Explanatory Memorandum
30 The Explanatory Memorandum referred to the following deficiencies in the existing provisions of the Act for dealing with uncooperative witnesses:
There are two issues with the offences as they currently operate. Firstly, there is no immediate threat of detention. At present, if a person is summonsed to appear as a witness and attends the examination but refuses to cooperate, the matter is referred to the CDPP and the prosecution proceeds by way of summons. As a result, there is no immediate detention or threat of immediate detention to the person. Arresting the person is not available as it is not necessary to arrest a witness in order to achieve any of the purposes set out in paragraph 3W(1)(b) of the Crimes Act.
Secondly, the effectiveness of these offences is often compromised by the delay in the commencement of court proceedings. It can often take a long time before a matter is brought before a court and even longer before the court is able to deal with the matter.
Witnesses have been prepared to not cooperate with examiners, knowing that no penalty will be imposed for at least 12-18 months. Witnesses are aware that they may also be able to avoid criminal conviction (and therefore any penalty) by eventually agreeing to give evidence prior to the completion of the criminal process knowing that the evidence will have lost its value to the investigation by that stage. By delaying when information is provided, a witness is able to effectively delay and frustrate the operation of an ACC investigation.
31 The Explanatory Memorandum stated that an independent review and report on the operation of certain provisions in the Act and the National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth), conducted by Mr Mark Trowell QC ("the Trowell Report") and presented in the House of Representatives on 21 February 2008, found:
that the lack of a contempt power for dealing with uncooperative witnesses in examinations is a significant impediment to its capacity to combat serious and organised crime. The Trowell Report recommended that the ACC Act be amended to give examiners the capacity to refer an alleged contempt to a superior court to consider and deal with as though it were contempt of that court. The Trowell Report went on to recommend that if, after hearing a contempt application, a court finds the person to be in contempt, the court would have the power to deal with the person as if they were in contempt of court (for instance, the court would have the power to imprison the person).
32 The Explanatory Memorandum set out the objectives of the amendment as follows:
Rationale for changes
This item will implement the key recommendation of the Trowell Report, and respond to the recommendations of the PJC-ACC, by providing an examiner with the power to refer uncooperative witness to a superior court to be dealt with as if the witness was in contempt of that court.
Under the new contempt provisions, the ACC, where appropriate, will be able to deal promptly with an uncooperative witness, while avoiding the delays which are a part of the prosecution process.
Allowing an examiner to refer a person to a court to be dealt with for contempt will provide a swift mechanism for dealing with uncooperative witnesses contempt proceedings bring with them the threat of immediate detention. It is anticipated that the new contempt provisions will motivate an uncooperative witness to reconsider his or her position and comply with the requirements of an examination, and avoid the immediate threat of detention.
Allowing a person to be dealt with through contempt provisions will maintain the integrity of the examination process as an important investigative and intelligence-gathering tool in combating serious and organised crime. The new contempt procedures will bring the ACC into line with other State and Territory agencies similar to the ACC who have had contempt provisions for some time. The experience of those agencies is that the power to cite an uncooperative witness for contempt is used sparingly, and that the threat of such action will be often sufficient to secure compliance.
33 The Explanatory Memorandum stated:
Section 34C
Section 34C will provide that contempt proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the ordinary rules and procedures of the Court to which the examiner applies. This will ensure that the court will retain overall control of the contempt proceedings from the time the person is brought before that court until the application is disposed of. The examiner will simply be a party to the proceeding.
Subsection 34C(3) will also provide that the certificate submitted under subsection 34B(3) by the examiner stating the grounds for making the application and evidence in support of that application is prima facie evidence showing contempt of the ACC. This will allow the court to find the facts of the alleged contempt without necessarily having to rely on any oral testimony. This does not prevent the defendant from
challenging the evidence. However, if there is no dispute as to the facts, the certificate will expedite the contempt proceedings.
34 Legislation similar to ss 34A-34F of the Act, such as provisions of the Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW) ("Royal Commissions Act"), has been considered in a number of authorities.
35 In Royal Commissioner v Staunton [1995] NSWSC 45 (19 September 1995) ("Staunton"), Dunford J referred to s 17 of the Royal Commissions Act and summarised the effect of the legislation (at [3]).
36 As with the legislation at issue in the present matter, a certificate was prima facie evidence of the matters certified. The certificate indicated that the Commissioner had asked the defendant a number of questions, some of which he refused to answer.
37 Dunford J stated (at [10]-[11]):
10. No evidence or defence was adduced on behalf of the defendant to the charge of contempt and his counsel indicated that he did not wish to say anything by way of defence. I therefore accepted the evidence in the certificate, found that the defendant was guilty of contempt of the Commission and adjourned the matter to the following day for evidence and submissions on penalty, and I directed that the defendant be detained in custody in the meantime.
11. On the following day evidence was adduced and submissions made in relation to penalty and I reserved my decision, the defendant again being detained in custody. I now proceed to give my determination on penalty mid the reasons therefor.
38 Dunford J considered an affidavit and crossexamination of the defendant. His Honour found that the defendant's professed reasons for not answering were not genuine. His Honour concluded that his contempt was wilful.
39 In Wood, Honourable Justice v Galea [1995] NSWSC 100 (26 October 1995), a witness was held in contempt under s 18A of the Royal Commissions Act for refusing to answer questions. In considering the penalty, Hunt CJ at CL stated:
21. The substantial issue which was debated before me was the purpose for which, stating it in neutral terms, action can or should be taken against the respondent as a result of his contempt of the Royal Commission. Three possible specific purposes of any such action were identified:
(1) as retribution for the contempt which has been committed by the respondent, or by way of expiation on his party;
(2) to coerce him into answering the questions; and
(3) the deterrence of others.
The third of those purposes would clearly overlap with each of the other two.
40 His Honour considered the seriousness of the contempt and noted that the information sought was of very substantial importance to the Commissioner's terms of reference (at [19]). His Honour was satisfied that the court was empowered to commit a person found guilty of contempt of a Royal Commission to prison until further order of the Court (at [29]).
41 Hunt CJ at CL considered whether a determinate sentence should be imposed as a punishment. His Honour observed (at [31]) that:
coercion would obviously be inappropriate if the respondent had already purged his contempt, or if it were no longer necessary to obtain the questions to the answers asked, or if the Royal Commission had been terminated, or if for any other reason no good purpose would be served by detaining him any further.
42 His Honour continued (at [32]):
I do not belief that the respondent's obduracy is of such a nature that it is unlikely that he will change his mind. …On the contrary, I am satisfied that it is likely that coercive action against the respondent will eventually produce the information sought by the Commissioner…and that these are the only means by which such a result may be obtained.
43 In Staunton, Dunford J found a witness guilty of wilful and contumacious contempt, designed to frustrate the work of the Commission, which was set up in the public interest. His Honour stated:
If a number of witnesses before the Commission took the same view the Commission would be reduced to a toothless farce. As Moffitt P said in relation to another Royal Commission in Thelander v Woodward (1981) 1 NSWLR 644 at 646:
"Where appropriate, the sanctions of contempt and a charge under s 21 should be pursued with vigour and expedition. Indeed unless this is done an inquiry is at risk of becoming a lame one, which does not reach out to the leaders or the central planning of crime,"
and in Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116, a case of a witness refusing to answer questions before an Inspector conducting an investigation under the Security Industry (SA) Code, King CJ at pp 117 to 118 said:
"The effectiveness of the administration of justice depends upon compliance by witnesses with the legal obligation to answer relevant questions. This is so whether the proceedings are in a court of law or before some other tribunal or authority which Parliament has empowered to compel answers."
44 His Honour further stated:
In considering an appropriate penalty the main considerations must be coercion, punishment and the deterrence of others, particularly those who may find themselves in a similar position before the Commission.
45 Dunford J considered a determinate sentence inappropriate. It had been imposed in cases that were distinguishable from that before him because, inter alia, the trial was complete, the witness had an avowed intention to continue to refuse to answer, or had sought to defend a genuinelyheld principle, such as protection of the confidentiality of journalistic sources.
46 In contrast, in Staunton, the defendant's motive for refusing to answer was the protection of wrongdoers, "possibly including himself". His Honour stated "[t]he Court's primary object at this stage is to persuade the defendant to comply with his legal obligation and answer questions" (at [28]).
47 Dunford J also observed that it was "early days yet" and he was not satisfied that the defendant's professed resolve would not weaken, "particularly after some time in prison" (at [27]).
48 In Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116, King CJ (with whom Zelling and Wells JJ concurred) in October 1982 refused to discharge from custody a defendant who maintained his refusal to answer questions put to him by an inspector appointed under the Securities Industry (South Australia) Code. King CJ observed that the answers were sought not in the context of private litigation, but for an investigation in the public interest. His Honour stated that therefore "the Court must do what it can to prevail upon the applicant to see the matter in a clearer light and to comply with his legal obligation" (at 118).
49 In November 1982, however, the respondent was released from custody, as the majority of the Full Court (Mitchell and Wells JJ, Zelling J dissenting) held that he had been sufficiently punished for his contempt. [Von Doussa v Owens (No 3) (1982) 31 SASR 116.]