Lou v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue

Overview of the legislative scheme

1. Part 3 of the LTM Act provides that land tax is payable by the owner of all land in New South Wales other than land which is exempt from taxation under the LTM Act. The tax year is each period of 12 months commencing on the first day of January and land tax is charged on land owned as at midnight on 31 December immediately preceding the tax year (ss 7-9).
2. The LTM Act provides that land used for certain defined purposes, including certain residential purposes, is exempt from taxation. Section 10(1)(r) of the LTM Act provides that land is "exempt from taxation under the principal place of residence exemption, as provided for by Schedule 1A". The "principal place of residence" of a person is defined in s 3(1) of the LTM Act to mean "the one place of residence that is, among the one or more places of residence of the person within and outside Australia, the principal place of residence of the person".
3. Unless the context otherwise requires, in these reasons references to years are to land tax years, references to legislation are to the LTM Act, references to clauses are to clauses of Schedule 1A of the LTM Act.

Ms Lou's material

1. Documents and oral evidence provided by Ms Lou to the Tribunal comprised: 1. Her unwitnessed statement dated 15 April 2018, marked Exhibit A1 and her oral evidence during the hearing. 2. Unwitnessed statement by Li Xuan dated 25 May 2018, marked exhibit A2. 3. Unwitnessed statement by Hua Qin dated 29 May 2018, marked exhibit A3. 4. Miscellaneous unpaginated unindexed bundle of 42 pages of documents marked Exhibit A4.

Written submissions on behalf of Ms Lou and Mr Lou's facts

1. Mr Lou provided written submissions to the Tribunal as Ms Lou's representative. Those submissions were submissions in reply dated 31 May 2018 (ASR), closing submissions dated 8 August 2018 (ACS) and closing submissions in reply dated and filed 5 September 2018 (ACSR).
2. During the hearing Mr Lou was asked whether he would give evidence to the Tribunal. He was informed that if he gave evidence, he would be subject to cross-examination. Mr Lou informed me that he would not give evidence.
3. Substantial parts of ASR, ACS and ACSR are irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunal. Those parts have not affected my reasons.
4. Other parts of ASR, ACS and ACSR comprise statements of fact (Mr Lou's facts) which are not included in any of the statements or documents provided by Ms Lou, her witnesses or the Chief Commissioner, nor are they included in Ms Lou's oral testimony. As Mr Lou declined to give evidence, Mr Lou's facts are not admitted in evidence. Some of ASR, ACS and ACSR are submissions in relation to Mr Lou's facts. Those submissions have not been taken into consideration except to the extent that they relate to evidence accepted in the proceedings.
5. Mr Lou attached to ACSR a letter, apparently from Ms Lou's tax agent, Helen Zhao Accountants & Co. which Mr Lou wanted me to take into consideration in making my decision. If that letter had been provided at an appropriate time the Chief Commissioner would have had the opportunity to both require the author of the letter to attend for cross-examination and to investigate the matters referred to in the letter. The Chief Commissioner did not have the opportunity to do either. I also note that Mr Lou informed me at the end of the hearing that Ms Lou would not be relying on any other evidence.
6. In the normal course I would not admit Ms Zhao's letter into evidence and not take it into consideration in making my decision. However, I have had regard to the letter and as, in my opinion, it does not unreasonably assist Ms Lou nor does it detract from the Chief Commissioner's position, I admit it into evidence and comment briefly on it below.
7. In summary, and with the exception of Ms Zhao's letter, I have only had regard to those parts of ASR, ACS and ACSR which relate to either evidence properly before the Tribunal or relevant legal arguments.
8. Mr Lou, representing Ms Lou, made oral submissions during the hearing. I have had regard to those submissions to the extent that they are based on evidence properly before the Tribunal or relevant legal arguments. Otherwise I have not had regard to those submissions.
9. Except where the context otherwise requires all references to submissions by Ms Lou containing a paragraph number are from ACS.

The Respondent's material

1. Documents provided by the Respondent to the Tribunal comprised: 1. Section 58 documents filed 17 January 2018, marked Exhibit R1. 2. Affidavit made by Robert Ghanem made 17 May 2018, marked Exhibit R2. 3. Six page bundle of Ms Lou's documents filed by the Respondent, marked Exhibit R3. 4. Respondent's written submissions dated and filed 17 May 2018 and Respondent's closing submissions dated and filed 22 August 2018.
2. During the hearing Mr Byrne made oral submissions in behalf of the Respondent.
3. Unless the context otherwise requires references to paragraph numbers of submissions by the Chief Commissioner are to numbered paragraphs of RCS.

Onus and the procedure in Tribunal hearings

1. Section 100(3) of the Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW) (TA Act) relevantly states "The applicant has the onus of proving the applicant's case in an application for review."
2. Mr Lou did not expressly dispute that onus. However as will be apparent from these reasons, substantial parts of Ms Lou's submissions disregarded the onus on her and indicated a misunderstanding of the role of the Tribunal and the function of the proceedings.
3. Ms Lou submitted at [2] and [3]: 2. … The whole process of land tax assessment is like someone were punished by a much stronger powerful 'group' who then make up an excuse for their violence. 3. … [the Chief Commissioner's] legal representative … build (sic) his argument on presumption or prejudice …
4. The submissions at [2] and [3] above exemplify several emotional submissions in ASR, ACS and ACSR. They do not advance Ms Lou's case and I do not propose to otherwise refer to them in these reasons.
5. Ms Lou submitted at [3]: … according to our communication during the mediation … the Chief Commissioner's use of his discretionary power regarding land tax has put Olivia in an impossible position.
6. This submission raises two specific matters. Firstly a reference to mediation and secondly a reference to Ms Lou's claim in these proceedings.
7. I note in relation to the reference to mediation that s 37 of the CAT Act and Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulation 2013 (NSW) (CAT Reg) deal with resolution processes in general and mediation in particular. As a general rule, evidence of anything said or admission made or document prepared in relation to a mediation session is not admissible in evidence in any proceedings, cl 10 CAT Reg. I am not aware of any relevant exception. Accordingly, I do not propose to have regard to the references to mediation in Ms Lou's written submissions.
8. The submission at ACS [3] above in relation to Ms Lou's "impossible position" does not explain how Ms Lou has attempted to satisfy her statutory onus by failing to provide: 1. statements from relevant former employers as to their records of her home address during relevant periods; 2. statements from neighbours of the Land regarding Ms Lou's presence in residence at the Land during relevant periods; 3. statements from unidentified persons, with whom she said she shared accommodation at Bondi during relevant periods, as to their recollection of her residing at Bondi; nor 4. any explanation as to why she provided no statements from the employers, neighbours or persons referred to in the three immediately preceding paragraphs.
9. The onus lies on Ms Lou to satisfy me on the balance of probability of her case. Failing to provide any of the information referred to in the previous paragraph does not assist her.

Standard of proof

1. The standard of proof in reviews by the Tribunal is the "balance of probabilities". Cornish Investments Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (RD) (2013) NSWADTAP 25 at [31] and B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWCA 187, (2008) 74 NSWLR 481 per Allsop P at [104] (Giles and Basten JJA agreeing).
2. Ms Lou did not dispute this standard of proof.

Initial consideration and issues

1. It is not disputed that Ms Lou owned the Land at all relevant dates
2. Unless Ms Lou proves she is entitled to the principal place of residence exemption for the Land for each of the 2011 and 2012 Tax Years, having regard to the requirements of the LTM Act and any other relevant legislation, she is liable for land tax in respect of the Land for relevant Tax Years.

Jurisdiction of the Tribunal

1. The Tribunal's authority is derived from the Civil and Administrative Act 2013 (NSW) (CAT Act) which established the Tribunal. Section 28(1) of the CAT Act states "The Tribunal has such jurisdiction and functions as may be conferred or imposed on it by or under this Act or any other legislation." Relevantly s 96 of the TA Act provides that under certain circumstances a taxpayer may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (ADR Act) of a decision. A prerequisite for the exercise of the review powers by the Tribunal is that the taxpayer has lodged an objection with the Respondent and is not satisfied with the determination of the objection or the Respondent has not determined the objection within 90 days.
2. Ms Lou's application to the Tribunal sought a review of the objection determination, which had not itself been the subject of an objection. In Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Paspaley [2008] NSWCA 184 the Court of Appeal said at [28]: … the right of review under s 97 is given by reference to the operative decision of the Chief Commissioner and not to a ruling made on an objection. Although the existence of an objection is a necessary precondition to the power of review by the Court, and it is the taxpayer's dissatisfaction with the determination of the objection which provides standing to seek review, it is the initial decision which is the subject matter of the review.
3. There is no dispute that the assessment, not the disallowance of the objection to the assessment, is the subject of review by the Tribunal in these proceedings.
4. In Yen-Cheng Chuang & Anor v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2009] NSWADT 160 the late Verick JM provided at paragraphs 19 to 23 a range of matters to be considered in determining whether a place of residence of a person is the principal residence of that person. He said: 19 The Act does not provide any technical or legal meaning for the expression "principal place of residence" and accordingly, the expression has its ordinary meaning. A person's place of residence is usually understood as "the place where he eats, drinks and sleeps" (per Ridley J in Stoke-On-Trent Borough Council v Cheshire County Council [1915] 3 KB 699 at 706). The use of the term "principal" in the expression suggests that a person may use and occupy more than one residence but that the exemption is only available for the principal place of residence of the person. 20 In ascertaining whether a particular residence of a person is the principal place of residence of that person it is necessary to use an objective test and the conclusion is determined by considering the extent and quality of use and occupation of the residence in each case (per Fryberg J in Dean v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld)(No 2) [1996] 2 Qd R 557 in considering the meaning of the expression "principal place of residence" found in the Stamps Act 1894 (Qld)). 21 The onus to establish one's principal place of residence is usually discharged on the basis of various matters. It is important to note, as observed by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in Re Ziino and Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] VCAT 1707 that: "… while sleeping by itself in a place can be an indication of a principal place of residence, it is not the sole matter to be taken into account. One needs to look at a whole indicia of matters …One needs to look as well at where the applicant ate; her use of electricity and the furniture and fittings and other matters such as entertainment of friends in the house… Sleeping in a place does not make a residence. It has got to be the whole indicia of things that are done in a home which are described in the cases…" 22 Other indicia of matters would include evidence of an applicant's use of the address of the property as the residential address for purposes of her or her mail, driving licence, on the electoral roll, in immigration records, income tax returns and telephone bills. 23 In Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Ferrington (GD) [2004] NSWADTAP 41 the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal agreed that "to occupy a home as her or her principal place of residence a person's occupation must have a degree of permanence to it: a connection to a place of residence of a transient, temporary, contingent or passing nature is not sufficient, nor occupation for any other reason". The Appeal Panel also held that "the intention of the person concerned, gauged objectively, is relevant but not determinative of the issue". (Also see Zakariya v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] NSWADT 26).
5. Ms Lou's case relies on that part of the material referred to at [12] to [21] which I allowed into evidence together with submissions concerning that evidence and submissions as to matters of law.
6. Focussing on alleged inconsistencies in reasons given by Revenue NSW for the disallowance decision disregards the statutory requirements as to how the Tribunal makes its decision in these proceedings.
7. In determining Ms Lou's application, the Tribunal is required to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including any relevant factual material and any applicable written or unwritten law, s 63 ADR Act.
8. The Tribunal may confirm or revoke the assessment or other decision to which the application relates or make a decision in place of the reviewable decision and make orders as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, s 101(1) of the TA Act.

Legislative Scheme - Ms Lou's claims

1. In ASR Ms Lou relied at "C. PRINCIPAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE Exemption" on two extracts from the LTM Act and an interpretation of part of par [28] from the decision at first instance in Mesiti v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] NSWADT 99 (Mesiti 1) a decision at first instance in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT), the predecessor to this Tribunal.
2. Ms Lou relied on cll 2 and 8. Part of the clause 2 extract is set out below. Clause cl 8 is dealt with later in these reasons. 2 Principal place of residence exemption (1) Land used and occupied by the owner as the principal place of residence of the owner of the land, and for no other purpose, is exempt from taxation under this Act, in respect of the year commencing 1 January 2005 or any succeeding year, if the land is: (a) a parcel of residential land, or (b) a strata lot or, subject to this Schedule, land comprised of 2 or more strata lots. (2) Land is not used and occupied as the principal place of residence of a person unless: (a) the land, and no other land, has been continuously used and occupied by the person for residential purposes and for no other purposes since 1 July in the year preceding the tax year in which land tax is levied, or (b) in any other case, the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the land is used and occupied by the person as the person's principal place of residence. (3) …
3. In order for Ms Lou to succeed in her reliance on cl 2 she must demonstrate compliance with either cl 2 (2) (a) or cl 2(2)(b).

Clause 2(2)(a)

1. To satisfy cl 2(2)(a) Ms Lou must prove that the Land was continuously used and occupied by her for residential purposes and for no other purpose for the 6 month periods from 1 July to at least 31 December in each of 2010 and 2011 (the six month periods).
2. A major focus of the communications between the parties, and of the submissions, relates to the information provided by Ms Lou to third parties, in particular, Commonwealth and State government agencies, as to her address for various purposes. The two main purposes are her postal address or her address for service of notices on the one hand and her residential address on the other.
3. The Chief Commissioner referred at [44] to: ... inconsistencies in Ms Lou's evidence as to the reason that she had arranged for mail to be sent to the Forest Lodge Property over the years in question are not to her credit. In this respect: (a) In the Application, Ms Lou stated that the reason for her having mail sent to the Forest Lodge Property, after her purchase of the Empire Bay Address, was that she had fallen into the habit of using that address when she lived with her father; (b) By contrast, in an email to the Office of State Revenue in December 2016, Ms Lou stated that the reason that mail ("insurance letters, utility bills" and so on) were sent to Mr Lou at the Forest Lodge Property was that she had entrusted Mr Lou "to handle all issues in respect to" the Empire Bay Property; (c) However, in her statement dated 15 April 2018, Ms Lou now claims that she had mail sent to her father's address (that is, the Forest Lodge Property) because of uncertainties in respect of the post code that applies to the Empire Bay Property (and straddling suburbs) and her experience in losing letters and parcels by reason of those uncertainties."
4. I have checked the Chief Commissioner's references in [44] and I am satisfied that they are accurate.
5. At [45] the Chief Commissioner submitted that the Tribunal should prefer various categories of contemporaneous documents, to Ms Lou's above explanations, and the inference available on those documents is that Ms Lou did not reside at the Land during the two six month periods.
6. To take Ms Lou's explanations in context I note that: 1. item (a) relates to the first four years of Ms Lou's ownership of the Land, from 2008 to 2012, when she worked in Sydney city and it was very convenient for her to stay at her father's place at Forest Lodge when she occasionally needed to be at work early and stay late. 2. Item (b) relates to the death of Ms Lou's mother in 2004 when Ms Lou was 17 and had a 4 year old brother. Ms Lou says that Mr Lou took an early retirement to take care of his two children. An email dated December 2016 from Ms Lou to Revenue NSW states that she received an investment property from her late mother's estate, her father was in charge of all dealings in relation to that property and she entrusted him to handle all issues in respect of the Land "Hence the reason that insurance letters, utility bills for [the Land] are addressed to him." 3. Item (c) from Ms Lou's statement is supported by copies of multiple envelopes showing the street address of the Land with two different suburbs and two different postcodes. I note that two of the envelopes appear to be water consumption accounts from Gosford City Council less than six months apart, one addressed to "O Lou" at the Land, "Bensville NSW 2251" and the other to "O Lou" at the Land, "Empire Bay NSW 2257".
7. I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the context of all three situations nor do I have any reason not to accept to the reasons given by Ms Lou in each case to the extent that her father's address at Forest Lodge was used for postal or package deliveries. I deal below with the issue of using Forest Lodge as a residential address. I also deal below with a potential discrepancy between Ms Lou's reasons in item (a) and Ms Li's statement.
8. Another major focus relates to the collection of documents by Ms Lou to provide to Revenue NSW to prove her use and occupation of the Land as her principal place of residence in respect of the Tax Years.
9. Mr Lou has sought to provide evidence to show the efforts that have been made to prove Ms Lou's case. As mentioned above, to the extent that Mr Lou makes statements of fact which did not appear elsewhere in the evidence they have not been considered nor have any submissions by him in respect of those statements. Submissions by Mr Lou as to facts properly in evidence or as to law have been considered.

ATO record retention period

1. At A. Summary. 2 (b) in ASR is a submission to the effect that there is a rule set by the Australian taxation office (sic) stating that a person needs to keep written records for only 5 years for tax purposes. The reference relied on is on the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) website. That part of the ATO website relates to taxpayers self-assessing in relation to their personal income tax returns and the retention of records for that purpose. It is not relevant for these proceedings. The submission is rejected.

Residential address on income tax returns

1. At [4(g)] in RS the Chief Commissioner submitted: In her tax returns for the financial years ended 30 June 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, Ms Lou recorded her home and postal addresses as the Forest Lodge Property address (and identified the Umina Property as a rental property);"
2. Firstly, I find that the inclusion by the Chief Commissioner of a reference to a property, other than the Land, owned by Ms Lou as a "rental property" is irrelevant to the issues before me.
3. On the more substantive point I note ASR included at E. In reply to the assessment using 'objective factors' doctrine [1] an explanation concerning the addresses set out in Ms Lou's income tax returns. That explanation comes under the category 'Mr Lou's facts' and is not admitted into evidence for reasons given above. ACS contains at [25] more of 'Mr Lou's facts' concerning income tax returns which are also not admitted into evidence.
4. I have referred above to the attachment to ACSR of a letter from Helen Zhao Tax Accountant. That letter, dated 1 August 2018, states that Ms Zhao certifies that Ms Lou whose "Main residential address" is at the Land has been her client since 2010. Ms Zhao was notified that Ms Lou "wants to use her father's home address as her post address for taxation purposes".
5. Income tax returns have a requirement for two addresses, a postal address for notices and a home address to be inserted if it differs from the postal address. The Tax return for individuals for the 2018 financial year is found on the ATO website at https://www.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/IND/Downloads/Tax-return-for-individuals-2018.pdf.
6. There is a clear difference between a postal address (for receipt of mail, documents and parcels) and a home address (at which one resides). Ms Zhao has referred in her 1 August 28 letter to the use of Mr Lou's home address as Ms Lou's "post address for taxation purposes". I find that Ms Zhao's letter does not evidence that the Land was Ms Lou's principal place of residence at any relevant date and reject any submission to the contrary.
7. The Chief Commissioner referred at [6] to Ms Lou's evidence In cross-examination in relation to her substantial qualifications and experience including audit, finance, commerce, accounting and as an analyst as follows: Ms Lou is a chartered accountant, having obtained an undergraduate Bachelor of Commerce degree (majoring in finance and accounting) from the University of Sydney and then a post-graduate degree in chartered accounting (completed in about 2008)." Between February 2008 and February 2009, Ms Lou worked as an auditor at KPMG; and was then employed, between March 2009 and September 2010, as an analyst at Rodgers Reidy Chartered Accountants." Ms Lou was then employed at National Australia Bank, between September 2010 and June 2013, as a product control analyst (for rates, credit and equities, until August 2011; and thereafter in foreign exchange and commodities)." She currently works for Barclays in Singapore.
8. Ms Lou did not challenge any of the contents of the above paragraph.
9. Ms Lou also gave evidence that Ms Zhao had been the family's tax agent since 2010. Ms Zhao prepared drafts of Ms Lou's income tax returns having regard to information Ms Lou sent to her. Ms La did not recall specific dates specific income tax returns. She acknowledged that declarations to the Commonwealth in income tax returns are a serious matter. She could not recall whether she checked the final income tax returns in respect of the relevant period. However final returns were provided to her for signing.
10. I find it implausible that a person with Ms Lou's academic qualifications and practical experience who was provided drafts by her tax agent of her personal income tax returns and to whom the returns went for signing would not notice that her home address on the front page of those returns for several years was the same as a postal address at which she is now stating she did not reside.

Contract for sale

1. The Chief Commissioner notes at [17(f)] that documents relied on by Ms Lou include "An unsigned front page of a "Contract for the sale of land" for the Empire Bay Property,"
2. At ASR B. Background 1(e) Ms Lou submitted: [She] tried to sell the property in 2010 and the buyer would like to know how much the rent would be. That is why there appeared a rental amount on the statement. Please refer to the drafted contract of sale in 2010. The Empire Bay property has never been rented out or incurred any income in any form.
3. At [3] in ASR E. In reply to the assessment using 'objective factors' doctrine Ms Lou submitted: … drafted contract of sale showing 'vacant' condition in 2010 provided by conveyancer sufficiently demonstrate that the property has never been rented out …
4. I find that the phrase "vacant possession" on the front page of a Law Society standard Contract for sale of land relates, and has related to my knowledge for some decades, to an obligation by the vendor to provide to the purchaser vacant possession of the property being sold with effect on the date of settlement. The phrase does not in any way "demonstrate that the property has never been rented out". I reject Ms Lou's submission to the contrary.

Incoming passenger cards

1. At B. Background 1.(h) in ASR is Ms Lou's submission "on Australian incoming passenger cards, the addresses need to fill in are 'contact details'" and the submission "the inconsistent Empire Bay address would not be a good choice for contact her (sic)".
2. The incoming passenger cards in evidence each have two sides. One side commences with "YOUR CONTACT DETAILS IN AUSTRALIA". The spaces to be completed on that side under that heading are "phone, email or address".
3. The other side of the incoming passenger card commences on the left-hand side with details of the incoming passenger's family/surname; given names; passport number; flight number or name of ship and importantly "Intended address in Australia". My emphasis.
4. I reject the implied submission that the "Intended address in Australia" is somehow restricted to the 'contact details' in Australia on the other side of the card. I also note that Ms Lou's non-email contact details in Australia on the incoming passenger card dated 1 April 2013 is the Bondi address which Ms Lou's driver licence history in evidence states was her residential address from 20 to December 2011 until 17 August 2016.
5. I note that Ms Lou's "intended address" in Australia was Forest Lodge on incoming passenger cards dated 13 March 2010, 6 September 2010 and 29 April 2012. The non-email contact details on 6 September 2010 were Glebe NSW and on 29 April 2012, the Forest Lodge address.
6. Ms Lou's oral evidence was that she used the Forest Lodge address as her intended address on incoming passenger cards as that was the address she intended to stay at normally after she returned to Australia as it was "a lot closer" than going to the Land.
7. I accept Ms Lou's evidence in relation to her intended address being Forest Lodge on her returns to Australia. However, there is no evidence before me as to the duration of her stay at Forest Lodge on each or any occasion that she returned to Australia during any relevant period.

Electricity bills, water bills, council rates, draft contract of sale etc

1. At C. PRINCIPAL PLACE OF RESIDENCE Exemption in ASR Ms Lou submitted her control of the Land "could be evidenced by the electricity bills of 2009, 2012, 2013 etc., information about water bills and council rates, draft contract of sale in 2010 …"

Electricity bills

1. There are several electricity invoices and notices for the Land in evidence. These documents are dated from November 2008 to October 2013. None of the documents relate to either of the relevant six-month periods.
2. They go some way to confirm that electricity was connected to the Land during the Tax Years. However, they do not assist Ms Lou to evidence her use or occupation of the Land as her principal place of residence in respect of the Tax Years.

Water bills

1. There are some Gosford water consumption tax invoices in evidence. They provide evidence of a use of water on the Land;. However, they are not evidence that Ms Lou was using the water while in residence on the Land.

Difficulty obtaining evidence

1. Ms Lou's submissions are substantially based on her evidence as to difficulties she encountered in locating documents which officers of the Chief Commissioner indicated may assist her. I accept that there is some evidence that some suppliers have not retained records for as far back as she has sought.
2. I refer to two particular submissions at D. Olivia Lou's evidence in ASR

1 Difficulties obtaining evidence … they [Revenue NSW] chose to ignore all our efforts to get evidence and explanation and continue to push us to get evidence of 8 years ago that even government organisation would not keep any documents for that long.

1. The above submission is one of a continuing theme of similar submissions for Ms Lou. The submission is to the effect that the relevant period expired so long ago that it is unreasonable to expect that Ms Lou, having provided evidence of attempts to obtain details requested by Revenue NSW, should not have to prove anything else in order to obtain the land tax exemption she seeks.
2. The law places an onus on the taxpayer to prove her case on the balance of probability. For reasons best known to Ms Lou, but not provided to the Tribunal, Ms Lou has relied on her own evidence and evidence from two other persons neither of whom state that they have visited the Land.at any time. No evidence has been provided to the Tribunal by any other persons such as her neighbours at the Land, which she said she used and occupied as her principal place of residence for several years.
3. While claiming that the Land was her principal place of residence for the Tax Years, Ms Lou's driver licence history states that from 22 December 2011 until 17 August 2016 her residence was an address at Bondi Road, Bondi.
4. Ms Lou's explanation was that between 2012 and 2013 she shared a property at Bondi Road Bondi with friends as somewhere she could stay when working overtime. She states that for parking purposes she had to change the address of her driver's licence to the Bondi address and after no longer living there she did not change the address of her licence. New South Wales law provides requirements for the address to be used on a driver's licence. I am not aware of any statutory requirement that the address on a driver's licence is to be varied for parking purposes. Ms Lou has not provided any authority to support what she says was her obligation to change the address on her licence nor any reason why she failed to again change the address when she no longer stayed at Bondi.
5. I also observe that Ms Lou has not provided the Tribunal with statements from any of her friends with whom she said she shared the Bondi Road property, nor has she provided any explanation for failing to obtain any such statements nor of any attempts she made to obtain statements.
6. Ms Lou went to some length to provide evidence of attempting to obtain utility bills and the documents from certain companies and agencies. However, there is no evidence that she made any similar attempts to obtain statements from employers, neighbours or friends with whom she said she lived. This unexplained gap in her evidence does not assist Ms Lou to satisfy her statutory onus.

2 Statements from two witnesses in evidence … we have two witnesses that have made statements showing that Olivia Lou lived at the Empire Bay property during the relevant period …

1. The two witnesses are Ms Li and Mr Qin.

Ms Li's evidence

1. The Chief Commissioner submitted at [32(a)]: Xuan Li simply states that she lived at the Forest Lodge Property between October 2009 and December 2010 (covering only one of the two relevant six month periods), and that Ms Lou "did not live with us" but would "occasionally come here to have meal with us". That is not, however, evidence that Ms Lou was living at the Empire Bay Property (as opposed to some other address - for example, the Bondi address which Ms Lou registered with Roads and Maritime Services in December 2011).
2. Ms Lou's response to the Chief Commissioner's submission, at ACSR [30], listed Ms Li's statement as evidence supporting Ms Lou and at [21] submitted: The 'use and occupation' test required by S. (3)(a)12 could be conducted by examining the objective evidence ... other material evidence including … witnesses' statements … all together objectively indicate the applicant's possession and control of the Empire Bay property has already exceeded 6 months.
3. I agree with the Chief Commissioner's submission that Ms Li provided no evidence that Ms Lou resided at the Land at any time, only that between October 2009 and December 2010 she occasionally had a meal at Forest Lodge but did not live at that address.

Mr Qin's evidence

1. The Chief Commissioner submitted at [32(c)]: Hua Qin states, in his statement, that he knows ("I know") that, since purchasing the Empire Bay Property, Ms Lou "has not lived with her father". Again, however, this is not evidence that Ms Lou lived at the Empire Bay Property, and, in any event, no basis is provided by Mr Qin as to his asserted knowledge that Ms Lou did not live with Mr Lou. Likewise, Mr Qin asserts that "Olivia did entertain family friends at" the Empire Bay Property, without any further details or explanation, (including as to whether he ever attended and was entertained at the property).
2. Ms Lou's response to the Chief Commissioner's submission, at ACSR [30] listed Mr Qin's statement as evidence supporting Ms Lou and at [21] made the submission extracted above.
3. I agree with the Chief Commissioner's submission that Mr Qin provided no evidence that Ms Lou resided at the Land at any time, only that for a ten or eleven year period she did not live with her father and on an unknown number of occasions during that period she entertained unidentified "family friends" at the Land.
4. Mr Qin's evidence was not challenged. However, the source of his evidence appears to be second hand, presumably from his friend Mr Lou, who declined to give evidence, and is vague in the extreme. I cannot give Mr Qin's evidence any great weight as to Ms Lou using and occupying the Land continuously as her principal place of residence during either of the six month periods or using the Land other than for occasional entertainment of "family friends".

Employers

1. In cross-examination Ms Lou referred to several employers for whom she worked from February 2008 until the date of the hearing. Ms Lou's employment included from March 2009 to September 2010, with Rodgers Reidy Chartered Accountants and from September 2010 until after August 2011 by the National Australia Bank. I would have expected that Ms Lou would have at least attempted to obtain from those employers a copy of perhaps an employment agreement or her employment records indicating her residence during the period of her employment. No such records were produced in evidence nor is there any evidence of any attempt by Ms Lou to obtain such documents in support of her claim.

Hardship

1. In her objection Ms Lou referred to suffering financial hardship having regard to certain recovery action taken by Revenue NSW. There are statutory provisions in relation to financial hardship concerning taxation issues. These are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and if Ms Lou is concerned about hardship she should consider seeking legal advice.

Mr Lou's English language skill and problems of interpretation

1. Mr Lou requested that an interpreter be available to assist him throughout the hearing and an official interpreter was provided for that purpose.
2. At [19] in ACS Ms Lou, through Mr Lou, made disparaging comments concerning the official interpreter and his interpretation of what Mr Lou said in the hearing. Mr Lou also said he "felt very disappointed and helpless during the whole hearing".
3. In RCS the Chief Commissioner submitted: … the Tribunal went to significant lengths to ensure that procedural and substantive matters were, as they arose, understood by Mr Wu and the interpreter … In addition, Ms Lou attended the whole hearing by video-link from Singapore, and, in cross-examination, demonstrated that she is sophisticated and confident in her use of English. Ms Lou and Mr Lou were provided various opportunities through the hearing to engage with the Tribunal, and neither suggested, at the hearing, that they did not understand any of the matters that were presented or were being addressed.
4. At [27] in ACSR Ms Lou, through Mr Lou, made further negative comments concerning the interpreter and submitted that Mr Lou was "deprived of a fair opportunity to understand the words used by [the Chief Commissioner's] barrister clearly … and express [himself] especially when [he] tried to cross-examine (sic) Ms Lou. The submission also claims that there was a problem allowing Mr Lou to speak English with no assistance of the interpreter and this was unfair.
5. The recording of the hearing shows that Mr Lou agreed at its commencement that he was comfortable with my understanding, derived from a prior directions hearing before me at which Mr Lou had represented Ms Lou, that he "spoke and understood English quite well". Mr Lou agreed that if and when he did not understand anything during the course of the hearing he would say to the interpreter in Mandarin whatever he wanted to say to me and the interpreter would express Mr Lou's words in English to me. If Mr Lou wished, the interpreter would translate into Mandarin anything said during the hearing in English. I informed Mr Lou that he was not permitted to merely ask questions of the interpreter.
6. At no time during the hearing did I observe Mr Lou express any dissatisfaction with the manner in which the hearing was conducted or the interpreter carried out his duties.
7. I reject both the negative submissions in respect of the interpreter and in respect of any alleged unfairness concerning the conduct of the hearing.

Duties of the Chief Commissioner

1. At [21] Ms Lou submitted: … According to Kioa v West, 'a statutory authority having power to affect the rights of a person is bound to hear him before exercising the power'. In fact, no reason or chance to explain has been given to the applicant before the Chief Commissioner making the decision to collect land tax of …
2. The Chief Commissioner did not respond to Ms Lou's reliance on Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550. The quotation in the previous paragraph is from the judgement of Gibbs CJ at [11] who was quoting Mason J in F.A.I. Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342 at page 360 who was himself referring to two earlier judgments of the High Court.
3. It is not appropriate to go further into the above judgments in these reasons. However I observe, and I note that it is not necessary for me to make a finding on this point having regard to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, from my consideration of the s 58 documents and written communications between Ms Lou and her representatives on the one hand and the Chief Commissioner's representatives on the other, that Ms Lou was given ample opportunity to put her case to the Chief Commissioner before a decision was made to actively collect relevant land tax.

Rainwater tanks and rebate

1. Ms Lou provided undated photographs of water tanks together with a letter dated 27 October 2010 she sent to the Department of Environment Climate Change and Water in relation to a rainwater tank rebate to her from the Department.
2. These photographs and letter may well evidence the installation of water tanks to a residential building on the Land. They may also support evidence in relation to a lower usage of water on the Land than might otherwise be the case. However, they are not evidence that Ms Lou lived on the Land.

Relevance of Mesiti's case

1. Ms Lou submitted at [24]: … according to Mesiti, for deciding whether the address is the principal place of residence for one person, the address of a person on a licence or on an electoral roll is not conclusive evidence.
2. Ms Lou was referring to Chief Commissioner of State Revenue v Mesiti [2003] NSWADTAP 57 (Mesiti 2), an appeal from Mesiti 1.
3. Mesiti 2 is persuasive but not binding on these proceedings. There is no need to go into the detail of the Mesiti cases save to note that the factual circumstances are substantially different from the circumstances in these proceedings. However, I accept that by itself an address of a person on a driver's licence or on an electoral roll is not conclusive evidence of that person's principal place of residence.
4. Having regard to my above findings in relation to the evidence provided by, and the unexplained gaps in the evidence of, Ms Lou, I am not satisfied that she complied with the requirements of cl 2(2)(a) in respect of either the 2011 or the 2012 Tax Years.

Clause 2(2)(b)

1. In order to comply with cl 2(2)(b), Ms Lou must prove that "in any other case" the Chief Commissioner, or in these proceedings the Tribunal, is satisfied that the Land was used and occupied by her as her principal place of residence. I find that, by the disallowance decision and his submissions in these proceedings, the Chief Commissioner is not so satisfied.
2. Having regard to my above findings, Ms Lou has not satisfied me on the balance of probability that she used and occupied the Land as her principal place of residence at any relevant date or for any relevant period.

Clause 8

1. Ms Lou included the following extract of part of cl 8 in ASR. 8 Concession for absences from former residence (1) A person is taken, for the purpose of the principal place of residence exemption, to continue to use and occupy land formerly used and occupied by the person as a principal place of residence (a former residence), after the person ceases to so use and occupy the former residence, if the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that: (a) the person used and occupied the former residence as a principal place of residence for a continuous period of at least 6 months, and (b) the person does not own any other land used and occupied by the person as a principal place of residence. 2.
2. Clause 8(1) was mentioned by Revenue NSW in communications with Ms Lou representative on the basis that it may be of some assistance to her in certain circumstances.
3. Clause 8 provides a conditional land tax concession for absences from a former principal place of residence. However, in order for the cl 8 concession to apply if requires, as one of several prerequisites, that the Chief Commissioner, or in these proceedings, the Tribunal, must be satisfied that at a relevant date Ms Lou has used and occupied a former residence as a principal place of residence for a continuous period of at least six months.
4. In ASR Ms Lou referred to Mesiti 1. With respect I find that Ms Lou has misconstrued the quotation she extracted from par [28] of Mesiti 1 by disregarding the above precondition from cl 8(1). As I am not satisfied on the balance of probability on the material before me that at any date or for any period Ms Lou used and occupied the Land as her principal place of residence, that precondition has not been satisfied in relation to the Tribunal..
5. I also find that the Chief Commissioner's disallowance of Ms Lou's objection and submissions in the proceedings evidence the Chief Commissioner's failure to be so satisfied.
6. Accordingly I find that Ms Lou is not entitled to the clause 8 concession.

Decision

1. Having regard to my above findings on the material before me I am not satisfied on the balance of probability that the Land was Ms Lou's principal place of residence for either of the Tax Years. Accordingly, the correct and preferable decision of the Tribunal is that the Land was not exempt from land tax for any of the Tax Years.

Orders 1. The decisions of the Chief Commissioner under review are affirmed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 January 2019