Merits and unfair prejudice
19 Although strictly unnecessary to my decision, I will deal with the other two arguments raised by the Minister as to why the application for extension of time should not be granted. They are:
(a) the applicant has not identified any error by the Federal Magistrate in the draft notice of appeal; and
(b) the ground raised by the applicants in the draft notice of appeal was not argued before the Federal Magistrate.
20 I do not find merit in the ground set out in the draft notice of appeal. There is no obvious error in the Federal Magistrate's reasons. It was not open to the Federal Magistrates Court, nor is it open to this Court, to engage in merits review of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
21 The second applicant claims that the decision was unfair because, as the Federal Magistrate recognised at [48], a differently constituted Tribunal may have made a different decision about the amount of time the applicant should be given to sit another IELTS test. While the Federal Magistrate was no doubt right in describing the Tribunal's decision as "hard", I agree that it cannot be said in any relevant sense to be "unfair" because the applicant did have opportunity over a three year period to pass the IELTS test, was given an opportunity to schedule a test on 11 June and was on notice of the relevant issues: see the Federal Magistrate's reasons at [56]-[60]. Nor do I regard this decision of the Tribunal as one which is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker could have made it.
22 In the draft notice of appeal, the applicants again suggest that the Tribunal acted in bad faith. No evidence was offered either before the Federal Magistrate or this Court to substantiate that claim. An allegation of bad faith is a serious matter involving personal fault on the part of the decision maker. The allegation must be clearly made and proved. The circumstances in which the Court will find an administrative decision maker had not acted in good faith are rare and extreme. This is especially so where all that the applicant relies upon is the written reasons for the decision under review: SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749 at [43]-[44]. In these circumstances, the Federal Magistrate was clearly right to reject this claim, and it must be rejected by the Court as well.
23 Lastly, the representative for the Minister cited SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499 at [29]-[30] in support of the proposition that even though the Minister could not point to any prejudice of a conventional kind in leave being granted, there is public interest in the timely disposal of applications in which the Minister has a legitimate interest. Perhaps the weighty issue raised in those paragraphs is the recognition that where, as here, the applicants seek to rely on grounds which are substantially different from those raised in the court below, it has the effect of making this Court a court of original jurisdiction rather than appellate. That is inappropriate and would unnecessarily burden the High Court on review. Save for exceptional circumstances, this will not be permitted: see Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 71; Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7; SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship at [22]-[28].
24 I will dismiss the application and order the applicants to pay the costs of the Minister.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Farrell.