FCR 1
(1991) 23 NSWLR 84
(1998) 157 ALR 1
(1992) 39 FCR 31
(2011) 192 FCR 281
(1984) 57 ALR 167
(1978) 140 CLR 434
(1983) 65 FLR 213
(1999) 43 IPR 545
(2002) 210 CLR 109
(1992) 37 FCR 526
(2000) 172 ALR 532
(1989) 97 FLR 458
(2011) 244 CLR 352
(1978) 34 FLR 81
(1952) 85 CLR 352
(1991) 171 CLR 506
(1998) 196 CLR 494
(1992) 37 FCR 6
(2010) 241 CLR 357
(1996) 64 FCR 410
(2003) 215 CLR 563
(1958) 98 CLR 1
(2004) 138 FCR 107
(1991) 105 ALR 25
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(2004) 160 FCR 1
(1911) 14 CLR 387
(2008) 73 NSWLR 272
(1986) 12 FCR 477
(2002) 118 FCR 236
(1989) 23 FCR 357
(1995) 56 FCR 236
(1975) 5 ALR 465
(1990) 22 FCR 305
(1993) 44 FCR 206
(1985) 6 FCR 1
(1992) 175 CLR 514
(1992) 39 FCR 97
(2006) 227 CLR 532
(1985) 158 CLR 661