(d) fourth, the application for modification seeks, in effect, by other means to obtain that which was sought previously from the council and was rejected by both the council and this Court.
25. Section 124(3) is an important provision (see Sahade v The Owners - Strata Plan No 62022 [2006] NSWLEC 770 at [10]) but it is not intended, as the respondents seek to do, to be employed as a device to thwart or avoid compliance with conditions attached to a valid development consent (as to the operation of s 124(3) generally, see Grace v Thomas St Café Pty Limited (No 2) [2008] NSWLEC 179).
26. Accordingly, in light of the evidence of the council's witnesses and the admissions made by the respondents both at the hearing, in Mr Tanwar's affidavit and in the course of their correspondence with the council, I have no hesitation in finding that conditions 3, 3A, 3B and 3E and 5 have been breached and continue to be breached by the respondents.
Relief
27. I now turn to deal with the issue of what orders are appropriate to remedy and restrain the breaches I have found above.
28. All relief sought is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Court (see ss 123 and 124 of the EPAA and ss 20-23 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979).
29. The order that the council seeks is that the respondents, their servants and agents, be restrained from carrying out the development, that is to say, from using the Property except in accordance with the Development Consent. The conditions of the Development Consent are unambiguous and simple in their terms. I find that an injunctive order is appropriate to restrain and remedy the breach of s 76A of the EPAA occasioned by the respondents' breach of the conditions of the Development Consent.
30. The council seeks that in addition to the Court making this injunctive order, that the Court should make a declaration in terms of the findings it has made above relating to the breaches by the respondents of the conditions.
31. The council submits that such an order is appropriate having regard to the numerous and continuing nature of the breaches. The council also submits that a declaration regarding the respondents' breach of the Act serves the public interest in ensuring compliance.
32. While the Court has jurisdiction to make the declaration, a question arises as to whether the Court, as a matter of discretion, ought to do so. The Court should make declarations only where some proper and practical purpose is to be served by making them (Great Lakes Council v Lani (2007) 158 LGERA 1 at [16]-[25] and Council of the City of Sydney v Mae [2009] NSWLEC 84 at [29]).
33. In Great Lakes Council v Lani Preston CJ set out the relevant principles applicable in determining whether the making of a declaration is appropriate (see [20]-[25]). Summarised, these are as follows: