Kevin Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW and Anor - [2009] NSWSC 347 - NSWSC 2009 case summary — Zoe

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Kevin Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW and Anor

[2009] NSWSC 347

Supreme Court of NSW|2009-03-18|Before: Johnson J

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Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2009-03-18

Before

Johnson J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (77 paragraphs)

[1]

Background to Appeal 4 The present proceedings result from a complaint made by Miss Elaine Burn to the Board concerning the way in which the Plaintiff had handled the euthanasia on 12 September 2007. of her dog, Gretal, an eight-year old Rottweiler. The Tribunal provided the following factual background in its decision at [4]: "Miss Burn's dog Gretal was diagnosed with an aggressive tumour and she was advised to have him put down. When her local veterinary surgeon could not do so, he gave Miss Burn Dr Polglaze's name. After talking to Dr Polglaze on the phone, Miss Burn agreed to him euthanasing Gretal. Miss Burn says that Dr Polglaze gave her a firm price of $155 for the procedure. Dr Polglaze says that he gave her an estimate of $155 plus GST but told her that it could be more depending on the circumstances. Dr Polglaze came to Miss Burn's home, administered a sedative and then planned to give Gretal an overdose of general anaesthetic. When Gretal did not respond to the sedative after 10 or 15 minutes, Dr Polglaze gave Gretal a second dose of sedative but that did not have the desired effect either. As Dr Polglaze was at his car getting a third dose, Gretal finally went to sleep. Dr Polglaze then administered the anaesthetic and Gretal passed away. The whole process took approximately 50-55 minutes whereas Dr Polglaze had anticipated that it would take 15-20 minutes. At the end of the procedure, Dr Polglaze told Miss Burn that because he had given Gretal extra sedative which took more time, the cost was now $305. Miss Burn said that she thought the price was $155 but paid the full amount in cash. Later she complained to the Board." 5 The Board, through its Complaints Committee, investigated Miss Burn's complaint. The Plaintiff provided a written response to the complaint. The Plaintiff elected not to appear before the Complaints Committee or the Board and was content to respond to the complaint in writing. The Board adopted the conclusions of the Complaints Committee to the following effect (Exhibit PDS1, page 52):

[2]

[3]

(b) the Plaintiff did not advise Miss Burn during the course of the procedure on 12 September 2007 that the unusual reaction of the dog meant that he would be making an additional charge. 6 The Board found that the Plaintiff had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct and determined to caution him, as well as imposing a fine of $300.00 and hearing costs of $400.00. 7 On 7 May 2008, the Plaintiff applied to the Tribunal for a review of the decision of the Board. The hearing before the Tribunal took place on 21 July 2008, with the Tribunal comprising her Honour Magistrate Hennessy, (Deputy President), Dr T Carter (veterinary surgeon) and Ms F Clarke (lay member). The Tribunal reserved its decision, which was handed down on 15 August 2008. 8 The Tribunal observed that the Board had found that the Plaintiff had failed to comply with the provisions of clause 16 of the Veterinary Practitioners Code of Professional Conduct ("the Code") (see [28] below) in two respects. The Tribunal said at [6]: "According to the Board, Dr Polglaze failed to comply with this provision in two respects. He did not give a 'realistic' estimate for the services when he spoke to Miss Burn on the phone and he did not tell her, before he administered the second dose of sedative, that the cost would be more than he originally quoted." 9 The Tribunal turned then to consider whether, either in the phone call to Miss Burn or during the course of the home visit, the Plaintiff failed to comply with clause 16 of the Code, and was consequently guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct. The Tribunal summarised the accounts of Miss Burn and the Plaintiff concerning what was said during the phone call. Neither Miss Burn nor the Plaintiff gave oral evidence before the Board or the Tribunal, and thus the Tribunal determined this issue by reference to the written accounts of the two persons. 10 Given the issues raised on the appeal, it is appropriate to set out the Tribunal's reasons for its critical decisions at [14]-[17]: " Findings re phone call

[58]

Submissions of Parties 35 In support of this ground, Mr Strickland SC submitted that the Tribunal erred in law in two ways. Firstly, it interpreted clause 16 of the Code incorrectly in finding that clause 16 required the Plaintiff to provide a cost estimate before the provision of the service and an updated estimate, if necessary, during the performance of the service. Further, or alternatively, he submitted that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to take into account a relevant consideration, namely that the Plaintiff provided only a single veterinary service to Miss Burn, namely the euthanasia of the dog "Gretal". He submitted that the Tribunal could only find that the Plaintiff had breached clause 16 of the Code if it found that the further sedation was a separate service, but it made no such finding nor can such a finding be implied in the decision. 36 Mr Strickland SC submitted that the Plaintiff had complied with the requirements of clause 16 of the Code, properly construed. He submitted that the Plaintiff had provided to Miss Burn the estimated cost of the veterinary services (euthanasia of the dog) before he provided those services. The fact that there may have been a change in circumstances requiring the use of additional sedatives, and a longer period of time for the services, did not alter this position. After all, Mr Strickland SC submitted, the requirement of clause 16 is to provide an estimate of cost and this requirement envisaged that circumstances may change thereafter. 37 Insofar as the Tribunal may have concluded that the Plaintiff was providing more than one veterinary service because further drugs were to be administered to the dog as sedatives, the Plaintiff submitted that an erroneous construction of the term "veterinary services" had been adopted. It was erroneous to construe clause 16 as requiring the Plaintiff to provide a form of updated estimate during the performance of the relevant service. 38 Mr Strickland SC submitted that, once the Tribunal had found that the Plaintiff had given an estimate of the cost of his services before providing those services, the Tribunal ought to have set aside the entire decision of the Board as no breach of clause 16 had been established. He submitted that the Plaintiff could only be found guilty of a failure to comply with clause 16 if it was found that the further sedation was in fact a separate veterinary service. Mr Strickland SC submitted that the Tribunal made no such finding, nor could such a finding have reasonably been made. 39 Mr Strickland SC submitted that clause 16 should be read strictly given that any failure to comply with the clause constituted unsatisfactory professional conduct under the VP Act. 40 He submitted that if there was a lacuna in the Code, then the Code should be amended, but that it was not open to the Tribunal to construe the Code in a manner adverse to the Plaintiff in the circumstances of this case. 41 Under the umbrella of Ground 2, a further error of law was submitted by the Plaintiff. Mr Strickland SC submitted that in paragraph [17] of its judgment, the Tribunal had failed to make a critical intermediate finding so as to constitute an error of law. He submitted that the Tribunal had not made a critical finding that the second sedative constituted a second or additional "service" within clause 16 of the Code. The Plaintiff submitted that the failure to make this finding constituted error of law: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] 206 CLR 323 at 348-350 [74], [78]. 42 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that the Tribunal held at paragraph [17] that clause 16 required an estimate to be given before any service was provided, and a further estimate when any additional veterinary service was contemplated and before the Plaintiff embarked on providing it. She submitted that this construction of the Code conforms with its legislative purpose: s.33 Interpretation Act 1987. A purpose of the Code is the protection of the consumer, and clause 16 is designed to provide the consumer with the best possible information about cost to enable the consumer to make decisions about whether or not to agree to both initial treatment and additional treatment. Ms Katzmann SC submitted that it would not serve this purpose if a veterinary surgeon could provide any estimate at the outset (no matter how unrealistic it may turn out to be) and, without advising the consumer of the financial impact of them, proceed to provide additional veterinary services productive of significant additional costs and expect the consumer to pay them. 43 The Board submitted that the obligation contemplated in clause 16 is a continuing one, otherwise there would be no need for the clause "before providing veterinary services …". Ms Katzmann SC submitted that the rest of clause 16 is plainly prospective in its terms. 44 Ms Katzmann SC pointed to the factual circumstances of this case in support of the construction of clause 16 advanced by the Board. She submitted that a practical application of clause 16 may be perceived readily in this case. The Tribunal found that the Plaintiff had provided an estimate for veterinary services to Miss Burn. The Plaintiff attended Miss Burn's residence for the purpose of euthanasing the dog. A sedative was administered by the Plaintiff to the dog. It became apparent to the Plaintiff that a further sedative was required. In his submission to the Board's Complaints Committee, which was in evidence before the Tribunal, the Plaintiff stated that, with Miss Burn's consent, he prepared another sedative which contained a combination of two drugs, one to sedate and inhibit pain and one to inhibit possible side effects from the first combination, and he administered this further sedative to the dog (Exhibit PDS1, page 19). Thus, the Board submitted, the Plaintiff had time to obtain informed consent from Miss Burn for this additional service, but did not provide an estimate of cost for the additional service when it was clear that further cost would be involved as a result of the changed circumstances. 45 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that these circumstances were readily accommodated by a sensible construction of clause 16 of the Code, bearing in mind that it was designed to operate in the practical world of veterinary practice. 46 In additional written submissions furnished after the hearing, by leave, Ms Katzmann SC submitted that, although the Tribunal did not expressly state (at [17]) that the administration of the second sedative constituted the provision of a second service, it was unquestionably an unexpressed finding of fact. The failure of the Tribunal to make an express finding to this effect did not constitute error of law: Williams v Bill Williams Pty Limited [1971] 1 NSWLR 547 at 557; Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 at [26]; B & L Linings Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue at [134]. Mr Strickland SC responded to this submission by contending that care must be taken in relying upon the cited parts of the judgment of Mason JA in Williams v Bill Williams Pty Limited (at 557) as part only of his Honour's judgment had been approved (or even considered) in Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council and B & L Linings Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue. The Plaintiff submitted that the better analysis of the Tribunal's judgment is that the failure of the Tribunal to make a critical finding whether there was one or two services provided, meant it simply failed to take into consideration that critical matter, so as to constitute error of law.

[61]

[78] … the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning." 51 The term "veterinary services" is not defined in the VP Act or VP Regulation. It has been observed that the term "services" has a wide meaning: IW v City of Perth [1996-1997] 191 CLR 1 at 11; Port of Geelong Authority v The Ship Bass Reefer (1992) 109 ALR 505 at 518. It is necessary to give the provision a purposive construction: s.33 Interpretation Act 1987. 52 According to The Macquarie Dictionary, the word "service" means, amongst other things, "1. An act of helpful activity. 2. The supplying or supplier of any articles, commodities, activities etc, required or demanded. … 6. The performance of duties as a servant; occupation or employment as a servant … 12. (Oft. Pl.) The performance of any duties or work for another; helpful activity: medical services. …". 53 The word "practicable" is defined in The Macquarie Dictionary to mean "1. Capable of being put into practice, done, or effected, psp. with the available means or with reason or prudence; feasible. 2. Capable of being used or traversed, or admitting of passage: a practicable road". 54 The Plaintiff contends that, in the circumstances of this case, the "veterinary service" to be provided by the Plaintiff was the euthanasing of the dog and that, on this approach, the Plaintiff had complied with the requirements of clause 16 of the Code. I do not accept this submission. There is no doubt that the Plaintiff gave an estimate with respect to the provision of certain veterinary services for the purpose of euthanasing the dog. However, it became apparent that those veterinary services would not suffice, and additional veterinary services were required. The Plaintiff so informed Miss Burn but failed to provide to her an estimate of the cost of those additional veterinary services. It was a matter for the Tribunal to consider what the "veterinary services" were in this case. The Tribunal applied this statutory term to the primary facts. Applying the principles set out in the authorities cited at [18]-[19] above, this is not a case where the facts as found are necessarily outside the statutory description so that a finding that a breach of clause 16 has occurred is wrong in law. 55 It is important to bear in mind the necessity to read fairly the Tribunal's decision in assessing this ground of appeal. The reasons under challenge must be read as a whole and must be fairly read: Cross v McHugh [1974] 1 NSWLR 500 at 503; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 291.

[62]

56 In my view, a fair reading of paragraphs [14]-[17] makes clear that the Tribunal has found that the second sedative constituted a second or additional service for the purpose of clause 16 of the Code, and that the obligation to provide an estimate in accordance with that provision applied at that point of time. The use of the term "additional service" by the Tribunal in the first sentence of paragraph [17] of the decision reinforces this conclusion, although the Tribunal did not repeat the term in the second and third sentences of that paragraph. It is not an error of law to omit to state expressly a finding that is clear on a fair reading of the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal has not erred in law because of the alleged deficiency of its reasons: Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited) (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 277-281. With respect to the competing submissions referred to at [46] above, I note that Mahoney JA, in Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited at 265D-G, recites the complete passages from the judgment of Mason JA in Williams v Bill Williams Pty Limited at 557, and observes that this statement of authority was not affected by the High Court's reversal of the decision in Bill Williams Pty Limited v Williams (1972) 126 CLR 146. 57 It was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the facts as found involved a breach of clause 16 of the Code by the Plaintiff. This is not a case where the facts as found fall entirely outside the provisions of clause 16, properly construed. 58 The Plaintiff identified to Miss Burn the likely extent and outcome of the veterinary services to be provided by him and the estimated cost of those services. However, it became apparent to the Plaintiff that the veterinary services which he had identified to Miss Burn would not suffice. It was necessary for him to provide additional veterinary services in the form of further sedation using two drugs, being a different sedation formula to that which was the subject of the estimate given by him to Miss Burn. The change in circumstances were such that the Plaintiff sought the consent of Miss Burn for the provision of these veterinary services to the dog: clause 7 of the Code. This practical analysis of what occurred emphasises the basis upon which the Tribunal's finding was open to it. It was practicable for the Plaintiff, before providing these additional veterinary services, to inform Miss Burn of the likely extent and outcome of the additional services and the estimated cost of those services. In seeking Miss Burn's consent to the provision of these additional services, the Plaintiff complied with his obligations under clauses 7 and 16(a) of the Code, but failed to comply with the obligation to provide the estimated cost of those additional services for the purpose of clause 16(b) of the Code. 59 The fact that the Tribunal included a veterinary practitioner is a not insignificant factor when considering submissions on this appeal, concerning the practical consequences of the competing constructions advanced with respect to relevant provisions of the Code. The Courts have recognised the significant role played by specialist members of professional bodies and tribunals: Kalil v Bray [1977] 1 NSWLR 256 at 258, 260-262; Bowen-James v Delegate of the Director General of the Department of Health (1992) 27 NSWLR 457 at 481-482. 60 In my view, the construction advanced by the Board (see [42]-[43] above), promotes the purpose or object of clause 16 of the Code viewed in its statutory context. That context includes the object of the VP Act (s.3) and the basic principles of professional conduct for a veterinary practitioner, including the maintenance of professional standards to the standard expected by users of veterinary services and the public (clause 1 of the Code). 61 Nor has the Plaintiff established that the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration. In the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision maker, and not the Court, to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 at 41. The considerations which a decision maker is bound to take into account are discerned from a reading of the statute. These considerations may be stated expressly in the statute or may arise by implication: Lansen v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2008] FCAFC 189 at [81], [301]. The considerations that are, or are not, relevant to the Tribunal's task are to be identified primarily, perhaps even entirely, by reference to the statute rather than the particular facts of the case that the Tribunal is called upon to consider: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf at 347-348 [73]. I do not accept the Plaintiff's submission that the Tribunal failed to have regard to a relevant consideration. This submission is dependent upon a conclusion that there was a single "veterinary service" in this case, namely, euthanasing the dog. I am satisfied that the Tribunal did not reach this conclusion and that it was open to the Tribunal to reach the conclusion that it did. 62 No error of law has been demonstrated. Ground 2 has not been made good.

[70]

Submissions of the Parties 71 Mr Strickland SC submitted that, if the Court rejected the Plaintiff's other grounds of appeal, leave was sought for the Court to review the merits of the decision on the basis that the Tribunal made an unreasonable finding for the reasons relied upon in support of Ground 3 (see [63] above). He submitted that the Tribunal overlooked certain matters relied upon by the Plaintiff, namely, that the original estimate was based upon the whole procedure taking 15 minutes, that the dog reacted in an atypical manner to the sedative given so that the whole procedure took almost one hour, and that the Plaintiff could not give a running estimate of the increased costs where the final cost was unclear until the services were complete. Further, he submitted that it was not practicable to provide an updated estimate due to the grief and distress of Miss Burn at the relevant time. 72 Mr Strickland SC submitted that the Tribunal did not consider the first three factors referred to in the preceding paragraph. In relation to the fourth factor, he submitted that there was clear evidence that the Plaintiff was aware that Miss Burn was distressed during the euthanasia process. 73 Mr Strickland SC submitted that leave ought be granted to the Plaintiff, and that the Court should decide what the correct and preferable decision is for the purpose of s.91G(1) having regard to the material before the Court. Having done so, he submitted that the Court ought decide to set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and to order in substitution for it, that the complaint against the Plaintiff be dismissed: s.91G(3) VP Act. 74 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that the Plaintiff ought not be granted leave under s.91C(2)(b) VP Act for the appeal to extend to a review of the merits of the decision. 75 Although the written submission relied upon by the Plaintiff before the Tribunal raised the matters now emphasised on this appeal (see [63] above), Ms Katzmann SC noted that the oral submissions of the Plaintiff's counsel before the Tribunal had referred only to the submission that "It's not practicable when he's - when we're in a very sensitive and distressing situation of a much loved pet being euthanased" (Exhibit PDS1, page 61, lines 40-45). The Board submitted that the Tribunal should not be criticised for not referring to the factors now emphasised by the Plaintiff, when his own counsel at first instance did not advert to these matters in oral submissions. 76 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that, in any case, the first and second factors (the basis for the original estimate and the atypical reaction of the dog to the sedatives) are irrelevant to the question whether it was practicable to provide an estimate for additional services. As to the third factor (the final costs of services will often be unclear), Ms Katzmann SC submitted that this will always be the case and constitutes the reason why clause 16 of the Code requires an estimate to be given. The Tribunal had regard to the fourth factor, Miss Burn's grief. 77 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that, once the Plaintiff had determined that an additional sedative was required, he was able to provide a further estimate. He knew what it would cost and Miss Burn was present and able to be informed. As mentioned above, the Plaintiff told her that a further sedative was required. The Board submitted that, if it was practicable to inform Miss Burn that a further sedative was required, it was practicable to tell her that the administration of this additional service would involve an extra charge. 78 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that it was irrelevant whether Miss Burn was distressed at the time. In any event, there was every chance she would be more distressed after her dog died, especially when confronted with a bill twice the size of the one she had expected, and in circumstances in which the Plaintiff had already been paid the estimated fee. 79 Ms Katzmann SC submitted that there is no proper basis to disturb the Tribunal's finding on this issue.

[72]

82 I have rejected the Plaintiff's other grounds of appeal. Thus, I have concluded that no error of law has been demonstrated in the construction of clause 16 of the Code. I have rejected Ground 3 which contended that the Tribunal's finding was unreasonable or irrational in the Wednesbury sense. For the purpose of considering the grant of leave, I should consider the strength of the Plaintiff's case for merits review if leave was granted. 83 I accept the submissions of the Board with respect to the factors relied upon by the Plaintiff in this respect. In its decision, the Tribunal adverted to the matters which had been emphasised by the Plaintiff's counsel in oral submissions. The fact that the Tribunal did not refer to factors set out in a 14-page written submission does not, in my view, demonstrate that these matters, to the extent that they were relevant, were not considered by the Tribunal. Following the hearing on 21 July 2008, the Tribunal reserved its decision, which was handed down on 15 August 2008. It might be concluded that the Tribunal had regard to the written and oral submissions for the purpose of preparing its reserved decision. 84 In any event, I accept the Board's submission that the matters now emphasised by the Plaintiff did not advance his case in any material way. The Plaintiff was at Miss Burn's residence for the sole purpose of providing veterinary services with respect to her dog. Miss Burn was present at all times. This is not a case where the veterinary practitioner was engaged in a busy veterinary practice, treating different animals over a period of time with competing demands upon him in that respect. Nor is it a case where the owner of the animal was absent and/or difficult to contact so that the provision of information by way of estimated cost of the additional services may not readily be provided. It is important not to lose sight of the reality of veterinary practice, with the various differentials which may impact upon the practitioner's practical ability to comply with the obligation under clause 16 of the Code. The use of the term "practicable" in the legislation acknowledges that the particular circumstances of the case might mean that compliance with clause 16 may not be required. These factors may be taken into account on the "practicable" issue within clause 16 (see [53] above). However, there was no such difficulty in this case. It was practicable for the Plaintiff to inform Miss Burn of the estimated cost of the additional veterinary services. He spoke to her to outline the nature of the additional services to be provided for the purpose of obtaining consent. In the circumstances of this case, it is difficult to see how the Tribunal could have reached a conclusion that it was not practicable for the Plaintiff to comply with the requirements of clause 16(b). 85 The Tribunal was conscious of the fact that the Plaintiff had provided an estimate for the veterinary services, and characterised his failure to provide an estimate for the additional veterinary services as being a "relatively minor breach" of clause 16. 86 In circumstances where I do not consider that there is a reasonably arguable basis that the Tribunal's decision was erroneous, nor that the Tribunal had failed to have regard to evidence which could materially affect the outcome of the appeal, I am not persuaded that the Plaintiff ought be granted leave under s.91C(2)(b) for the appeal to extend to a review of the merits of the Tribunal's decision. 87 I refuse the Plaintiff leave under s.91C(2)(b) VP Act for the appeal to extend to merits review of the Tribunal decision. Ground 5 is rejected.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Kevin Polglaze

Respondent/Defendant:

Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW and Anor

Cases Cited (37)

CITATION : Kevin Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW and Anor [2009] NSWSC 347

Polglaze v Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW [2008] NSWADT 228 Director of Public Prosecutions v Illawarra Cashmart Pty Limited (2006) 67 NSWLR 402 B & L Linings Pty Limited v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWCA 187 Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1995]-[1996] 186 CLR 389 Health Care Complaints Commission v Karalasingham [2007] NSWCA 267 State of New South Wales v Macquarie Bank Limited (1992) 30 NSWLR 307 Coleman v Gray (1994) 55 FCR 412 at 423 Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Crazzi (2006) 68 NSWLR 266 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Neat Holdings Pty Limited v Karajan Holdings Pty Limited (1992) 67 ALJR 170 B v Medical Superintendent of Macquarie Hospital (1987) 10 NSWLR 440 Gianoutsos v Glykis (2006) 65 NSWLR 539 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] 206 CLR 323 Williams v Bill Williams Pty Limited [1971] 1 NSWLR 547 Vetter v Lake Macquarie City Council (2001) 202 CLR 439 Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer General (1940) 40 SR(NSW) 126 Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1 at 10; Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Limited (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 CASES CITED : Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark (2003) 57 NSWLR 113 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 IW v City of Perth [1996-1997] 191 CLR 1 Port of Geelong Authority v The Ship Bass Reefer (1992) 109 ALR 505 at 518 Cross v McHugh [1974] 1 NSWLR 500 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Limited ) (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 Bill Williams Pty Limited v Williams (1972) 126 CLR 146 Kalil v Bray [1977] 1 NSWLR 256 Bowen-James v Delegate of the Director General of the Department of Health (1992) 27 NSWLR 457 Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24 Lansen v Minister for Environment and Heritage [2008] FCAFC 189 Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Limited (1996) 91 LGERA 31 Minister for Immigration v Eshetu [1999] 197 CLR 611 BHP Billiton Direct Reduced Iron Pty Limited v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1528 Attorney-General for NSW v Quin (1989-1990) 170 CLR 1 Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181; [2000] NSWCA 88 Wyong Shire Council v MCC Energy Pty Ltd (2005) 139 LGERA 296 at 312; [2005] NSWCA 86

(2006) 67 NSWLR 402

(1992) 30 NSWLR 307

(1994) 55 FCR 412

(2006) 68 NSWLR 266

(1938) 60 CLR 336

(1992) 67 ALJR 170

(1987) 10 NSWLR 440

(2006) 65 NSWLR 539

(2001) 202 CLR 439

(1980) 144 CLR 1

(1985) 4 NSWLR 139

(2003) 57 NSWLR 113