McLachlan v Edwards Landscapes Pty Ltd

Supreme Court of NSW|2023-05-11|Before: Chen J

Introduction

This is an appeal from a decision of a Local Court Magistrate transferring a home building dispute that had been commenced in that Court to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('NCAT' or 'the Tribunal'). The transfer was sought by the builder, but resisted by the homeowners.
The issue raised by the appeal is narrow: it is whether the building dispute, that had been commenced in the Local Court, was one that could be heard by the Tribunal.

The nature of the appeal to this Court

The plaintiffs' summons sought to appeal from the order of the Magistrate as of right, but also, in the alternative, sought leave to appeal. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had no right to appeal, but were required to seek leave.
Section 39(1) of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) ('the LCA') permits a party to proceedings before the Local Court "who is dissatisfied with a judgment or order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court, but only on a question of law". Section 40(1) of the LCA permits a party to proceedings before the Local Court "who is dissatisfied with a judgment or order of the Court on a ground that involves a question of mixed law and fact may appeal to the Supreme Court but only by leave of the Supreme Court". A party to proceedings, dissatisfied with an interlocutory judgment or order may appeal to the Supreme Court, but only by leave: s 40(2)(a) of the LCA.
The plaintiffs argued that they had an appeal as of right - arguing that the transfer of the proceedings to the Tribunal was "to a body without jurisdiction to hear such claims [and this] amounts to a final disposition of those claims" (plaintiffs' summons, ground 3).
I do not accept that submission. In my view the decision of the Magistrate is clearly interlocutory - there was no final disposition of the rights of the plaintiffs - and leave to appeal from the decision is necessary: s 40(2)(a) of the LCA. That conclusion is consistent with the decision in Laycock v Putty Community Association Incorporated [2006] NSWSC 900 at [22] - where Hoeben J held that a decision on jurisdiction, by a Local Court Magistrate, was interlocutory. It is also a conclusion that is consistent with well-established principle: Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423, 439-440; 443-444; [1966] HCA 36; Sanofi v Parke Davis Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 147, 152-153; [1982] HCA 9.
As I explain later (see [45]-[48], below), leave should be refused.

The HBA: the relevant statutory provisions

The defendant's application sought the transfer of proceedings pursuant to s 48L(2) of the HBA, and it is convenient to start with that provision. Section 48L of the HBA, relevantly, provides: (1) This section applies if a person starts any proceedings in or before any court in respect of a building claim and the building claim is one that could be heard by the Tribunal under this Division. (2) If a defendant in proceedings to which this section applies makes an application for the proceedings to be transferred, the proceedings must be transferred to the Tribunal in accordance with the regulations and are to continue before the Tribunal as if they had been instituted there. (3) … (4) …
A number of matters should presently be noted arising from s 48L(1). First, the section is directed to a "building claim" - a term that is defined by ss 48A(1) and (2) of the HBA. The plaintiffs conceded that their claims satisfy this definition - although it will be necessary to return to this concession later in these reasons. The Magistrate proceeded on this basis - as did the argument in this Court. Secondly, the section is engaged if, and only if, "the building claim is one that could be heard by the Tribunal" under Part 3A, Division 4 of the HBA: upon satisfaction of these matters, then if an application is made by a defendant to proceedings to transfer them to the Tribunal, the transfer of the proceedings is mandatory: s 48L(2). Thirdly, a determination of whether a "building claim is one that could be heard by the Tribunal" under Part 3A, Division 4 of the HBA directs attention to s 48K of the HBA - the section which confers the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in relation to building claims.
Section 48K of the HBA provides: (1) The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine any building claim brought before it in accordance with this Part in which the amount claimed does not exceed $500,000 (or any other higher or lower figure prescribed by the regulations). (2) The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine any building claim whether or not the matter to which the claim relates arose before or after the commencement of this Division, except as provided by this section. (3) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim relating to building goods or services that have been supplied to or for the claimant if the date on which the claim was lodged is more than 3 years after the date on which the supply was made (or, if made in instalments, the date on which the supply was last made). (4) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim relating to building goods or services that are required under a contract to be supplied to or for the claimant on or by a specified date or within a specified period but which have not been so supplied if the date on which the claim was lodged is more than 3 years after the date on or by which the supply was required under the contract to be made or, if required to be made in instalments, the last date on which the supply was required to be made. (5) The fact that a building claim arises out of a contract that also involves the sale of land does not prevent the Tribunal from hearing that building claim. (6) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim arising out of a building cover contract required to be entered into under this Act if the date on which the claim was lodged is more than 10 years after the date on which the residential building work the subject of the claim was completed. (7) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim arising from a breach of a statutory warranty implied under Part 2C if the date on which the claim is lodged is after the end of the period within which proceedings for a breach of the statutory warranty must be commenced (as provided by section 18E). (8) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim relating to - (a) a contract for the supply of goods or services to which none of subsections (3), (4), (6) and (7) applies, or (b) a collateral contract, if the date on which the claim was lodged is more than 3 years after the date on which the contract was entered into. (9) This section has effect despite clause 5 (Relationship between Tribunal and courts and other bodies in connection with Division functions) of Schedule 4 to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.
The focus of the arguments was on ss 48K(3) and (7). The plaintiffs relied on s 48K(3) to support their argument that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction - at least in respect of the plaintiffs' claim that did not rely upon breach of any statutory warranty implied under Part 2C. (It should be noted, however, that although the plaintiffs' summons made reference to ss 48K(2) and (4), no submissions were directed to those sections). The defendant relied upon s 48K(7) to argue that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the claim because, in reality, it was simply one for breach of a statutory warranty.

The hearing of the notice of motion and the judgment below

The Magistrate's reasons are brief. In order to understand the conclusion reached, it is best to start with the arguments of the parties - arguments that were essentially repeated in this Court.

The arguments below

The defendant's argument was that the terms of s 48L(1) were met, requiring the transfer of the proceedings to the Tribunal. The first limb in s 48L(1) - the requirement that the proceedings are "in respect of a building claim" - was conceded by the plaintiffs. As to the second limb in s 48L(1), the essential argument of the defendant was that the terms of s 48K(7) were satisfied - because the building claim was one arising from a breach of a statutory warranty implied under Part 2C of the HBA and within the 6 year time period required when the claim involves an allegation of breach that results in a major defect - and a finding was made to that effect, with the consequence that transfer was mandatory.
The plaintiffs' argument was that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction because s 48K(3) excluded it. The essential submission put was that the "claim" - the commencement of the proceedings in the Local Court - was 'lodged' 3 years after the building services were supplied and although, the Tribunal had jurisdiction in cases where the building claim was one arising from a breach of statutory warranty, the plaintiffs' claim was more extensive - seeking recovery of damages relying upon multiple causes of action.
Having set out the respective arguments, I turn now to the reasons of the Magistrate.

The reasons of the Magistrate

The decision of the Magistrate, reproduced in full, is as follows: Alright thank you. So I don't think that there's a lot in dispute here, this is a claim in relation to the building of a swimming pool with allegations that there are defects in the work. So it is a claim that would normally fall under the Home Building Act and of course the legislation makes clear that the tribunal NCAT really, that it is designed in part to deal with these kinds of claims. Now there's not dispute at all that there would be no difficulty with this transfer at all if it fell within the 3 year period, but what is suggested is that 48K(7) applies where there is a reliance on the statutory warranties in section 18 and therefore that means that despite the 3 year period, there being no expiry yet of those warranties by the time of the filing of the claim, therefore I should transfer the matter. Now the nub of the issue today is that the claims in relation to the statutory warranty is but one part of the claim and that there is other relief sought that NCAT simply doesn't have jurisdiction to deliver. But I've had a look at this claim and certainly the home building statutory warranties in my view are front and centre of this claim. Clause 12 of the claim, its alleged that the following were essential terms of the contract, (a) the direct reference to the section 18B statutory warranties and then further, duties of care at 20, warranties contained at section 18B and in 23, in breach of the contract, the Consumer Law, another bit of legislation but also the Home Building Act. It is my view today that the nature of this claim and the nature of the dispute, the nature of the claim all mean that this matter is an appropriate matter for the NCAT jurisdiction and today I make order 1 of the motion.
These reasons are more confined than one might have expected. However, no point was taken by the plaintiffs about them being legally insufficient - thus, it is unnecessary to dwell further upon their brevity.
The parties accepted on appeal that the "essence" of these reasons involves the following: 1. First, the plaintiffs' claim "is a claim that would normally fall under the Home Building Act" and the "legislation makes clear that the Tribunal NCAT really, that it is designed in part to deal with these kinds of claims". 2. Secondly, the Magistrate made the following finding: "But I've had a look at this claim and certainly the home building statutory warranties in my view are front and centre of this claim". That is a finding characterising the nature of the plaintiffs' claim - which the Magistrate had earlier found was "a claim in relation to the building of a swimming pool" - against the defendant, based upon the Magistrate's assessment of the SOC. 3. Thirdly, the Magistrate's conclusion: "It is my view today that the nature of this claim and the nature of the dispute, the nature of the claim all mean that this matter is an appropriate matter for the NCAT jurisdiction and today I make order 1 of the motion". That is a dispositive finding, and conclusion, within the terms of ss 48L(1) and (2) of the HBA.

The plaintiffs' claim and the concept of a "building claim"

Before dealing with the detail of the arguments advanced by the parties, it is necessary to say something further about the plaintiffs' claim, and the concept of a "building claim".

The plaintiffs' claim

I have earlier drawn attention to some parts of the plaintiffs' claim. The claim itself, however, merits close attention bearing in mind the findings made by the Magistrate, including the finding about the character of that claim. To recap: the two findings were: (a) that the claim was "in relation to the building of a swimming pool"; and, (b) the claim for damages based upon breach of the home building statutory warranties were "front and centre" of that claim.
There is no challenge to either finding. Given the arguments advanced, it is useful to briefly explain the basis for making them - what was alleged in the SOC. The focus of the claim is upon what is described in the SOC as the "Pool Surround Works". This is evident from the following: 1. Those works were defined in the SOC to include concreting and tiling around the pool; the installation of glass balustrading around the pool area, once tiled; and the installation of expansion joints "along the pool's coping, between it and the concrete slab": SOC, pars 7(a)-(c). 2. The terms of the agreement included an implied term "reasonably required to properly complete and give efficacy to the Pool Surround Works": SOC, par 11(b)(iii). 3. The terms of the agreement included a number of "essential terms", that included that all works, including the Pool Surround Works, "would be carried out in a proper and workmanlike manner and in accordance with" the HBA "in particular, s 18B": SOC, par 12(a). 4. That the "works the defendant was contracted to perform" were 'residential building work' within the meaning of the HBA: SOC, par 14(c). 5. Although the plaintiffs rely upon a range of causes of action, in relation to each of them the only specific pleading of breach (as opposed to the generally expressed ones in SOC, par 23), is that the defendant failed to "install, as part of the Pool Surround Works, expansion joints along the pool coping between it and the adjacent concrete slabs": SOC, par 23(a). 6. To the extent that other defects are referred to in the SOC, it is either the absence of expansion joints around the pool coping, or tiles cracking or lifting. This is apparent from SOC, pars 28-29 (which are contained within that part of the SOC with the heading: 'Invitations by the plaintiff to the defendant to rectify the defects'): 28. The Contract is now breached by the defendant by reason of the Pool Surround Works having been defective (in that they did not contain any expansion joints around the pool coping) and further, leaving this major defect un-remedied and not returning to site to rectify the defects. (Underlining added). 29. The defendant has refused to comply with the Contract by remedying the defective Pool Surround Works and the adverse effects of this to the plaintiffs is that there is substantial and major structural risk to the pool, by the concreting expanding. Also, the tiles cracking and lifting in places. 1. It is important as well to note the loss that is claimed in SOC, par 33: As a result of the defendant's above breaches, particularly failing to return to remedy the defects, the plaintiffs are at loss for the monies paid to the defendant and further, for the costs of rectifying the defects ("Loss"). Also, the costs incurred in assessing and investigating this loss, that but for the breaches would not have been required. 1. The plaintiffs' claim, however, putting to one side the investigation costs was for damages "for the rectification costs of the defects": SOC, par 34(a).
It is also important to recognise that, although the plaintiffs' SOC raised claims for breach of contract, the Australian Consumer Law, the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) ('the DBP Act') and in negligence, SOC, par 34(a) confines the claims to damages measured by the cost of rectifying the defects. Undoubtedly the structure of the plaintiffs' claim underpinned the two findings by the Magistrate - viz., that the plaintiffs' claim was in relation to the "building of a swimming pool" and that at the forefront of the claim was a claim under the HBA for that allegedly defective work.
It is important to note as well the further matter that was alleged in SOC, par 28 - namely, that the defective Pool Surround Works was a major defect. In proceedings for breach of a statutory warranty under the HBA, what constitutes a 'major defect' is defined under s 18E(4) of the HBA. The term is important for a further reason: the warranty period for a breach that results in a major defect in residential building work is 6 years "or 2 years in any other case": s 18E(1)(b) of the HBA. Again, these matters undoubtedly underpinned the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was engaged by reason of s 48K(7) of the HBA.

The definition of a "building claim"

As I have earlier noted, the parties argued the application below on the basis that the plaintiffs' proceedings in the Local Court were a "building claim" so as to satisfy the first limb in s 48L(1) of the HBA. What constitutes a "building claim" for the purposes of Part 3A of the HBA is defined by ss 48A(1) and (2).
Sections 48A(1) and (2) provide: (1) In this Part - building claim means a claim for - (a) the payment of a specified sum of money, or (b) the supply of specified services, or (c) relief from payment of a specified sum of money, or (d) the delivery, return or replacement of specified goods or goods of a specified description, or (e) a combination of two or more of the remedies referred to in paragraphs (a)-(d), that arises from a supply of building goods or services whether under a contract or not, or that arises under a contract that is collateral to a contract for the supply of building goods or services, but does not include a claim that the regulations declare not to be a building claim. building dispute means a dispute that has been notified as referred to in section 48C. building goods or services means goods or services supplied for or in connection with the carrying out of residential building work or specialist work, being goods or services - (a) supplied by the person who contracts to do, or otherwise does, that work, or (b) supplied in any circumstances prescribed by the regulations to the person who contracts to do that work. goods, services and supply have the same meanings as in Part 6A of the Fair Trading Act 1987. (2) Without limiting the definition of building claim, a building claim includes the following - (a) an appeal against a decision of an insurer under a building cover contract required to be entered into under this Act, (b) a claim for compensation for loss arising from a breach of a statutory warranty implied under Part 2C.
Two matters should be noted about these provisions. First, it is clear that the definition can be satisfied in different ways, reflecting the fact that there are different types of "building claims". Secondly, without limiting s 48A(1), s 48A(2) provides that a building claim includes any claim for compensation for loss arising from a breach of a warranty implied under Part 2C.
The fact that there are different types of "building claims" is recognised by s 48K. The point can be made by reference to the competing arguments in this case, and the provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs and defendant respectively: 1. Section 48K(3) - relied upon by the plaintiffs - provides: (3) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim relating to building goods or services that have been supplied to or for the claimant if the date on which the claim was lodged is more than 3 years after the date on which the supply was made (or, if made in instalments, the date on which the supply was last made). (Underlining added). 1. Section 48K(7) - relied upon by the defendant - provides: (7) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in respect of a building claim arising from a breach of a statutory warranty implied under Part 2C if the date on which the claim is lodged is after the end of the period within which proceedings for a breach of the statutory warranty must be commenced (as provided by section 18E).
The submissions of the parties did not address this distinction, nor its impact upon the relief sought by the defendant in its notice of motion. As I have earlier pointed out, the entire focus of the submissions - in this Court, and below - was upon the second limb in s 48L(1) - viz., whether the proceeding commenced by the plaintiffs "is one that could be heard by the Tribunal".

Consideration: the competing arguments

The defendant's argument was that it was an agreed fact that the plaintiffs' claim was a building claim (s 48A), such that the only issue before the Magistrate on the transfer application was whether the requirement, within s 48L(1) of the HBA for that claim to be "one that could be heard by the Tribunal", was satisfied. As to the second limb in s 48L(1), the defendant argued that this only requires the Court to "form the view" whether the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was engaged, which it did by making the two key findings referred to - viz., that: (a) the claim was "in relation to the building of a swimming pool"; and, (b) the claim for damages based upon breach of the home building statutory warranties was "front and centre" of that claim.
The defendant further submitted that the Magistrate found that s 48K(7) was satisfied. This was argued to be so because: (a) there is a two-year "limitation period" in connection with proceedings for breach of a statutory warranty in connection with minor defects: ss 18E(1)(b) and (4) of the HBA; (b) these proceedings were commenced 3 years after any breach, with the consequence being that the claim on the warranties sought to be advanced could only be in connection with major defects - which have a 6 year "limitation period": ss 18E(1)(b) and (4) of the HBA, consistent with what was pleaded in the SOC, par 28 (see [28(6)], above); and (c) the Magistrate held that it was "an appropriate matter" to be transferred to the Tribunal, given the two findings made earlier referred to.
The plaintiffs argued that s 48K(3) stood against this conclusion, as did the fact that the plaintiffs' SOC advanced "not only claims for breach of the statutory warranties outlined in HBA s 18E" but "include claims for breaches to the contract, Australian Consumer Law, the [DBP Act] and duty of care the Builder owed to the Owners" (plaintiffs' submissions, par R). The plaintiffs further submitted that, as a result, s 48K(7) "has no application in the present scenario" (plaintiffs' submissions, par R). As to this last matter, put slightly differently, the plaintiffs conceded that, but for the differing ways in which they sought to advance their claim for damages, s 48K(7) was engaged.
Neither party drew attention to any relevant authority although, during submissions, the plaintiffs referred to the decision in Tinsley v Masterton Homes Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCTTT 26: the plaintiffs argued that this decision "only assists if the entire claim, the claim in its totality" is one for breach of a statutory warranty implied under Part 2C.
The essential proposition drawn from Tinsley is that "a claim for breach of statutory warranty within the meaning of s 48K(7) should not be limited by reason of the operation of s 48K(3)": at [29]. The decision in Tinsley expressly approved what was said, to that effect, in Marks v Stafflair [2012] NSWCTTT 199 at [32]. That reasoning has been approved in the Tribunal: David Cameron Jones t/as Oz Style Homes v Panchal [2018] NSWCATAP 238 at [30].
The plaintiffs accepted the correctness of the reasoning, but argued that it did not apply to the present case because the plaintiffs' claims extended beyond being a claim merely for breach of a statutory warranty: the plaintiff emphasised that there were claims for "breaches to the contract, Australian Consumer Law, the [DBP Act] and duty of care the Builder owed to the Owners", with the consequence that s 48K(3) was engaged.
I do not accept the plaintiffs' submissions for the following reasons. First, there are two factual findings about the nature of the plaintiffs' claims - viz., (a) that the claim was "in relation to the building of a swimming pool"; and, (b) the claim for damages based upon breach of the home building statutory warranties were "front and centre" of that claim. Those findings were not - at least expressly - challenged by the plaintiffs. To the extent that they may be taken to have been so, it should simply be noted that they are factual findings which, in and of themselves, are insusceptible to review on appeal by this Court: there is no right of appeal from a finding of fact. Furthermore, any complaint about them is not an error of law: that is because a finding that "is against the evidence and the weight of the evidence, that it ignores the probative force of the evidence which is all one way" is an error of fact, not of law: Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139, 156. Moreover, "no error of law occurs simply because the judge prefers one version of the evidence to another or one set of inferences to another": Azzopardi at 151.
Secondly, in connection with the Magistrate's characterisation of the plaintiffs claim, to conclude - as the Magistrate did - that the claim under the HBA was "front and centre" of the dispute reflects, in my view, an application of the principle that "a statute must be applied to the substance rather than the form of a transaction": Emad Trolley Pty Ltd v Shigar (2003) 57 NSWLR 636; [2003] NSWCA 231 at [79]; Secretary, Department of Treasury and Finance v Kelly (2001) 4 VR 595; [2001] VSCA 246 at [10]. The findings of the Magistrate have the consequence that the circumstances of the present case were properly characterised, as a matter of substance, as within s 48K(7) of the HBA. Contrary to what was argued by the plaintiffs, in my view it does not follow - merely because a home building claim is put as one for breach of a statutory warranty under the HBA but also in a juristically different way - that, axiomatically, s 48K(7) cannot be satisfied. It might, or might not be: it would depend upon an assessment of what is alleged. That is what occurred here. The Magistrate focused upon substance, and was not distracted (particularly given, as I have already noted, the plaintiff's claim for damages - irrespective of the cause of action relied upon - was "for the rectification costs of the defects": SOC, par 34(a)) by any creativity in the pleading.
Thirdly, to the extent that the plaintiffs' appeal reduced to the contention that the Magistrate was in error in making this assessment, then the principles referred to in [42], above, stand against its acceptance. Furthermore, to the extent that it extended to a failure to make findings that the terms of s 48K(3) was satisfied, none were necessary given the finding that, as a matter of substance, the plaintiffs' claim was within s 48K(7) of the HBA.

Leave to appeal

In any event, separate from the above analysis, in my view leave to appeal should be refused.
The matters affecting a decision to grant leave under s 40(1) of the LCA were considered in Café Du Liban Pty Ltd v Bespoke Garage Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 779 at [4] and in Namoi Sustainable Energy Pty Limited v Buhren [2022] NSWSC 175 at [34]-[39]. These considerations apply equally to an application for leave under s 40(2)(a) of the LCA, and they align with principles relating to the grant of leave in other contexts. For example, it has been said that leave to appeal will ordinarily only be granted "concerning matters that involve issues of principle, questions of general public importance or an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond what being merely arguable": Jaycar Pty Ltd v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284 at [46]; Cheng v Motor Yacht Sales Australia Pty Ltd t/as the Boutique Boat Company (2022) 108 NSWLR 402; [2022] NSWCA 118 at [15]-[16] ('Cheng').
In Namoi, Bellew J identified the matters relevant to the question of leave under s 40(1) of the LCA as follows (citations omitted): The general principles which govern an application for leave to appeal include the following. First, the jurisdiction which the Court exercises in determining an application for leave to appeal is not a proceeding in the ordinary course of litigation. It is a preliminary procedure which is recognised by the legislature as a means of enabling a Court to control, in some measure, the volume of appellate work requiring its attention. Secondly, it is appropriate to grant leave only in those matters that involve issues of principle, questions of general public importance, or an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond what is merely arguable. Thirdly, it is necessary for the Court to examine the merits of the arguments advanced in support of the appeal, and pay attention to whether any injustice had been occasioned to either party, such that the intervention of the Court is required. Fourthly, the intention of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) is that this Court should have supervision over Local Courts in matters of law. Where small claims are involved, it is important that there be early finality in the determination of litigation. Fifthly, there is a need for legal costs to be proportionate to the amount in issue. The Local Court has a limited monetary jurisdiction in civil cases. Left unchecked, appeals from its decisions, especially interlocutory decisions, could lead to there being a significant risk that the overall costs of proceedings would be completely disproportionate to the matters in dispute. Accordingly, a relevant consideration in the exercise of the discretion to grant leave is the proportionality between the amount in issue and the legal costs which have been expended. Disproportion between the two may be a further reason for refusing leave, particularly having regard to case management principles and the appropriate allocation of court resources.
In my view, leave should be refused for the following reasons. 1. First, I do not consider that there is an issue of principle that arises - merely an application of facts found to the statutory criteria. 2. Secondly, I do not consider there is any arguable error nor - even if it be assumed that there is arguable error - that any practical injustice has arisen if there were, bearing in mind the Magistrate's assessment (and finding) about the essential character of the plaintiffs' claim as being one for breach of a statutory warranty under the HBA, and the analysis of the plaintiffs' claim at [28]-[30], above. Put simply, the dispute between the parties will be quelled by the decision of the Tribunal on the claim that has been transferred to it. Furthermore, it was expressly accepted by the defendant that if, ultimately, the plaintiffs' case somehow managed to go beyond the claim for breach of the statutory warranties claim, then the plaintiff could continue litigating them. 3. Thirdly, costs - specifically the need for them to be proportionate to the amount in issue - loom large, and tell against the grant of leave. On the face of what is alleged in the SOC, the amount in issue could only be a fraction of the total contract sum ($65,111 inclusive of GST). Although the amount of the legal costs incurred so far are unknown, they have involved a contested application in the Local Court and an appeal to this Court. It is well recognised that it is highly desirable where claims of limited monetary value are involved that there be "early finality and determination of litigation otherwise the costs which will be involved are likely to swamp the money sum involved in the dispute": Carolan v AMF Bowling Pty Ltd [1995] NSWCA 69, 3; Cheng at [16].

Orders

For the above reasons, I make the following orders: 1. Refuse leave to appeal. 2. Order the plaintiffs' to pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings in this Court.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 19 May 2023

Australian Consumer Law, the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020(NSW)

(2022) 108 NSWLR 402

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (14 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (17)

Cited By (1)