4 An agreed statement of facts was tendered relevant to the charge which reads as follows:
3. At all material times the Defendant contracted with the Olympic Co-ordination Authority to project manage the fabrication, erection and later dismantling of parts of, the Sydney International Aquatic Centre at Olympic Park, Homebush in the State of New South Wales ("the site").
4. At all material times the Defendant sub-contracted with National Engineering Pty Ltd (ACN 061131333) ("National Engineering") for National Engineering to undertake the erection and dismantling of the Aquatic Centre.
5. At all material times National Engineering sub-contracted with Penrith Rigging Service Pty Ltd (ACN 001 863 109) ("Penrith Rigging") for Penrith Rigging to provide riggers and cranes to National Engineering to erect and dismantle the Aquatic Centre.
6. The Aquatic Centre was erected by National Engineering and Penrith Rigging without incident.
7. After the Olympics, WorkCover informed the Defendant that dismantling of parts of the Aquatic Centre was "demolition work" within the meaning of the Occupational Health & Safety (Demolition Licensing) Regulation (NSW) 1996.
8. On 21 March 2001, Inspector Rech on behalf of WorkCover granted to the Defendant an exemption from the need to hold a current unrestricted demolition licence in order to dismantle parts of the Aquatic Centre, subject to certain conditions. Those conditions were:
a. The exemption is for the specific purpose of the company Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd ("the Company") carrying out all the demolition of the structure known as Portion 2, Contract HBAY 125 on the Aquatic Centre, Homebush, New South Wales.
b. All work is to be supervised by Kevin [sic Kelvin] Durham.
c. All work must be risk assessed and the control measures put in place to control the risk. Security to be provided around the work area to prevent unauthorized persons (children) entering the area during the demolition process as defined.
d. All lifting gear to meet current Australian standards.
e. That all staff involved in the demolition work be inducted into the work plan.
f. That during the carrying out of demolition work all work meets the performance standard of AS2601 - 1991.
g. That the State Co-ordinator of the Construction Team be advised of any issues that draw the attention of the public or press ASAP.
h. Should any issues as per Item 8 come to the attention of the Company, that the MBA be consulted immediately and solutions to those matters be implemented.
9. Section 2.1.1 of AS 2601-1991 provides that:
"Supervision At all times demolition work shall be directly supervised by a competent person."
10. "Competent person" is defined in Section 1.3 of AS 2601-1991 as "a person suitably qualified, adequately trained and appropriately experienced for the particular class or kind of work specified".
11. Kelvin Durham was the Project Manager for the site and employed by the Defendant at the time of the accident. In this position he had overall responsibility for the site.
12. Leighton delegated the task of providing supervision of the dismantling to National Engineering. National Engineering appointed Michael Brown as its supervisor. National Engineering did not hold a demolition licence. Nor had it been exempted from holding one.
13. Michael Brown was a qualified and experienced rigger. However, he did not hold a demolition licence. Neither was he exempted from holding one.
14. On 12 May 2001 Allan James Welsh ("Welsh") was injured in a fall at the Aquatic Centre ("the accident").
15. Michael Brown was in Canberra on 12 May 2001.
16. On that day Welsh and Lance Grove ("Grove") had been working in an elevated work platform ("bucket") of a boom lift undertaking the removal of steel columns on Grid Line P, being columns that had supported part of the seating stands at the Aquatic Centre during the Olympics. Leslie Nancarrow ("Nancarrow") was operating a crane in order to lift the columns. The crane was rated to lift significantly in excess of 1.5 tonnes.
17. Both Welsh and Grove were qualified riggers. Welsh had been working in the industry for the whole of his working life, which was approximately 30 years. Both employees had been inducted onto the site.
18. Welsh, Grove and Nancarrow were employed by Penrith Rigging. Stanley Beard ("Beard"), the sole owner and director of Penrith Rigging, was their immediate supervisor. At the time of the accident Beard had over twenty-seven years experience in rigging and had operated Penrith Rigging for over twenty-five years. Neither Penrith Rigging nor Beard held a demolition licence. Nor had it or he been exempted from holding one.
19. At all relevant times Beard was working approximately 90 metres away from Welsh and Grove.
20. Welsh was working from within the bucket using an electric impact wrench to remove the "holding down" bolts which affixed column 1210B ("the Column") to the top of a concrete plinth. Two columns had originally been attached to the plinth on diagonal angles. The Column weighed approximately 1480 kilograms. It was approximately 9 metres in length with a 3 metre section of steel ("the outrigger") extending at 90 degrees from the top. The Column was attached by a number of bolts to a concrete plinth at its base. Welsh had slung the column that had been attached to the opposite side of the plinth without incident.
21. Welsh was wearing a harness which was attached to a section of the bucket which was rated as a fall arrest anchor. Grove was also with Welsh in the bucket wearing a harness attached to the bucket.
22. Shortly before the accident Welsh unhooked his harness lanyard and stepped out of the bucket onto the concrete plinth to remove the last of the holding down bolts.
23. When Welsh removed the nut from the last holding down bolt the Column lifted and swung to the side, knocking Welsh from the plinth, causing him to fall approximately 4.5 metres onto the grassed area surrounding the plinth. He then rolled down an incline of approximately 45 degrees, hitting his head on a stone feature wall at the base, sustaining serious injuries. The injuries included multiple fractures of the pelvis and the ribs, a bruised lung, a torn tendon, a wedge fracture of T8 and a crack in T10 and a cut of some 250 mm across the top of his head from one ear to the other.
24. No-one was supervising the work of Welsh and Grove during the slinging of the Column and its removal.
25. Beard noticed that Welsh had left the bucket a short time before the accident but was too far away from him to do anything about it.
26. After Welsh fell, the Column continued to swing out of control, in the direction of the boom lift basket, striking the basket and damaging it. Grove ducked his head below the hand rail of the basket to avoid being injured, himself.
27. Before the accident, whilst removing the other column bolted to the same plinth, Grove had stepped from the bucket onto the plinth to remove the last nuts from the holding down bolts as he could not reach these bolts from within the bucket. He had connected his fall arrest harness lanyard to the hand rail of the bucket. The hand rail was not rated as a fall arrest anchor. (See AS 2550.10 Elevated Working Platforms, particularly Section 9.4).
28. Kelvin Durham was present at the site on the day of the accident. At the time of the accident he had just stepped out of his site office. The office was situated approximately 60 metres from where Welsh and Grove were working. Durham saw the accident as it happened. Durham was aware of the work being undertaken that day on Grid Line P as was he aware of other works being undertaken on the site. He did not visit the area that day at any time before the accident.
29. The steel columns had been erected by slinging a nylon sling around the top part of each column, hoisting the column with a crane over a concrete plinth and then lining up the base of the column with the top of the plinth. A rigger would then use an Electric Impact Wrench, and working from within the bucket of a boom lift, harnessed at all times, tighten the first bolt at the uppermost point of the plinth to hold the column in place temporarily. The crane would then slew the beam so as to lower it to the correct angle and then the rigger would tighten the final bolts. Penrith Rigging had erected all the steel columns at the site under supervision of National Engineering.
30. Before 12 May 2001 the Defendant did not conduct a risk analysis or prepare a work method statement but National Engineering did. Neither the risk analysis nor the work method statement identified;
(a) the risk of a column moving suddenly or erratically;
(b) the need for a competent person to supervise the lifts and, in particular, the need for Mr Durham to undertake the supervision;
(c) the method of demolition, including the slinging positions.
31. The work method statement was attached to the application for exemption from the need to have a demolition licence under the Occupational Health & Safety (Demolition Licensing) Regulation (NSW) 1996.
32. On 10 May 2001 Michael Brown instructed a meeting of riggers at which Welsh, Grove and Nancarrow were present in the system of work to be used to dismantle the structure. The instruction required the persons involved to remove the upper columns first and then the lower columns, to sling each column about a metre and a half from the top and to use a double wrap with a 4 tonne nylon sling. Brown demonstrated with a dogman from another company how the job should be done. Welsh witnessed the demonstration. He noted that Brown appeared to be careful not to place the sling too low and saw that the procedure was safe. He also noticed that during the demonstration the men in the bucket wore safety harnesses and were not required to leave the bucket of the boom lift
33. After the demonstration, from a position on the ground, Brown watched Welsh, Grove and Nancarrow remove columns on Grid Line Q. The columns on Grid Line Q were similar in size and shape to the columns on Grid Line P. The rigging crew performed this lift correctly. On that occasion Welsh and Grove remained harnessed and within the bucket. The columns were dismantled without incident.
34. Welsh was absent from the site on 11 May 2001.
35. At the beginning of the shift on 12 May 2001 Welsh, Grove and Nancarrow attended an informal tool box meeting. Ted Tamsett told them to take down the two lower columns on Grid Line P. Welsh understood that the work was to be carried out strictly in accordance with the method that Brown demonstrated two days earlier on Grid Line Q.
36. If the riggers had trouble reaching the holding down bolts the boom lift could have been manoeuvred to facilitate access from a position within the basket.
37. An investigation into the causes of the accident revealed that the nylon sling had been placed at the central point of the column, which was not its point of equilibrium. The combination of the placement of the sling and the section of steel extending at 90 degrees from the top of the column caused the column to rotate when it was being lifted vertically.
38. Welsh's conduct in removing his harness and leaving the bucket of the boom lift was contrary to the risk analysis, which stipulated that all personnel using the boom lift were to be harnessed and hooked up to the bucket and were to remain within the bucket at all times.
39. After the accident the work method statement was amended. The amendments included a description of the method of dismantling the remaining columns, stipulated the slinging positions and emphasized the requirement for riggers to wear their harnesses hooked up to the boom lift bucket and remain within the bucket at all time (sic).
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