Consideration
65 In Mr Mizen's submissions, ground 1 is principally put in terms that the Tribunal's conclusion about the level of likelihood that he would reoffend was irrational, unreasonable or lacked a probative basis. It is convenient to repeat the summary of principle given in BAE23 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCA 1152 at [27]-[29]:
… [J]urisdictional error may occur when either the outcome of the exercise of a statutory power was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could reach, or because it was not open to the Minister to engage in the process of reasoning in which he did engage and to make the findings he did make on the material before him: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [133]; Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21 at [34]-[35]. Where reasons are given, the Court ordinarily looks to those reasons to assess the reasonableness of the exercise of power: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44]-[47].
Nevertheless, the characterisation of a decision as legally unreasonable because of illogicality or irrationality is not easily made, and not every lapse of logic will give rise to jurisdictional error: SZMDS at [130]; Djokovic at [34]. It is not sufficient that the court disagrees with the basis of the fact finding or associated reasoning, or even strongly or emphatically disagrees; it must be shown that the findings were not rationally open to be made: CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 70; (2022) 293 FCR 634 at [65] (Moshinsky, O'Bryan and Cheeseman JJ) and the cases cited there.
It was also common ground that a finding of fact on a key matter can lead to jurisdictional error if there was no probative basis for it in the materials before the decision maker. In Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Splendido [2019] FCAFC 132; (2019) 271 FCR 595 at [48] Mortimer J (Moshinsky J agreeing) endorsed the following statement of principle made in submissions:
Save that the reviewing court must be satisfied that the evidence relied upon achieves at least a threshold probative value, the inquiry is not otherwise concerned with ascertaining the sufficiency or quality (including cogency) of the evidence. The ground necessarily invites and requires a comparison between the material available to the decision-maker and the conclusions drawn from that material.
66 The core of Mr Mizen's contentions under ground 1 is that the Tribunal started from a (questionable) assessment that while in prison, his risk of reoffending was medium, and received evidence indicating that since then the likelihood had reduced, but still concluded that the likelihood was 'moderate' (which he appears to equate with medium).
67 However, despite Mr Mizen's submission that this is illogical, in my view the contention does amount to a mere expression of disagreement with the Tribunal's factual conclusions. It is a claim that an evaluative conclusion should not have been reached because the Tribunal should have found that the matters listed contradicted that conclusion.
68 That is said to be because the Tribunal started with an assessment of medium risk at the time of sentencing, and should have discounted that by reference to subsequent positive developments to arrive at an assessment lower than 'moderate'. That starting point is open to doubt; it is not clear, in paragraph 98 of its reasons, whether the Tribunal is adopting the finding from the 'pre-sentence and prison assessment [that] his overall risk for general offending was medium' or just noting that the assessment was made. But even if the Tribunal did accept the assessment, Mr Mizen's argument, with respect, focusses on selected aspects of the Tribunal's reasons, divorced from their context in the rest of the reasons. It is trite that the Tribunal's reasoning must be assessed as a whole. I have set out those reasons in detail at [14]-[53] above. When assessed as a whole, the following path of reasoning emerges.
69 The Tribunal's focus was on the risk that Mr Mizen would possess and distribute CEM again if he remained in Australia. That is common ground before this Court. The Tribunal assessed the risk that he would commit an offence involving contact with a child as low, and did not have any real regard to that risk.
70 The Tribunal was aware of, and addressed, Mr Mizen's representations to the effect that he was at a low risk of reoffending by the possession of CEM.
71 When the Tribunal turned to the likelihood, in the sense of degree of probability, that Mr Mizen would reoffend, it recorded Mr Mizen's submissions in that regard. Mr Mizen does not suggest that it did so inaccurately or in any way that evinced a misunderstanding of his submissions. The Tribunal also recorded the Minister's submissions to the effect that the prison risk assessment process determined Mr Mizen to present 'a moderate risk of reoffending'.
72 It is necessary at this point to digress from the summary of the Tribunal's reasoning to say that I do not accept Mr Mizen's submission that the Tribunal's reference to this process is a reference to the LS/RNR QuickScore Form. That is not among the materials that the Tribunal listed as being before it at paragraph 92 of its reasons. It does say that 'a presentence report prepared by the Department of Corrective Services dated 14 July 2020' was before the sentencing judge. 14 July 2020 is the date on which the person who filled out the LS/RNR QuickScore Form signed off on it. But at paragraph 92 the Tribunal said that this document was not before it.
73 The Tribunal made no direct reference to the LS/RNR QuickScore Form and says nothing to suggest that it had read that document. This tends to indicate that it did not have regard to the form, even though it was in fact in the tender bundle before it. I find that the Tribunal proceeded on the misapprehension that the LS/RNR QuickScore form was not in the materials before it. Further, while the sentencing judge's remarks indicated that her Honour had regard to a document that can be inferred to be the LS/RNR QuickScore form, those remarks make no apparent reference to that form subsequently and do not say anything that can be inferred to have been derived from the form. Therefore the Tribunal had no regard to the contents of the LS/RNR QuickScore form, directly or in any indirect way.
74 As counsel for the Minister pointed out at the hearing in this Court, the Tribunal did say that it had before it the (post sentencing) Treatment Assessment Report of May 2021 that is mentioned above. This is what it calls 'the prison report', immediately after having referred to information indicating that 'in the pre-sentence and prison assessment, his overall risk for general offending was medium' (see text excerpted at [28] above). The Treatment Assessment Report had indeed assessed Mr Mizen as presenting 'a medium risk for general reoffending'.
75 It is true, as counsel for Mr Mizen pointed out, that the Treatment Assessment Report refers to and partly relies on a previous 'LS/RNR assessment [that] was completed by a Community Corrections Officer'. But whoever completed the Treatment Assessment Report did not stop there, but reviewed and updated it, including after interviewing Mr Mizen, and it is evident from the form that a qualitative assessment of Mr Mizen was undertaken. Therefore Mr Mizen's criticisms of the LS/RNR QuickScore form in this Court are not relevant.
76 To return to tracing the Tribunal's reasoning, it had regard to the sentencing judge's analysis of psychological and pre-sentencing reports that were not before it (noting that, as remarked above, her Honour did not appear to undertake any analysis of the LS/RNR QuickScore form). But her Honour's remarks said nothing about a 'medium' (or 'moderate') level of risk. The Tribunal also referred to the Treatment Assessment Report, the SOMED report and parole documents that were before it.
77 The Tribunal then commenced its analysis of the material before it by referring to the sentencing judge's observations as to attempts by Mr Mizen to find 'other explanations for his offending including toxoplasmosis and autism spectrum disorder - neither of which the Court accepted [Mr Mizen] was suffering from' [22]. In context, this means explanations other than having a sexual interest in children. The sentencing judge said that the psychologist ultimately concluded, in her forensic psychological assessment, that Mr Mizen was 'a fantasy driven CEM offender, so rather than it being something that is connected to any contact offending … it is connected to [Mr Mizen's] sexual interest in children'. The Tribunal quoted further passages from the sentencing remarks which add detail to and bolster that assessment.
78 Thus the focus of the Tribunal's consideration was Mr Mizen's sexual interest in children as a cause of his offending. The Tribunal also highlighted the sentencing judge's view that Mr Mizen had not recognised or accepted that he had a sexual interest in children and had not shown significant remorse for his offences [24]-[25]. The Tribunal then referred to the report that it did have before it, the Treatment Assessment Report, and similarly highlighted a passage indicating that Mr Mizen denied having a sexual interest in children [28].
79 The Tribunal then considered the SOMED report, setting out a passage recording that Mr Mizen had identified a deviant sexual interest in children. However the Tribunal reached the conclusion set out at [29] above, that 'there is a risk [Mr Mizen] will reoffend and that the risk was assessed to be in the medium range' and that the SOMED report suggested that there was 'further work to be done'. It did this after considering the different nature of the task before it, as compared to the task of sentencing.
80 The Tribunal then turned to evaluate Mr Mizen's evidence before it as indicating that he had 'continued a pattern of minimisation of his offending and a lack of insight into its impacts' [30]. It was open to the Tribunal to characterise the cross examination described at [31] above as showing that Mr Mizen resisted expressing remorse for the impact of the offending on the children, that he attempted to deflect the discussion to an esoteric question of Marxist theory and the financial dimensions of child pornography, and that at most he could bring himself to express bland 'regret that it had happened'. It is true that in a subsequent passage Mr Mizen acknowledged that the offending perpetuated trauma, but this does not address the reasons for his offending, namely his sexual interest in children.
81 Mr Mizen did appear to acknowledge the existence of that interest in the final excerpt set out by the Tribunal [33], when he was asked directly about how psychological treatment plans would help with regard to his sexual attraction to children, but he then immediately digressed into an unclear metaphor about trees and attributed his offending to stress and anxiety. In the end, any acknowledgement of the point that he gave was fleeting and unclear, and immediately undermined by his subsequent evidence.
82 In view of that, it was open to the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that Mr Mizen continued to be reluctant to acknowledge that a sexual interest in children was an underlying factor in his offending.
83 The Tribunal then went on to consider that continuing to care for his mother would provide a limited protective factor, since it was a stressor before his incarceration to which Mr Mizen attributed his offending. The Tribunal noted his plans to engage in less stressful work, and the availability of psychological and medical treatment [35]. While it then put weight on the evidence of friends and colleagues, it assessed them as having limited relationships with him, and said that the relationships had not prevented his past offending [36]. These findings were all rationally open.
84 Finally, the Tribunal discounted the protective effect of the parole, since it was almost over, but did consider that the ongoing ANCOR reporting obligations would be a protective factor [37].
85 The Tribunal's conclusion that the risk of reoffending remained 'in the moderate range' must be considered in the context of all that reasoning. When that is done, it becomes apparent that the reasoning and the conclusion were both logically open on the material before the Tribunal. Specifically, the Tribunal's concern that Mr Mizen continued to be reluctant to acknowledge that his offending stemmed from a sexual interest in children informed its concern that there was a moderate risk that he would reoffend in respect of CEM. There was nothing illogical about that; the unstated but reasonably open premise in the argument appeared to be that acknowledgment of that interest as an important cause was a necessary step to treatment and rehabilitation.
86 Viewed in that light, it does not demonstrate jurisdictional error for Mr Mizen to isolate a selected subset of the materials before the Tribunal and put them together in order to posit an arguable conclusion that is contrary to the one the Tribunal did reach. Still less does it demonstrate error to posit an 'initial' assessment of risk as 'medium' and then to apply quasi-quantitative discounts to that, by reference to a selected list of specific matters, to seek to establish that the end point could not have been 'moderate' (noting, anyway, that the Tribunal was careful to speak of the risk of reoffending as being in the moderate range [33]).
87 As far as Mr Mizen's list of five protective factors is concerned (using the numbering from [58] above):
(1) The Tribunal did consider the SOMED report, carefully, and concluded, rationally, that there was 'further work to be done' [29]. Mr Mizen's submission that the Tribunal should have found that the SOMED report indicated a reduced risk of reoffending is merely an expression of disagreement with the Tribunal.
(2) The Tribunal also considered the cross-examination where Mr Mizen acknowledged his interest in children, and came to the view that he had made some progress but was still reluctant to acknowledge this [34]. The Tribunal was entitled to reach that view. As noted in the preceding sub-paragraph 87(a), the Tribunal considered the SOMED report's finding that Mr Mizen had identified a deviant sexual interest in children, ultimately reaching the conclusion that there was 'further work to be done'. Again, Mr Mizen's submission about his acknowledgment of a sexual interest in children is merely an expression of disagreement.
(3) While the Tribunal did note Mr Mizen's plan to reduce stress by ceasing to practise as a lawyer, it did not appear to choose to put weight on that. The weight to put on any specific piece of evidence was a matter for the Tribunal: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [197] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). It also noted his ongoing access to medical and psychological services, and also did not appear to put much weight on that. Once again, that was a matter for the Tribunal. Mr Mizen submits that the Tribunal found that his reintegration plans were a 'limited protecting factor', but that takes the finding out of context. It related specifically to Mr Mizen's plans to live with and care for his mother, not his plans for avoiding stress and seeking psychological and medical support as Mr Mizen appears to submit. Further, reading the relevant paragraph as a whole (see [35]), the Tribunal's emphasis was clearly on the limited weight to be given to this as a protective factor, because the demands of caring for his mother had been a cause of his stress before, allegedly pushing him towards offending.
(4) The Tribunal minimised the importance of Mr Mizen's social supports because it found that the relevant relationships were not close ones, and because they were present in the past but not sufficient to prevent Mr Mizen's offending. Mr Mizen has identified no basis to doubt that this was open to the Tribunal. Its assessment overall was that Mr Mizen's plans for reintegration did not mean that it could find that he presented a low risk of reoffending. Further, Mr Mizen submits that the Tribunal found that this factor would 'provide some protection against reoffending'. This is an excerpt of part of a sentence, and overstates the Tribunal's finding. When read in full, the sentence is as follows [37]: 'The Tribunal considers that while the Applicant's plans for reintegration provide some protection against reoffending, in the Tribunal's view they do not mean it could find with any degree of satisfaction that the Applicant presents a low risk of offending.'
(5) The Tribunal noted that ANCOR reporting requirements would apply to Mr Mizen if he were released, and considered that they would act as a protective factor against reoffending [37]. But again, the weight to be put on this in the overall evaluation of risk was a matter for the Tribunal. Its presence as a protective factor does not mean that the conclusion that the risk of reoffending was in the moderate range was irrational.
88 Counsel for Mr Mizen sought to draw an analogy between the decision of the Tribunal in this case and decisions of the Minister which were set aside due to unreasonableness or illogicality in Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; (2017) 255 FCR 81 and in Ogbonna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 620; (2018) 261 FCR 385. But the process of identifying jurisdictional error on such grounds will inevitably be fact dependent and each case turns on its own facts: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [48]; KXXH v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 111; (2022) 292 FCR 15 at [50]. Both Muggeridge and Ogbonna are distinguishable.
89 In Muggeridge, the Minister had made a positive finding that the appellant had rehabilitated. The appellant had not been convicted of any offences for 19 years and was suffering from a debilitating medical condition. And the Minister had made no real assessment of the possibility that the appellant would resume contact with the outlaw motorcycle club that had been the context of his previous offending. So the finding that it was possible that he would reoffend in the same fashion was insupportable: see Muggeridge, especially at [42], [52], [55]. In this case, the Tribunal made no finding that Mr Mizen has rehabilitated. Further, Mr Mizen's offending was recent. Above all, the reasoning described above shows there was a rational basis for the Tribunal's conclusion, in particular the Tribunal's concern that Mr Mizen had not confronted the likely cause of his efforts to seek out CEM and had little insight into or remorse for his offending.
90 In Ogbonna, the Minister had found that there was a likelihood that the applicant would reoffend in a similar manner by taking part in the supply of a large commercial quantity of commercial drugs. But all but one of the matters which the Minister said he took into account in reaching that conclusion pointed away from reoffending in a similar manner, and the remaining matter - that his rehabilitation had not been tested in the community - was incapable by itself of providing a probative foundation to conclude that there was a likelihood that he would reoffend in that way: see Ogbonna, especially at [31], [43]-[45]. This case and the Tribunal's reasoning about it are quite different; the Tribunal articulated logically coherent reasons to be concerned that Mr Mizen would reoffend . To say, as Mr Mizen does, that the Tribunal should have found that more protective factors existed is merely to disagree with its fact finding. And to 'add' other findings to a finding that the risk of reoffending at the time of sentencing was medium is merely to argue for a different evaluation of the weight to be put on those factors, and to disregard the course of reasoning above.
91 Jurisdictional error on the basis of illogicality and irrationality is not easy to establish. In truth, Mr Mizen's arguments under ground 1 do no more than express disagreement with the Tribunal's evaluative findings of fact.
92 While the ground also asserts that the Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the relevant paragraph from Direction 99, Mr Mizen made no submission that purported to identify any misunderstanding or misapplication of the paragraph.
93 To the extent that Mr Mizen submitted that the impugned finding did not reflect an active intellectual engagement with the materials or the Tribunal's own earlier findings, that submission cannot be sustained. As the discussion above shows, the Tribunal's engagement with the likelihood of reoffending was careful and thorough.
94 Ground 1 is not upheld.