Kostov (Bankrupt) v Australian Financial Security Authority, in the matter of Kostov
[2020] FCA 1105
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2020-07-20
Before
Farrell J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (43 paragraphs)
- The application for a stay filed on 10 July 2020 is refused.
- The proceedings, including all interlocutory applications made by the applicant, be dismissed.
- The applicant pay the respondents' costs as agreed or taxed.
- Pursuant to r 39.03(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), any further proceedings brought by the applicant against either of the respondents for some or all of the same or substantially the same causes of action or relief as those claimed in these proceedings be stayed until the costs the subject of order 3 have been paid. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
INTRODUCTION 1 On 18 July 2018, District Registrar Wall made a sequestration order against the estate of the applicant, Adriana Kostov, on the application of a creditor, Jeffrey Lind Easton. The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy was appointed as the trustee of Ms Kostov's bankrupt estate. Ms Kostov did not appear at the hearing of the creditor's petition before the District Registrar. 2 On 12 December 2018, an application made by Ms Kostov on 13 September 2018 for an extension of time and review of the orders made by the District Registrar on 18 July 2018 was dismissed by Robertson J. As noted by Robertson J, the bankruptcy proceedings arose out of costs orders made in proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Ms Kostov and the certificate of the relevant judgment of that Court was in the total amount of $24,447.96. Ms Kostov did not appear at the hearing of her application: Easton v Kostov [2018] FCA 2002 at [1], [3], [18]-[20], [28]. 3 In the proceedings before the Court for hearing on 8 July 2020, Ms Kostov's applications were: (1) An originating application filed on 3 January 2019 as amended on 23 April 2019. The Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) was named as the sole respondent. These applications sought: (a) An order pursuant to s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) annulling the sequestration order made on 18 July 2018. (b) If the annulment order was not made, Ms Kostov sought the discharge of her bankruptcy within 12 months. (c) Orders removing AFSA as the trustee of her bankrupt estate and appointing a new trustee. The Court notes that the originating application filed on 3 January 2019 did not contain an application for removal the trustee of Ms Kostov's bankrupt estate. (2) A further amended application dated 27 April 2020. That application sought interim relief as follows: (a) Review by the Federal Court of a decision made by the Official Trustee and notified to the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) in relation to proceedings NSW 2814/18/4 between Ms Kostov and Amelie Housing (formerly known as Ecclesia Housing Limited) in a letter from Terrence Arnold (a case manager acting for the Official Trustee) dated 15 November 2018 (November 2018 letter), (see [64(1)] below). The November 2018 letter was copied to Ms Kostov and Peterson Haines Lawyers on behalf of Amelie Housing. It is useful to note that Ms Kostov was locked out of social housing owned by Amelie Housing on 1 June 2018 (after proceedings brought by Ecclesia Housing Limited for Ms Kostov's eviction arising from Ms Kostov's failure to pay rent) and her chattels were placed in storage. A number of proceedings in NCAT and the Supreme Court of New South Wales related to that issue; (b) Copies of all correspondence between Carrie Peterson of Peterson Haines Lawyers (the firm acting for Amelie Housing) and AFSA, and disclosure of any pre-existing commercial or personal relationship between AFSA and Ms Peterson or Amelie Housing; and (c) That the Court direct that Ms Kostov be allocated a case manager within AFSA with legal qualifications. (3) An interim application filed on 21 May 2020. Ms Kostov sought orders that the proceedings be stayed until AFSA itemised and proved the costs "declared" in Melissa Bondin's affidavit sworn on 11 May 2020 and "if verified" the costs be "transferred to the Applicant's claim [that] the Respondent be removed as Trustee", that the annulment application be "transferred to a Judicial Review application before the Court, to avoid Respondents claiming costs for improper purpose", judicial review of the decision notified in the November 2018 letter, and, that the respondent provide copies of all communications between AFSA and Ms Peterson, Peterson Haines Lawyers and Amelie Housing, and disclose any pre-existing personal or commercial relationship between AFSA and Ms Peterson or Amelie Housing. (4) An application under r 20.31(3) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) for the production of documents in categories 2 and 3 below which the respondents refused to produce under a document headed notice to produce given by Ms Kostov to AFSA on 9 June 2020 for: 1. Correspondence between Peterson Haines Lawyer and Amelie Housing, and Respondents in relation to Decision of Trustee of November 2018, pleaded in Paragraph 14 to 16 of Affidavit of Ms Melissa Bondin, dated 11 May 2020 2. Notes and proof of internal review of Decision of Trustee, and any communication between Mr Shaw, and Mr Matthew Osborne, Chief Legal Officer of the Respondent, to undertake a legal review of Decision, pleaded in Paragraph 16 of Affidavit of Ms Melissa Bondin, dated 11 May 2020 3. Proof of costs incurred, and costs estimated to be incurred by Respondent, pleaded in 21 and 22 of Affidavit of Ms Melissa Bondin, dated 11 May 2020 4 Ms Kostov did not appear at the hearing of her application on 28 October 2019. As Ms Kostov had refused to join the Official Trustee as a party, the Court made orders on that date joining the Official Trustee as a party and dismissed the amended application with costs. On 9 March 2020, the Court made orders setting aside the order dismissing Ms Kostov's application in circumstances described further below and made timetabling orders for the provision of evidence and submissions prior to a hearing listed for 16 June 2020. 5 In their submissions filed on 4 June 2020, the respondents stated that they neither opposed nor consented to the annulment of Ms Kostov's bankruptcy and otherwise gave notice that they sought the following orders from the Court: (1) Dismissing the proceedings; (2) Ordering that Ms Kostov pay the respondents' costs; and (3) Staying any further proceedings being commenced by Ms Kostov against the respondents until such time as the costs order has been satisfied. 6 Due to a death in Ms Kostov's family in early June 2020, the hearing was deferred to 8 July 2020. 7 On 24 June 2020 a hearing for return of a subpoena issued to Peterson Haines Lawyers and production of documents under the notice to produce was held before Judicial Registrar Cridland. Peterson Haines Lawyers had answered the subpoena issued to it on 9 June 2020 and the respondents produced documents in the first category, despite contesting that they were obliged to do so. It appears from enquiries made by my chambers with the Court's Registry that Ms Kostov has not sought to uplift any of the documents produced. 8 Ms Kostov and Scott Hedge of Colin Biggers & Paisley (who appeared for the respondents) attended the proceedings before Judicial Registrar Cridland on 24 June 2020. Shortly before that hearing, an employee of Global Skip Tracing Pty Ltd, on instructions from AFSA Enforcement, made a call to a telephone number of a relative of Ms Kostov seeking to obtain contact information relating to Ms Kostov. Ms Kostov raised this call at that hearing, seeking to know if Mr Hedge knew anything about it. Ms Kostov sent a number of emails on 24 June 2020 enquiring of Mr Hedge, Ms Bondin and others at AFSA and Global Skip Tracing about the reason for the call. On 25 June 2020, Ms Kostov was advised by an email from Ms Bondin that the contact was made as part of an enforcement program conducted by a separate part of AFSA directed to bankrupts who had not filed a statement of affairs or provided to the Official Trustee details of their residential address. 9 Ms Kostov filed written submissions dated 25 June 2020. Those submissions did not address the orders sought by the respondents. 10 Ms Kostov continued to make enquiries concerning the contact made by Global Skip Tracing on 24 June 2020. She ultimately refused to attend the hearing on 8 July 2020 if Mr Hedge appeared to represent the respondents until her allegations that Mr Hedge engineered the contact by Global Skip Tracing had been addressed. The Court did not accept that as a reasonable excuse for Ms Kostov to fail to attend the hearing. 11 At the hearing on 8 July 2020, the respondents pressed for the proceedings to be resolved and the Court proceeded to hear the matter in Ms Kostov's absence. Following the hearing, the Court advised the parties by email that it would deliver judgment on Tuesday, 14 July 2020 at 9.30 am and would accept no further submissions. 12 On 10 July 2020, Ms Kostov filed an application to stay delivery of judgment until she had been provided with a transcript of the hearing conducted on 8 July 2020 and she was given an opportunity to provide written submissions. 13 For the reasons which follow, in particular under the heading "Resolution" which commences at [182] below, the stay on delivery of judgment was refused and the Court made orders generally of a kind for which the respondents had pressed in their written submissions filed on 4 June 2020. 14 As she has asked the Court for clear guidance, it is important for Ms Kostov to note the matters set out at [15]-[30] below. 15 First, it is a fact that, by the sequestration order made on 18 July 2018, Ms Kostov became bankrupt and she has remained bankrupt from that time because the sequestration order has not been set aside and she has not been discharged from bankruptcy by force of s 149 of the Bankruptcy Act. 16 Second, nothing has been brought to the Court's attention which would indicate that the sequestration order was made in error or that Robertson J was wrong to refuse Ms Kostov an extension of time to review that sequestration order. 17 Third, the evidence indicates that Ms Kostov has not co-operated with her trustee by filing a statement of affairs or keeping the trustee advised of her residential address. The fact that a sequestration order was made on 18 July 2018 and it has not been set aside has the consequence that Ms Kostov has obligations under s 54 of the Bankruptcy Act to provide a statement of affairs within 14 days of becoming aware of the sequestration order and under s 80 of the Bankruptcy Act to update the Official Trustee about changes in her contact details, including her residential address. 18 Ms Kostov's mistaken belief that her obligations under ss 54 and 80 of the Bankruptcy Act were somehow suspended until she attended a hearing at which the Court found that she is bankrupt does not justify her failure to observe those obligations or her conduct in these proceedings. 19 Aside from any other consideration, it is plain from the Court's experience in these proceedings and the proceedings before Robertson J that, in the lead up to the final hearing of her applications, Ms Kostov finds reasons not to attend the hearing. The fact that Mr Hedge would represent the respondents at the hearing on 8 July 2020 was not a reasonable excuse for failing to attend that hearing, which was being conducted by electronic means and at which Ms Kostov would appear by telephone, nor was it a reason to adopt procedures whereby the parties would be heard in each other's absence. Ms Kostov provided copies of correspondence between Robertson J's associate and the parties in that matter in a chain attached to her email to my associate dated 9 August 2019. Discomfort about being cross-examined would not justify an ex parte hearing of her review application and late advice of work commitments and a medical appointment were not reasonable excuses to fail to attend the hearing before Robertson J on 12 December 2018 in circumstances where Ms Kostov had agreed to fix that date for hearing in November 2018. 20 The Court does not accept that Ms Kostov was harassed merely because an officer of AFSA, its solicitor or any person acting on its behalf states to her the effect of ss 54 and 80 of the Bankruptcy Act in written or oral communications or if it employs someone to seek to establish her current residential address for the purpose of AFSA taking enforcement action. 21 Fourth, this Court was not satisfied that Ms Kostov's bankruptcy should be annulled even though the Court accepts that it is likely that she did not attend the hearing or participate in the assessment of costs giving rise to the judgment debt obtained by Mr Easton which founded the bankruptcy petition due to a mental illness which was diagnosed in 2017: see Kostov v YPOL Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 306; (2018) 98 NSWLR 1002 at [3]-[9]. Mr Easton's judgment debt and a debt owed to Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (Fairfax Media) remain in force and the information Ms Kostov has provided to the Court does not establish that she was able to pay those debts as at 18 July 2018 or at the time of the hearing on 8 July 2020. 22 Fifth, Ms Kostov's undisciplined and repetitious correspondence with the Court and the respondents' employees and solicitors has led to waste of the Court's time and resources and to the respondents incurring substantial unnecessary legal costs. Ms Kostov cannot now rely on those costs being incurred as a reason to remove the Official Trustee as the trustee of her bankrupt estate. Further, in the Court's view, the tenor of some of the communications to AFSA's employees and their frequency amounted to harassment by Ms Kostov. 23 It is unacceptable that Ms Kostov has failed to comply with the Court's orders in relation to the timing of filing evidence and submissions and that she has instead sent copious communications to the Court and chambers without leave in the face of directions not to do so. It is reprehensible that Ms Kostov routinely included the Court's Registry and my chambers on email communications with non-parties (such as Global Skip Tracing), her inter partes communications with the respondents' solicitors and emails sent by Ms Kostov to the respondents' employees. 24 That is true, even though the Court accepts that Ms Kostov had a diagnosed mental illness in 2017 and she has clearly struggled since then. Her comments at the hearing of her stay application would indicate that she is gaining insight into her conduct, but she still has a way to go and her continued contact with her doctors is plainly important. The fact that incidents cause her to "go on a tangent" which causes her to lose sight of the main game, as she told the Court, is an explanation but not an excuse. It does not relieve her of the obligation to meet a costs order when proceedings brought by her are dismissed and the costs order is assessed. As I told Ms Kostov at the hearing of her stay application on 20 July 2020, it does not justify Ms Kostov taking action to deliberately mislead Judicial Registrar Cridland and me about who had taken the call from Global Skip Tracing on 24 June 2020. I would now add that Ms Kostov's conduct after 25 June 2020, when Ms Bondin told her by whom the contact was made and why (see [110] below), was not justified, much of it was harassing in nature and involved AFSA incurring unnecessary cost. Ms Kostov's explanation also does not excuse the fact that many of the communications copied to the Court made scurrilous claims and some appeared to have the purpose of using the contact with the Court as some form of threat to the people to whom the emails were addressed. 25 It is also of concern that Ms Kostov's numerous applications to this Court and the course of litigation concerning Amelie Housing (effectively also raised in these proceedings) demonstrates that she will not accept determinations when they are made by a Court or the Official Trustee. That gives rise to the respondents' legitimate concern about whether she will seek to re-litigate the issues in these proceedings. 26 Sixth, the Official Trustee had no obligation to consult Ms Kostov before issuing the November 2018 letter (see [64(1)] below) and the Official Trustee's December 2018 letter (see [43] below) indicating that it would not prosecute proceedings commenced by Ms Kostov against Amelie Housing in NCAT and the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The fact that Ms Kostov has degrees in law and commerce makes no difference. 27 It was entirely open to the Official Trustee to conclude that it should not prosecute litigation commenced by Ms Kostov against Amelie Housing after she became bankrupt having regard to the fact that there appear to be no assets in Ms Kostov's bankrupt estate, its duty to act commercially and in the interest of Ms Kostov's creditors and legal advice concerning prospects of success. The fact that offers were made by Amelie Housing to Ms Kostov in August 2018 (for $8,000) and October 2018 (for $10,000) to settle litigation commenced by Ms Kostov against Amelie Housing is irrelevant not least because Ms Kostov refused to enter into a deed of settlement exonerating Amelie Housing and its staff against all claims, which was a condition of the offers. Those offers were plainly made to put a stop to Ms Kostov's persistent litigation and not (as Ms Kostov has asserted) a reflection of the merit of the litigation. Ms Peterson had no obligation to advise the Official Trustee that those offers had been made and refused by Ms Kostov. This is the effect of Paul Shaw's response to Ms Kostov's complaints to the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy set out in Mr Shaw's letter to her dated 15 February 2019 (see [46(6)] below) and he was not wrong. 28 Seventh, Ms Kostov is wrong in her belief that s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act applied to the conduct of proceedings she commenced against Amelie Housing on 3 October 2018. Those proceedings were commenced after she became bankrupt and they related to a tenancy agreement and removal of Ms Kostov's chattels to storage. The proceedings were therefore clearly not commenced before she became bankrupt and they were not an action for "personal injury or wrong", both preconditions to the operation of s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. The fact that Ms Kostov was locked out from the premises the subject of the tenancy on 1 June 2018 and her chattels removed to storage before her bankruptcy has no bearing on the operation of s 60(4). Any right Ms Kostov had to commence proceedings arising out of events which occurred before her bankruptcy vested in the Official Trustee under s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act when the sequestration order was made so that she had no standing to commence those proceedings and her cause of action was not for "personal injury or wrong" within s 116(2)(g). Ms Kostov has already been told that by Fagan J in Kostov v Amelie Housing (NCAT Appeal) [2019] NSWSC 16 at [11]-[16] and in Mr Shaw's letter (see [46(6)] below). 29 Eighth, having regard to these matters and the fact that Ms Kostov did not propose another trustee who had consented to act, the Court was not satisfied that the Official Trustee should be removed as the trustee of her bankrupt estate. 30 Ninth, the Court accepted that it was appropriate to make the order sought by the respondents that any other proceedings which Ms Kostov may bring against any of the respondents for causes of action or relief which are the same or substantially the same as that sought in these proceedings should be stayed until she has paid the costs of these proceedings. That order was made having regard to Ms Kostov's conduct in these proceedings and a similar pattern of conduct which is evident when she litigated many of the same issues in proceedings before Robertson J and against Amelie Housing in NCAT and the Supreme Court of New South Wales (see Kostov v Amelie Housing [2018] NSWSC 1800 (Fagan J) and judgments cited therein and Kostov v Amelie Housing (NCAT Appeal) (Fagan J)). 31 Having regard to the nature of some of the relief sought, the Court has considered it necessary to set out many emails and other submissions made by Ms Kostov in relation to the conduct of a number of people, including but not limited to Mr Hedge, Ms Bondin and Ms Peterson, in which Ms Kostov has asserted serious misconduct or unethical conduct on their behalf. The fact that that material is set out should not be understood as acceptance by the Court of Ms Kostov's assertions contained in it. In particular, the Court does not accept that there is any evidence before the Court on which it could reasonably be concluded that any of Mr Hedge, Colin Biggers & Paisley, Ms Bondin, Mr Arnold or Ms Peterson lied to or otherwise misled Ms Kostov or harassed her or that any of them otherwise engaged in any form of misconduct in relation to her, the administration of her bankrupt estate or these proceedings. Having regard to a number of statements made by Ms Kostov in her evidence and submissions concerning Mr Easton and his legal advisors, it should also be said that the facts that Mr Easton chose to file a creditor's petition rather than garnish Ms Kostov's wages, that his solicitors sought to establish her residential address for the purpose of personal service of that petition on her, and that his legal advisors indicated that she would be required for cross-examination on her evidence in the proceedings before Robertson J are not evidence of either improper purpose or harassment.