(a) Reasonable belief as to right to relief
30 L'Oréal Australia contended that it had a reasonable belief that it may have the right to obtain relief from BrandPoint for the purposes of r 7.23(1)(a) for misleading or deceptive conduct or false representations in contravention of ss 18 and 29 of the Australian Consumer Law (set out in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) (ACL). L'Oréal Australia asserted that BrandPoint may have used information about the Clarisonic products to promote its PuraSonic product and that the BrandPoint email representations and BrandPoint website representations may have been false.
31 To establish the necessary reasonable belief, L'Oréal Australia asserted a number of propositions which it submitted needed to be considered together. It referred to BrandPoint's access to information about the Clarisonic products in its role as exclusive distributor of such products, the similarity between the BrandPoint email representations and the study findings made by PBL about the Clarisonic products, the absence of any reference to or evidence of testing to support the BrandPoint email representations, and the subsequent reference to testing in the BrandPoint website representations which were published several months later. It also relied on what it said were incompatibilities between the BrandPoint email representations and the BrandPoint website representations, alleging that the former had overstated the performance of the PuraSonic product.
32 Ms Cochrane for BrandPoint submitted that L'Oréal Australia had had the opportunity to purchase and conduct testing on the PuraSonic product in order to impugn the representations, but had chosen not to do so. She submitted that there was no evidence that the representations about the PuraSonic product were misleading or false. Further, she submitted that there was no evidence that the BrandPoint email representations conflicted with the BrandPoint website representations.
33 Section 18 of the ACL provides that:
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.
(2) Nothing in Part 3-1 (which is about unfair practices) limits by implication subsection (1).
34 Paragraphs 29(1)(a) and (1)(g) of the ACL provide that:
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services:
(a) make a false or misleading representation that goods are of a particular standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style or model or have had a particular history or particular previous use; or
…
(g) make a false or misleading representation that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits; …
35 In terms of looking at potential classes of persons and how they might understand the relevant promotional material, the intended audience or potential classes are either actual or potential retailers and ultimately actual or potential consumers of the PuraSonic product. Where there is a dispute as to the effect of conduct on a class of persons, what is considered is whether an ordinary and reasonable member of that class would be or was likely to be misled or deceived (Google Inc v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2013) 249 CLR 435 at [6] to [9] per French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). Further, in considering the hypothetical ordinary and reasonable member of the relevant class, one considers the dominant message conveyed (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v TPG Internet Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 640 at [20], [40] and [45] per French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). Moreover, the question is whether there is a real rather than a remote possibility of the member of the relevant class being misled or deceived. Further, where general injunctive relief is being sought, all that may be required to be shown is that the relevant statement has a tendency to lead persons of the relevant class into error; contrastingly, if a damages claim is being made, causation, including reliance questions, needs to be specifically addressed. For completeness, I have not separately addressed whether the representations made by BrandPoint were fact or opinion, putting to one side the functional utility of such a division (cf Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486 at [38] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ). BrandPoint did not advance any separate argument based upon that division.
36 As to the question of silence or non-disclosure:
One looks at the relevant course of conduct as a whole in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances (Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592 at [109] per McHugh J (dissenting in the result but not the principle)).
Silence is to be assessed as a circumstance like any other (Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 at 32 per Black CJ).
A practical approach may be to consider whether there is a reasonable expectation of disclosure as an aid to the necessary factual enquiry, but this is not to be taken as any reformulation of the statutory test (Miller & Associates Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v BMW Australia Finance Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 357 at [20] to [21] per French CJ and Kiefel J).
37 In my view, L'Oréal Australia has satisfied r 7.23(1)(a) in relation to the BrandPoint email representations.
38 First, there is little doubt that there is a reason to believe that the representations were made. They are arguably apparent from the email and attachment.
39 Second, there is material demonstrating that the BrandPoint email representations were made to at least 25 retailers.
40 Third, there is a reasonable basis for saying that no appropriate trials, testing or analysis was carried out at the time of and to support the making of the BrandPoint email representations.
41 Fourth, there is an appropriate foundation for saying that the BrandPoint email representations were misleading or deceptive, likely to mislead or deceive, or were false because:
(a) if statements of fact, they were inaccurate;
(b) if statements of opinion, they lacked reasonable grounds.
42 Such a proposition is supported by at least two matters. There was no appropriate trials, testing or analysis of the product at the time of the BrandPoint email representations. Further, the BrandPoint website representations arguably differed from or were at odds with the BrandPoint email representations. In circumstances where one was dealing with the same PuraSonic product, there was an appropriate basis for saying that one of either sets of representations were misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. L'Oréal Australia took the position that the BrandPoint email representations were misleading or deceptive given that at the time they were made there was no adequate testing and they conflicted in some respects with the BrandPoint website representations. In my view, that was a reasonable belief to hold.
43 I should say at this point that L'Oréal Australia's application in relation to the BrandPoint website representations was entirely speculative. Unlike the BrandPoint email representations, there was apparently appropriate testing carried out for the BrandPoint website representations. Further, L'Oréal Australia contrasted the BrandPoint website representations with the BrandPoint email representations to demonstrate that the BrandPoint email representations were misleading or deceptive. That assumed that the BrandPoint website representations were the "correct" standard to contrast with the BrandPoint email representations. In my view, L'Oréal Australia advanced nothing more than mere speculation in asserting the misleading or deceptive nature of the BrandPoint website representations. Moreover, that assertion was in tension with how it was seeking to establish the appropriate reason to believe in relation to the BrandPoint email representations.
44 Fifth, in my view, there is an appropriate basis for saying that L'Oréal Australia may be entitled to some relief in relation to the BrandPoint email representations in the form of declarations and damages. The retailers who received the BrandPoint email and attachment were likely to have been influenced thereby in a manner disadvantageous to L'Oréal Australia's commercial interests. More generally, inaccurate or misleading representations about the performance of BrandPoint's product would have been likely to have had a potential impact on the market for sonic facial cleansing brushes generally and therefore L'Oréal Australia's commercial interests.
45 Sixth, BrandPoint has asserted that L'Oréal Australia must also establish that it has a subjective belief that it may have a right to obtain relief. It asserts that neither Mr Lo nor Mr Catania has so sworn. Whether or not Mr Lo or Mr Catania have so sworn explicitly, it seems clear to me that I can infer that such a belief is held from the evidence before me. BrandPoint's submission elevates form over substance.