Should the court make a declaration about Mr Mae's admitted non-compliance with Council's s121B Order?
28 Mr Mae clearly admits he ignored the Order; indeed he boasts (in par 24 of his affidavit 20 April 2009) that "until recently I have generally ignored all contact with Syndey (sic) Council".
29 The court should make declarations only where some proper and practical purpose is served (see Great Lakes Council v Lani (2007) 158 LGERA 1, per Preston ChJ at [16]-[25]), and I accept Council's submissions that a declaration regarding Mr Mae's non-compliance serves the public interest in ensuring compliance with such orders by members of the community.
30 The declaration sought in par 1 of the Amended Summons should be made.
Are the premises being used as a boarding house?
31 The premises were regarded as, and are still rated as, a two-three-bedroom single residential dwelling, with development approval to conduct in two small darkrooms within it a photographic facility as a home industry. The Council's garbage arrangements are limited to those applicable to a residence occupied by a single family group.
32 The premises currently have nine bedrooms, two bathrooms, a kitchen and some other shared facilities. A washing machine has been set up in the rear yard near where the unauthorised two-room structure has been built - and, after the fire, rebuilt - to provide two of the nine bedrooms.
33 Mr Mae advertises rooms for rent on the internet. He alone selects his occupants, individually, from among the resultant applicants, and he enters written agreements with them.
34 Occupants are generally individuals, and not related (see admission by Mr Mae in par 24 of his affidavit 17 April 2009). They pay rents (including $20 per week expenses), apparently ranging between $120 and $170 per week, provide bonds in sums between $300 and $360, and commit to a minimum term of six weeks. It appears most residents stay for only short periods, possibly an average of three months. While there, the premises provide their "principal place of residence", rather than overnight accommodation. A lockable bedroom, a front door key, and access to the bathrooms, kitchen and other shared facilities (cable TV, internet) are provided, but no meals are served, and no cleaning services provided. Mr Mae accesses the premises at will.
35 Council relies on oral evidence given to its investigators by various residents at various times. The court has the benefit of Mr Dillon's affidavit, but, in addition, granted Council leave to rely on some hearsay evidence of others, given the expense, delay and impracticality involved in having all these former residents brought to court - by the nature of the accommodation provided, many occupants are short-term and itinerant, and hard to trace later, many being overseas students holidaying in Australia. The Council's evidence shows strenuous efforts to obtain affidavits from, and perhaps secure personal attendance by, persons such as Edmund Chan, Hamish Munro, Christophe Plos, Kasper Kommeren, and Kazuki Wakabayashi, and the court is happy to accept what they said when interviewed by Council investigators. (Evidence Act ss 64, 67). At the same time, as a result of his non-appearance, Mr Mae was not put to strict proof of the various conversations to which he deposes, and the court has had regard to his evidence regarding them.
36 In any event, Mr Mae's own evidence basically confirms the evidence of the former occupants, but Mr Mae denies that such an operation constitutes a boarding house, and he relies on dictionaries and information he says he obtained from the Department of Fair Trading.
37 The clear effect of the planning instruments is that a use properly characterised as a "boarding house" - as defined by the relevant instrument, rather than by a dictionary, or a conversation with an unidentified officer of the department administering the tenancy legislation - is permissible, but only with development consent. In deciding whether to grant its consent, the Council would have regard to the two relevant DCPs.
38 There is no evidence at all that there has been any consent for use of the subject premises as a boarding house.
39 I have concluded that Mr Mae's conduct of the premises is indeed as a "boarding house". See Ashfield Municipal Council v Australian College of Physical Education Ltd (1992) 76 LGRA 151, per Pearlman J at 152-155; South Sydney Municipal Council v James (1977) 35 LGRA 432, per Reynolds JA. There is no justification for the court to have recourse to any dictionary to supplement or otherwise construe the LEP definition. See Warlam Pty Ltd v Marrickville Council [2009] NSWLEC 23, per Biscoe J at [23]-[29].
40 The second declaration sought should be made.
The post-1992 building works
41 The building works done to/on the premises since Council granted its "darkroom" consent in 1992 comprise (1) the so-called "Treehouse", the two-room building constructed in the rear yard, immediately abutting neighbouring properties and sitting on the "dunny" lane (as admitted by Mr Mae in par 17 of his affidavit 17 April 2009), and (2) the major rearrangement of internal spaces. None of these works were approved by Council and Mr Mae so admits in pars 25-26 of his affidavit 17 April 2009 and par 25 of his affidavit 20 April 2009.
42 The effect of these extensive unauthorised building works (only one wall of which Mr Mae says, in par 31 of his affidavit 20 April 2009, that he did not build) has been to convert a 2-3 bedroom home into a nine-bedroom "share accommodation" facility, which Council says, and I have accepted, is at law a boarding house (see annexure 'I' to Mr Mihaila's affidavit 16 February 2009, and compare the plan in item 'H' of Exhibit C5). The front room downstairs (shown as office/lounge in 1992) and the two darkrooms approved in 1992, have been converted to bedrooms, the 1992 bedrooms have been reconfigured, and the "Treehouse" containing two bedrooms has been constructed, with the overall result that there are now five bedrooms downstairs and four upstairs.
43 These works clearly do not satisfy the "exempt" or "complying" provisions of the instruments, and, therefore, they also required Council consent. Mr Mae says he did or supervised most of the unapproved work himself. He advances no owner-builder permit, nor evidence of appropriate skills or qualifications. There was no inspection. He simply contends that his works do not interfere with the neighbours (pars 9-12 of his affidavit 17 April 2009), and he believes that acceptance of his application to have the premises rated on a residential basis entitles him to think that Council has approved the works.
44 The third declaration sought should also be made.
Coercive orders and discretion
45 The injunctive relief sought in pars 4, 5 and 6 of the amended summons should also be granted.
46 There are serious health and safety issues, apart from amenity issues, associated with the illegal works and unauthorised use of the premises. Those issues justify the court having given this application by the Council urgent attention, and now granting all the relief sought.
47 In all the rhetoric placed before the court in his three affidavits Mr Mae makes out no grounds whatever for the court to exercise its discretion in his favour.
48 On the contrary, Mr Mae merely attacks the Council's witnesses, rather than address their evidence. His personal invective against them does him no credit, and he has failed overall to address the implications of their evidence for his premises, and for himself personally.
49 He asserts rights and immunities unknown to the law, and complains of "harassment" by an "unprofessional" Council, acting "inappropriately". None of his assertions are supported in any way by the evidence.
Costs
50 The Council having been entirely successful, the costs of the proceedings should "follow the event". Its submissions (pars 57-58) make a strong case for the usual party-party order, and foreshadow, on the basis of the available evidence, possible success in obtaining an order for its costs to be paid on an indemnity basis. I will make the party-party order at this time, and allow time for Council to prepare and pursue a case for an indemnity order should it so decide.
Other orders
51 There are in the circumstances of this case grounds for concern that the Council may have further difficulty in respect of these premises. I will accordingly grant Council "liberty to apply".