Double Jeopardy
36Section 177 of the RTG Act is in the following form:
"177 Double Jeopardy
(1) A person may be punished only once in relation to the same failure to comply with the particular provision of the Road Transport legislation, even if the person is liable in more than one capacity.
(2) Despite subsection (1), a person may be punished for more than one breach of a requirement where the breaches relate to different parts of the same vehicle, or combination."
There is no suggestion that subsection (2) applies here.
37It is to be observed from the Summonses that the prosecutor charges the company in almost identical terms with committing an offence either under s 53 of the RTG Act or s 55 of the RTG Act, because the failure alleged is that it was in breach of cl 61(2) of the MLA Regulations. That clause requires that a load be secured in a manner which means that it is unlikely to dislodge. The operative facts here depend upon the load falling from the vehicle, and the consequential conclusion that the load was not secured as required by cl 61(2) of the MLA Regulations. Intentional is not a relevant factor.
38The separate offences with which the Company is here charged, relate respectively to it, in its capacity as the consignor and also in its capacity as a loader, but the operative facts are, in substance, the same.
39Counsel for the prosecutor submits that s 177 has no application to the proceedings here. Counsel for the defendant submits that although the company has properly pleaded guilty to both offences, the Court is prohibited from imposing more than one penalty.
40There is no authority directly on the proper interpretation of s 177 of the RTG Act. In Palfrey v South Penrith Sand & Soil Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1357, Barr AJ was considering a question of whether the charging of a company with offences against the Road Transport legislation in more than one capacity constituted an abuse of process. He was not dealing directly with the issue of the imposition of more than one penalty.
41At [49] his Honour turned his attention to s 177. He said this:
"49 As I observed earlier, Mr Hatcher submitted that s 177 of the Act prevented the entry of conviction for more than offence in the example I have used. I doubt whether that is so. The parties made no reference to authority about the meaning of double jeopardy as used in the Act's introduction to that section. Subs (1) is not easy to understand. It speaks of a person's being "liable" in more than one capacity. The liability must be "in relation to the same failure..." but whether the section refers to a liability to be convicted or merely a liability to be prosecuted in more than one capacity is not clear. At any rate, the section is clear when it states that a person may be punished only once. If the Parliament had intended the person to be convicted only once it would have presumably had said so. Accordingly, I do not think that s 177 is a bar to the bringing of multiple charges in the examples I have used.
50 However, I am of the opinion, that it is an abuse of process to charge the company in these several ways when there is a single underlying event and only one sentence can result. The prosecutor's practice in the framing of all the outstanding summonses has produced waste and expense."
42It is to be observed that his Honour regarded the section as being applicable, at the stage of imposition of penalty rather than at the stage of the charging by a prosecutor of a defendant with more than one offence.
43The ratio decidendi of his Honour's decision is to be found in [49], in the last sentence, namely, that s 177 is not a bar to the bringing of multiple charges. However, his Honour's remarks, which are to be found in the next paragraph, namely that when there is a single underlying event, only one sentence can result, although obiter dicta, are the carefully considered expression of a view with respect to the proper application of s 177 of the RTG Act in circumstances similar to those which here exist.
44The prosecutor submitted that because the charges were framed with respect to separate sections of the RTG Act, there was no occasion to conclude that there was a "same failure" to comply with a particular provision of the Road Transport legislation, because each section of the Act was different and, accordingly, there was no room for the phrase "same failure" to operate in these circumstances.
45Counsel for the defendant submitted that the expression "same failure" should be interpreted in the circumstances of this case to apply to the core allegation of a failure, or breach, which has given rise to both offences, and which, here, is the failure to comply with the provisions of cl 61(2) of the MLA Regulation.
46Having regard to the terms of the Summonses, and the particulars provided as to the conduct which it is alleged constituted the offences, in the context of the use of the words "even if the person is liable in more than one capacity" at the end of s 177 of the RTG Act, in my view, the proper conclusion to be reached is that, contrary to the submissions of the prosecutor, the provisions of s 177 of the RTG Act have application here. Accordingly, the Court is constrained from imposing more than one penalty. This decision is consistent with the judgment of Barr AJ in Palfrey.
47The breach of the Road Transport legislation, namely, that the load was not properly secured, is identical with respect to each of the two offences. The only difference between the offences is the capacity in which the Company is charged - in one offence as the consignor, in another offence as the loader.
48In those circumstances, I am abundantly satisfied that s 177 of the RTG Act has application.
49I should say that the prosecutor conceded that, even if his submission be correct, and that s 177 of the RTG Act did not apply, nevertheless the Court, by having regard to the common law principle of totality in sentencing, and the decision of the High Court of Australia in Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610, would reach a conclusion in the circumstances of these two offences, such that it would be inappropriate to impose a full fine with respect to each of the two offences as though they were entirely separate.
50The prosecutor accepted in his submissions that if the Court was to impose a full penalty with respect to one offence, then it should only impose a nominal penalty with respect to the second offence. This, counsel for the prosecutor submitted, would be a sufficient way of recognising that there was similarity of conduct by the Company which was reflected in the two separate charges.
51The effect of this submission, if I had accepted it, which I do not, is that it would only have lead to the imposition of a nominal penalty by way of a fine which would not have exceeded $1,000, with respect to the second offence.