Section 6(3) the Criminal Appeal Act
48Each party was content for this Court, if it came to re-sentence, to adopt the findings by his Honour with regard to the objective and subjective features of the matter, other than those with regard to assistance. I shall do so. I also adopt the starting point identified by his Honour of a total head sentence of 17 years, again without demurrer by either party.
49Nor is there any reason not to grant a discount of 25 per cent for the utilitarian value of the plea of guilty.
50I have considered the contents of the sealed envelope for myself. I shall not go into detail for obvious reasons. In evaluating that material as a whole, I shall briefly advert to the matters contained in ss 23(2)(a) - 23(2)(i).
51Considering what the law enforcement authorities have said about the assistance both past and future, I consider that the assistance is of significance and substantial usefulness.
52On the material before me, there is nothing to gainsay the proposition that the material is truthful, complete and reliable.
53I regard the nature of the assistance and promised assistance as generally being of a high order. It is detailed and specific. Having said that, I do not regard it as exceptional.
54The assistance was only provided after the applicant was arrested.
55There is no evidence of any benefits that have accrued to the applicant apart from the discount under discussion.
56Nor, as I have said, is there evidence that the offender will suffer harsher custodial conditions as a result of his actions.
57There is no evidence of injury to the offender or the family of the offender as a result of what he has done. However, there is evidence of significant danger and risk of injury to the offender and his family.
58The assistance and promised assistance concern the involvement of others in the offence for which the offender is being sentenced.
59In short, I assess the assistance, both past and future provided by the applicant as of substantial but not exceptional value.
60Exercising my own sentencing discretion, for the totality of the assistance I would provide a further discount of 15 per cent, comprised of 5 per cent for past assistance and 10 per cent for future assistance.
61Three things may be said about my evaluation. The first is that it is the result of my own independent assessment of the assistance and its surrounding circumstances, in accordance with the mandatory considerations contained in s 23.
62The second is that I have applied the long-standing principle enunciated by Howie J at [5] in R v Sukkar that:
"In my opinion discounts for a plea and assistance of more than 40 per cent should be very exceptionally, if at all, granted in a case where there is no evidence that the offender will spend the sentence, or a substantial part of it, in more onerous conditions than the general prison population. It should now be accepted that an offender who has provided assistance will not necessarily be disadvantaged in the prison system and, if the offender wishes to assert otherwise, he or she should lead evidence of that fact."
That proposition has been applied many times by this Court: see the review of the authorities by Johnson J in R v Ehrlich at [67].
63The third is that I would regard any lesser sentence than a total head sentence of imprisonment for 10 years as being unreasonably disproportionate and therefore contravening s 23(3).
64There has been a degree of divergence of opinion in this Court as to whether discounts for a plea of guilty and for providing assistance should be applied sequentially or globally. As to the former approach, see: R v El Hani [2004] NSWCCA 162 at [70] and SZ v R at [10]. As to the latter, see: R v Waqa (No 2) [2005] NSWCCA 33; (2005) 156 A Crim R 454 at [10] - [12]. In R v Ehrlich, Basten JA said at [10] - [12]
"In relation to the third matter, the sentencing judge assessed the respective discounts for the guilty plea and for assistance to authorities and combined them to identify the appropriate sentence. No error of law was asserted in undertaking this course, nor is any error manifest.
Adams J refers to authority which appears to support the proposition that discounts should be applied consecutively. That approach was adopted by the Court in R v NP [2003] NSWCCA 195 at [30] (Hodgson JA) and [47] (Simpson J). In R v El Hani the Court accepted this approach "in a case where it is appropriate to specify individual discounts": at [70]. There is no reason to doubt that conclusion: however, the inference (implicit though not expressed) that it is incorrect to add the discounts, so as to achieve a single global figure applied to the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed, should not be assumed without demonstration. No authority or statutory support for the adoption of one approach rather than another was relied on in the cases noted above. Nor does s 23 necessarily require either process to the exclusion of the other. For example, for the Court to state the penalty which it would "otherwise have imposed" no doubt refers to the appropriate penalty disregarding only the assistance to authorities. It says nothing as to the manner in which the discounting is to be achieved. Indeed, on one view, the manner in which it is achieved is irrelevant: the selected reduction can be expressed in a number of different ways, none of which is prohibited.
The fact that no objection was taken to the cumulative discount approach in this case supports the view that it is commonplace to adopt such an approach, regardless of what was said in R v NP and El Hani. Indeed members of the Court in those cases have, in other cases, accepted or applied the cumulative approach."
65I am content in this matter to apply a global discount of 40% to the starting point total head sentence of imprisonment for 17 years. That results in a total head sentence of imprisonment for 10 years 2 months.
66Turning to structural aspects of re-sentence, I see no reason to depart from the decision of his Honour to find special circumstances and to impose a total non-parole period that is two-thirds of the total head sentence.
67Nor do I propose to depart from the structure of his Honour whereby sentences were imposed partly concurrently with regard to head sentences, but fully cumulatively with regard to non-parole periods.
68If the combined effect of the adoption of such a structure and application of two discounts to the starting point leads to a few days of custody here or there, they will be rounded down, on the basis that the law does not concern itself with trifles. And in order to achieve a total head sentence of 10 years 2 months with a total non-parole period that is two-thirds of that sentence, very small mathematical adjustments will need to be made to the constituent sentences and their non-parole periods.
69I have reflected on such a sentence with an eye to the sentences imposed upon Eastman and Zabul. Balancing the objective and subjective features of all three offenders recounted by me above, I consider that the individual sentences and total sentence proposed do not demonstrate erroneous disparity and fit comfortably within the hierarchy of sentences.
70Finally, I reiterate that any lesser total head sentence than the one I propose would, in my opinion, ultimately be "unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances" of the two offences. It will be recalled that each carried with it a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life and a standard non-parole period of 15 years, and that the criminality they encompassed was that of an offender who played a substantial role in a sophisticated and ongoing operation directed towards the manufacture of very large quantities of prohibited drugs.
71In short, I am satisfied that a lesser sentence is warranted in law, and that this Court should proceed to re-sentence.