Consideration
66 Section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule relevantly provides as follows:
90-15 Court may make orders in relation to external administration
Court may make orders
(1) The Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in relation to the external administration of a company.
Orders on own initiative or on application
(2) The Court may exercise the power under subsection (1):
(a) on its own initiative, during proceedings before the Court; or
(b) on application under section 90-20.
Examples of orders that may be made
(3) Without limiting subsection (1), those orders may include any one or more of the following:
(a) an order determining any question arising in the external administration of the company;
…
(d) an order in relation to the costs of an action (including court action) taken by the external administrator of the company or another person in relation to the external administration of the company;
…
Matters that may be taken into account
(4) Without limiting the matters which the Court may take into account when making orders, the Court may take into account:
(a) whether the liquidator has faithfully performed, or is faithfully performing, the liquidator's duties; and
(b) whether an action or failure to act by the liquidator is in compliance with this Act and the Insolvency Practice Rules; and
(c) whether an action or failure to act by the liquidator is in compliance with an order of the Court; and
(d) whether the company or any other person has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of an action or failure to act by the liquidator; and
(e) the seriousness of the consequences of any action or failure to act by the liquidator, including the effect of that action or failure to act on public confidence in registered liquidators as a group.
…
Section does not limit Court's powers
(7) This section does not limit the Court's powers under any other provision of this Act, or under any other law.
67 By virtue of s 90-20(1)(d) of the Insolvency Practice Schedule and paragraph (d) of the definition of "officer" of a corporation in s 9 of the Corporations Act, Mr Kerr is authorised to apply for directions under s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule.
68 The principles applied in determining applications for directions under the now repealed ss 497(3) and 511 of the Corporations Act are a useful guide on applications of this kind, albeit that s 90-15(1) is more broadly expressed than the former s 511 of the Corporations Act: see GDK Projects Pty Ltd, in the matter of Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) v Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCA 541 at [33] (Farrell J); Walley, in the matter of Poles & Underground Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2017] FCA 486 at [32]-[41] (Gleeson J).
69 The Court accepts that the following principles enunciated by Brereton J in In the matter of One.Tel Ltd [2014] NSWSC 457 at [32]-[35] and [55] should guide the determination of Mr Kerr's application for directions:
… The jurisdiction is analogous to the judicial advice jurisdiction under (NSW) Trustee Act, s 63. The effect of a direction under s 511 is to sanction a course of conduct on the part of the liquidator so that he or she may adopt that course free from the risk of personal liability for breach of duty [Purchas, [36]; Re Timbercorp Limited (in liq) [2011] VSC 189, [3]; Re S&D, [88]].
While the ability of a liquidator to approach the Court for directions is intended to facilitate the liquidator's functions and should be interpreted widely to give effect to that intention [Re One-Tel Networks Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1065; (2001) 40 ACSR 83], it is insufficient to justify giving such directions that the liquidator wants reassurance about a commercial decision; some such issue as a question of law or procedure, of power, propriety or reasonableness, is required to justify approaching the court for directions, as was explained by Goldberg J (in the context of a voluntary administrator's application for directions under s 447D) in Re Ansett Australia Limited and Korda [2002] FCA 90; (2002) 115 FCR 409; 40 ACSR 433, [65]:
…
The prevailing principle adopted by the courts, when asked by liquidators and administrators to give directions, is to refrain from doing so where the direction sought relates to the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision, either committed specifically to the liquidator or administrator or well within his or her discretion, in circumstances where there is no particular legal issue raised for consideration or attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the decision in respect of which the directions are sought. There must be something more than the making of a business or commercial decision before a court will give directions in relation to, or approving of, the decision. It may be a legal issue of substance or procedure, it may be an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness, but some issue of this nature is required to be raised. It is insufficient to attract an order giving directions that the liquidator or administrator has a feeling of apprehension or unease about the business decision made and wants reassurance.
In Sanderson v Classic Car Insurances Pty Limited (1985) 10 ACLR 115, Young J said (at 117) that the cases in which directions might properly be given fell into four categories, namely guidance on matters of law, guidance on questions of legal procedure, whether a liquidator should postpone a sale in order to achieve a better price, and where there are two competing offers for assets and a liquidator wishes to gain court directions in order to avoid a subsequent allegation that he or she has acted improperly in choosing one over the other. However, these categories are not exhaustive, and as Giles J said in Re Spedley Securities (at 85), immediately after noting that a Court will not make a liquidator's commercial decision for him, "It is nonetheless common for a liquidator to seek directions as to whether he is justified in entering into a particular compromise".
Thus, while the Court will not generally give a direction where the matter relates to the making or implementation of a business or commercial decision, or where no legal issue is raised and there is no attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the liquidator's decision, it may do so in the context of a proposed compromise [Re Spedley Securities, 85], and/or where the decision is likely to be contentious [Re Ansett, [65]; 7 Steel Distribution, [20]; Re S&D, [58]-[59]]. But the fact that a direction under s 511 - unlike an approval under s 477(2A) or (2B) - exonerates the liquidator from personal liability, means that a closer examination of the liquidator's decision is required than under s 477. In short, the court should not make a direction the effect of which is to exonerate the liquidator from personal liability in respect of a commercial judgment that the liquidator is concerned may prove contentious, unless satisfied that the liquidator's decision is, in all the circumstances, a proper one.
…
As with judicial advice to trustees, the court is usually conservative in the advice it gives to liquidators under s 479(3) and s 511, and such advice is conventionally expressed in terms that "the liquidator would be justified" in adopting a particular course of action. The jurisdiction to give such directions is concerned with affording protection to the liquidator in connection with proposed future action, not with ratifying action that the liquidator has already taken. This view of the jurisdiction is supported by the following observations of McLelland J, as he then was, in Re GB Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 673, (at 678):
... the only proper subject of a liquidator's application for directions is the manner in which the liquidator should act in carrying out his functions as such, and that the only binding effect of, or arising from, a direction given in pursuance of such an application (other than rendering the liquidator liable to appropriate sanctions if a direction in mandatory or propitiatory form is disobeyed) is that the liquidator, if he has made full and fair disclosure to the court of the material facts, will be protected from liability for any alleged breach of duty as liquidator to a creditor or contributory or to the company in respect of anything done by him in accordance with the directions.
70 The Court considers that this application was appropriately brought by Mr Kerr and the relief sought should be granted having regard to all of the matters drawn to the Court's attention including:
(1) Efforts already undertaken to resolve the Intercompany Indebtedness dispute and the issues likely to be raised in a New Appeal as discussed at [48(3)] above.
(2) Determination of the Garnishment Proceeding may determine who will benefit from the determination of the Intercompany Indebtedness issue and the utility of bringing a New Appeal.
(3) The fact that the Garnishment Proceeding has been set down for hearing shortly, commencing on 3 November 2019.
(4) The difficult legal issues and costs attendant on any New Appeal having regard to the possibility (acknowledged by members of the Committee of Inspection and Admin's Liquidator) that determination of the Garnishment Proceeding may, as a practical matter, facilitate settlement of the Intercompany Indebtedness issue.
(5) Particularly in circumstances in which a company in liquidation apparently has good prospects in relation to a claim, it is appropriate for a liquidator to obtain a direction that he or she is justified in refraining from instigating proceedings. For Mr Kerr to continue on the course of refraining from instigating proceedings without such judicial advice places him at risk of future allegations of breach of duty.
(6) The apparently conflicting opinions of members of the Committee of Inspection discussed at [55] above concerning whether the Intercompany Indebtedness issue should be progressed, albeit that it appears that the members of the Committee of Inspection and Admin's Liquidators support deferring resolution of the Intercompany Indebtedness issue until after the Garnishment Proceeding has been determined and none of Octaviar's creditors has indicated opposition to that course.
(7) The application is concerned with a future course of action by Mr Kerr as special purpose liquidator; it will not confer protection or immunity in respect of acts (or delays) which he has already undertaken.
(8) The proposed course of action does not involve a business or commercial decision to be taken by Mr Kerr as special purpose liquidator.
(9) There is no suggestion that Mr Kerr is acting other than properly in bringing the application. In saying that, the Court notes PTQ's suggestion that an alternative course would have been available, but that course would also have led to an application for a direction to Mr Kerr and the Liquidators and the Court is not persuaded that that course would have involved less cost.