27 On the question of contrition Mr Elder stated, 'The Defendant is genuinely contrite in respect of the Incident.' However, it may no longer be sufficient for a corporate defendant in this jurisdiction to simply say it is contrite or remorseful. Section 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provided that remorse may only be taken into account as a mitigating factor, if the following conditions are met:
(i) the offender has provided evidence that he or she has accepted responsibility for his or her actions, and
(ii) the offender has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by his or her actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both)
28 In WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Hitchcock [2005] NSWIRComm 34; 139 IR 439 at [39] it was said that an express statement of remorse or contrition by someone duly authorised to make such a statement on behalf of a defendant may be evidence of contrition, although any statement must be assessed in light of the defendant's conduct. That decision was, of course given prior to the amendment to the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act that introduced s 21A(3)(i) in it current form (Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2007 effective 1 January 2008).
29 In addition to Mr Elder's statement of contrition there is, indirectly, evidence of remorse: the defendant pleaded guilty and has taken steps to avoid a recurrence of the incident in which the two men were injured. To the limited extent that evidence indicates remorse I have taken it into account. However, I am disinclined to believe that a mere statement on behalf of a corporate defendant of contrition is 'evidence' that a defendant has accepted responsibility for its actions and has acknowledged any injury, loss or damage caused by its actions or made reparation for such injury, loss or damage (or both).
30 I accept the defendant fully co-operated with the investigation by the Department of Primary Industries.
31 The principle of totality arises for consideration. The two offences are essentially the same and there is no basis for concluding that one offence was less or more serious than the other. I have decided, having regard to the objective factors and the subjective considerations, that the penalty in Matter No IRC 365 of 2008 should be $320,000. That amount is discounted by 20 per cent for the utilitarian value of the guilty plea. In Matter No IRC 366 of 2008 the penalty should also be $320,000 with the same amount of discount, namely, 20 per cent. Having regard to the totality principle, the total penalty, having regard to the overall criminality of the defendant, should be $260,000 making the penalty in Matter No 365 $130,000 and in Matter No 366, $130,000.
Orders