Ground 13 - Claim That the Convictions Were Unsafe and Unsatisfactory
344These grounds of appeal should be considered together. The real ground of appeal is that the verdicts of the jury are unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence.
345For reasons made clear earlier in this judgment (at [34]), the use of the formula "unsafe and unsatisfactory" is no longer appropriate. In these circumstances, Ground 13 is surplusage and no more need be said about it. The ground to be addressed is Ground 1.
Submissions
346The Appellant submitted that there was no evidence adduced by the Crown capable of identifying or establishing, to the criminal standard of proof, that he used false documentary instruments as charged. In support of this proposition, the Appellant made a number of submissions critical of the evidence of a number of Crown witnesses.
347The Appellant submitted that the evidence of a number of Crown witnesses, who were said to have related business interests and not be independent, had been discredited completely by defence counsel at trial, thereby giving rise to a reasonable hypothesis that the Appellant did not make or use false instruments or obtain money by deception as charged.
348The Appellant submitted that the totality of the evidence lacked probative force so that the verdicts of the jury were unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence.
349The Crown submitted that there was a combination of direct evidence and circumstantial evidence before the jury which was more than sufficient to support the verdicts on each count. It was submitted that the Crown case was an overwhelming one, and that the Appellant left a trail of reliable circumstantial evidence in his wake so that, when taken in combination with the direct evidence, the verdicts of guilty were inevitable.
Decision
350The task of the Court in determining a ground of appeal such as this was summarised in Raumakita v R [2011] NSWCCA 126; 210 A Crim R 326 at 332-333 [31]-[34]:
"31 In determining a ground of appeal which asserts, for the purpose of s.6(1) Criminal Appeal Act 1912, that the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, this Court is required to apply the test set down in M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; 181 CLR 487 at 493, and restated in MFA v The Queen [2002] HCA 53; 213 CLR 606. The Court is to make an independent assessment of the evidence, both to its sufficiency and quality. This involves a question of fact. The Court is to determine whether the evidence is such that it was open to a jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant was guilty. The central question is whether this Court is satisfied that the Appellant is guilty of the offence charged in the first count: Morris v The Queen [1987] HCA 50; 163 CLR 454 at 473; SKA v The Queen [2011] HCA 13; 85 ALJR 571 at 575 [11]-[14], 576-577 [20]-[22].
32 In exercising that function, the evidence ought not be considered piecemeal: The Queen v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; 228 CLR 618 at 637-638 [46]-[48]; The Queen v Keenan [2009] HCA 1; 236 CLR 397 at 435 [128]. This Court is required to consider the totality of evidence before the jury. This involves an assessment of direct evidence of witnesses, and inferences to be drawn from a combination of events: Rasic v R at [29].
33 In some cases, the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeal has not seen or heard the witnesses at trial may have a bearing on the outcome of an appeal on an unreasonable verdict ground. In M v The Queen , Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ said at 494-495:
'In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury's advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. That is to say, where the evidence lacks credibility for reasons which are not explained by the manner in which it was given, a reasonable doubt experienced by the court is a doubt which a reasonable jury ought to have experienced. If the evidence, upon the record itself, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the court of criminal appeal to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the court is bound to act and to set aside a verdict based upon that evidence. In doing so, the court is not substituting trial by a court of appeal for trial by jury, for the ultimate question must always be whether the court thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. Although the propositions stated in the four preceding sentences have been variously expressed in judgments of members of the court in previous cases, we have put aside those differences in expression in order to provide authoritative guidance to courts of criminal appeal by stating the propositions in the form in which they are set out above.'
34 The M v The Queen formulation of the task of this Court has been emphasised by the High Court in later cases: The Queen v Nguyen [2010] HCA 38; 85 ALJR 8 at 14 [33]; SKA v The Queen at 575 [13]."
351To the extent that the Crown case against the Appellant was based upon circumstantial evidence, in addition to direct evidence, it is appropriate to bear in mind the approach of this Court to appeals from jury verdicts arising from circumstantial evidence. In Rasic v R [2009] NSWCCA 202, the Court said at [30]:
"This Court has emphasised the fact that a jury brings to consideration of a circumstantial case the common experience of members of the community who apply their collective knowledge of human affairs and their common sense: R v Kaldor [2004] NSWCCA 425; 150 A Crim R 271 at 272-273 [2], 293-294 [86]; Chahine v R [2006] NSWCCA 179 at [88]; BJR v R [2008] NSWCCA 43; 185 A Crim R 360 at 380 [97]. After citing these authorities, Giles JA (Howie and Buddin JJ agreeing) said in Burrell v R at [65]:
'This Court must make its own assessment of the evidence. But the assessment is of the cumulative effect of the evidence, and with due regard to the common experience of human affairs and common sense brought by the jury to their determination of guilt or innocence'."
352In the present case, the jury had an opportunity to observe the Crown witnesses and the Appellant give evidence. In circumstances where challenges were made to the credibility of witnesses, including the Appellant, the jury had a considerable advantage in seeing the witnesses give evidence and their demeanour whilst doing so.
353For the purposes of resolving this ground, it is helpful to refer to the trial Judge's factual findings on sentence (AB190-193), which summarise accurately the evidence adduced at the trial.
354His Honour found that the essence of the deception alleged by the Crown was that the Appellant, pretending to be John Harris, solicitor, with the assistance of Mr Copeland, a mortgage broker, approached Mr Suman Sharma, a personal mortgage manager employed by the ANZ Bank. His Honour noted that the verdicts of the jury indicated that it was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Copeland was aware that the person pretending to be John Harris was an impostor.
355Contact was made with Mr Sharma indicating that it was desired that a client, Ivan Pagett (whose daughter was said to be ill), wished to mortgage his home at Concord so that he could buy a home for his daughter. Mr Sharma received a telephone call from a person calling himself John Harris, who said he was the solicitor for Mr Pagett. Mr Sharma said that he had never met Mr Harris face to face. The whole transaction took a couple of months.
356In support of the loan application, the documents referred to in Counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the indictment were presented to the ANZ Bank. Mr Sharma accepted the documents at face value, together with the assertion of Mr Harris that he was a solicitor, then acting for Mr Pagett. The documents presented to Mr Sharma included a falsified solicitor's letterhead, a falsified passport and driver's licence in the name of Ivan Pagett, falsified details of a personal cheque account in the name of Ivan Pagett, a falsified letter of employment and a false document purporting to be a PAYG summary. The purpose of these documents was to convince the ANZ Bank that Mr Pagett was a man aged in his 50s, receiving an annual salary in excess of $100,000.00 and well able to meet the required mortgage payments.
357Mr Sharma conceded that he acted contrary to accepted banking practice in not meeting Mr Pagett, but stated that he spoke on the telephone to a person who said he was Mr Pagett, who said his daughter was ill and that he wanted everything done through his solicitor.
358His Honour referred to the evidence of Mr Pagett, a 78-year old man who had been disabled since 1979. His Honour noted that his evidence was in no serious way contested. He said that he had never asked anyone for a mortgage over his home. He stated that neither of his two daughters were sick in 2003. He became aware of the alleged mortgage when he received in the mail a chequebook from the ANZ Bank.
359Mr Pagett said that he had never held a passport and he had a driver's licence only until 1978.
360His Honour referred to evidence given by Brett Gall, and his father, Raymond Gall. Brett Gall said he had known the Appellant for over 30 years. On Boxing Day 2003, Brett Gall had met the Appellant at the races. The Appellant told Mr Gall that he was coming into some money, and that he was thinking of buying a racehorse if the Galls had one for him. At a later date, the Appellant told Mr Gall he was going to get a cheque for $200,000.00 or $300,000.00. He asked if he could deposit that cheque into the bank account of the Galls.
361Later, Mr Gall said he discovered that about $750,000.00 had been deposited as payment for the horse, which was to cost the Appellant about $100,000.00. It was at that time that the Appellant asked if it would be possible for him to get the $650,000.00 owing to him in cash. Mr Gall said he telephoned the bank to see if that could be done and was told that it could.
362A date was arranged and, on that date in February 2004, Brett Gall, Brian Purkiss and the Appellant's father, Charles Miller, went to the Commonwealth Bank at South Hurstville. When they arrived at the bank, the Appellant was already present. Before entering the bank, papers relating to the sale of the horse were signed by the Appellant on the roof of his car.
363The four men then entered the bank and were shown to the office of Mr Dasios, the manager. The money was brought in by a teller in bundles of $10,000.00, which was counted out by Mr Dasios on a counting machine. The total sum of $650,000.00 in cash was handed by Mr Dasios to the Appellant, who was identified by Mr Dasios.
364Mr Dasios stated that the reason he remembered the Appellant was that he was the person doing all the talking.
365His Honour noted that it was the Appellant's evidence at the trial that he was not present on this occasion, that he did not receive any part of the money, that he did not pretend to be John Harris, that he did not sign any documents relating to the Ivan Pagett loan and that he was completely uninvolved in the transaction.
366It is useful, as well, to refer to the principal circumstances relied upon by the Crown, and a more detailed account of the evidence, in support of its case against the Appellant under the headings utilised at the trial.
First Circumstance - There Was No Solicitor Called John Harris
367Jennifer Platt, an officer with the Professional Standards Department of the Law Society of NSW gave evidence that there was no person by the name of "John Harris" practising as a solicitor at 48 Hunter Street, Sydney from July 2003 to February 2004.
368Detective Senior Constable Hetherington also gave evidence that there was no solicitor's office on the relevant levels at 48 Hunter Street, Sydney nor a firm entitled "J Harris Solicitors" at any part of that building.
Second Circumstance - The Appellant Received the Proceeds of the Cheque for $759,739.58 Drawn Against the $800,000.00 Loan Granted by the ANZ Bank By Way of $650,000.00 Cash and an 80% Share in a Racehorse
369In November 2003, Brett Gall was the General Manager for Galloping Press. He gave evidence that he had known the Appellant for about 30 years and saw him about twice a year.
370On Boxing Day 2003, Brett Gall saw the Appellant at Randwick races. In the course of that meeting, the Appellant told him that he was coming into some money and was thinking of buying a horse. The Appellant later contacted Brett Gall by phone and they discussed a price, about $100,000.00 including ongoing training costs for two-to-three years.
371The Appellant told him that he expected to get a cheque for $200,000.00 or $300,000.00 from a property settlement.
372The Appellant obtained the bank account details so that he could deposit the cheque into that account. Some time after the cheque was deposited, the Appellant asked Brett Gall, by telephone, if it would be possible to get the money to him in cash. Brett Gall called the Commonwealth Bank of Australia at South Hurstville and asked if the sum of $650,000.00 cash could be withdrawn. When he was advised that it could, a date was fixed and Brett Gall told the Appellant of the nominated date.
373On that date, Brett Gall, Charles Miller and Brian Purkiss went to the bank. The Appellant was already there when they arrived at the bank. The papers relating to the horse, "Manor Born", were signed by the Appellant on the roof of the car before they all went into the bank.
374The men were taken into a back room of the bank, where the money was brought by a bank officer and the bundles were counted. Brett Gall signed for the money, and the Appellant put the money into a brown suitcase he had with him. When they returned to the cars, the Appellant threw the suitcase on to the back seat of his car before moving it to the boot. Everyone, except the Appellant, drove back to work in Brian Purkiss' car.
375Under cross-examination, Brett Gall denied that he and Brian Purkiss took the $650,000.00 cash.
376Brett Gall said that the Appellant was still registered as an owner of the horse at the time of the trial.
377Raymond Gall (Brett Gall's father) gave evidence that in 2003-2004 he was a director of Galloping Press. Raymond Gall said that he had known the Appellant for about 40 years.
378The Appellant contacted Raymond Gall, asking when he would be able to put him on to a good horse. Discussion ensued and the Appellant told Raymond Gall that he had a property settlement coming up and he was interested in buying a horse.
379Several further conversations ensued, and eventually the Appellant told Raymond Gall that the property matter had been settled and that the money would be put in one of Mr Gall's accounts. The Appellant told him that there would be more money than the price of the horse and that he wanted the balance in cash.
380The Appellant later called Raymond Gall and said that the money had been transferred. The office manager confirmed that about $759,000.00 had been paid in. The horse sold to the Appellant was one that had been earmarked for the Melbourne sales. He stated that the agreement as to ownership was that the Appellant would have 80%, whilst he and his company would have 20%. Several reports were prepared in relation to the horse and the Appellant's father, Charles Miller, was given progress reports.
381Brian Purkiss gave evidence in the Crown case. Mr Purkiss was an employee of Galloping Press and had known the Appellant for about eight or nine years.
382Mr Purkiss stated that he was asked to drive Brett Gall and Charles Miller to the bank and he was present when the Appellant signed papers on the roof of his car outside the bank in South Hurstville on 4 February 2004. Also present were Brett Gall and Charles Miller. He said that the Appellant's daughter was inside the Appellant's car.
383After the papers were signed, all persons went into the bank. Brett Gall spoke to someone at the counter and then the manager came out and they were taken to a private room where the money was brought in. It was in bundles of $10,000.00. The Appellant placed $600,000.00 or $650,000.00 in a bag and they left the bank. When the Appellant threw the bag onto the back seat of the car, Mr Purkiss told him that it would be safer to put it in the boot. The Appellant did so and drove off.
384In 2004, Phillip Markou was employed as a teller at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia at South Hurstville. He gave evidence that he was aware that a customer had ordered a large cash withdrawal of $650,000.00 on 4 February 2004.
385About midday on 4 February 2004, Mr Markou was told that the persons making that withdrawal were at the bank in the manager's office. He was given a withdrawal slip by the manager, Mr Dasios. He processed the withdrawal, counted the money, placed it into a large green canvas bag and gave it to Mr Dasios. He observed the people making the withdrawal leaving the bank and gave some descriptions of them. He thought there were a combination of men and women in the group, but he could recall in particular, an older gentlemen, pretty tall build, whitish grey hair, walking out with the brief case. Subsequently, he attended the Downing Centre Court complex to see if he could recognise any of the people he had seen on 4 February 2004, but he could not recognise anyone.
386George Dasios gave evidence that, in February 2004, he was the bank manager of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia at South Hurstville when the sum of $650,000.00 was withdrawn. He described four men who attended, three being in their early 40s and the other man being in his late 70s. He also gave evidence that he subsequently saw one of the men he had described as being in his 40s, in April or May 2005, but he did not speak to him on that occasion. Mr Dasios then saw the same person about two months later when he was with his manager, Greg Ahladiotis, who spoke to the man and said, "Damon Miller, where have you been"? The person addressed as "Damon Miller" responded to Mr Ahladiotis, and the meeting between the three of them lasted about two minutes. Mr Dasios recognised that person coming out of the lifts in the court complex and entering the court room, the only difference being that the man had lost a lot of weight since then, but it was the same man (identified as the Appellant).
Third Circumstance - The Appellant provided the same mobile number that John Harris provided as his contact number, as a contact mobile number for himself
Fourth Circumstance - Callers traceable to the Appellant had been contacting the mobile phone number nominated by the person John Harris
387John Burraston was a postman with Australia Post from September 2000 to May 2004, and a member of the Earlwood Bardwell Park RSL from 2003 to 2004. He gave evidence that he knew the Appellant from about mid-2002 to 2004. He frequently saw the Appellant at the RSL. They exchanged telephone numbers. Mr Burraston gave evidence of the contact telephone numbers he had for the Appellant.
388The Appellant's daughter, Noelle, contacted Mr Burraston on the mobile phone using the number said to be that of John Harris on 31 December 2003, a day after the phone was activated, and again on 8 and 9 January 2004.
Fifth Circumstance - Some Time in 2003 the Appellant Introduced Himself to Leonard Whitaker and Exhibited an Interest in Meeting with Mr Ivan Pagett About the Preparation of a Will
Sixth Circumstances - Mr Whitaker Provided the Appellant with Mr Pagett's Residential Address at Links Avenue, Concord
389Leonard Whitaker was a tourist bus driver in 2003. He gave evidence that he met Ivan Pagett about two or three years earlier, and would see Mr Pagett about three or four times a week and take him out according to Mr Pagett's itinerary. Mr Whitaker left his dog with Mr Pagett for eight months whilst Mr Whitaker went to Thailand.
390Around the time that he knew Mr Pagett, Mr Whitaker was a member of the Earlwood Bardwell Park RSL, where he came to know David Miller. The Appellant had introduced himself as David Miller, not Damon Miller. Mr Whitaker used to drive the Appellant and his associates to the races. Mr Whitaker did not have the Appellant's telephone number, but the Appellant had Mr Whitaker's number and would ring him when he needed his services.
391Mr Whitaker said that he had told the Appellant about his other customers and that he admired Mr Pagett and his independence. The Appellant asked Mr Whitaker, "Has he got a will"? Mr Whitaker replied, "I don't know, why don't you approach him"? He then gave the Appellant Mr Pagett's address at Links Avenue, Concord.
392Ivan Karl Pagett (born in 1929) had lived at his home in Links Avenue, Concord for 45 years. He thought that the mortgage on the house had probably been paid off in 1969. The house was in his wife's name only and, when she died, he discovered a $20,000.00 mortgage which he paid off in 1992. Since that time, he had never sought to again mortgage the house.
393Mr Pagett had been a plumber during his working life. When he received a cheque book from the ANZ Bank in 2003 or 2004, he threw it away.
394Mr Pagett had never spoken to anyone at LJ Hooker Burwood about buying a house for his daughter, and he did not know anyone known as John Harris.
395Peter Hernfield gave evidence that he was a real estate agent employed by LJ Hooker Burwood. In October 2003, he received a telephone call at his office from a man calling himself Ivan Pagett. That person sounded as if he was in his 50s. He said that he was buying a home for his daughter and that his solicitor was John Harris of Hunter Street, Sydney with a telephone number being provided.
396An arrangement was made for Mr Pagett to attend the property for an inspection on 7 October 2003, but no one turned up at the appointed time. When he returned to the office, he contacted the number given to him and a voice message stated that he had contacted "Ivan Pagett", but the voice sounded different to the person to whom he had previously spoken. Mr Hernfield left a message but the person did not contact him.
397Mr Pagett's daughter, Narelle Brien, gave evidence that she knew a solicitor named John Carmody, both professionally and socially, though he had not acted as her solicitor since about 1995. Between 1992 and 1995, she had occasion to access her father's Certificate of Title for the property at Links Avenue, Concord. Her father had asked her to get that document from Mr Carmody's office because he wanted to help his other daughter out and act as a guarantor for her. She obtained the Certificate of Title for her father and, when it was not needed, she thought that it had been returned to Mr Carmody's office.
398In cross-examination, Ms Brien said that she and her brothers were a little concerned about the friendship that had been formed between her father and Mr Whitaker, and the fact that Mr Whitaker was at the house. She agreed that the reason her father required the Certificate of Title was so that he act as surety for her younger sister's bail.
399John Carmody gave evidence that he was a solicitor in practice since 1980 at Burwood, with the Pagett family as a client. In 1993, he handled the estate of the late Joan Pagett and arranged for the property at Links Avenue, Concord to be transferred to her husband. At that time, he took possession of the original Certificate of Title showing Ivan Pagett as the sole proprietor. The Certificate of Title had been in his office since then, except for a period from 4 October 1995 to 8 November 1996 when Mr Pagett's daughter, Narelle, took it away.
400About November 2004, Mr Carmody became away of a fraudulent transaction concerning the property at Links Avenue, Concord. Mr Carmody did a title search and discovered that an application had been made for a replacement Certificate of Title. Mr Carmody then contacted the ANZ Bank on behalf of Mr Pagett, and informed the bank that his client had not entered into that transaction, and that he expected the bank to cause the mortgage registered by the bank over the title to be discharged and removed from the title.
401Gregory Channell gave evidence that he was a solicitor employed as a Legal Officer by the Department of Lands (Office of the Registrar General of NSW). In October 2004, he was contacted by Detective Senior Constable Hetherington in relation to the alleged fraudulent transaction in connection with Mr Pagett's property at Links Avenue, Concord. A Land & Property Information search was conducted. It was found that the fraudulent Certificate of Title had the words "Local Government Area of Concord", whereas the real Certificate of Title bore the words "Municipality of Concord".
402Mr Carmody wrote to Mr Channell on 9 November 2004 on behalf of Mr Pagett, enclosing a copy of a title search they had done, a Change of Name document which had been obtained and other documents.
Seventh Circumstance - The Appellant Met the Valuer When he Visited Mr Pagett's Property at Links Avenue, Concord to Make his Assessment for the ANZ Bank
Eighth Circumstance - The Appellant Required Access to Mr Pagett's Home to Access Information Relevant to the Pretend Loan Application and to Meet the Valuer
403Mark Chung gave evidence that, in 2003, he was a property valuer. He conducted a valuation of the property at Links Avenue, Concord on 28 October 2003 for the ANZ Bank. He saw two persons at the premises. He met a person outside the house and said, "So you are a solicitor. Can I have one of your business cards"? The man said, "I don't have one on me". He described the man as being in his late 40s or early 50s with other features also described.
404Mr Chung entered the house, the door was open and part of the time the man was inside the house and, at other times, he was outside. Towards the end of the valuation, another person arrived in a taxi. That person was not disabled and was also in his late 40s or early 50s. Mr Chung thanked the person he had first seen at the premises and left the property. He prepared a valuation report with the property being reasonably worth $1 million, and he sent the report to the ANZ Bank.
405In cross-examination, Mr Chung said that the first person he described had unlocked the house with a set of keys.
406The evidence of Mr Whitaker and Ms Brien (at [389]-[398] above) was also relevant to these circumstances.
Ninth Circumstance - The Accountant Nominated in the False Tax Returns Tendered in Support of Mr Pagett's Alleged Income was Peter Hill, the Same Name Stated as an Accountant for the Appellant in a Document Found in the Appellant's Briefcase Upon Arrest
Tenth Circumstance - The Tax Agent Number Quoted in the False Tax Documents Was Used by a Tax Agent With Whom the Appellant Had Been Associated
407An Accountant, Robert Elliot, gave evidence that from 2000-2005 he ran a taxation services business at Bardwell Park. He met the Appellant at Christmas 2002, being introduced to him as David Miller.
408Mr Elliot was shown the false tax returns used in support of Mr Pagett's alleged income. He said that Peter Hill was not a tax agent with whom he was familiar, but the tax agent number belonged to Mr Tony Taktak, a person to whom Mr Elliot was trying to sell his business and for whom he was preparing tax returns.
409There was clear opportunity for the Appellant to obtain the tax agent number utilised on the false document through his association with Mr Elliot.
Eleventh Circumstance - The Phone Number Provided as a Landline for Drain Savers (the Company Falsely Presented in the Loan Documentation as Mr Pagett's Employer)_Was a Telephone Number Allocated to a Billing Address at Bardwell Park Connected with the Appellant
410The Appellant conceded that whoever fabricated the Drain Savers documents, used in support of the false application, included a telephone number associated with an address at Bardwell Park. There was evidence associating the Appellant with this address in a manner that permitted a finding that the Appellant had knowledge of, and an ability to use, that telephone number in any false document.
The Appellant's Case
411The Appellant gave evidence that he knew nothing of the matters alleged by the Crown. He denied having any knowledge of, or involvement in, an application to the ANZ Bank purportedly on behalf of Ivan Pagett, said to be a 54-year old plumber earning $122,000.00 a year, secured by a mortgage over the Links Avenue, Concord property.
412The Appellant denied using the name John Harris or pretending to be a solicitor named John Harris.
413The Appellant admitted that he knew Leonard Whitaker and John Burraston, but denied any association with those persons in the manner relied upon by the Crown.
414The Appellant was cross-examined to some effect upon the range of his associations and access to premises and phone numbers, which came to be mentioned (in one respect or another) in false documentation relied upon in support of the loan application. The Appellant denied that he was involved in the activities in question completely.
Decision
415The Crown case against the Appellant comprised several powerful and overlapping elements:
(a) direct evidence from Brian Purkiss, Brett Gall and George Dasios of the Appellant's attendance at the Commonwealth Bank on 4 February 2004 to obtain the sum of $650,000.00 in cash as a result of the deception of the ANZ Bank;
(b) direct evidence from other persons who knew the Appellant, including John Burraston, Leonard Whitaker and Robert Elliot, which linked the Appellant to critical persons and events associated with the offences;
(c) a range of fabricated documents used to deceive the ANZ Bank in support of the loan application, with features of those documents bearing tell tale links to the Appellant.
416This was a powerful Crown case demonstrating that the Appellant was the person calling himself John Harris, solicitor, who had orchestrated the false loan application utilising Mr Pagett's property.
417Having considered the record of the trial, in accordance with the principles referred to at [350] above, I am well satisfied that it was open to the jury to find the Appellant guilty on each of the counts charged against him.
418The jury had the advantage of seeing and hearing the Appellant give evidence, together with other witnesses at the trial. That advantage would, in my view, have reinforced a conclusion that the Appellant was not a truthful witness, but rather a calculated fraudster who had devised the criminal scheme reflected in the charges of which he was convicted.
419I express my own satisfaction that the guilt of the Appellant of each offence has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
420I would reject Ground 1.