Costs implications - are the costs fair and reasonable?
49 I noted earlier in this judgment that the costs in respect of which approval by the Court is sought are (in summary) the applicants' costs of the proceeding, costs and disbursements associated with the approval hearing, and administration costs. I have had regard to the affidavit of Mr Mazzeo, a solicitor and legal costs consultant, who has given an expert opinion as an independent costs consultant in relation to the reasonableness of the costs submitted for approval. Mr Mazzeo has also given evidence as to his expertise in the field of costs assessment.
50 There is no dispute in this proceeding in respect of Mr Mazzeo's expertise or the value of his expert opinion. While it is always for the Court to reach its own view on matters in respect of which expert opinions may be provided, in this case I see no reason not to accept Mr Mazzeo's opinion as to the fairness and reasonableness of the costs in respect of which approval is sought.
51 I note however that the Court's approval is also sought in respect of the lead applicant payment of $15,000 to Mr and Mrs Lee. This proposed sum is an extra amount to be paid by the Bank to Mr and Mrs Lee, on top of the settlement sum.
52 In his affidavit dated 11 December 2014 Mr Levitt deposed that one of the major reasons for the delay in commencing proceedings was the difficulty in finding a group member who was willing to take on the lead applicant role in the proceedings. This difficulty was exacerbated by the potential exposure of lead applicants to adverse costs orders in light of s 43(1A) of the Federal Court Act. Mr Levitt also deposed that:
He or his professional staff had spent over 60 hours either engaged in attendances (on the telephone or in conference) on the applicants.
The applicants were required to spend time reviewing the pleadings, reviewing witness statements, discussing the matter between themselves, locating and supplying documents, travelling to and from mediations and conferences in Brisbane, and engaging in the formal mediation and settlement conference process.
The applicants were frequently contacted by other group members, and fielded ongoing progress enquiries concerning the proceedings.
The applicants attended approximately 20 public information meetings held by him for the benefit of his Storm clients.
The applicants engaged in these activities notwithstanding that they were both self-employed.
He observed the anxiety of the applicants as to the possibility of adverse costs orders being made against them.
53 In Darwalla Jessup J was presented with similar circumstances and expressed the following reservations:
[75] I was informed by the applicants that, if such payments are approved as part of the settlement scheme in this proceeding, it will be the first occasion when that approach has been taken in an Australian court. It is a matter, therefore, which I must approach with great care, notwithstanding that the sums involved appear to be fairly modest in the context of the settlement as whole. There are, in addition, other reasons why the court should pause before approving payments of this kind. First, although the claimants are not fiduciaries apropos the generality of group members, they have chosen to remunerate themselves, albeit modestly, ahead of the distribution to group members of a sum which has been calculated by reference to the estimated loss and damage suffered by the latter. The sensitivity of the position in which the claimants find themselves in these circumstances is obvious. Secondly, although courts have long-established procedures, and scales, by reference to which to assess the propriety and quantification of parties' claims to be compensated for the legal costs and expenses made necessary by successful litigation, the same cannot be said of the payments with which I am presently concerned. I am denied the advantage of court scales and taxation procedures. I have only the claimants' own evidence on the matter of the reasonableness of the payments, and of the necessity for the work and outlays to which they relate. Thirdly, the court is denied the benefit of the contribution of a contradictor in relation to these payments. Although the same may be said of the settlement distribution scheme as a whole, the problem is particularly acute where the court has only the say-so of those who claim these benefits with respect, for example, to the time occupied on the work to which their claims relate and the hourly rates by reference to which particular categories of personnel should be compensated.
54 However his Honour then continued:
[76] Notwithstanding these reservations, I consider it prima facie reasonable that particular parties who have sacrificed valuable time and incurred expenses in the interests of prosecuting this proceeding on behalf of group members as a whole should be able to look to the corpus of the settlement sum for some degree of compensation and reimbursement. More importantly, perhaps, I would hold that group members who have benefited from the proceeding could not be heard to deny the reasonableness of such a proposition. As the applicants pointed out in their submission, payments of this kind occur frequently in class actions in the United States. There, both the philosophy behind, and the calculation of, the payments concerned are a little different from those relied upon by the applicants in this proceeding. The payments are commonly referred to as 'incentive payments', and take account not only of the time and expense involved getting up a case for trial, but also of the exposure and risks to which those who choose to be lead plaintiffs in class actions necessarily subject themselves. There is also on occasion, I detect, a suggestion that, as a matter of policy, there should be some encouragement for people to assume the role of lead plaintiffs, without whom the particular kind of generalised justice embodied in such proceedings could not be achieved.
55 In my view the reasoning of his Honour is applicable in the present context, in the sense that the applicants in this case have clearly sacrificed valuable time on these proceedings and assumed risks for the benefit of the group members as a whole. I note that the amount of $15,000 for which approval is sought is very modest compared with the sums approved in Darwalla. I note further that in this case the lead applicant payment is a separate payment by the Bank to the applicants rather than payment out of the settlement sum, and to that extent does not disadvantage other group members in any way.
56 I am satisfied that the proposed lead applicant payment is also fair and reasonable, and should be approved by the Court.