Issues arising on the confirmation order
25 There were a number of minor errors in the steps taken by the applicants in complying with the necessary pre-confirmation procedures.
26 First, there was a typographical error in the date of the application to the Court for confirmation of the Scheme, in the Notice of Intention published in various newspapers on 18 December 2007. The error was not apt to cause confusion or to mislead the ordinary reader.
27 Second, the Notice of Intention was published in two of the approved newspapers after the Scheme was open for public inspection. This was a breach of paragraph 11 of Prudential Standard GPS 410 which therefore resulted in a failure to comply with s 17C(2)(b) and s 17E(2) of the Act.
28 Whether or not this results in a failure to strictly comply with the requirements of those subsections, the short answer is that they are not conditions precedent to the existence of the jurisdiction to confirm a scheme: Re Armstrong Jones Life Assurance Ltd (1997) 74 FCR 160 at 161-162 (Emmett J); Re Royal & Sun Alliance Assurance Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 37 at [18] (Katz J); Re Insurance Australia Ltd 139 FCR 450 at [62]-[63] (Lindgren J).
29 Third, there was a further timing issue arising from the delayed provision of a summary of the Scheme to some affected policyholders. This resulted in a failure to comply with paragraph 15 of Prudential Standard GPS 410 and s 17E(2). It is sufficiently covered by what I said above.
30 The principal issue arising on the application was whether there was likely to be any material detriment to policyholders affected by the Scheme: Re GIO Personal Investment Services Ltd [2000] FCA 1871 at [27] (Emmett J). This accords with the main object of the Act which is expressed in s 2A(1), namely, to protect the interests of policyholders.
31 In the GIO case Emmett J was satisfied upon the basis of a joint actuarial report that there was not likely to be any material detriment to the owners of policies affected by the Scheme. His Honour therefore confirmed the Scheme under the provisions of s 194 of the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth).
32 Emmett J took a similar approach in Re Mercantile and General Reinsurance Company of Australia Ltd [2004] FCA 1773 at [19]-[20] and Re PMI Indemnity Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCA 1842 at [71]-[74]. In PMI [2005] FCA 1842 at [72] his Honour observed that even if the Scheme did not proceed, policyholders would not be guaranteed that the company would retain its excess capital because insurance companies are permitted to reduce their capital, subject to the approval of APRA.
33 It seemed to me that I should take the same approach in the present application in view of the conclusion reached by the actuaries as to the financial position of QIA after the Scheme and in view of the lack of opposition from any affected policyholder.
34 I also took into account the fact that APRA was represented before me and that it has expressed no objection to the Scheme. As Sheppard J said in The Application of Advance Insurance Ltd (unreported, Sheppard J, 18 February 1997) at 16-18, the Court relies on persons in the position now occupied by APRA, to place any evidence, including actuarial evidence, before the Court if it chose to do so. This is not to suggest that the Court abdicates the decision to APRA (cf, in a similar context, Re Metlife Insurance Ltd (2007)63 ACSR 492, [2007] FCA 1327 at [28], [30] and [37]).
35 The relevant authorities were collected and referred to by Katz J in Re Royal & Son Alliance 104 FCR 37 at [25]-[27]. The same approach was taken by Hely J in The Application of Zurich Insurance Co [2003] FCA 1519 at [4].
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.