Nichles v R

Background Facts

1. To understand what has occurred, it is necessary to review some of the relevant facts. By Court Attendance Notice (CAN) served on 19 February 2024, the appellant is charged with an offence contrary to s 14(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007.
2. The allegation contained in the CAN is that she did between 3:00pm and 3.30pm on 24 December 2023 at Bondi Beach, knowingly contravene a restriction specified in an order. The order in question was made by the Southport Magistrates Court in the State of Queensland on 5 December 2019. Under the law of that State, the order is called a "protection order" and was made pursuant to the s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld).
3. It appears to be common ground, although I may be incorrect in that, that it is a nationally recognised DVO. The protection order itself states that. Inter alia, the order prohibited the appellant from following or remaining or approaching to within 100 metres of "the aggrieved" when the aggrieved is at any place. There are two exceptions to that order. The first is when the aggrieved was appearing personally before a Court or tribunal and except in compliance with an order of a Court.
4. The aggrieved we would describe in New South Wales as the person in need of protection (PINOP). The person in need of protection was Adam James Nichles, a former husband of the appellant. The order was made on 5 December 2019 and is in force until 5 December 2024.
5. In the "Facts Sheet" prepared by the prosecution and originally dated 10 February 2024, after setting out the name of the appellant and the name of the PINOP, are these details: "The witness in the matter is Amy McKenzie. The victim and the accused were in an intimate relationship for nine years, which ended in 2019. There are three children as a result of the relationship... All the children are under the age of 18. The children reside with the victim as per Family Court orders that are currently in place. The court order states that the accused is allowed eight visitations per year. In September, the accused cancelled her visitation and has had no contact with the children or the victim. There is also a current nationally recognised ADVO in place, listing the victim as the aggrieved and the accused as the respondent. Each year, the victim travels from Southport, Queensland to New South Wales to spend the Christmas Period with his mother and the children. The victim usually resides in [his] mother's house at...Bondi Beach during this period. Earlier in the week, on Saturday 23 December 2023, the victim travelled from Southport to Bondi Beach with the children. The accused knows the victim does this each year but was unaware he was going to be in the Bondi Beach vicinity. On Sunday [24] December 2023 the victim was shopping at a local shopping centre during the day, when he returned back to his mother's residence his children approached him and stated 'You need to come to the front door'. The victim opened the front gate of the residence and was met by the witness, who is not known to him. The witness explained to the victim, that she was asked by the accused to assist in delivering Christmas presents to their children. The witness had a bag full of presents at the time of the victim and the witness coming into contact. The victim saw the accused standing about 20 metres away from the front gate. At this time, the accused was recording the victim and waved to the victim. The victim being in shock, took his phone out and took photos of the accused and the vehicle she was standing next to, a white Holden Captiva [registration number redacted]. The accused remained recording the victim and waved at him for short period of time until she got in the vehicle and drove off, leaving the witness behind. The victim and his mother then spoke with the witness. The witness stated to the victim she was contacted by the accused via a single mum's group on Facebook and was asked to assist the accused in delivering presents. The witness also stated, [she] had never met before and was unaware there was any court order in place. Around 5.30pm on Sunday 24 December 2023, the victim attended Bondi Police Station to report the matter. The victim provided police with a domestic violence evidence in chief (DVEC) recorded statement. On Wednesday 27 December 2023, the accused attended Maitland Police Station where she participated in an electronically recorded interview of suspected person (ERISP) as a protected suspect with recording number [redacted]. Police introduced themselves with all Safeguards of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA) and explained how the interview would be taking place. The accused was introduced to the custody manager and read her pt 9 LEPRA rights. During the electronic recorded interview of suspected person (ERISP) the accused explained that on Sunday 24 December 2023 she was parked outside [the premises] at Bondi Beach and had her friend drop the gifts at that address. The accused stated to police she was under the impression she was 60 metres away from the victim and recognised the victim's mother's vehicle parked out the front, so she started recorded on phone for her own protection. The accused explained that she was of the opinion the children would not be at the address with the victim yet as she thought they would attend on Christmas Day. Her intention was to drop the presents prior to their arrival so they could open the gifts on Christmas Day. The accused made admission under caution she stood and filmed the victim for a short period of time before getting into her vehicle and driving away, thus breaching [order 3] in the apprehended domestic violence order as she remained within 100 metres of the victim and continued to film him for a short period of time."
6. I reiterate that these are the allegations made by the police, many of which are disputed.

Application to Local Court

1. On 8 July 2024 the appellant affirmed an affidavit in support of an application that she made to the Local Court. As I understand it, the application itself was filed in the Local Court at Waverley on 24 July 2024. The application is voluminous. On my count it contains 531 pages.
2. The first 20 pages consist of the application itself. The 21st page contains an index of annexures. Those annexures run between pages 22 and 468. After that page there is an Annexure B. On page B1 commences the affidavit of the appellant of 8 July 2024. Together with the annexures to the affidavit the pages of Annexure B amount to 63.
3. I shall seek to summarise the application. The application is headed "Application for Stay of Proceedings". It purports to invoke the jurisdiction of the Local Court at Maitland, but as ought be clear from what I have said the proceedings were in fact listed at Waverley.
4. The application has a number of paragraphs. The first few commence thus: "1. The Court will determine this application at Maitland Courthouse and in the alternative, by telephone link with the application pursuant to s 20(7) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992. 2. The matter is permanently transferred to Maitland Courthouse. 3. The Court grants a permanent stay of proceedings in this matter. 4. The Court order the immediate production within 24 hours of the: (a) complainant's audio and video footage of the events of 24 December 2023; (b) complainant's phone statements showing all calls and text messages sent or received from 24‑31 December 2023; (c) the complainant's interview with police; (d) all warrants, communications and instructions given to NSW Police in relation to the matter from any person; (e) to be made available to the defendant for prosecution of further proceedings in any Australian court. 5. The Court makes a declaration that it is satisfied that the matter brought by the NSW Police and the complainant: (a) is an abuse of process prosecuted for alternate purpose, in order for the Complainant to commit further legal systems abuse against the defendant and [their children]; and (b) is frivolous, malicious, vexatious in nature; and (c) involves the complainant being a cause for the event, having twice contravened Family Court Orders so the defendant could not see her children prior to Christmas; and (d) involves the complainant committing a criminal offence in making false statements to NSW Police in order to invoke an investigation and prosecution against the defendant; and (i) the NSW Police have been notified of this fact by the Complainant; and (ii) the NSW Police took no action against the complainant in respect of his crime in making false statements to police officers; and (e) involves the complainant exercising psychological abuse and coercive control, being acts of domestic and family violence against the defendant, and her Children, particularly in respect of the defendant's right to spend regular time with her children and give them gifts; and (f) holds no evidence the defendant knowingly breached the Queensland domestic violence order in question; and (g) holds clear evidence the defendant did not remain in proximity of the complainant, having actively left the vicinity within six minutes of the complainant entering 100 metre exclusion zone; and (h) holds clear evidence the defendant was not in the vicinity at the times listed by the complainant and the NSW Police on the charge; and (i) is doomed to fail."
5. Prayer 6 of this application commences in this fashion: "The Court acknowledges the significant psychological stress and anxiety this matter has caused the defendant and her family, including the work effort required to run this stay of proceedings application..."
6. Prayer 7 asks for a vexatious litigation order against the complainant, her former husband. Prayer 8 sought a vexatious litigation order against the NSW Police Service. Prayer 9 sought an order that the Court revoke the order that had been made by the Southport Magistrates Court on 5 December 2019. The tenth prayer commences in this fashion: "The Court has sufficient prima facie evidence to apply a lifetime apprehended domestic violence order against the complainant..."
7. Prayer 11 spells out in greater detail the lifetime apprehended domestic violence order which the appellant was seeking. Prayer 12 contains "detailed grounds" as to why the prosecution was an abuse of process and further details about the alleged frivolity, malice and vexatiousness. Prayer 13 is in the alternative to Prayer 1 and seeks a temporary stay of proceedings if a permanent stay was not granted.
8. I understand that the application was eventually sent from the Local Court at Maitland to the Local Court at Waverley. It appears that when the application was received it was fixed by the Registrar or his or her clerk for hearing before the Local Court on 2 August 2024. It was, in fact, also drawn to the attention of the learned Magistrate who vacated that date and dealt with the matter "in Chambers" as it was an urgent application. The orders and reasons for them are endorsed in her Honour's handwriting on the Court record. They are these: "The application for stay or dismissal was considered 'in chambers'. Items 1 and 2 of the application seek to transfer the charge matter to Maitland - it will remain in its proper jurisdiction 'Waverley Local Court' where the police and other witnesses are located. Item 3 seeks a 'permanent stay' no reasons are given for this request. These proceedings are not oppressive or an abuse of process. Despite her assertions elsewhere in her application that there are ulterior and unfair 'motives' for the police action, her reasoning does not support that 'the proceedings are brought for an improper purpose.' The stay is not granted. Items 4-13 have been considered and not agreed to. The Court has ordered a brief of evidence to be served 14 days prior to the hearing. The defendant can issue subpoenas for any other items she may require to prepare for the hearing on 11 November 2024. Clearly this is a matter that should have been dealt with by the Family Court as orders were in place at the time of the alleged breach of the DVO. This charge will not be difficult to resolve at a hearing, so I will allow Ms Nichles to conduct her case by AVL. The Court appointed questioner will need to be in attendance as it is clear the defendant will be self-represented."

Appeal to District Court

1. The Notice of Appeal to this Court is 19 pages in length. It is alleged to be urgent. The Notice of Appeal commences with this: "On 24 July 2024, her Honour Magistrate Milledge…made errors of law and fact, and acted with procedural unfairness, with bias and a prejudicial mind in relation to the Dismissal of an Application to Permanently Stay a criminal prosecution on the following grounds."
2. There are a number of grounds which I shall seek to summarise. The first ground is that her Honour acted with procedural unfairness in failing to give the applicant an opportunity to present her application in a formal hearing. The principle of natural justice is called audi alteram partem, "hear the other side." The person who could complain about a failure to hear the other party is the prosecutor who appears not to have been made aware of the application and certainly there is no suggestion in her Honour's reasons that her Honour called upon the appellant to be heard.
3. The second ground is that her Honour made an error of fact in relation to the venue of the hearing where her reasoning was that the hearing should be held "where the police and other witnesses are located" in Waverley. According to further reasons given in the Notice of Appeal, there was only one local witness, the police officer who was in charge of the prosecution, Constable Miguel Munoz. The Notice of Appeal also maintains that the majority of the witnesses are from the Hunter Valley.
4. The appellant at the time was living in Maitland and the witness, Amy McKenzie, is, according to the appellant, currently living in Wallsend. Other primary witnesses are, of course, the complainant, Mr Nichles, and perhaps his mother who does not live in Queensland, but at Bondi Beach. If she is to be called, the closest venue to her residence is Waverley.
5. Generally speaking, the venue in New South Wales is determined by the place where a crime was committed or in civil law where the cause of action arose. If the cause of action arose in Dubbo, the matter would be heard in Dubbo. If a crime was committed in Dubbo, it would be heard in Dubbo. One matter which constantly vexes motorists is, if they commit a motoring offence whilst on a long trip, say from Lismore to Bega, they might be pulled up at anywhere on that long stretch of road and, for example, one could be charged with a motoring offence at Batemans Bay, and one could be living in Lismore, but the venue for the hearing of the motoring offence would be in Batemans Bay.
6. The idea of venue arose originally because the areas served by the old Court of Petty Sessions were confined to crimes appearing in their bailiwicks and this Court as originally constituted, judges were appointed for certain districts and they could only deal with crimes committed in their district and not in other districts. The decision by her Honour on the question of venue was the usual, typical order made in all cases both civil and criminal in this state.
7. The third ground is that her Honour erred in law in failing to stay the matter on the basis of the Court's procedural non-compliance with court rules. Courts have a discretion to vary their own rules and indeed in the civil jurisdiction a court can dispense with the rules of court. In particular, the appellant complained about a failure to comply with Local Court Practice Note Crim 1 because the brief of evidence was not served on the appellant/accused within four weeks of the plea of not guilty being entered. However, courts can regulate their own procedures.
8. The fourth ground of appeal is that her Honour made an error of fact when she said that there were no reasons to give a permanent stay on proceedings. That can be answered shortly by saying that the magistrate thought that no sufficient reason was given for granting a permanent stay and that the reasons given by the appellant did not establish sufficient reason to grant a permanent stay.
9. The sixth ground of appeal is that her Honour made an error of law and an error of fact by stating in her reasons that the proceedings were not oppressive or an abuse of process. That, again, is a matter for judgment.
10. The seventh ground of appeal was that her Honour made an error of law and an error of fact by stating in her reasons: "Despite her assertions elsewhere in her application that there are ulterior and unfair 'motives' for the police action, her reasoning does not support that 'the proceedings are brought for an [improper] purpose.'"
11. The eighth ground is that her Honour made an error of jurisdiction by stating that, "Clearly this is a matter that should have been dealt with by the Family Court as orders were in place at the time of the alleged breach of the DVO." At the end of the Notice of Appeal is a heading, "Request for urgency and conditions of appeal" and beneath that is stated this: "1. An urgent appeal should be granted on the above grounds, and all orders sought by the applicant be granted under the discretion of House v The King where the evidence on its face is before the appellate court; and they can therefore make replacement orders in line with such evidence. 2. I refer the appeal court to the brain injury of the complainant in the evidence and requested to make further application from the bar in respect of that matter. 3. The matter is extremely urgent in respect of the issues causing this prolonged matter affecting all jurisdictions of NSW, QLD and Federal Courts and police. 4. I request the appeal be heard in Newcastle Courthouse urgently and without the complainant present, in a closed hearing with the exception of pre-identified and approved legal/emotional support persons of the appellant."
12. The Notice of Appeal was filed at Newcastle on or about 26 July 2024. It came before me on 17 September, last Tuesday, and I was told that it would take one hour. It took about three hours before we ran out of time last Tuesday and the matter was stood over to today because I was otherwise engaged on Wednesday to Friday of last week.
13. When I considered the matter in Chambers on 17 September, after the Court had risen for the day, it occurred to me that I did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because the appeal was essentially from interlocutory orders made by the Local Court and as a general proposition this Court has no control about the internal practice and procedure in the Local Court nor with any interlocutory orders.
14. At 1.38pm today the appellant, Ms Nichles, sent an email to my Associate which contains this matter: "Please apologise to his Honour for me. I am unable to stay for two reasons: (1) Medical grounds (PTSD related injury caused by today's judicial behaviour I'm unable to withstand any further trauma today); and (2) I have run out of parking and have no money to renew it. I apologise, I wasn't sure how to get the message across before the lunch break. Could you please send me copies of his Honour's reasons for both matters in writing? The outcome is clear."

Jurisdiction

1. I turn then to the question of jurisdiction. Most appeals which come to this Court from the Local Court arise under the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 ("CARA"). Appeals from the Local Court to this Court are governed by Pt 3 of CARA. There are 29 sections in Pt 3 of CARA commencing at s 11. Section 11 is headed, "Appeals as of a right." Subsection (1) is this: "Any person who has been convicted or sentenced by the Local Court may appeal to the District Court against the conviction or sentence (or both)."
2. Section 11A provides for an appeal as of right against the Local Court's refusal of an application for an annulment of a conviction. Section 12 refers to appeals requiring leave. Section 12(1) is this: "Any person who has been convicted by the Local Court in the person's absence or following the person's plea of guilty may appeal to the District Court against the conviction, but only by leave of the District Court."
3. Section 13 provides for late applications for leave to appeal. Section 14 governs the filing of Notices of Appeal and applications for leave to appeal. Section 15 refers to documents to be forwarded to the prosecutor and the relevant court registrars. Subdivision 2 of Pt 3 concerns how appeals are to be determined. Section 16A provides for determination of appeals against the Local Court's refusal of an application for annulment of a conviction.
4. Sections 17, 18, 19 are procedural in nature. Section 20 is headed, "Determination of appeals" and provides this: "(1) The District Court may determine an appeal against conviction: (a) by setting aside the conviction, or (b) by dismissing the appeal, or (c) in the case of an appeal made with leave under section 12(1) by setting aside the conviction and remitting the matter to the original Local Court for redetermination in accordance with any directions of the District Court. (2) The District Court may determine an appeal against sentence: (a) by setting aside the sentence, or (b) by varying the sentence, or (c) by dismissing the appeal."
5. Section 21 provides for notice of dismissal of appeal or application for leave to appeal if the dismissal was because of the appellant's failure to appear. The Registrar of the District Court for the proclaimed place where the appeal or application was dismissed is required to send a notice of that fact to the appellant who failed to appear.
6. Section 22 provides for revocation of orders dismissing appeals and applications for leave to appeal. Division 2 of Pt 3 concerns appeals by prosecutors and is irrelevant. Division 3 contains miscellaneous provisions. They, for example, deal with the venue where the appeal is to be heard, the sittings at which the appeal is to be heard and the power of this Court on appeal to exercise any function that the Local Court could have exercised in the original Local Court proceedings. Section 29 provides for limits on appeals and is currently irrelevant. Section 30 provides that rules may be made under the District Court Act 1973 with respect to the jurisdiction conferred by Pt 3 of the Act on the District Court.
7. In short, the appeals only arise out of the pronouncement of a conviction or the imposition of a sentence. This Act does not provide any right of appeal from any interlocutory order or failure to make an interlocutory order by the Local Court. When, this morning, I asked the appellant how I had jurisdiction, she referred me to an extract from a Bench Book available online from the Judicial Commission of New South Wales. The relevant extracts say this: "Appeal from the Local Court in its special jurisdiction: s 70(1) of the Local Court Act confers a right of appeal in respect of any order made in its special jurisdiction. Any appeal to the District Court is to be made in accordance with Pt 3 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (CARA Act). 'In the same way as such an…appeal may be made in relation to a conviction arising from a Court attendance notice' dealt with under Pt 2 of Ch 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986: Huang v Nazaran [2021] NSWCA 243 at [22]-[24]. Section 70 is not to be construed as restricting or qualifying the subject matter of such an appeal so that it is limited to a conviction (or sentence) appeal: Huang v Nazaran at [21]. The right of appeal from any order is 'by way of rehearing' in accordance with ss 18 and 19 of the CARA Act, the District Court relevantly having power in determining the appeal to exercise 'any function that the original Local Court could have exercised in the original Local Court proceedings' (s 28(2): Huang at [23]; see also Lewis v Sergeant Riley (2017) 96 NSWLR 274 at [12]."
8. The "special jurisdiction of the Local Court" is provided for in Pt 4 of the Local Court Act 2007. Section 44 has a heading, "Application of Part." It provides this; "This Part applies to any proceedings with respect to matters for which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by or under any other Act or law, other than: (a) criminal proceedings, or (b) proceedings with respect to any matter for which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by Part 3."
9. When one goes to Huang v Nazaran, it is clear that the proceedings there were for a noise abatement order pursuant to the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997. The "offensive noise" was said to emanate from an air-conditioning unit of Dr Fatemeh Nazaran located between the homes of the respondent and the appellant. The application was dismissed with costs by a Magistrate on 17 November 2020.
10. The appellants in the Court of Appeal accepted that this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the making of a noise abatement order. The right to appeal from such an order was to the Land and Environment Court and was conferred by the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997. However, s 290(2) of that Act removed any right of appeal from the making of such an order to the District Court. The Court of Appeal held that under s 70 of the Local Court Act 2007 there was a right of appeal to this Court "in the same way as such an appeal may be made in relation to a conviction arising from a court attendance notice." In other words, there was a right of appeal to this Court if the noise abatement order had not been made. Firstly, the current proceedings are not in the special jurisdiction of the Local Court and furthermore no final decision has been made by the Local Court in this matter in any event.
11. The next submission made by the appellant was that this Court had jurisdiction because of the decision of Mahommed v Unicomb [2017] NSWCA 65. The appellant submitted that the making of a permanent stay order was a civil decision and therefore it could be dealt with under s 144 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. In Mahommed v Unicomb, Mr Mahommed had brought numerous claims against Greenhills Securities Pty Ltd and Mrs Unicomb, the sole director of Greenhills. The head note continues thus: "The claims included claims in debt, quasi-contract, equitable claims and various statutory claims. The statutory claims included claims under the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (the Consumer Claims) as well as claims under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The claims brought by Mr Mahommed related to the alleged financial dealings involving the assets of the Lovedale Ranch Unit Trust (the LR unit Trust). Mr Mahommed brought the claims in his stated capacity as the assignee of the relevant debts and choses in action under a deed of assignment between Mr Mahommed, the trustee of the LR unit trust (Loire Consultants Pty Ltd) and Mr Mahommed's solicitor (Mr Smits). In June 2016, Gibson DCJ struck out and dismissed Mr Mahommed's claims (the Dismissal Judgment). In August 2016, Balla DCJ dismissed Mr Mahommed's application to set aside or vary the orders made by Gibson DCJ (the Variation Judgment). By summons invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Mr Mahommed sought a variety of relief, declaratory and otherwise. In essence Mr Mahommed contended the District Court had jurisdiction to hear all of his claims and that proceedings should not have been summarily dismissed."
12. The appeal was allowed in part. The primary judgment was given by Ward JA with whom Macfarlan JA and McDougall J agreed. His Honour held that Gibson DCJ was bound to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 144 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and erred in law in not so doing. His Honour went onto hold that in view of the requirements of s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 for the just, quick and cheap resolution of real issues in dispute the orders made in the dismissal judgment should be set aside subject to qualifications. Those were that the order striking out the consumer claims should stand as those claims were not assignable to Mr Mahommed. His Honour also said that the costs order that her Honour had made should also stand. His Honour also held that the appeal then before the Court of Appeal was not suitable for discussing the scope of the equitable jurisdiction of this Court.
13. Whilst a permanent stay of proceedings can be granted in crime, such a stay can also be granted in civil proceedings. However, the applicable law is not the same.That applicable law is unwritten law. I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case for me to exercise any power that I am said to have under s144 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 to transfer these proceedings to the Supreme Court. All the material I have read indicates to me that an appeal to this Court only arises upon the making of a final order, that is, generally speaking, a conviction or a sentence, or both. Not only did the learned Magistrate fail to grant a permanent stay of proceedings her Honour also refused a temporary stay of proceedings.
14. In my view it would be otiose to make such an order when it would become completely unnecessary, if the appellant be found not guilty of the charge which has been laid against her. I should say this, the appellant was and is a very passionate litigant. She uses every opportunity she can to point out the various vicissitudes that she has suffered as a result of a litigious process which has been going on for almost a decade arising out of the breakdown of her marriage with the complainant in the current matter and struggle at various levels of the judicial system between the appellant and the complainant in both the Family Court of Australia, the Full Bench of the Family Court of Australia and proceedings in the High Court and as far as I could understand various arguments put to me because of further proceedings which are sought to be agitated in the Federal Court.
15. The appellant also argues that there has been a conspiracy essentially against her, caused or initiated by the complainant, aided and abetted and involving the Queensland Police, the NSW Police and the magistracy of this State. One can feel considerable sympathy for the appellant if all that she says be correct but she does use emotive language which makes life very difficult for anyone trying to discern the substance of her complaint. For example, the appellant said that she will be sentenced to full-time imprisonment if she is convicted of the offence however that appears to be inconsistent with the provisions of s 4A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
16. She also makes a large number of allegations against others including allegations of serious crimes committed by her former partner against their children which, if true, would inevitably lead to his being incarcerated, but that is part of a coverup or the conspiracy to which I have earlier referred between the police forces of New South Wales and Queensland and presumably because of involvement in it of the magistracy of, at least, New South Wales. Furthermore, much of what she says involves, as far as I can determine, hyperbole. For example, one of the things that I have read indicated the appellant could not afford to come to Sydney and she came to Sydney on 17 September from the Hunter Valley and again today, 23 September 2024.
17. Today she told me that she was now living in her car which was different to what she told me last week. Of course, things could have changed in the interim. Again, one must feel sorry for her but again what she says in the appeal is not given on oath and there are a number of inconsistencies. That, of course, is irrelevant to the issue that I have determined which is that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

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