The Facts
14The prosecutor, and each of the Company and Mr Doble, have agreed upon a Statement of Facts which generally describe the conduct of each of the defendants, the offences and their consequences. I am not bound to accept these facts, however, in this case, upon the basis of such material as has been tendered, I do so. The facts, which I accept and which relate to the time of the offences, are set out below:
"1. At about 10.20am on 3 May 2011, a combination motor vehicle, consisting of a Volvo rigid truck, NSW Registration K69126, and a single axle "pig" trailer, NSW Registration K69126 (the trailer) [together referred to as 'the combination'], was being driven in a generally eastern direction along Lue Road, approximately 15 km from Mudgee in the State of NSW.
2. At about the said time and place the trailer was loaded with 5 bulk industrial gas cylinder packs, known as Maxi 8s.
3. At about the said time and place, the trailer flipped onto the path of oncoming traffic.
4. A portion of the trailer and at least one of the 5 Maxi 8s collided with a Mazda wagon being driven by Ms Jane Mersing.
5. Ms Mersing died at the scene as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.
6. Doble Express Transport Pty Limited ACN 002 751 751 (DXT) was incorporated on 6 August 1984.
...
8. Mr Graeme John Doble was appointed a director of DXT on 15 May 1984.
9. Mr Graeme John Doble is and was at all material times a director of DXT.
...
11. At all material times the issued share capital in DXT consisted of two $1.00 "Ordinary Shares".
12. Graeme John Doble is and was at all material times the beneficial owner of one Ordinary Share issued in DXT.
...
17. DXT carries on, and carried on, business as a general transport company. The carrying on of this business includes the operation of combination vehicles, in the transport of goods by road.
18. DXT was the operator of the combination ...
19. DXT employed Timothy James Webber as a driver.
20. As at May 2011, Mr Webber had been employed by DXT as a driver for approximately three years.
21. Mr Webber was the holder of an unrestricted HC [Heavy Combination] Class driver's licence.
22. Mr Webber was assigned by DXT to operate the combination in the transport of goods by road.
...
29. Air Liquide supplied industrial gases, in particular nitrogen gas, in bulk cylinder packs known as "Maxi 8" packs (Maxi 8s).
30. Maxi 8s consisted of:
(i) a metal, caged pallet (pallet) that measured:
· 197cm high;
· 97cm wide; and
· 47cm deep
(ii) 8 connected gas cylinders.
The base of each Maxi 8 was smooth metal.
31. Each Maxi 8 was marked with an "average gross weight" of "920kg" and a "safe working load" weight of "920kg".
32. A Maxi 8, when the 8 gas cylinders were "empty" of gas, had an average gross weight of approximately 700kg.
33. On 2 January, 2007 Air Liquide and Robert Oatley Vineyards Pty Limited (ROV) executed a Cylinder Service and Supply Agreement, for an initial term of five years, pursuant to which ROV agreed to purchase from Air Liquide and Air Liquide agreed to supply ROV with its total industrial gas requirements. The Cylinder Service and Supply Agreement included the supply of gaseous nitrogen by Air Liquide to ROV at its premises located on Henry Lawson Drive at Mudgee (the winery).
34. Commencing in about 2008, Air Liquide retained the services of DXT in relation to the delivery by road, from time to time, of gaseous nitrogen, contained in cylinders to the winery and the collection of empty gas cylinders from the winery.
35. There was no written contract between Air Liquide and DXT in relation to the provision by DXT of its services in the delivery by road of cylinders of gaseous nitrogen to ROV and the return of empty gas cylinders from ROV by road to Air Liquide.
36. Air Liquide did not provide any written instructions, written directions and/or written guidelines to DXT in relation to the transportation by road of its gas cylinders, whether full or empty, including the transportation by road of bulk packs of gas cylinders supplied by Air Liquide and known as Maxi 8s.
37. On or about 14 April, 2011 ROV ordered delivery of one Maxi 8 of nitrogen from Air Liquide to the winery and requested the collection of five empty Maxi 8s from the winery for return to Air Liquide.
....
40. On or about 29 April, 2011, ... Air Liquide, placed two orders with DXT in relation to:
(i) the delivery of one Maxi 8 of gaseous nitrogen to the winery; and
(ii) the collection from the winery of five Maxi 8s that were empty of gas for return to Air Liquide.
....
42. On 3 May, 2011, in the course of his employment with DXT, Mr Webber was assigned to drive the combination on the transport run comprised in DXT runsheet number 45829.
43. The DXT transport run comprised in DXT runsheet number 45829 included the collection of five Maxi 8s from "Oatley Family Wines, Henry Lawson Drive, (Poet's Corner Winery) Mudgee NSW 2850" for return to Air Liquide under DXT pickup reference number PU4097.
44. At about 9.20am on 3 May, 2011 Mr Webber drove the combination into the winery.
45. On the arrival of the combination at the winery:
· the truck contained a small amount of general freight; and
· the trailer was empty.
46. On the arrival of the combination at the winery five Air Liquide Maxi 8s, empty of gas, were available to be collected by Mr Webber for return by road to Air Liquide.
47. Under Mr Webber's direction the five Maxi 8s were loaded, using a forklift, onto the trailer. The Maxi 8's were loaded one by one. Four Maxi 8s were loaded across the front of the trailer, immediately adjacent to the headboard. The remaining Maxi 8 was loaded to the rear of, and immediately adjacent to, the four Maxi 8s.
48. At the time of loading, the five Maxi 8s were loaded firmly against each other on the trailer.
49. The combined width of the four Maxi 8s, loaded by side by side adjacent to the headboard of the trailer, was 188cm.
50. The four Maxi 8s loaded adjacent to the headboard were positioned centrally on the trailer and there was a gap of approximately 25cm to the raised edge or combing of the trailer on either side of the four Maxi 8s loaded adjacent to the headboard.
51. The fifth Maxi 8, loaded to the rear of the four Maxi 8s adjacent to the headboard, was also centred on the trailer.
52. The headboard of the trailer was metal with a smooth painted surface.
53. The surface of the trailer, onto which the five Maxi 8s were loaded, was unpainted checkerboard sheet metal.
54. No anti-slip material or dunnage was placed between the base of each Maxi 8 and the checkerboard metal deck of the trailer.
55. Mr Webber restrained the five Maxi 8s on the trailer using a single 2,500kg synthetic ratchet strap (the strap).
56. The strap was placed, by Mr Webber, around the five Maxi 8s with:
· one end of the strap being secured to an upright component of the headboard located to the right-hand side of the trailer;
· the other end of the strap being secured to an upright component of the headboard located to the left of the trailer; and
· the strap located approximately 125cm from the base of each "Maxi 8 .
57. Mr Webber did not place any padding or other protection to stop the strap from rubbing on the metal angles of the headboard and the metal angles of the Maxi 8s.
58. Mr Webber did not apply any load restraint over the top of the Maxi 8s to prevent vertical movement.
59. Mr Webber did not block the load to prevent sideways movement of the Maxi 8s on the deck of the trailer.
60. At all material times, after the five Maxi 8s had been loaded and retrained on the trailer, Mr Webber put in place two metal side gates. Mr Webber used two natural fibre ropes to secure the side gates in position on the trailer. The two ropes were not used to restrain the five Maxi 8s on the trailer.
61. Mr Webber then drove the combination out of the winery and travelled, by road, towards Rylstone in the State of New South Wales.
62. At about 10.20am Mr Webber was driving the combination at approximately 90km per hour in a generally easterly direction on Lue Road about 15km from Mudgee.
63. On Lue Road, a short distance past the Hayes Gap Rd turn-off, and shortly after Mr Webber had driven the combination through a right hand kink in the road, some or all of the Maxi 8s moved to the left on the bed of the trailer. The movement of the Maxi 8s, to the left on the bed of the trailer, caused the trailer to dip towards its left hand side.
64. A short time later, as Mr Webber was commencing to drive the combination through a left hand bend in Lue Road, the Maxi 8s moved across the bed of the trailer to right hand side of the trailer. The movement of the Maxi 8s on the bed of the trailer, to its right hand side, caused the trailer to dip to the right.
65. As the trailer dipped towards its right hand side, the left hand tyre of the trailer lifted from the roadway, continuing to rise until the trailer flipped into the oncoming lane of Lue Road.
66. At the same time and at the same place on Lue Road, Jane Mersing, 58 years of age, was driving a Mazda wagon, NSW Registration VXL-969, in a generally westerly direction. There were no passengers in the Mazda wagon.
67. The turning moment caused by the movement of the Maxi 8s on the bed of the trailer, from left to right, caused stress on the tow coupling between the truck and the trailer.
68. Due to stress on the tow coupling, from the turning moment caused by the movement of the Maxi 8 s from left to right on the bed of the trailer, the trailer dislodged from the tow bar fitted to the truck.
69. The safety chains, used as backup between the truck and trailer, failed due to the forces involved in the overturning of the trailer.
70. The five Maxi 8s were also dislodged from the trailer.
71. A portion of the trailer and at least one Maxi 8 collided with the Mazda wagon being driven by Ms Mersing.
72. The impact of the trailer, and of at least one Maxi 8, with the Mazda wagon caused Ms Mersing to sustain severe injury.
73. As a result of the injuries sustained in the impact, Ms Mersing died at the incident scene.
74. A mechanical examination of the trailer performed after the incident disclosed no mechanical defect or failure in relation to the trailer that was a contributing factor to the subject incident.
75. Upon examination after the incident, the main clamping bolt which formed part of the towing mechanism between the truck and trailer, was found to have failed. Upon examination, the mode of failure was observed to be consistent with mechanical overload, most likely due to the overturning moment of the trailer which caused axial tensile forces to be applied to the clamping bolt.
76. Prior to the incident the clamping bolt was not compromised in any way that contributed to the occurrence of the subject incident.
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78. The general condition of the roadway at the incident scene was in excellent condition and no features were identified that played a causative role in the subject incident.
15That the load was not properly secured is clear and accepted by the Company and Mr Doble. But it is necessary to understand the ways in which the securing of it was defective and what could have been done to remedy that inadequacy, and so prevent the death of Ms Mersing.
16This evidence is to be obtained in large part from the expert report of Mr M Robertson of Engistics Pty Ltd, which is relied upon by the prosecution. Mr Robertson was not required for cross-examination. His report was accepted as substantially accurate by Mr Rob Di Cristoforo, an expert relied upon by the Company and Mr Doble. I accept Mr Robertson's evidence.
17Mr Robertson identifies two "crucial matters" which had a direct effect on the load restraint. The first is that the metal pallets of gas cylinders were placed directly onto the steel deck of the trailer, resulting in low friction. This could have easily been addressed by placing anti-slip rubber matting, timber sheeting or timber dunnage between the metal pallet and the steel deck of the trailer. Mr Robertson expressed the view that placing goods "metal on metal" directly onto a steel deck was poor load restraint practice. The problem of low "metal on metal" friction was widely known in the transport industry prior to this collision. Mr Doble accepted in his evidence that this was so.
18The second crucial matter identified by Mr Robertson was the method of lashing used in this case because, besides being of inadequate restraining capacity, the lashing failed to provide any direct restraint. This means that the relevant force was taken directly onto the lashing without relying upon friction. That failure occurred because only one strap was used, and it was anchored at an inappropriate angle being bent around and towards the central uprights of the headboard. The webbing straps did not have any protective sleeve at the corners of the steel post.
19Such was the inadequacy of the restraining strap that Mr Robertson expressed the view that it:
"... dooms the strap to premature failure when loaded because it exposes the webbing to a steel edge and places uneven loads on the strands within the webbing."
20In short, the combination of these two crucial matters meant that there was little sideways resistance to sliding, with the result that the restraint method failed at 0.21 G of lateral force, when the minimum legal requirement for adequate sideways restraint was that the load not be able to move or dislodge under a lateral force of 0.5 G. Put simply, the capacity of the lashing was a little over forty per cent of the minimum legal requirement.
21The inadequacy of the load restraint could have been, but was not, addressed by any of the following measures which were well-known in the transport industry, and readily available to be implemented here:
- using timber or other like material to "sideways block" the load to prevent lateral movement;
- using at least three webbing straps and lashing the load in a different configuration;
- restraining the load over the top of it to prevent vertical movement during transport;
- attaching the webbing straps to the outer, rather than the central, vertical posts of the headboard.
22The expert opinions of Mr Robertson and Mr Di Cristoforo both expressed the view, which I accept, that the breach of the load restraint requirement was a severe breach. I am satisfied that it was because the breach involved an appreciable issue of harm to public safety. Once the gas cylinders had been loaded, the journey embarked on was about 150km long. That the journey was much shorter in fact because of the collision does not diminish the potential risk of harm to public safety.
23As well, because of the inadequacy of the load restraint and the risk of the load being dislodged during the journey, there was a serious risk of harm to the road infrastructure and, if a collision occurred, there would inevitably be increased traffic congestion at and around the collision site, with a consequent diminution of public amenity.
24Clearly this was a severe risk breach with many of the consequences to which s 60 of the RTG Act refers.