DISCUSSION
55 In the present case, the liquidators claimed payment from the fee escrow on the potentially overlapping bases of entitlement as a stakeholder and the principle in Re Universal Distributing Co Ltd (in liq) (1933) 48 CLR 171 ("Universal Distributing").
56 The liquidators acknowledged that some of the amounts claimed related to fees, costs, expenses and legal costs for work they performed prior to their appointment as stakeholders, but submitted that the relevant amounts directly related to and were necessarily incurred in their roles as stakeholders, and, or alternatively, in the care, preservation or realisation of the surplus fund in accordance with the Universal Distributing principle.
57 The liquidators bore the onus of establishing their entitlement to payment from the fee escrow in the amount claimed. In that context, it was necessary to establish that work or expenses of the general description in each major category satisfied the requirements of stakeholder entitlement discussed in relevant authority or the Universal Distributing principle, and, further, if so, that individual items of work or expenditure for which claims were made under each major category fell within it and were reasonably undertaken or incurred, and that the charges were reasonable.
58 In relation to their claim as stakeholders, the liquidators relied on McPherson Thom & Co v Coombie Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1929] VLR 295 ("McPherson"), where an interpleader summons was taken out by stock auctioneers confronted with conflicting claims to the proceeds of sale of certain sheep. The auctioneers, who had "no interest whatever in the subject-matter of the claims" (at 299), sought a complete indemnity for their costs.
59 Lowe J acknowledged the dearth of specific authority, but accepted that the interpleader provision in the court's rules conferred the power to make such orders as to costs as were just and equitable.
60 Lowe J stated at 301:
In my judgment, the rule to be deduced from these cases in regard to costs is that where the applicant on an interpleader summons has come promptly to the Court when faced with conflicting claims, and has been guilty of no conduct which has increased costs, prima facie he should have a complete indemnity, so far as the fund will permit, for his costs; that is to say, he is prima facie entitled in such circumstances to his costs as been solicitor and client. In most cases of interpleader, however, the proceedings on the part of the applicant are of the simplest nature, and his costs should not require to be taxed in order that he should have full indemnity. In such cases - and these I think will be the general rule - the Judge on the hearing will fix the costs of the applicant at an amount which will give that indemnity. The rule which I have now declared records with what, in my experience, has been the practice in the past.
61 In Kennett v Charlton [2007] NSWSC 190 ("Kennett"), a solicitor who had received conflicting instructions from disputing interested parties about the payment of certain funds he held, sought his costs of corresponding about the disposition of the funds, negotiating with the rival claimants and his interpleader summons issued when the matter failed to settle. Gzell J allowed the solicitor the costs of his dealings and negotiations with the parties prior to issuing the application and of the application itself on an indemnity basis. Gzell J stated that the solicitor (who prior to the payment into court was a trustee with a right to exoneration and reimbursement from the trust fund) fell within the McPherson stakeholder principle and should not be out of pocket as a result of dealing with the rival claims to the fund he held.
62 In Universal Distributing, the liquidator of an insolvent company realised its assets subject to a debenture charge. The proceeds of the realised assets subject to the charge were not sufficient to pay the debenture holder in full and it was unlikely that any funds would be available for unsecured creditors.
63 Dixon J stated that, while the security was paramount to the general costs and expenses incidental to the realisation of the assets, the expenses attendant upon the realisation of the fund affected by the security must be borne by it (at 174). The debenture holders were creditors of the company with a specific right to the property for the purpose of paying their debts, and if it were realised instead by the liquidator, "the proceeds must bear the cost of the realization just as if they had begun a suit for its realization or had themselves realized it without suit" (at 174).
64 Dixon J discussed relevant authority and further stated (at 174):
In applying this principle, only those expenses appear to have been thrown against the fund belonging to the debenture-holders which have been reasonably incurred in the care, preservation and realisation of the property. In the present case the liquidator has employed a material part of his time and energies in recovering moneys, both uncalled capital and debts, which enure for the debenture-holder, and in so far as these services increase the remuneration which he receives, I see no reason why the burden should not be thrown upon the proceeds. The question is not whether moneys available for unsecured creditors should be relieved at the expense of the security. In such a case it may be said that the service of collecting enough to discharge the debenture must in any event be performed in order that a surplus may then arise in which the unsecured creditors may participate. The question in the present case is whether the liquidator can charge against the fund passing through his hands, as between himself and the person to whom it is payable, so much of the remuneration fixed for work done in the winding up as is referable to the calling in and conversion of the assets producing the fund. I see no reason why remuneration for work done for the exclusive purpose of raising the fund should not be charged upon it.
65 In Re S&D International Pty Ltd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2009] VSC 225 ("S&D"), Robson J analysed the decision in Universal Distributing extensively (at [255] to [257] and [261]).
66 His Honour stated (at [257] and [261]):
Dixon J speaks of the expenses as being "thrown against the fund." The equitable claim is against the fund irrespective of those claiming an interest in the fund. The expenses incurred must have contributed to the funds realization, care or preservation. Dixon J recognised that this right against the fund is independent of any conduct of others laying claim to the fund which might otherwise have given rise to some claim as between the parties.
…
In Hewett v Court Deane J addressed the nature of an equitable lien generally. He said:
An equitable lien is a right against property which arises automatically by implication of equity to secure the discharge of an actual or potential indebtedness … Though called a lien, it is, in truth, a form of equitable charge over the subject property … in that it does not depend upon possession and may, in general, be enforced in the same way as any other equitable charge, namely, by sale in pursuance of court order or, where the lien is over a fund, by an order for payment thereout … (citations omitted).
Importantly, for this case, these principles confirm that the liquidator may assert a lien even though he is not in possession of the fund and may enforce it by an order for payment out.
(citation omitted)
67 Robson J discussed Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Butterell (1994) 35 NSWLR 64, where Young J reiterated at 71 that it was necessary to distinguish between the general costs of the administration and the costs of preservation of the property. If something fell within the general costs of administration because its sole purpose was not to preserve or realise the property, then the secured creditor would take in priority to the person whose efforts brought about the production of the fund.
68 Young J held at [72] to [73] that the administrators' remuneration would not fall under the equitable lien unless their time was exclusively directed to the realisation of the fund passed over to the receivers. The administrators could not be remunerated for time spent on statutory duties and time spent on a heterogeneous group of problems.
69 In S&D, Robson J distilled the relevant principles at [273] as follows:
From these authorities the following principles referrable to a liquidator may be stated:
(a) At equity, an equitable lien arises in favour of a liquidator over the funds realised from the sale of company property for the costs he incurs for the care, preservation and realisation of the property in priority to those otherwise interested in the fund…
(b) The costs include those that the liquidator fairly incurs in the discharge of his duty to care, preserve and realise the property...
(c) The lien may arise whether or not the ultimate sale is affected by the liquidator and entitles the liquidator to be paid in priority out of the fund whether or not he is in possession of the fund…
(d) The costs and expenses secured by the lien must be incurred exclusively for the care, preservation or realisation of the property and not otherwise expended in the general administration of the mortgagor...
(e) The costs and expenses include the liquidator's reasonable remuneration…
(citations omitted)
70 In S&D, the liquidator, who did not realise the fund himself, nevertheless recovered it from persons who would probably have dissipated it. Robson J found that the fund in specie would have been lost but for the liquidator's actions. His Honour held that the liquidator's costs and expenses directed exclusively towards recovering the fund and delivering it to the safety of the court were covered by a lien conferring priority to all other claimants. His Honour allowed the liquidator reasonable remuneration exclusively for that purpose.
71 Robson J did not consider that the lien covered the liquidator's costs and expenses for his prior actions in investigating and making inquiries of the fund, or for general correspondence, which did not preserve the fund but merely sought to identify it, and were part of the liquidator's general duties.
72 In the present case, while acknowledging the potential overlap between their concurrent roles as liquidators of Export and stakeholders, the liquidators submitted that the court should approach their present claim robustly. Senior counsel for the liquidators submitted that the evidence established that, independently of the work claimed for in this application, they had carried out a significant number of activities and incurred expenses in the general administration of Export, for which significant remuneration was approved, albeit it remained unpaid. Those costs and expenses, including of investigating whether the unsecured creditors had any entitlement to the surplus, were thus separately charged for and were excised from the present claims, which did not relate to the liquidators' general administration duties incumbent on them in that capacity.
73 Martman conceded that the amounts of $13,004.20 and $1,815 including GST (categories 7 and 8) were properly incurred, reasonable in quantum and should be paid from the fund.
74 Martman nevertheless objected to payment of the claims comprising categories 1 and 2 (and, by necessary implication, to dependent claims under other categories). It submitted that, as a matter of principle, entitlement to payment of categories 1 and 2 from the fee escrow was not made out under either the stakeholder or the Universal Distributing principle, which applied only to costs exclusively incurred as a stakeholder or for the care, preservation and realisation of the relevant property. In Martman's submission, the activities described in categories 1 and 2 fell within the general administration of Export.
75 As an alternative or subsidiary submission, Martman contended that if payment for categories 1 and 2 were justified as a matter of principle, the liquidators' evidence did not establish the accuracy of their characterisation of their work and expenses, or exclude overlap with their general administration duties. Nor did the liquidators' evidence establish the reasonableness of performing particular tasks, incurring particular expenses or the quantum claimed for them.
76 While in written submissions Martman conceded that the liquidators as stakeholders were effectively trustees of the surplus fund and entitled to remuneration and costs for work incurred in the proper administration of the trust under s 77 of the Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) or in equity, it submitted that there was no general rule entitling a stakeholder to remuneration or fees, and any such entitlement related only to the time that property was held pending resolution of the dispute. It relied, in that context, on De Rothschild Freres v Morrison, Kekewich & Co (1890) 24 QBD 750.
77 Before me, however, counsel for Martman conceded that the liquidators were entitled to payment for work carried out as a stakeholder before their formal appointment. Martman also acknowledged the potential overlapping application of the Universal Distributing principle, but submitted that it required the claimants' efforts to increase the relevant fund. Martman submitted, however, that any injustice occasioned by the exclusivity requirement could be tempered by making a proportionate allowance.