The appropriate punishment
48 The contempt committed by the respondent by his refusal to answer questions when required to do so by the applicant was and is undoubtedly very serious.
49 It remains unclear why he refused to answer the questions. He declined, during the examination, to explain why he was refusing to answer questions. He also failed to give any plausible or credible explanation for his actions in his evidence before the Court. As has already been noted, the available inference in all the circumstances is that the respondent's refusal to answer questions was planned and pre-meditated. It was also deliberate and contumacious. The respondent had access to legal advice and was fairly warned of the consequences of his actions. He nonetheless persisted in his refusal to answer the relevant questions.
50 For the reasons given earlier, a person's refusal to answer questions put to him or her by an examiner at a Commission examination constitutes an inherently serious contempt. A refusal of a person who is lawfully obliged to answer questions put by a Commission examiner has the effect of frustrating and stymying the Commission's lawful processes and significantly undermines the important function that Parliament has bestowed upon the Commission. Such conduct undoubtedly warrants a condign punishment. Were it otherwise, examinees might consider it open to them to thumb their nose at an examiner's questions with impunity, or without any significant repercussions. Deterrence is plainly a particularly important consideration when penalising such a contempt.
51 The seriousness of the respondent's conduct has, however, been significantly mitigated by his early plea of guilty and, perhaps more significantly, by the purging of his contempt.
52 As already explained, the respondent attended a second examination, apparently having received legal advice from his new solicitor, and freely answered the six questions he had previously refused to answer. He also answered further questions put to him by the examiner. It is common ground that the information belatedly provided by the respondent was and is useful to the Commission. While there was some evidence that the delay occasioned by the respondent's actions somewhat hindered the Commission's investigation, I am not persuaded that the hindrance was particularly significant in all the circumstances.
53 The respondent's personal circumstances, as described earlier, also compel some leniency. As indicated, the appellant is a relatively young man. While he has a few minor convictions, mostly for driving offences, he has not previously been found to be in contempt and has not previously engaged in any conduct of the sort for which he is now to be punished. He has a responsible job, a young family and cares for [redacted]. I am satisfied that his family would suffer significant hardship if he were to be incarcerated.
54 I have considered the penalties that have been imposed by the Court for contempts of a similar nature to this contempt. Those cases provide some guidance. Many of them, however, involved cases where the contemnor had not purged his or her contempt, or involved different facts and circumstances, or concerned contemnors who had subjective circumstances which differed in material respects from the respondent's circumstances. Each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances.
55 The one case that involved fairly comparable facts and circumstances is XLVII. In that case, a contemnor who had initially refused to answer questions at a Commission examination subsequently purged his contempt within a fairly short space of time. White J imprisoned the contemnor for four months, but wholly suspended that sentence on the condition that the contemnor be of good behaviour for 15 months.
56 In my view, a similar sentence or punishment is appropriate in this matter. A sentence of imprisonment is appropriate given the objective seriousness of the contempt in question. I am not satisfied that the imposition of a fine, or an order akin to a good behaviour bond, or any other form of entirely non-custodial punishment, would adequately achieve the important punitive and deterrent objects of a penalty for a contempt of this nature.
57 In my view, having regard to all of the facts and circumstances, including the respondent's personal circumstances, a sentence of four months' imprisonment is warranted. The respondent should, however, be in no doubt whatsoever that, had he not pleaded guilty and purged his contempt, the sentence of imprisonment that I would have imposed would have been significantly longer.
58 While a term of imprisonment of four months is warranted, I am persuaded in all the circumstances that it is appropriate to wholly suspend the respondent's imprisonment on the condition that he be of good behaviour. A suspended sentence is appropriate because the respondent pleaded guilty and purged his contempt at a relative early stage. He thereby demonstrated his willingness to facilitate the course of justice. I am also persuaded that the respondent's subjective circumstances compel a degree of leniency in the sentence.
59 While the suspension of a sentence of imprisonment involves a degree of leniency, as White J pointed out in XLVII, a suspended sentence is nonetheless a real punishment: XLVII at [61] and the cases there cited. There is also no doubt that the Court has the power to impose a suspended sentence when imposing a penalty for a contempt of the sort in question in this case: XLVII at [60] and the cases there cited.
60 I accordingly convict the respondent of contempt of the Commission and sentence him to imprisonment for four months. That sentence of imprisonment is to be wholly suspended subject to the following conditions: first, that he be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months, commencing on 2 February 2023; second, that he notify the applicant within seven days of any change from his current residential address; and third, that he appear in this Court if called upon to do so, should it be alleged that he has breached any condition of the suspension. The respondent must also pay the costs of and incidental to this application.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wigney.