Consideration
37 This proceeding concerns a single contravention of s 354(1)(f) of the EPBC Act by Mr Woodley and Venture. Both Mr Woodley and Venture admit the contraventions alleged against them.
38 The detailed facts giving rise to those contraventions are set out in the Statement of Claim and in the Statement of Agreed Facts. In those circumstances, evidence is not required to prove the existence of the agreed facts and evidence may not be adduced to contradict or qualify any of the agreed facts unless the Court gives leave to a party so to do (see s 191(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 10 at [30]-[37]).
39 The maximum penalty for a contravention of s 354(1)(f) of the EPBC Act is $55,000 for an individual and $550,000 for a body corporate. Section 354A of the EPBC Act creates certain cognate criminal offences and provides for severe maximum penalties for those offences. These circumstances indicate that the protection of the environment is considered by the legislature to be a matter of high importance.
40 At [31] (p 372) in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ said:
31. It follows that careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick. That having been said, in our opinion, it will rarely be, and was not appropriate for Hulme J here to look first to a maximum penalty (The maximum selected by his Honour was not, as will appear, the maximum available in respect of the principal offence) and to proceed by making a proportional deduction from it. That was to use a prescribed maximum erroneously, as neither a yardstick, nor as a basis for comparison of this case with the worst possible case.
41 In this Court, these remarks by the High Court in Markarian have been held to apply to the imposition of civil penalties (see Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 at [108] (p 584) and Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing v Export Corp (Australia) Pty Ltd (2012) 288 ALR 702 at [49]-[50] (p 714) and at [67] (p 718)).
42 The penalties sought by the Minister in the present case are towards the low end of the available range set by the legislature (18%-27% of the maximum for Mr Woodley and 9%-13% of the maximum for Venture).
43 In his Defence, Mr Woodley submitted that the contravention was not intentional, that he and Venture both had unblemished records in respect of environmental matters, that he had co-operated with the authorities in the conduct of the litigation, that he was truly sorry for what he had done and that he had "… learnt his lesson …". To this list of factors which count in favour of Mr Woodley and Venture must be added the following additional matters, namely:
(a) Both respondents admitted the contraventions in full. That conduct led to the production of the Agreed Statement of Facts. This co-operation on the part of Mr Woodley and Venture saved the Minister a great deal of time, effort and expense. It has also meant that there has been a considerable saving of the Court's time.
(b) There was only one contravention. It appears to have been a "one-off" event.
(c) No lobsters were actually caught by Mr Woodley in the Sanctuary Zone or in the Reserve on the occasion in question.
(d) Both Mr Woodley and Venture are experiencing financial difficulties at the present time. The precise detail of those difficulties was not the subject of evidence beyond the documents attached to the second Defence referred to at [27] above.
44 The matters listed at [43] above were identified by Counsel for the Minister as being relevant in determining penalty and in favour of Mr Woodley and Venture. Those matters were accepted by him as being relevant to the determination of penalty.
45 In determining the appropriate penalties in this case, I intend to take into account all of the matters listed at [43] above in favour of Mr Woodley and Venture.
46 Counsel for the Minister submitted that, in addition to the four matters specified in s 481(3) of the EPBC Act, the Court has held on previous occasions that, in matters such as those with which I am presently dealing, it is appropriate to have regard to:
(a) The contravenor's co-operation during investigations and subsequent Court proceedings;
(b) Any relevant prior "record" on the part of the contravening party;
(c) The contravenor's business arrangements and financial circumstances; and
(d) Any remorse or contrition shown by the contravenor.
47 Counsel for the Minister emphasised that the principal object of civil penalty provisions is to ensure deterrence. In Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd [1991] ATPR 41-076, which was a case dealing with s 76 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), French J said (at p 52,152):
The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act.
48 It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that the dictum of French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd has been applied not only in the Trade Practices context but in a wide variety of other regulatory regimes. In particular, it was submitted that the need for a penalty to have a proper deterrent effect had been emphasised in the context of the EPBC Act in a number of cases (Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities v De Bono [2012] FCA 643 at [49] and [54]; Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd at [16]; Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v Rocky Lamattina & Sons Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 107, (2009) 167 LGERA 219 at [46]-[47]; Minister for Environment and Heritage v Warne [2007] FCA 599 at [15]-[16]; Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Wilson [2004] FCA 6 at [7]; and Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Greentree (No 3) (2004) 136 LGERA 89 at [69]-[70] and [81]).
49 Counsel for the Minister submitted that I should approach the determination of the penalties in the present case by applying the process commonly called "instinctive synthesis". He submitted that this process was described in Markarian as having the following attributes:
(a) There must be a weighing of all relevant factors, rather than starting from some pre-determined figure and making incremental additions or subtractions for each separate factor (Markarian at [36]-[39] (pp 373-375) (per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) and at [69]-[73] (pp 385-387) (per McHugh J)); and
(b) It is critical that the reasoning process involved in synthesising the penalty be transparent (Markarian at [36]-[39] (pp 373-375) (per the plurality) and at [84] (p 390) (per McHugh J)).
50 I think that the submissions made on behalf of the Minister which I have summarised at [46]-[49] above are correct and I accept them. I shall approach the imposition of penalties in the present case with those submissions firmly in mind.
51 I now turn to address the factors which operate against Mr Woodley and Venture and which suggest that penalties in the range sought by the Minister are appropriate.
52 Mr Woodley is likely to continue working for some time in the future as a commercial fisherman. Whilst he has co-operated in the swift determination of this proceeding and declared his genuine remorse, the penalty imposed nonetheless should be such as to ensure that he does not repeat the contravening conduct. There is an element of special deterrence that needs to be reflected in the penalties imposed.
53 As is usually the case in matters such as this, I should reflect the need for general deterrence in the penalties which I impose.
54 The provisions of Pt 15 of the EPBC Act are designed to ensure that areas of international and/or national environmental significance are protected and managed consistently with the natural values of the area and Australia's international environmental responsibilities. By the various mechanisms adopted in the legislation, the objects of the Act set out in s 3(1) are advanced.
55 Non-compliance with Pt 15 of the EPBC Act is likely to:
(a) Directly cause harm to the environment;
(b) Undermine the objects of the EPBC Act;
(c) Create or increase environmental risks;
(d) Reduce public confidence in the effective protection of the environment under the EPBC Act; and
(e) Discourage other persons from incurring costs associated with taking steps necessary to comply with the EPBC Act.
56 The consequences to which I have referred at [55] above are all very serious.
57 In addition, there are other matters to be considered under the heading of general deterrence:
(a) The marine areas off the south coast of Tasmania are subject to significant levels of commercial rock lobster fishing, which is a major and valuable commercial activity.
(b) The detection of illegal rock lobster fishing is extremely difficult. This is because:
(i) There are large areas of Commonwealth marine reserves protected under the EPBC Act;
(ii) Rock lobster fishing pots are not readily observed unless seen from quite close;
(iii) Rock lobster pots can be easily and swiftly placed and just as easily and swiftly removed, making such fishing a mobile and transitory affair; and
(iv) Access to legitimate commercial markets to dispose of rock lobsters that are illegally caught is easy. When lobsters are ultimately sold, it is not possible from their appearance or otherwise to determine precisely where they have been caught.
58 In addition, there are significant commercial gains to be achieved by fishing in protected areas for rock lobster because the sale of rock lobster is a very profitable activity.
59 In a nutshell, those who may be tempted to fish in protected areas may think that the risk is worth taking because of the potential for significant financial gain and the low level of risk of detection.
60 The Sanctuary Zone is a highly protected area. No fishing whatsoever is permitted there.
61 Whilst it is true that no lobsters were caught by Mr Woodley in the Sanctuary Zone on the occasion in question, that is more perhaps the result of the early but coincidental detection of the Brid Venture in the prohibited area by the Tasmanian Police vessel Vigilant than anything else.
62 If those who contravene s 354(1) of the EPBC Act receive relatively small penalties when apprehended, there is every chance that commercial fishermen will conclude that the benefits of fishing in protected areas (given its potential for deriving significant financial rewards) far outweigh the risk of being caught committing a contravention because the risk of detection is low and the financial penalties relatively insignificant. If such conduct is undertaken, the harm to the environment is likely to be significant.
63 In the present case, although the contravention was not intentional, it was certainly reckless. Mr Woodley was aware of the existence and location of the Reserve and the Sanctuary Zone and was well aware that it was illegal to set lobster pots within the Reserve. At all times whilst engaged in rock lobster fishing in January 2011, Mr Woodley had access to Fishery Map 9. That map clearly showed the boundaries of the Sanctuary Zone. Mr Woodley had used Fishery Map 9 on a daily basis in the period towards the end of January 2011. Just before committing the contravention, he had set 100 lobster pots very close to the boundary of the Sanctuary Zone. Despite all this, Mr Woodley said that he did not turn his mind to the question of whether he was setting his pots in the prohibited Zone.
64 Whilst the Minister accepts that Mr Woodley and Venture are both in financial difficulties, the Minister submitted that this factor should be given little weight, given the importance of the other factors to which I have referred at [46]-[63] above. The Minister also submitted that, had Mr Woodley wished the financial position of him and Venture to be taken into account in a more significant way, it was incumbent upon him to place detailed evidence before the Court directed to establishing the financial position of each of the contravenors. This he did not do.
65 Finally, the Minister submitted that Mr Woodley had not offered co-operation of any moment during the course of the investigation. Rather, he had left his co-operation to the point in time when it was inevitable that the contraventions would be established.
66 Whilst Mr Woodley is clearly the controlling mind of Venture, that fact does not mean that only one penalty is appropriate or that a purely nominal penalty should be imposed upon one or other of the respondents. This is particularly the case where, as here, much greater maximum penalties are applicable to corporations than to individuals (see Fair Work Ombudsman v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 408 at [8] (per Buchanan J)). Venture was, after all, the trading vehicle for the commercial fishing activities conducted by Mr Woodley. It would have been the repository of the financial rewards from the contravention, had any lobsters actually been caught in the Reserve.
67 I think that I should give significant weight to the need for general deterrence in the present case bearing in mind that the contraventions of the type with which I am dealing are extremely difficult to detect. Although the mitigating factors in favour of Mr Woodley and Venture mean that the present case is not at the worst end of the spectrum, nonetheless the high importance attached to the protection of the environment in the respects specified in the EPBC Act, coupled with the other matters to which I have referred at [46]-[66] above, suggest that a penalty in the range submitted by the Minister for each of the contravenors is appropriate. I have decided to impose a penalty on Mr Woodley at a point in the range submitted by the Minister which is just above the mid point of that range. I accept the Minister's submission that Venture should receive a penalty of five times that which is imposed upon Mr Woodley.
68 I propose to impose a penalty of $13,000 on Mr Woodley and a penalty of $65,000 on Venture. I also propose to make the declarations sought by the Minister. Costs should follow the event.
69 Earlier today, I was informed by the solicitor for the Minister that the parties had agreed on the terms of the appropriate orders for costs. The agreement is that:
(a) The first respondent should be ordered to pay $17,000.00 towards the Minister's costs; and
(b) The second respondent should be ordered to pay $28,000.00 towards those costs.
70 I will reflect the terms of that agreement in the costs orders which I shall make.
71 There will be orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Foster.