The ambiguity argument
31 NRMA's first argument was that the objects and powers of a company must be defined in plain and unambiguous terms. It contended that in delimiting the powers of the company (which the proposed resolutions purport to do) a greater level of clarity and certainty is required than the test laid down in Upper Hunter by Barwick CJ. NRMA argued that the applicable test was the more stringent approach expressed by Lord Wrenbury in Cotman v Brougham.
32 I pause at this stage to note that ambiguity does not mean uncertainty: McDermott v Black (1940) 63 CLR 161 at 175. As Gibbs CJ pointed out in Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 (at 578), the fact that opinions may differ as to which of two possible meanings is to be given to the words of a clause in a contract does not mean that the clause is uncertain. It was held in that case that a contract will only be said to be uncertain if it is so obscure that the court is unable to put any definite meaning on its essential terms.
33 I do not think that there can be any doubt that the resolutions are indeed replete with ambiguities. This is apparent from a cursory examination. Mr Bathurst QC, who together with Mr McHugh appeared for NRMA, made it plain, however, that NRMA's first argument assumes that the language of the resolutions is not so obscure and ambiguous as to be incapable of any definite or precise meaning. Thus, the first argument does not rest on the proposition that the resolutions are uncertain.
34 There are three limbs to the first argument. Firstly, NRMA argues that the resolutions seek to limit the powers of the company. Secondly, it argues that the resolutions are ambiguous. Thirdly, it argues that the mere existence of the ambiguities, because they concern a proposed alteration to the constitution that will limit the company's powers, renders the resolutions void. Underlying this argument is NRMA's acceptance (solely for the purposes of the argument) that a court will be able to attribute to the parties a particular contractual intention and the resolutions cannot be held to be void for uncertainty.
35 The first two limbs of the argument may be accepted. What is presently in issue is the third limb.
36 The Upper Hunter test is a forgiving one. As Campbell J explained:
"The way this test is applied in practice is that if the Court is capable of putting a meaning on the wording of the document, then it is not void for uncertainty - it has the meaning which the Court decides it has, no matter how difficult the task of ascertaining that meaning might have been."
37 Campbell J, in essence, gave two reasons for applying the Upper Hunter test (and not the Cotman v Brougham test) to the requisition.
38 Firstly, he pointed out that in Cotman v Brougham Lord Wrenbury was considering legislation that concerned specifically the "objects specified in the memorandum" of a company. His Honour observed, further, that Lord Wrenbury's statement was made at a time when the doctrine of ultra vires applied to corporations, and this doctrine was the basic reason for the approach expressed in Cotman v Brougham. The doctrine has now been abolished by s 125 of the Corporations Act which provides:
"(1) If a company has a constitution, it may contain an express restriction on, or a prohibition of, the company's exercise of any of its powers. The exercise of a power by the company is not invalid merely because it is contrary to an express restriction or prohibition in the company's constitution.
(2) If a company has a constitution, it may set out the company's objects. An act of the company is not invalid merely because it is contrary to or beyond any objects in the company's constitution."
39 Accordingly, Campbell J observed:
"The objects in a company's constitution, if a company chooses to have one, do not, under s 125, delimit the field of activity which it is legally possible for the company to engage in. … Thus, there is not the same need as there was, when the doctrine of ultra vires continued in existence, for there to be a publicly available statement of what the company could and could not do."
40 Secondly, Campbell J pointed out that in NRMA Limited v Snodgrass (2001) 52 NSWLR 383 (at 387, [21]) this Court accepted that it was appropriate to apply the Upper Hunter test in deciding whether a proposed amendment of a constitution was so vague as to be meaningless, as did Young J in Totally and Permanently Incapacitated Veterans' Association of NSW Ltd v Gadd (1998) 146 FLR 161 (at 167). Campbell J considered that, although it did not seem to have been argued in Snodgrass and Gadd that any other test was appropriate, the adoption of the approach in those cases was a strongly persuasive reason for adopting the Upper Hunter test.
41 Mr Bathurst submitted that Campbell J's reasoning could not be sustained.
42 Mr Bathurst submitted that the rationale of the approach adopted in Cotman v Brougham in regard to the objects of a company was equally applicable to the powers of a company. This submission was necessary as, although the requisition seeks to amend the objects clause of the constitution, the resolutions do not relate to the objects of NRMA, but rather, seek to impose limitations on the powers of its board of directors by requiring it "to ensure" that the terms of each of the two resolutions in question are complied with.
43 Mr Bathurst submitted that persons dealing with the company, including employees, directors and other officers, are entitled to a statement of the company's powers in clear and unambiguous terms. He submitted that the practical consequences of applying any lesser standard "would be chaos". In the present case, he said, it would not be possible for NRMA to achieve any certainty without recourse to the courts, who would have to decide the issues that would arise by reference to the nebulous concepts in the proposed resolutions which include such terms as "disadvantaged", "undermined", "fair and equitable", and "discriminate".
44 Finally, he submitted that Snodgrass and Gadd were distinguishable as the resolutions considered in those cases did not concern the powers of the companies and, moreover, it did not appear that Cotman v Brougham had been cited to the courts concerned.
45 The fact that the proposed resolutions go to the powers of NRMA and not its objects has two consequences. Firstly, Lord Wrenbury's remarks in Cotman v Brougham are not of direct application. Secondly, as Mr Bathurst put it, NRMA's primary proposition did not depend on "the accident of these particular provisions being inserted in the objects clause". NRMA's argument was that, when it came to powers (like objects), "to the extent possible, constitutions of any company should be clear". In other words, NRMA's contention was that Lord Wrenbury's comments were applicable, not only to the objects clause in the memorandum, but to all provisions of the constitution that deal with the powers of the company (wherever they appear).
46 I turn firstly to the degree to which Lord Wrenbury's remarks in Cotman v Brougham apply to the resolutions in issue in this case.
47 Those remarks (which I have quoted above) were concerned solely with the objects of the company as stated in its memorandum; the point being, according to his Lordship, that the reader of the memorandum must be able to "identify the field of industry within which the corporate activities are to be confined". The proposed resolutions do not in any way affect the identification of the field of industry within which NRMA's activities are to be confined.
48 Taking Lord Wrenbury's remarks at face value, it seems that his Lordship was propounding a special rule applicable to the objects of a company when determining their validity. NRMA, on the other hand, contends for a special rule applicable to the determination of the validity of both the objects and powers of a company.
49 It is necessary to focus on the need for such a special rule.
50 One can readily appreciate the factors in favour of the Cotman v Brougham rule (relating to objects) being applicable to the objects of a corporation at a time when the ultra vires doctrine was of application. Lord Wrenbury said (at 522) that the rule had a twofold purpose, namely:
"The first is that the intending corporator who contemplates the investment of his capital shall know within what field it is to be put at risk. The second is that anyone who shall deal with the company shall know without reasonable doubt whether the contractual relation into which he contemplates entering with the company is one relating to a matter within its corporate objects."
51 The idea that the constitution should inform the public with absolute precision of the field in which the company is to undertake its activities (Lord Wrenbury's first purpose) is no longer of significance. This is the consequence of ss 124 and 125 of the Corporations Act. Section 124 provides that a company has the legal capacity of an individual. By s 125(2) an act of a company is not invalid merely because it is contrary to any of the objects in the constitution.
52 It follows, also, from ss 124 and 125, that, nowadays, a company is able to embark on new fields of endeavour untrammelled by objects clauses. Accordingly, the second of the purposes mentioned by Lord Wrenbury (that anyone who deals with the company should know without reasonable doubt whether the contract contemplated is within the company's corporate objects) has fallen away.
53 As regards the need to define the powers of a company without ambiguity, s 124 provides that a company has the powers of an individual. While s125(1) provides that a constitution may contain an "express restriction" on, or a prohibition of, the company's exercise of any of its powers, it also provides that "[t]he exercise of a power by the company is not invalid merely because it is contrary to an express restriction or prohibition in the company's constitution". Thus, it seems to me, there is no need for a rule as contended for by NRMA to protect outside parties who deal with the company.
54 Mr Bathurst submitted that if the powers of a company were not defined and identified in the constitution with clarity and without ambiguity there would be serious problems for directors, other officers and employees of the company who should be able to ascertain from the constitution what they can or cannot do.
55 In support of this submission, Mr Bathurst argued that, were the resolutions in their present form to be passed, the directors or other officers of the company could, unwittingly, readily act beyond power (that is, because of the inherent ambiguity of the proposed resolutions). They could face actions based on their breach of obligations to the company in circumstances where it would be difficult to know whether a breach had taken place or not. Moreover, the resolutions in question could form the basis of actions for oppression or for injunctions.
56 The ambiguity of the resolutions would be a weighty argument in the defence of claims against directors or other officers based on alleged negligence or breach of fiduciary duties resulting from acts that contravene the resolutions. I do not think that the resolutions would materially increase the susceptibility of directors or other officers to liability in respect of such claims. They may increase the number of claims made.
57 I accept that the ambiguity of the resolutions increases the prospects of NRMA having to face claims for injunctions arising out of alleged contemplated contraventions of their terms. Whether those prospects are to be regarded as real or significant is a matter of debate (see Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (10th ed) at paras 6.120 and 8.280).
58 I also accept that the ambiguity of the resolutions increases the prospects of NRMA having to face claims alleging oppressive conduct against members.
59 The prospects of these resolutions, if they are passed, causing litigation, inconvenience and expense is readily apparent. This consequence, does not, however, in my view, warrant a rule that provisions in a company's constitution defining and delimiting the company's powers must be clear and unambiguous.
60 Complete lack of ambiguity in expression is virtually unattainable. If it were the law that provisions in a constitution relating to the powers of a company could be set aside on the grounds of ambiguity, an entire new litigation industry would be created. The orderly conduct of affairs would be disrupted, uncertainty in commerce and industry and related fields would be prevalent, there would be harmful delay in conducting company business and companies would have to bear significantly increased legal expenses. Moreover, undue burdens would be imposed upon the courts.
61 In my view, these factors, applicable to the community as a whole, far outweigh the difficulties that NRMA might experience should the resolutions be passed.
62 It also has to be borne in mind that the difficulties and prejudice that NRMA would incur should the resolutions be passed are self-evident. These matters can be avoided simply by the meeting rejecting the resolutions, or altering them in an appropriate way.
63 Leaving it to the meeting to resolve problems of this kind, where possible, has long been the approach of the courts. This is exemplified by Isle of Wight Railway Company v Tahourdin (1884) 25 Ch D 320. Cotton LJ said in that case (at 330-331):
"Now I am of opinion that if the object for which it is proposed to call a meeting is one which can be carried out in a legal way, then, although the notice may be so expressed that resolutions following its precise terms would be illegal, it is not right for the directors to limit the notice so as to prevent the meeting from entering into the question simply because the terms of the notice would justify a resolution which would be ultra vires . Directors have great powers, and the Court refuses to interfere with their management of the company's affairs if they keep within their powers, and if a shareholder complains of the conduct of the directors while they keep within their powers, the Court says to him, 'If you want to alter the management of the affairs of the company go to a general meeting, and if they agree with you they will pass a resolution obliging the directors to alter their course of proceeding.'"
Lindley LJ was of the same mind. He said (at 333):
"We must bear in mind the decision in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 and the line of cases following it, in which this Court has constantly and consistently refused to interfere on behalf of shareholders, until they have done the best they can to set right the matters of which they complain, by calling general meetings. Bearing in mind that line of decisions, what would be the position of the shareholders if there were to be another line of decisions prohibiting meetings of the shareholders to consider their own affairs? It appears to me that it must be a very strong case indeed which would justify this Court in restraining a meeting of shareholders."