68 The first and fourth of the questions posed by do not arise in this case. The threats were made, in each case, to the victim and they were immediate. However, it is difficult to see why, on the ordinary meaning of the words used in s 319(2)(a) of the Code, the threat should be one directed at the victim or why it should be 'immediate'. The question for the jury will always be whether or not the consent was freely and voluntarily given or, relevantly to this issue, whether it was obtained by threat. On the face of it, it is difficult to see why the legislature should have chosen to distinguish between a threat, for example, to a spouse or sibling of the victim, so as to force the victim to consent to intercourse, and one of harm to the victim himself or herself. As will be apparent, s 325 of the Code, in its original form, referred to 'threats or intimidation of any kind'. However, it does not seem to me that the deletion of the words 'of any kind' was intended to limit the words 'threat' and 'intimidation'. Section 324G, which followed the Murray Report, merely adopted the form of words suggested in that report. Equally, because the question is whether or not the consent was 'obtained by' force, threat, intimidation, deceit, or any fraudulent means, it is difficult to see why the threat should necessarily be immediate. The victim may be as much induced to consent by a threat of something that is to happen in the future as by something that will happen more immediately. However, because these questions were not addressed, at all, in argument, it is unnecessary to reach any final decision in respect of them.